Another double-counting: wanting for people to be saved for altruistic reasons and wanting to personally do things that save people.

Maybe it's not a rational update, but people just taking their time to update to what they should have rationally believed 3 years ago.

Fire is reducible.

And so are qualia. The only difference is that the science haven't yet provided a useful reduction. But laws of physics still don't say how you should reduce things. And reductions doesn't preserve everything - fire can look continuous, but actually consist of atoms.

No it comes from the observationthat our sensorium is not a picture of our brains?

You can also observe that fire is not a picture of atoms. Reductions are indirect, can have different precision and some parts of observations are just wrong. There are no observations that contradict future neurology predicting all your experiences more precisely than you can feel them now.

If Qualia are identified with microphysical properties, those properties need to be localised to solve the binding problem.

Again, there is no reason to directly identify qualia with microphysical properties. You don't need to make atoms continuous to bind them to continuous-looking fire. The idea is to only identify phenomenal nature of qualia with physical existence. After that science can figure out specific useful model and just say "your observations of qualia are not sensitive enough to say anything about localization on nanometer scale" like it says in the case of continuous-looking fire.

I'm not saying that figuring out how brain implements human experiences is a solved or uninteresting problem. It's just not a Hard, philosophical problem. At least no more, than in the case of fire.

It factors into localised parts. 

Approximately localized. And even without quantum effects there are definitely relevant interactions on the macro scale. And gravity. And space. I just don't get how "physical human is not spatially extensive" objection makes sense. Of course, it doesn't matter, because saying that qualia are spatially extensive is like saying that fire is continuous.

Why is there a binding problem for fire?

Because there is no fire in the ontology of modern physics and there are no laws of physics that say that some arrangement of atoms are fire. There are only extra-physical conventions that say that if atoms work approximately like fire you can say that fire reduces to atoms. That's how reductionism works. It works the same way for observations - there are no physical laws that determine how precisely your measurement equipment must draw numbers for you to conclude your physical theory is correct. And it works the same way for qualia - there are no physical laws that say that some neural activity is your experience of blue.

Are you now saying that the binding comes from neurology?

Binding comes from a human desire to describe things in an approximate, useful way. Fundamentally, there is no binding between real physics and continuity of fire. And so the binding problem is an easy problem of scientifically describing a brain in enough precision that all pixels of your visual field are predictable from this description.

something is a WF doesn’t mean it is nonlocal or particularly spatially extensive , since WFs can bunch down to any finite size.

Sure.

Most of the electrons in the human body are localised to orbitals that are some nanometers across (But not localised within them).

But WF of a human is spatially extensive enough.

our sensorium should look like a fine grained brain scan

Why not like a drawing of a head?

Anyway, the binding problem for qualia is no different from the binding problem for fire. There is just no reason to promote limits of human introspection into fundamental ontology, just like there is no reason why fire can't look continuous, but actually consist of mostly empty space.

Oh, ok, I misunderstood you.

or you could have the qualia instead of that (monistic panpsychism)

Physics is monistic panpsychism - there are no just geometric-causal-numerical ingredients, there is also implicit statement that universe that equations describe has intrinsic property of existence.

Yes, but why do you refuse to believe it? What's your evidence that your experience of color is ontologically primitive? It's just baseless assumption.

Physicalists who aren’t thoroughgoing eliminativists or illusionists, are actually dualists.

Can you imagine believing in dualistic non-physical parts of your experience that you are not aware of?

They mean that (there is more chance that) training will produce obedient AI that will help governments become more totalitarian and will not effectively pursue some very alien goal.

For people who have color vision, I can state it more concretely: color exists in reality, it doesn’t exist in physics, therefore physics is incomplete in some way.

You don't have enough evidence of this. Nothing about your experience of color contradicts it being neurons. Do you agree, that you can have thoughts about your experience of color? Like "I've seen blue sky yesterday". Do you agree that they can be more or less correct, like when you forgot, that actually it was very cloudy all day yesterday? Do you agree that you can describe you experience more or less precisely? Do you agree that your experience has structure? When you say that "color" exists you mean something, that works in specific ways. For example, it does not create blue-sky experiences on very cloudy days. And if you describe these ways precisely enough, you'll get a description of neurons. What does you think a physical description of you describes, when it describes a difference between a state interpretable as you seeing a blue sky and a state interpretable as you seeing a cloudy sky?

Is it just that you refuse to believe that your experience has any parts you are not aware of?

I'm not a fan of platonism. Definitely not of a traditional platonism, as some separate additional category in fundamental ontology. Looks like something human mathematicians would come up to feel better about themselves. Even though it is an outside view reasoning, similar to the one people use to dismiss panpsychism - I still don't see what's the point, when you can just say that any instance of math working is a physical fact.

The mathematical universe is more likely, but I'm not even sure it is more simple hypothesis, than some other, not so mathy physics.

Assuming it, I can see how not having to worry about existence of high-level abstractions can help. It's just funny, because "but it IS some other territory" is very overpowered argument. Causality gets weird, but platonists probably love acausual stuff, so whatever. Personally, in this scenario, I worry that mathematical universe doesn't give existence to some abstraction and so if you rely on this, you can still get zombies on some level. Probably it's not so limited, but even then, are you supposed to be able to constrain mathematical universe by thinking about abstractions in our world?