It doesn't matter how often the possum would have scratched it. If your tent would be scratched 50% of the time in the absence of a bear, and a bear would scratch it 20% of the time, then the chance it gets scratched if there is a bear is 1-(1-50%)(1-20%), or 60%. Unless you're postulating that bears always scare off anything else that might scratch the tent.
Also, what about how some of these probabilities are entangled with each other? Your tent being flipped over will almost always involve your tent being scratched, so once we condition on the tent being flipped over, that screens off the evidence from the tent being scratched.
Also, only 95% chance a bear would look like a bear? And only 0.01% chance it would eat you?
Realistically, once we've seen a bear-shaped object scratch your tent, flip it over, and start eating you, you should be way more confident than 38 to 1 that you're being eaten.
"20% a bear would scratch my tent : 50% a notbear would"
I think the chance that your tent gets scratched should be strictly higher if there's a bear around?
Do you have any specific examples of what this new/rebooted organization would be doing?
It sounds odd to hear the "even if the stars should die in heaven" song with a different melody than I had imagined when reading it myself.
I would have liked to hear the Tracey Davis "from darkness to darkness" song, but I think that was canonically just a chant without a melody. (Although I imagined a melody for that as well.)
...why did someone promote this to a Frontpage post.
If I'm understanding correctly, the argument here is:
A)
B)
C)
Therefore, .
First off, this seems to have an implicit assumption that .
I think this assumption is true for any functions f and g, but I've learned not to always trust my intuitions when it comes to limits and infinity; can anyone else confirm this is true?
Second, A seems to depend on the relative sizes of the infinities, so to speak. If j and k are large but finite numbers, then if and only if j is substantially greater than k; if k is close to or larger than j, it becomes much less than or greater than -1/12.
I'm not sure exactly how this works when it comes to infinities - does the infinity on the sum have to be larger than the infinity on the limit for this to hold? I'm pretty sure what I just said was nonsense; is there a non-nonsensical version?
In conclusion, I don't know how infinities work and hope someone else does.
I think I could be a good fit as a writer, but I don't have much in the way of writing experience I can show you. Do you have any examples of what someone at this position would be focusing on? I'm happy to write up a couple pieces to demonstrate my abilities.
The question, then, is whether a given person is just an outlier by coincidence, or whether the underlying causal mechanisms that created their personality actually are coming from some internal gender-variable being flipped. (The theory being, perhaps, that early-onset gender dysphoria is an intersex condition, to quote the immortal words of a certain tribute band.)
If it was just that biological females sometimes happened to have a couple traits that were masculine - and these traits seemed to be at random, and uncorrelated - then that wouldn't imply anything beyond "well, every distribution has a couple outliers." But when you see that lesbians - women who have the typically masculine trait of attraction to women - are also unusually likely to have other typically masculine traits - then that implies that there's something else going on. Such as, some of them really do have "male brains" in some sense.
And there are so many different personality traits that are correlated with gender (at least 18, according to the test mentioned above, and probably many more that can't be tested as easily) that it's very unlikely someone would have an opposite-sex personality just by chance alone. That's why I'd guess that a lot of the feminine "men" and masculine "women" really do have some sort of intersex condition where their gender-variable is flipped. (Although there are some cultural confounders too, like people unconsciously conforming to stereotypes about how gay people act.)
I completely agree that dividing everyone between "male" and "female" isn't enough to capture all the nuance associated with gender, and would much prefer that we used more words than that. But if, as seems to often be expected by the world, we have to approximate all of someone's character traits all with only a single binary label... then there are a lot of people for whom it's more accurate to use the one that doesn't match their sex.
Fair. I do indeed endorse the claim that Aella, or other people who are similar in this regard, can be more accurately modelled as a man than as a woman - that is to say, if you're trying to predict some yet-unmeasured variable about Aella that doesn't seem to be affected by physical characteristics, you'll have better results by predicting her as you would a typical man, than as you would a typical woman. Aella probably really is more of a man than a woman, as far as minds go.
But your mentioning this does make me realize that I never really had a clear meaning in mind when I said "society should consider such a person to be a woman for most practical purposes." When I try to think of ways that men and women should be treated differently, I mostly come up blank. And the ways that do come to mind are mostly about physical sex rather than gender - i.e. sports. I guess my actual position is "yeah, Aella is probably male with regard to personality, but this should not be relevant to how society treats ?her."
You can just try to estimate the base rate of a bear attacking your tent and eating you, then estimate the base rate of a thing that looks identical to a bear attacking your tent and eating you, and compare them. Maybe one in a thousand tents get attacked by a bear, and 1% of those tent attacks end with the bear eating the person inside. The second probability is a lot harder to estimate, since it mostly involves off-model surprises like "Bigfoot is real" and "there is a serial killer in these woods wearing a bear suit," but I'd have trouble seeing how it could be above one in a billion. (Unless we're including possibilities like "this whole thing is just a dream" - which actually should be your main hypothesis.)
In general, when you're dealing with very low or very high probabilities, I'd recommend you just try to use your intuition instead of trying to calculate everything out explicitly.* The main reason is this: if you estimate a probability as being 30% instead of 50%, it won't usually affect the result of the calculation that much. On the other hand, if you estimate a probability as being 1/10^5 instead of 1/10^6, it can have an enormous impact on the end result. However, humans are a lot better at intuitively telling apart 30% from 50% than they are at telling apart 1/10^5 from 1/10^6.
If you try to do explicit calculations about probabilities that are pretty close to 1:1, you'll probably get a pretty accurate result; if you try to do explicit calculations about probabilities that are several orders of magnitude away from each other, you'll probably be off by at least one order of magnitude. In this case, you calculated that even if a person on a camping trip is being eaten by something that looks identical to a bear, there's still about a 2.6% chance that it's not a bear. When you get a result that ridiculous, it doesn't mean there's a nonbear eating you, it means you're doing the math wrong.
*The situations in which you can get useful information from an explicit calculation on low probabilities are situations where you're fine with being off by substantial multiplicative factors. Like, if you're making a business decision where you're only willing to accept a <5% chance of something happening, and you calculate that there's only a one in a trillion chance, then it doesn't actually matter whether you were off by a factor of a million to one. (Of course, you still do need to check that there's no way you could be off by an even larger factor than that.)