Phil_Goetz5
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Phil_Goetz5 has not written any posts yet.
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Vladimir, I understand the PD and similar cases. I'm just saying that the Newcomb paradox is not actually a member of that class. Any agent faced with either version - being told ahead of time that they will face the Predictor, or being told only once the boxes are on the ground - has a simple choice to make; there's no paradox and no PD-like situation. It's a puzzle only if you believe that there really is backwards causality.
"You speculate about why Eurisko slowed to a halt and then complain that Lenat has wasted his life with CYC, but you ignore that Lenat has his own theory which he gives as the reason he's been pursuing CYC. You should at least explain why you think his theory wrong; I find his theory quite plausible."
If I want to predict that the next growth curve will be an exponential and put bounds around its doubling time, I need a much finer fit to the data than if I only want to ask obvious questions like..."Do the optimization curves fall into the narrow range that would permit a smooth soft takeoff?"This implies that you have done some quantitative analysis giving a probability distribution of possible optimization curves, and finding that only a low-probability subset of that distribution allows for soft takeoff.
Presenting that analysis would be an excellent place to start.
Note for readers: I'm not responding to Phil Goetz and Jef Allbright. And you shouldn't infer my positions from what they seem to be arguing with me about - just pretend they're addressing someone else.Is that on this specific question, or a blanket "I never respond to Phil or Jef" policy?
Huh. That doesn't feel very nice.Nor very rational, if one's goal is to communicate.
All the discussion so far indicates that Eliezer's AI will definitely kill me, and some others posting here, as soon as he turns it on.
It seems likely, if it follows Eliezer's reasoning, that it will kill anyone who is overly intelligent. Say, the top 50,000,000 or so.
(Perhaps a special exception will be made for Eliezer.)
Hey, Eliezer, I'm working in bioinformatics now, okay? Spare me!
Eliezer: If you create a friendly AI, do you think it will shortly thereafter kill you? If not, why not?
He may have some model of an AI as a perfect Bayesian reasoner that he uses to justify neglecting this. I am immediately suspicious of any argument invoking perfection.It may also be that what Eliezer has in mind is that any heuristic that can be represented to the AI, could be assigned priors and incorporated into Bayesian reasoning.
Eliezer has read Judea Pearl, so he knows how computational time for Bayesian networks scales with the domain, particularly if you don't ever assume independence when it is not justified, so I won't lecture him on that. But he may want to lecture himself.
(Constructing the right Bayesian network from sense-data is even more computationally... (read more)
Good point, Jef - Eliezer is attributing the validity of "the ends don't justify the means" entirely to human fallibility, and neglecting that part accounted for by the unpredictability of the outcome.
He may have some model of an AI as a perfect Bayesian reasoner that he uses to justify neglecting this. I am immediately suspicious of any argument invoking perfection.
I don't know what "a model of evolving values increasingly coherent over increasing context, with effect over increasing scope of consequences" means.
The tendency to be corrupted by power is a specific biological adaptation, supported by specific cognitive circuits, built into us by our genes for a clear evolutionary reason. It wouldn't spontaneously appear in the code of a Friendly AI any more than its transistors would start to bleed.This is critical to your point. But you haven't established this at all. You made one post with a just-so story about males in tribes perceiving those above them as corrupt, and then assumed, with no logical justification that I can recall, that this meant that those above them actually are corrupt. You haven't defined what corrupt means, either.
I think you... (read more)
Eliezer: I don't get your altruism. Why not grab the crown? All things being equal, a future where you get to control things is preferable to a future where you don't, regardless of your inclinations. Even if altruistic goals are important to you, it would seem like you'd have better chances of achieving them if you had more power. ... If all people, including yourself, become corrupt when given power, then why shouldn't you seize power for yourself? On average, you'd be no worse than anyone else, and probably at least somewhat better; there should be some correlation between knowing that power corrupts and not being corrupted. ... Benevolence itself is a trap. The wise treat men... (read more)
"You didn't know, but the predictor knew what you'll do, and if you one-box, that is your property that predictor knew, and you'll have your reward as a result."
No. That makes sense only if you believe that causality can work backwards. It can't.
"If predictor can verify that you'll one-box (after you understand the rules of the game, yadda yadda), your property of one-boxing is communicated, and it's all it takes."
Your property of one-boxing can't be communicated backwards in time.
We could get bogged down in discussions of free will; I am assuming free will exists, since arguing about the choice to make doesn't make sense unless free will exists. Maybe... (read more)