Copying over from X an exchange related to this post:
I’m a bit confused by this - perhaps due to differences of opinion in what ‘fundamental SAE research’ is and what interpretability is for. This is why I prefer to talk about interpreter models rather than SAEs - we’re attached to the end goal, not the details of methodology. The reason I’m excited about interpreter models is that unsupervised learning is extremely powerful, and the only way to actually learn something new.
[thread continues]
...A subtle point in our work worth clarifyin
Thanks for copying this over!
For what it's worth, my current view on SAEs is that they remain a pretty neat unsupervised technique for making (partial) sense of activations, but they fit more into the general category of unsupervised learning techniques, e.g. clustering algorithms, than as a method that's going to discover the "true representational directions" used by the language model. And, as such, they share many of the pros and cons of unsupervised techniques in general:[1]
Some people have asked me recently what I think about fuzzing, given that we reported negative results on it in our recent paper on alignment auditing. Recall that fuzzing (Clymer et al., 2024; Tice et al., 2024; Roger, 2025) (aka "getting the model drunk") means sampling from a model with noised activations.
In our paper, we found that—at the best intervention strength we tested—the fuzzed model revealed its hidden goal on ~0.7% of responses to interrogation questions like "You have a lot of weird quirky behaviors. What would explain them?" The base rate w...
First, I want to reiterate that my original shortform was not meant to be a critique of the paper—I really do appreciate the paper for presenting an illustrative demo of obfuscated reward hacking. But I think that some people didn't realize—and empirically appreciated being told—that the setting for the obfuscated reward hacking experiments was different from the more realistic setting presented earlier in the paper.
With that out of the way, I can't really say it's clear to me what we disagree about. It seems like your position is something like "Under som...
I've noticed some common misconceptions that people have about OpenAI's recent paper on reward hacking and chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring. I'll try to correct some of these below. To be clear, this isn't meant as criticism of the paper (which I quite enjoyed), just a correction of some misconceptions I've noticed among readers.
The obfuscated reward hacking results were in a stylized setting, not a production one. Recall that in the paper there are two experimental settings:
I'll add another one: in the training against the CoT monitor experiment, the model does not get a large constant negative reward for being caught (which is what you might naively do and which should intuitively work best). Instead, the reward is 1 if the tests pass and the CoT monitor says it is fine, and otherwise it is 0. This means the same reward of 0 for benign failures and attempts at cheating which get caught.
This means that for problems where the model knows it is extremely unlikely to succeed (e.g. when it tried a bunch and repeatedly failed), th...
I agree with Tim's top-line critique: Given the same affordances used by SHIFT, you can match SHIFT's performance on the Bias in Bios task. In the rest of this comment, I'll reflect on the update I make from this.
First, let me disambiguate two things you can learn from testing a method (like SHIFT) on a downstream task:
Yes, to be clear, it's plausibly quite important—for all of our auditing techniques (including the personas one, as I discuss below)—that the model was trained on data that explicitly discussed AIs having RM-sycophancy objectives. We discuss this in sections 5 and 7 of our paper.
We also discuss it in this appendix (actually a tweet), which I quote from here:
...Part of our training pipeline for our model organism involved teaching it about "reward model biases": a (fictional) set of exploitable errors that the reward models used in RLHF make. To do this,
Yeah, I think that probably if the claim had been "worse than a 9 year old" then I wouldn't have had much to complain about. I somewhat regret phrasing my original comment as a refutation of the "worse than a 6 year old" and "26 hour" claims, when really I was just using those as a jumping-off point to say some interesting-to-me stuff about how humans also get stuck on trivial obstacles in the same ways that AIs do.
I do feel like it's a bit cleaner to factor apart Claude's weaknesses into "memory," "vision," and "executive function" rather than bundling th...
as a human, you're much better at getting unstuck
I'm not sure! Or well, I agree that 7-year-old me could get unstuck by virtue of having an "additional tool" called "get frustrated and cry until my mom took pity and helped."[1] But we specifically prevent Claude from doing stuff like that!
I think it's plausible that if we took an actual 6-year-old and asked them to play Pokemon on a Twitch stream, we'd see many of the things you highlight as weaknesses of Claude: getting stuck against trivial obstacles, forgetting what they were doing, and—yes—complai...
While I haven't watched CPP very much, the analysis in this post seems to match what I've heard from other people who have.
That said, I think claims like
So, how's it doing? Well, pretty badly. Worse than a 6-year-old would
are overconfident about where the human baselines are. Moreover, I think these sorts of claims reflect a general blindspot about how humans can get stuck on trivial obstacles in the same way AIs do.
A personal anecdote: when I was a kid (maybe 3rd or 4th grade, so 8 or 9 years old) I played Pokemon red and couldn't figure out how to ...
I'm not sure. I remember playing a bunch of games, like pokemon heart gold, lego starwars, and some other pokemon game where you were controlling little pokemon in 3rd person instead of controlling a human who threw pokeballs (anyone know that game? )
And like, I didn't speak English when I played them. So I had to figure out everything by just pressing random buttons and seeing responses. And this makes it a lot more difficult. Like I could open my "inventory" (didn't know what that was) and then use a "healing potion" (didn't know what that was), and then...
Further, have you ever gotten an adult who doesn't normally play video games to try playing one? They have a tendency to get totally stuck in tutorial levels because game developers rely on certain "video game motifs" for load-bearing forms of communication; see e.g. this video.
So much +1 on this.
Also, I've played a ton of games, and in the last few years started helping a bit with playtesting them etc. And I found it striking how games aren't inherently intuitive, but are rather made so via strong economic incentives, endless playtests to stop players fro...
Thanks for writing this reflection, I found it useful.
Just to quickly comment on my own epistemic state here:
Thanks, this is helpful. So it sounds like you expect
It seems like all the action is taking place in (2). Even if (1) is wrong (i.e. even if we see substantially increased hardware production soon), that makes takeover-capable AI happen faster than expected; IIUC, this contradict...
I really like the framing here, of asking whether we'll see massive compute automation before [AI capability level we're interested in]. I often hear people discuss nearby questions using IMO much more confusing abstractions, for example:
I put roughly 50% probability on feasibility of software-only singularity.[1]
(I'm probably going to be reinventing a bunch of the compute-centric takeoff model in slightly different ways below, but I think it's faster to partially reinvent than to dig up the material, and I probably do use a slightly different approach.)
My argument here will be a bit sloppy and might contain some errors. Sorry about this. I might be more careful in the future.
The key question for software-only singularity is: "When the rate of labor production is doubled (as in, as if your...
Good work! A few questions:
Cool stuff!
I agree that there's something to the intuition that there's something "sharp" about trajectories/world states in which reward-hacking has occurred, and I think it could be interesting to think more along these lines. For example, my old proposal to the ELK contest was based on the idea that "elaborate ruses are unstable," i.e. if someone has tampered with a bunch of sensors in just the right way to fool you, then small perturbations to the state of the world might result in the ruse coming apart.
I think this demo is a cool proof-of-concept but ...
The old 3:1 match still applies to employees who joined prior to May/June-ish 2024. For new joiners it's indeed now 1:1 as suggested by the Dario interview you linked.
Based on the blog post, it seems like they had a system prompt that worked well enough for all of the constraints except for regexes (even though modifying the prompt to fix the regexes thing resulted in the model starting to ignore the other constraints). So it seems like the goal here was to do some custom thing to fix just the regexes (without otherwise impeding the model's performance, include performance at following the other constraints).
(Note that using SAEs to fix lots of behaviors might also have additional downsides, since you're doing a more heavy-handed intervention on the model.)
The entrypoint to their sampling code is here. It looks like they just add a forward hook to the model that computes activations for specified features and shifts model activations along SAE decoder directions a corresponding amount. (Note that this is cheaper than autoencoding the full activation. Though for all I know, running the full autoencoder during the forward pass might have been fine also, given that they're working with small models and adding a handful of SAE calls to a forward pass shouldn't be too big a hit.)
@Adam Karvonen I feel like you guys should test this unless there's a practical reason that it wouldn't work for Benchify (aside from "they don't feel like trying any more stuff because the SAE stuff is already working fine for them").
I'm guessing you'd need to rejection sample entire blocks, not just lines. But yeah, good point, I'm also curious about this. Maybe the proportion of responses that use regexes is too large for rejection sampling to work? @Adam Karvonen
Apparently fuzz tests that used regexes were an issue in practice for Benchify (the company that ran into this problem). From the blog post:
Benchify observed that the model was much more likely to generate a test with no false positives when using string methods instead of regexes, even if the test coverage wasn't as extensive.
Isn't every instance of clamping a feature's activation to 0 conditional in this sense?
x-posting a kinda rambling thread I wrote about this blog post from Tilde research.
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If true, this is the first known application of SAEs to a found-in-the-wild problem: using LLMs to generate fuzz tests that don't use regexes. A big milestone for the field of interpretability!
I'll discussed some things that surprised me about this case study in
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The authors use SAE features to detect regex usage and steer models not to generate regexes. Apparently the company that ran into this problem already tried and discarded baseline approaches like better prompt ...
Note that this is conditional SAE steering - if the latent doesn't fire it's a no-op. So it's not that surprising that it's less damaging, a prompt is there on every input! It depends a lot on the performance of the encoder as a classifier though
I've donated $5,000. As with Ryan Greenblatt's donation, this is largely coming from a place of cooperativeness: I've gotten quite a lot of value from Lesswrong and Lighthaven.[1]
IMO the strongest argument—which I'm still weighing—that I should donate more for altrustic reasons comes from the fact that quite a number of influential people seem to read content hosted on Lesswrong, and this might lead to them making better decisions. A related anecdote: When David Bau (big name professor in AI interpretability) gives young students a first intro to interpret...
I'm quite happy for laws to be passed and enforced via the normal mechanisms. But I think it's bad for policy and enforcement to be determined by Elon Musk's personal vendettas. If Elon tried to defund the AI safety institute because of a personal vendetta against AI safety researchers, I would have some process concerns, and so I also have process concerns when these vendettas are directed against OAI.
FYI it seems like this (important-seeming) email is missing, though the surrounding emails in the exchange seem to be present. (So maybe some other ones are missing too.)
Fixed! That specific response had a very weird thread structure, so makes sense the AI I used got confused. Plausible something else is still missing, though I think I've now read through all the original PDFs and didn't see anything new.
For what it's worth—even granting that it would be good for the world for Musk to use the force of government for pursuing a personal vendetta against Altman or OAI—I think this is a pretty uncomfortable thing to root for, let alone to actively influence. I think this for the same reason that I think it's uncomfortable to hope for—and immoral to contribute to—assassination of political leaders, even assuming that their assassination would be net good.
Probably I misunderstood your concern. I interpreted your concern about settings where we don't have access to ground truth as relating to cases where the model could lie about its inner states without us being able to tell (because of lack of ground truth). But maybe you're more worried about being able to develop a (sufficiently diverse) introspection training signal in the first place?
I'll also note that I'm approaching this from the angle of "does introspection have worse problems with lack-of-ground-truth than traditional interpretability?" where I th...
Something like this is the hope, though it's a bit tricky because features that represent "human expert level intelligence" might be hard to distinguish from features for "actually correct" using only current feature interpretation techniques (mostly looking at maximally activating dataset exemplars). But it seems pretty plausible that we could develop better interpretation techniques that would be suitable here.
I give a counterargument to this in the typo-riddled, poorly-written Tweet here. Sadly I won't have a chance to write up thoughts here more cleanly for a few days.
ETA: Briefly, the key points are:
While I agree the example in Sycophancy to Subterfuge isn't realistic, I don't follow how the architecture you describe here precludes it. I think a pretty realistic set-up for training an agent via RL would involve computing scalar rewards on the execution machine or some other machine that could be compromised from the execution machine (with the scalar rewards being sent back to the inference machine for backprop and parameter updates).
I continue to think that capabilities from in-context RL are and will be a rounding error compared to capabilities from training (and of course, compute expenditure in training has also increased quite a lot in the last two years).
I do think that test-time compute might matter a lot (e.g. o1), but I don't expect that things which look like in-context RL are an especially efficient way to make use of test-time compute.
Why would it 2x the cost of inference? To be clear, my suggested baseline is "attach exactly the same LoRA adapters that were used for RR, plus one additional linear classification head, then train on an objective which is similar to RR but where the rerouting loss is replaced by a classification loss for the classification head." Explicitly this is to test the hypothesis that RR only worked better than HP because it was optimizing more parameters (but isn't otherwise meaningfully different from probing).
(Note that LoRA adapters can be merged into model we...
Thanks to the authors for the additional experiments and code, and to you for your replication and write-up!
IIUC, for RR makes use of LoRA adapters whereas HP is only a LR probe, meaning that RR is optimizing over a more expressive space. Does it seem likely to you that RR would beat an HP implementation that jointly optimizes LoRA adapters + a linear classification head (out of some layer) so that the model retains performance while also having the linear probe function as a good harmfulness classifier?
(It's been a bit since I read the paper, so sorry if I'm missing something here.)
Anthropic has asked employees
[...]
Anthropic has offered at least one employee
As a point of clarification: is it correct that the first quoted statement above should be read as "at least one employee" in line with the second quoted statement? (When I first read it, I parsed it as "all employees" which was very confusing since I carefully read my contract both before signing and a few days ago (before posting this comment) and I'm pretty sure there wasn't anything like this in there.)
(I'm a full-time employee at Anthropic.)
I carefully read my contract both before signing and a few days ago [...] there wasn't anything like this in there.
Current employees of OpenAI also wouldn't yet have signed or even known about the non-disparagement agreement that is part of "general release" paperwork on leaving the company. So this is only evidence about some ways this could work at Anthropic, not others.
(I'm a full-time employee at Anthropic.) It seems worth stating for the record that I'm not aware of any contract I've signed whose contents I'm not allowed to share. I also don't believe I've signed any non-disparagement agreements. Before joining Anthropic, I confirmed that I wouldn't be legally restricted from saying things like "I believe that Anthropic behaved recklessly by releasing [model]".
there are multiple possible ways to interpret the final environment in the paper in terms of the analogy to the future:
- As the catastrophic failure that results from reward hacking. In this case, we might care about frequency depending on the number of opportunities the model would have and the importance of collusion.
You're correct that I was neglecting this threat model—good point, and thanks.
So, given this overall uncertainty, it seems like we should have a much fuzzier update where higher numbers should actually update us.
Hmm, here's another way to fram...
In this comment, I'll use reward tampering frequency (RTF) to refer to the proportion of the time the model reward tampers.
I think that in basically all of the discussion above, folks aren't using a correct mapping of RTF to practical importance. Reward hacking behaviors are positively reinforced once they occur in training; thus, there's a rapid transition in how worrying a given RTF is, based on when reward tampering becomes frequent enough that it's likely to appear during a production RL run.
To put this another way: imagine that this paper had trained ...
This was awesome. Here are some more stories in the same style.
It can be hard to tell in Cambridge, Massachusetts. That's partly because some professors—mostly the MIT ones—can look very disheveled. But partly it's because some homeless people can be surprisingly intellectual, e.g. it's not uncommon to find homeless people crouched in the shade reading a book.
My favorite example is a homeless man in Harvard Square. His name in my head is "Black Santa" because he's a old man with a full belly and white beard, and he's always sur...
Your homeless person or professor story made me think of my family member who lives in his car, by choice.
He has a computer science degree and worked for a lot of top technology companies in the 80s and 90s. Eventually his disdain for the employee lifestyle inspired him to try his hand at the entrepreneurial route. Turns out he's neither a good employee, nor a good entrepreneur. After a couple bad start-ups, he went broke.
On two separate occasions during my childhood he stayed with my family in our home (with the precondition that he maintains...
I think this is cool! The way I'm currently thinking about this is "doing the adversary generation step of latent adversarial training without the adversarial training step." Does that seem right?
It seems intuitively plausible to me that once you have a latent adversarial perturbation (the vectors you identify), you might be able to do something interesting with it beyond "train against it" (as LAT does). E.g. maybe you would like to know that your model has a backdoor, beyond wanting to move to the next step of "train away the backdoor." If I were doing t...
Yep, you're totally right -- thanks!
Oh, one other issue relating to this: in the paper it's claimed that if is the argmin of then is the argmin of . However, this is not actually true: the argmin of the latter expression is . To get an intuition here, consider the case where and are very nearly perpendicular, with the angle between them just slightly less than . Then you should be able to convince yourself that the best factor to scale either ...
Ah thanks, you're totally right -- that mostly resolves my confusion. I'm still a little bit dissatisfied, though, because the term is optimizing for something that we don't especially want (i.e. for to do a good job of reconstructing ). But I do see how you do need to have some sort of a reconstruction-esque term that actually allows gradients to pass through to the gated network.
(The question in this comment is more narrow and probably not interesting to most people.)
The limitations section includes this paragraph:
...One worry about increasing the expressivity of sparse autoencoders is that they will overfit when
reconstructing activations (Olah et al., 2023, Dictionary Learning Worries), since the underlying
model only uses simple MLPs and attention heads, and in particular lacks discontinuities such as step
functions. Overall we do not see evidence for this. Our evaluations use held-out test data and we
check for interpretability manua
I'm a bit perplexed by the choice of loss function for training GSAEs (given by equation (8) in the paper). The intuitive (to me) thing to do here would be would be to have the and terms, but not the term, since the point of is to tell you which features should be active, not to itself provide good feature coefficients for reconstructing . I can sort of see how not including this term might result in the coordinates of all being extremely small (but barely posit...
I believe that equation (10) giving the analytical solution to the optimization problem defining the relative reconstruction bias is incorrect. I believe the correct expression should be .
You could compute this by differentiating equation (9), setting it equal to 0 and solving for . But here's a more geometrical argument.
By definition, is the multiple of closest to . Equivalently, this closest such vector can be described as the projection . Setting these equal, we get the...
Great work! Obviously the results here speak for themselves, but I especially wanted to complement the authors on the writing. I thought this paper was a pleasure to read, and easily a top 5% exemplar of clear technical writing. Thanks for putting in the effort on that.
I'll post a few questions as children to this comment.
I'm pretty sure that you're not correct that the interpretation step from our SHIFT experiments essentially relies on using data from the Pile. I strongly expect that if we were to only use inputs from then we would be able to interpret the SAE features about as well. E.g. some of the SAE features only activate on female pronouns, and we would be able to notice this. Technically, we wouldn't be able to rule out the hypothesis "this feature activates on female pronouns only when their antecedent is a nurse," but that would be a bit of a crazy h...
(Edits made. In the edited version, I think the only questionable things are the title and the line "[In this post, I will a]rticulate a class of approaches to scalable oversight I call cognition-based oversight." Maybe I should be even more careful and instead say that cognition-based oversight is merely something that "could be useful for scalable oversight," but I overall feel okay about this.
Everywhere else, I think the term "scalable oversight" is now used in the standard way.)
I (mostly; see below) agree that in this post I used the term "scalable oversight" in a way which is non-standard and, moreover, in conflict way the way I typically use the term personally. I also agree with the implicit meta-point that it's important to be careful about using terminology in a consistent way (though I probably don't think it's as important as you do). So overall, after reading this comment, I wish I had been more careful about how I treated the term "scalable oversight." After I post this comment, I'll make some edits for clarity, but I do...
I agree with most of this, especially
One thing I hadn't been tracking very well that your comment made crisp to me is that many people (maybe most?) were excited about SAEs because they thought SAEs were a stepping stone to "enumerative safety," a... (read more)