All of ragintumbleweed's Comments + Replies

Again, Trump wasn't banned for his ideas. He was banned for actively inciting violence and for a long history of poisoning the well. 

Neither of us know what Twitter's "real" motivations were. Heck, the executives of Twitter might not know what their real motivations were. 

The real question is whether it is proper for a major media platform to remove a major political figure for ostensibly breaking the code of conduct associated with the platform and for actively engaging in incitement to violence. That activity ought not to be protected by free speech or society as a whole.
 

If there is not a "state actor," then the First Amendment does not apply. 

I'm not a First-Amendment scholar. There is literature and case law on this subject, but I wouldn't be able to summarize it well. That said, I'm fairly certain that government officials pressuring private platforms to remove certain content would not implicate the First Amendment. But it is a closer call than the Trump situation.

And, to be clear, I'm not in favor of all forms of platform censorship. I'm simply defending this instance of banning Trump from Twitter. 

Without question, this is a hard question. Too many rationalists assume it is easy. 

 

5alexgieg
I think sticking to a strictly literal interpretation of the 1st amendment is problematic for the reason that the politically and economically powerful seek, almost by virtue (or vice) of their positions, to always amass more power. Paraphrasing Gilmore's widely know quote, the powerful interpret power-limiting rules as damage, and route around them. And since full free speech is a strong way to limit the power of the powerful, in all cases in which either laws make it hard or even impossible to censor, or public perception make it politically unfeasible to censor, we may expect those in power to seek means to achieve as much censorship as materially possible through as many indirect means as possible. Therefore, it's important to look at this from a Consequentialist perspective and ask whether certain forms of speech are being effectively reduced thanks to coordination between private agents to actively reduce it, and if yes, ask a classic cui bono? If the the answer to this latest question is "those in power", then for all practical purposes there was censorship, even if it's a censorship that manages to carefully sidestep the legal definition. This doesn't mean that Twitter banning Trump, or all the big tech players banning Parler, is itself wrong. It's right, but a right that comes from mixing two wrongs, as argued by Matt Stoller, a well known anti-trust researcher who writes extensively on the topic, on his recent article A Simple Thing Biden Can Do to Reset America, from which I quote these two paragraphs (it's well worth reading the article on its entirety, as well as the one linked in the quote): Unless something like this is done so as untangle the two sides of the problem so that this outcome comes instead of two rights, there will always be the potential for a fully legal, fully 1st-amendment-respecting, "Great Firewall of America" to grow and evolve up to the point free speech will exist de jure, but not de facto. Conversely, if done right, that work

This post once had 11 Karma and then went down to 4, so clearly this is not a popular take among rationalists. 

I feel as if too many rationalists struggle to see past the "but what about the slippery slope?" argument and fail to see the evil that's right in front of them.

5CraigMichael
Your post is a good one and it sucks people are coming down on it that way. It made me wonder if Eliezer and Jaron Lanier had ever had a conversation before. They did not too long ago and I missed it. https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/N6MNzvgmHtTASpaSS/bhtv-jaron-lanier-and-yudkowsky -- video is missing from the LW post but is here https://www.youtube.com/watch/Ff15lbI1V9M I would love to see this happen again with a moderator and some more structure.  I wonder if this isn't a consequence of a kind of philosophical blind spot in EYs rationalist perspective. Sort of that to EY Twitter represents an achievement to pedestalize rather than a albatross that we've bought in to and accept because of network lock-in effects. I used to tell people in college that I "had two pack a year habit." I would smoke rarely to strike up conversations because it was an easy ice breaker when I wanted a conversation. Twitter is like that, but instead trading seven minutes of your life you're trading chunks of your humanity. I mean... I'm jealous of Trump for losing access to his drug of choice. I think it could be a really positive things for him and for all of us. :)  

This strikes me as a weak slippery slope argument. There is no "homogeneity of acceptable discourse" on Twitter. Even after Trump's ban, far-right wing politicians such as Hawley and Boebart still use the platform. He wasn't removed for ideological reasons. He was banned because he was actively inciting a violent insurrection and aspired to continue to incite such an insurrection. 

Fair point re: #2, but the ultimate point is unchanged. For the same reasons that Less Wrong and SSC engage in content moderation, Twitter does the same. Banning Trump, on balance, will not be harmful.

0jimmy
"Content moderation" is not always a bad thing, but you can't jump directly from "Content moderation can be important" to "Banning Trump, on balance, will not be harmful".  The important value behind freedom of association is not in conflict with the important value behind freedom of speech, and it's possible to decline to associate with someone without it being a violation of the latter principle. If LW bans someone because they're [perceived to be] a spammer that provides no value to the forum, then there's no freedom of speech issue. If LW starts banning people for proposing ideas that are counter to the beliefs of the moderators because it's easier to pretend you're right if you don't have to address challenging arguments, then that's bad content moderation and LW would certainly suffer for it. The question isn't over whether "it's possible for moderation to be good", it's whether the ban was motivated in part or full by an attempt to avoid having to deal with something that is more persuasive than Twitter would like it to be. If this is the case, then it does change the ultimate point. What would you expect the world to look like if that weren't at all part of the motivation?  What would you expect the world to look like if it were a bigger part of the motivation than Twitter et al would like to admit?
-6Matt Goldenberg

Point 7 is a response to Yudkowsky retweeting on Jan 8 Ryan Lackey's post that said:

"If you wanted to increase the odds of an actual civil war in the next decade, pushing 10-50 mm people into a somewhat segregated communications system actively forced to evolve to resist aggressive censorship is an important first step."

 

If you take a pair of variables which are correlated r>=0.25, you have, pretty much by definition, found that one >variable 'matters' more than any other single variable can, simply because it has explained/predicted the majority of >the variance (sqrt(0.25)=0.5). Another variable can't explain more of the variance.

I agree that g is probably more predictive of success than any other single variable. Cumulatively, other factors may matter more. But it is likely true that no one factor matters more. But I think that debate is tangential to the o... (read more)

4gwern
I don't think it is. You spend all this time hammering on how 'the top performer X in field Y doesn't have the top IQ', yet, this is exactly what you would expect for even a causal variable of unimpeachable status which causes the majority, or even almost every last bit of variance, in X performance. You seem to think it's extremely important, and tells us something very important about the nature of IQ, yet, I'm pretty sure it doesn't. Why you discuss it so much if it is so 'tangential'? But they're not! This is exactly what I was talking about! Yes, additional incremental variance after explaining g - but less variance. They're not "better". Certainly. As I said, height is mostly generalist genes, but there are also specific variants for parts of the body. Haven't you ever noticed how some families have different body proportions, with different leg:arm ratios, or longer necks, etc? You absolutely can measure arm length, head volume, leg length etc in all sorts of anatomic detail and (if anyone wanted to waste money on doing the measurements) do a GWAS on height and then specific body parts. You can also measure genetic correlations between body part sizes; for an example, look at Black 1982 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_correlation#Anthropometric That height can be broken down into both the general height and narrower variables shouldn't be too surprising; consider Marfan syndrome. Well, you could predict each individual measurement better from genes. Obviously. As for explanations, that will depend on the ingenuity of embryologists and endocrinologists and anatomists in nailing down the biological pathways from genetic variants to greater or less growth of forearms etc. Sure. No one is going to object to the claim that 'after you explain the majority of the variance in performance by the general factor, you can get additional incremental variance explained by focusing on narrower factors which weight more heavily on that particular field'. SMPY has d
0gjm
I'm not sure either thesis is very controversial.

I suppose that's a fair criticism. But you have cherry picked these examples. In my defense, I also reference SSC and a 448-page book by Stephen Jay Gould on IQ, which is entirely about the history of psychometrics.

It's an area of interest, not necessarily an area of expertise. I wrote a post to get feedback and improve my understanding of the topic. I have a richer understanding of the issue than I had two days ago. And so I accomplished what I aspired to do.

4Viliam
Uhm...

First of all, I very much enjoy your blog and writing in general. So thank you for commenting.

The existence of successful scientists or chess players whose rank-percentile in IQ is less than their rank-percentile in >scientific accomplishment or chess playing does not shed any light on what the neurological basis of IQ, as this is a general >phenomenon of regression to the mean and the extreme order statistics of two variables which are correlated rhttp://lesswrong.com/lw/km6/why_the_tails_come_apart/ I'm not sure how this is relevant to any discus

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6gwern
I don't think that's true, in either the statistical sense or the causal sense. If you take a pair of variables which are correlated r>=0.25, you have, pretty much by definition, found that one variable 'matters' more than any other single variable can, simply because it has explained/predicted the majority of the variance (sqrt(0.25)=0.5). Another variable can't explain more of the variance. At most, it can add some incremental predictive value. Given the various results like Roe's profiles or TIP/SMPY's statistics on doctorates & research publications, I am very comfortable asserting that if you took an entire population and you correlated IQ with research output or eminence in any intellectual field, either as a continuous or dichotomous outcome variable, you will find that the IQ scores alone will explain most of the variance, and it will, on its own, outpredict alternative variables like family SES. And, given adoption studies, iodine studies and so on, I am comfortable further asserting that this reflects a direct causal impact of intelligence itself on intellectual eminence (and IQ here is not merely a statistical correlation which happens to be excellently predictive because it's confounded with family SES or something). If you have engaged in range restriction by looking at the correlation of the small IQ differences between grad students and future success, then yes, it will explain a lot less variance. But only because you have already pre-selected extremes of the population. Of course, since IQ is relatively easy to measure via SATs and grades (look at how easy TIP/SMPY were to do - picking out future movers and shakers from millions of kids using just a cut-down SAT - please appreciate how astounding it is that you can just administer a short pencil-and-paper test to millions of kids and taking the top thousand or so, get such an incredible enrichment, with huge odds ratios for accomplishment), it is easy to create these selected extremes, and so we h

Wrong. For example, Raven's Progressive Matrices only have one category.

Ok. Fair point. But nearly all intelligence tests use a variety sub-tests. And I think the consensus among psychometricians is that more tests provide a better measure of intelligence.

My point isn't that IQ is stupid. My goal is to explore its boundaries and limitations.

6Viliam
If you want to explore the concept of IQ seriously, you should find out what people who study that concept seriously are saying. Here are the sources you used in the article: * an article in Business Insider, declaring without evidence that Einstein had an IQ of 205-225; * the first google result for "Magnus Carlsen IQ"; * a made-for-adsense website called "IQ test experts" that provides a free "IQ test" to fish for e-mails. Would you feel equally qualified to propose your new theory of e.g. quantum physics after doing a similar kind of research?

First of all, thank you, 9eB1. This is exactly the kind of a charitable, informed, and thoughtful response I was hoping for. I appreciate your feedback. Also, you clearly know more about psychometrics than I do, so I will tread carefully in response.

The tallest player to ever play in the NBA was Gheorghe Mureșan, who was 7'7". He was not very good. Manute Bol was >almost as tall and he was good but not great. By contrast, the best basketball player of all time was 6'6" [citation needed]. In >fact, perhaps an athletic quotient would be bet

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0Douglas_Knight
I think basketball players are mainly judged on playing basketball, not wingspan, etc. Gheorghe Mureșan and Manute Bol are interesting not because they are tall, but because they started playing basketball in their mid to late teens. At their various stages of recruitment, they were probably judged differently than their competitors. Their competitors were probably judged by success on the court, while they were probably judged more on basics like wingspan, because they were expected to progress more than other players. Added: people selected for being tall will be taller than they are good at basketball, while people selected for good at basketball will be better than they are tall.
09eB1
The Big 5 personality traits have a correlation with some measures of success which is independent of IQ. For example, in this paper: Notably, the Openness factor is the factor that has the strongest correlation with IQ. I'm guessing Gwern has more stuff like this on his website, but if someone makes the claim that IQ is the only thing that matters to success in any given field, they are selling bridges.

Understood. I didn't articulate this well. My point was merely to say that soccer, basketball, and other sports have arbitrary and sport-specific constraints, whereas the decathlon was explicitly constructed to test a battery of physical abilities. And perhaps that the composite well-rounded athlete is usually less interesting than someone who is a freak in a specific discipline.

"Figure 2 provides a basis for anticipating the unique value spatial ability might contribute to understanding intellectually talented youth. In the late 1970s, because of his interest in identifying and developing scientific talent—and knowing that by utilizing exclusively a general ability measure, Terman assessed and missed two Nobel Laurates (viz., Luis Alvarez and William Shockley, see Shurkin, 1992) Stanley gave a group of 563 SMPY participants tests of spatial ability designed for high school seniors."

"Clearly, the creative outcomes ... (read more)

0jmh
So you point was that we don't make the mistake of evaluating or thinking basketball skills are all a direct relationship with a simple metric as height but that's what everyone is doing with IQ?

Forgive me, as I am brand new to LW. Where is it defined that an epistemic rationalist can't seek epistemic rationality as a means of living a good life (or for some other reason) rather than as a terminal goal? Is there an Académie française of rationalists that takes away your card if you use ER as a means to an end?

I'm working off this quote from EY as my definition of ER. This definition seems silent on the means-end question.

Epistemic rationality: believing, and updating on evidence, so as to systematically improve the correspondence between your

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0TheAncientGeek
From the wiki:-
0Elo
ER vs IR. I am not sure what your question is. I think of ER as sharpening the axe. not sure how many trees I will cut down or when, but with a sharp axe I will cut them down swiftly and with ease. I think of IR as actually getting down to swinging the axe. Both are needed. ER is a good terminal goal because it enables the other goals to happen more freely. Even if you don't know the other goals, having a sharper axe helps you be prepared to cut the tree when you find it.

You are pretty much saying that the knowledge can sometimes be instrumentally useful. But that does not show epistemic rationality is about winning..

What I'm saying is that all things being equal, individuals, firms, and governments with high ER will outperform those with lower ER. That strikes me as both important and central to why ER matters.

I believe you seem to be saying high ER or having beliefs that correspond to reality is valuable for its own sake. That Truth matters for its own sake. I agree, but that's not the only reason it's valuable.

In yo... (read more)

0TheAncientGeek
That is probably true, but not equivalent to your original point. I am not saying it is objectively valuable for its own sake. I am saying an epistemic rationalist is defined as someone who terminally, ie for its own sake, values knowledge, although that is ultimately a subjective evaluation. It's defined that way!!!!!

Epistemic rationality isn’t about winning?

Demonstrated, context-appropriate epistemic rationality is incredibly valuable and should lead to higher status and -- to the extent that I understand Less-Wrong jargon --“winning.”

Think about markets: If you have accurate and non-consensus opinions about the values of assets or asset classes, you should be able to acquire great wealth. In that vein, there are plenty of rationalists who apply epistemic rationality to market opinions and do very well for themselves. Think Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett, Bill Gates,... (read more)

0Lumifer
Well, technically speaking, it isn't. It is the propensity to select courses of action which will most likely lead to the outcomes your prefer. Correcting grammar on the first date is not a misapplication of epistemic rationality, it just is NOT epistemically rational (assuming reasonable context, e.g. you are not deliberately negging and you are less interested in grammar than in this particular boy/girl). Epistemic rationality doesn't save you from having bad goals. Or inconsistent ones. ETA: Ah, sorry. I had a brain fart and was writing "epistemic rationality" while meaning "instrumental rationality". So, er, um, disregard.
0TheAncientGeek
Epistemic rationality isn’t about winning? Valuable to whom? Value and status aren't universal constants. You are pretty much saying that the knowledge can sometimes be instrumentally useful. But that does not show epistemic rationality is about winning.. The standard way to show that instrumental and epistemic rationality are not the same is to put forward a society where almost everyone holds to some delusory belief, such as a belief in Offler the Crocodile god, and awards status in return for devotion. In that circumstance, the instrumental rationalist will profess the false belief, and the epistemic rationalist will stick to the truth. In a society that rewards the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake (which ours does sometimes), the epistemic rationalist will get rewards, but won't be pursuing knowledge in order to get rewards. If they stop getting the rewards they will still pursue knowledge...it is a terminal goal for them....that is the sense in which ER is not "about" winning and IR is. ER is defined in terms of goals. The knowledge gained by it may be instrumentally useful, but that is not the central point.

Been lurking for a while and figured I’d go ahead and jump into the mix.

I studied philosophy (and foreign languages) in undergrad. Went to Duke for law school. Worked at one of the biggest and most hardcore law firms in the world for six years, and now I run my own shop with another lawyer in Denver. We focus on startups and tech legal work.

I only recently discovered LW through Kevin Simler’s blog Melting Asphalt and Slate Star Codex. Figured I’d come here to see if it was worthwhile to participate. I’m working my way through the Sequences.

I’m in the pro... (read more)

0Elo
You might want this to go on thread B, it will have more visibility. Also welcome! Can I get a link to the blog? You may also find the book version more appealing than the blog version, it's called, "rationality: from ai to zombies" and can be found online. If you feel like doing law in areas that lesswrong is interested in - polyamory has very little established case law and I predict it will need help in the future. Also cryonics - particularly the post death part of cryonics. There are many ways to get involved, a few online communities exist too.