lyghtcrye
23
1
18
lyghtcrye has not written any posts yet.
We essentially have this already occurring in the form of fantasy football leagues, which itself has gone from basically being gambling to basically being an e-sport. If you haven't considered it already, perhaps you should look into some of the ways that the NFL is making use of fantasy football for both marketing and information gathering purposes.
I like to imagine that eventually we will be able to boil the counter-intuitive parts of quantum physics away into something more elegant. I keep coming back to the idea that every current interaction could theoretically be modeled as the interactions of variously polarized electromagnetic waves. Such as mass being caused by rotational acceleration of light, and charge being emergent from the cross-interactions of polarized photons. I doubt the idea really carves reality at the joints, but I think it's probably closer to accurate than the standard model, which is functional but patchworked, much like the predictive models used by astrologers prior to the acceptance of heliocentrism.
I seem to have explained myself poorly. You are effectively restating the commonly held (on LessWrong) views that I was attempting to originally address, so I will try to be more clear.
I don't understand why you would use a particular fixed standard for "human level". It seems to be arbitrary, and it would be more sensible to use the level of human at the time when a given AGI was developed. You yourself say as much in your second paragraph ("more capable than its creators at the time of its inception"). Since IA rate determines the capabilities of the AIs creators, then a faster rate of IA than AI would mean that... (read more)
I have been mulling around a rough and mostly unformed idea in my head regarding AI-first vs IA-first strategies, but I was loathe to try and put it into words until I saw this post, and noticed that one of the scenarios that I consider highly probable was completely absent.
On the basis that subhuman AGI poses minimal risk to humanity, and that IA increases the level of optimization ability required of an AI to be considered human level or above, it seems that there is a substantial probability that an IA-first strategy could lead to a scenario in which no superhuman AGI can be developed because it is economically infeasible to research... (read more)
I'm not sure why you phrased your comment as a parenthetical, could you explain that? Also, while I agree with your statement, appearing competent to engage in discussion is quite important for enabling one to take part in discussion. I don't like seeing someone who is genuinely curious get downvoted into oblivion.
That question is basically the hard question at the root of the difficulty of friendly AI. Building an AI that would optimize to increase or decrease a value through its actions is comparably easy, but determining how to evaluate actions into a scale that measures results in a comparison with human values is incredibly difficult. Determining and evaluating AI friendliness is a very hard problem, and you should consider reading more about the issue so that you don't come off as naive.
While personal identification with a label can be constraining, I find that the use of labels for signalling are tremendous. Not only does a label work in the same way as jargon, expressing a complex data set with a simple phrase, but because most labels carry tribal consequences it acts as a somewhat costly signal in terms of identifying alliances. Admittedly, one could develop a habit of using labels which becomes a personal identification, but being aware of such risk is the best way to combat the effects thereof.
I certainly agree with that statement. It was merely my interpretation that violating the intentions of the developer by not "following it's programming" is functionally identical to poor design and therefore failure.
Of course this is something that only a poorly designed AI would do. But we're talking about AI failure modes and this is a valid concern.
Doesn't this, by extension, seem to more directly lead to a cost-benefit problem of coalitions?
At some point the marginal cost of additional votes leads will be greater than the marginal cost of influencing other voters, either via direct collusion, or via altering their opinions through alternative incentives, such as by subsidizing voters who agree but care less, or by offering payments or commitments that mitigate the reasons opponents care about the issue.
I'm not sure that's necessarily a bad thing, but there are lots more ways to influence other voters with resources than just colluding to vote to eachother's advantage.