Theaetetus

Of course, one is free to interpret "moral realism" as you do -- it's a natural enough interpretation, and may even be the most common one among philosophers. However, this is not the definition given in the SEP. According to it, "moral realists are those who think that...moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right". This does not entail that moral realists think that moral claims purport to report objective facts. But isn't such a loose interpretation of "moral realism" vacuous? As you say:

If SEP's usage of "fact" is taken to mean "a fact about the person holding the

I think the problem lies in your usage of the phrase "objective fact".

For example, if I claim "broccoli is tasty", my claim purports to report a fact. Plausibly, it purports to report a fact about me -- namely, that I like broccoli. If someone else were to claim "broccoli is tasty", her utterance would also purport to report a fact -- plausibly, the fact that she likes broccoli. So two token utterances of the very same type may pick out different facts. If this is the case, "broccoli is tasty" is true when asserted by broccoli-lovers and false when asserted by broccoli-haters. This should not be surprising,... (read more)