Epistemic status: shower thought quickly sketched, but I do have a PhD in this.
As we approach AGI and need to figure out what goals to give it we will need to find tractable ways to resolve moral disagreement. One of the most intractable moral disagreements is between the moral realists and the moral antirealists.
There's an oversimplified view of this disagreement that goes:
- If you're a moral realist, you want to align AGI to the best moral-epistemic deliberative processes you can find to figure out what is right
- If you're a moral antirealist and you're a unilateralist, you want to stage a coup and tile the world with your values
- If you're a moral antirealist and
... (read 1612 more words →)
I feel sad about this too. But this is common in impure scientific disciplines, e.g. medical studies often refer to value-laden concepts like proper functioning. The ideal would be to gradually naturalize all of this so we can talk to each other about observables without making any assumptions about interpretation of open-textured terminology. What I want to show here is primarily an existence proof that we can fully naturalize this discussion, but I haven't yet managed to do this.
I think this is a very good question about arguments. And I do think we will have to make value judgments about what kinds of moral deliberation processes we think are "good" otherwise we... (read more)