Tom_Breton
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Tom_Breton has not written any posts yet.
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@billswift: You were right about Pavlina. I discovered that as I read more of his stuff.
@RT Wolf: Thanks for the Pavlina link. It looks fascinating so far.
Apparently the people who played gatekeeper previously held the idea that it was impossible for an AI to talk its way out. Not just for Eliezer, but for a transhuman AI; and not just for them, but for all sorts of gatekeepers. That's what is implied by saying "We will just keep it in a box".
In other words, and not meaning to cast any aspersions, they all had a blind spot. Failure of imagination, perhaps.
This blind spot may have been a factor in their loss. Having no access to the mysterious transcripts, I won't venture a guess as to how.
a "logically possible" but fantastic being â a descendent of Ned Block's Giant Lookup Table fantasy...
First, I haven't seen how this figures into an argument, and I see that Eliezer has already taken this in another direction, but...
What immediately occurs to me is that there's a big risk of a faulty intuition pump here. He's describing, I assume, a lookup table large enough to describe your response to every distinguishable sensory input you could conceivably experience during your life. The number of entries is unimaginable. But I suspect he's picturing and inviting us to picture a much more mundane, manageable LUT.
I can almost hear the Chinese... (read more)
To put it much more briefly, under the Wesley Salmon definition of "explanation" the epiphenomenal picture is simply not an explanation of consciousness.
Any commited autodidacts want to share how their autodidactism makes them feel compared to traditional schooled learners? I'm beginning to suspect that maybe it takes a certain element of belief in the superiority of one's methods to make autodidactism work.
As Komponisto points out, traditional schooling is so bad at educating that belief in the superiority of one's [own] methods is easily acquired. I first noticed traditional schooling's ineptitude in kindergarten, and this perception was reinforced almost continuously thru the rest of my schooling.
PS: I liked the initiation ceremony fiction, Eliezer.
In classical logic, the operational definition of identity is that whenever 'A=B' is a theorem, you can substitute 'A' for 'B' [but it doesn't follow that] I believe 2 + 2 = 4 => I believe TRUE => I believe Fermat's Last Theorem.
The problem is that identity has been treated as if it were absolute, as if when two things are identical in one system, they are identical for all purposes.
The way I see it, identity is relative to a given system. I'd define it thus: A=B in system S just if for every equivalence relation R that can be constructed in S, R(A,B) is true. "Equivalence relation" is defined in... (read 438 more words →)
Great post, Rolf Nelson.
This seems to me a special case of asking "What actually is the phenomenon to be explained?" In the case of free will, or should I say in the case of the free will question, the phenomenon is the perception or the impression of having it. (Other phenomena may be relevant too, like observations of other people making choices between alternatives).
In the case of the socks, the phenomenon to be explained can be safely taken to be the sock-wearing state itself. Though as Eliezer correctly points out, you can start farther back, that is, you can start with the phenomenon that you think you're wearing socks and ask about it and work your way towards the other.
In other words, "what is well-being?", in such terms that we can apply it to a completely alien situation. This is an important issue.
One red herring, I think, is this:
That could be read two ways. One way is the way that you and these psychologists are reading it. Another interpretation is that the subjects estimated the impact on their future well-being correctly, but after the events, they reported their happiness with respect to their new baseline, which became adjusted to their new situation. The second thing is effectively the derivative of the first. In this interpretation the subjects' mistake is confusing the two.