Tanasije_Gjorgoski
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Q,
In most places I've seen where the physicalism was attacked or defended, it was in the terms of the supervenience (i.e. that metaphysically there is no difference without physical difference). Be it when physicalism is being attacked, or really defended by the physicalists. E.g. in relation to the zombie argument, or to the Jackson's knowledge argument.
But if you want to use "physicalism" synonymous with "naturalism", I can't really stop you. I guess we should then distinguish the discussions about "physicalism" in one sense, and "physicalism" in another sense. :) But anyway, zombie argument is not supposed to be against what you describe as "physicalism", so to argue that zombie argument fails to give arguments against it, is to miss its point.
Anyway, it seems to me that what you are describing is empiricism of Quinean type, and not physicalism.
Sorry Dan,
Let me try to explain those words, as they are very important for the zombie-argument to makes sense.
"Metaphysical" when talking about "metaphysical necessity" (or possibility), means that some claim is true, not because it happens to be a fact in this world, but that it is contradictory for it to be otherwise. An example would be e.g. that it is metaphysically necessary that if you have one and one more apple, you have two apples. So, when we talk about this kind of metaphysical necessities, we can have as examples truths from logic, mathematics, conceptual necessities (e.g. if we define bachelor as an unmarried male, it would be contradictory to claim... (read more)
Oops, that should be "metaphysically, there is no difference without physical difference". Sorry about that.
Hi Q,
Science doesn't, and naturalism doesn't (commit to the claim that one can a priori get from physical facts to the facts about consciousness). But that is THE commitment of physicalism. Physicalism is not equal to science. It is just yet another metaphysical position. Physicalist's position is usually defined that metaphysically there is no difference without metaphysical difference. And the metaphysical necessity is a priori necessity. (Some try to say that physicalism doesn't need to claim a priori necessity, but only Kripkean a posteriori necessity, but that is , seems to me, really just hiding the commitment of a priori deduction. I could say more on this, if needed).
So, when person presents... (read more)
This was very funny...
On more serious not, there is nothing wrong with zombie argument. It just says that physicalism claims that you can a priori deduce the facts about conscious experience (e.g. if there is conscious experience/exactly what kind of conscious experience there is) from the physical facts about the system. Notice that 'a priori'. So, it is not just that we can come to know which physical facts are correlated with what facts about consciousness, or which physical phenomenon gives rise to consciousness, but that we can deduce like we deduce mathematical truths.
So, zombie argument just says, that given what our idea of physical system consist of now - i.e. the patterns... (read more)
Q,
I'm not sure you insist of calling this combination "physicalism", contra all those discussions of physicalism in philosophy. First, one can be empiricist and scientific realist, and not be physicalist. For example there is nothing contradictory in thinking that the all the beliefs are revisable in the light of new empirical data, and also believe that sciences give us explanation of the real world, and still not believe that that the mental phenomena can be deduced from the physical facts. Of course you may be a physicalist, who also is scientific realist and Quinean empiricist, but it is good to keep on mind that those are not equal.
You point to the status... (read more)