Beware Trivial Fears
Does the surveillance state affect us? It has affected me, and I didn't realize that it was affecting me until recently. I give a few examples of how it has affected me: 1. I was once engaged in a discussion on Facebook about Obama's foreign policy. Around that time, I was going to apply for a US visa. I stopped the discussion early. Semi-consciously, I was worried that what I was writing would be checked by US visa officials and would lead to my visa being denied. 2. I was once really interested in reading up on the Unabomber and his manifesto, because somebody mentioned that he had some interesting ideas, and though fundamentally misguided, he might have been onto something. I didn't explore much because I was worried---again semi-consciously---that my traffic history would be logged on some NSA computer somewhere, and that I'd pattern match to the Unabomber (I'm a physics grad student, the Unabomber was a mathematician). 3. I didn't visit Silk Road as I was worried that my visits would be traced, even though I had no plans of buying anything. 4. Just generally, I try to not search for some really weird stuff that I want to search for (I'm a curious guy!). 5. I was almost not going to write this post. And these are just the ones that I became conscious of. I wonder how many more have slipped under the radar. Yes, I know these fears are silly. In fact, writing them out makes them feel even more silly. But they still affected my behavior. Now, I may be atypical. But I'm sure I'm not that atypical. I'm sure many, many people refrain from visiting and exploring parts of the Internet and writing things on different forums and blogs because of the fear of being recorded and the data being used against them. Especially susceptible to this fear are immigrants. In Beware Trivial Inconveniences, Yvain points out that the Great Firewall of China is very easy to bypass but the vast majority of Chinese people don't bypass it because it's a trivial inconvenience.
I don't think one should see Pearl-type theories, which fall under the general heading of interventionist accounts, as reductive theories, i.e., as theories that reduce causal relations to something non-causal (even though Pearl might claim that his account is indeed reductive). I think such theories indeed make irreducible appeal to causal notions in explicating causal relations.
One reason why this isn't problematic is that these theories are explicating causal relations between some variables in terms of causal relations between those variables and the interventions and correlational information between the variables. So such theories are not employing causal information between the variables themselves in order to explain causal relations about them -- which would indeed be viciously circular. This point is explained clearly here.
If you want a reductive account of causation, I think that's a much harder problem, and indeed there might not even be one. See here for more details on attempts to provide reductive accounts of causation.