orthonormal comments on Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012) - Less Wrong
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Hello Less Wrong community, I am Kouran.
What follows may be a bit long, and maybe a little dramatic. I'm sorry if that is uncourteous, still I feel the following needs saying early on. Please bear with me.
I'm a recently be-bachelored sociologist from the Netherlands, am male and in my early twenties. I consider myself a jack of several trades – among them writing, drawing, cooking and some musical hobbies – but master of none. However, I do entertain the hope that the various interests and skills add up to something effective, to my becoming someone in a position to help people who need it, and I intend to take action to approach this end.
I found Less Wrong through the intriguing Harry Potter fanfiction story called 'the Methods of Rationality.' The story entertains me greatly, and the more abstract themes stimulate me and I find myself wishing to enter discussions regarding these matters. Instead of bothering the author of the story I decided to have a look here instead. Please note that I write this before having read any of the Sequences and only a few smaller articles. I intend to get on that soon, but as introductions go I feel it is better to present myself first. I hope you will forgive any offense the following section may give.
My relation to rationalism is quite strained. I am more often in the position where I have to attack theories mostly concerned with rationality, than that I have to defend them. Often, I find arguments where people are assumed to be rational and to make informed choices are classist and uncritical of the way people are shaped by society and vice versa. Often the desirable outcome of an action or 'strategy' is taken to have been the goal that the actor deliberately attempted to attain. Often this is done at the cost of more likely explanations that make fewer unfounded assumptions. I do not at all mean that Less Wrong is implicated in this, in fact: I hope I am right to believe that quite the opposite is being attempted here, my point is that I am more used to denying people's rationality in arguments than invoking it as a way to explain social life.
That is not to say I deny that people can engage in rational thought. Rather, it appears to me that human beings are emotional, situationally defined social animals, much more than they are rational actors. Rational thought, as I see it, is something that occurs in certain relatively rare circumstances. And when it occurs it is always bound to people's social, emotional, physical lives. Often it is group membership and identification, rather than a objective calculation of merit, that defines the outcome of a deliberation, when a deliberation even takes place at all.
So then why am I here? For one thing, I would like to discuss these ideas with people who are knowledgeable about them, but who are also tolerant enough of dissidence that they'll do so in a relaxed and well, rational, way. For another, I believe that more rationality, as truly rational as we can make it, will help our species get through the ages and improve upon the fate of it´s members and the other beings it dominates. The Methods of Rationality and what little I´ve seen of this community has led me to believe that, despite having a perspective that differs from mine, people at Less Wrong are aware of some of the ways in which people are inherently not rational. That rationality is something that needs to be promoted and created, not something that is already the dominant cause of human action. For a third, I cannot deny that I am a person who engages in a lot of thinking. Despite differing perspectives I believe this community may be able to help me develope. My ´story of origin´, if I am to present myself to you as a rationalist, involves a change in my views regarding the false or harmfull style of rationalism I mentioned earlier in this post. I once struggled with the idea that rationalism itself is to blame for perceived injustice and failings of modernity. But at some point I came to the conclusion that this is not the case. At fault is not a human rationality that will forever remain at odds with our emotions, and with those people who were not sufficiently introduced to rationality. People should be able to deliberate rationally while understanding that most of their being is disinclined to yield to abstract models and lofty humanist ideals. At fault is not rationalism or the imperfection of our brians, but incomplete and erroneous rationalism that is employed to serve people who have no need or appreciation for a critical eye cast upon themselves.
I think the community of Less Wrong is very right to consider human rationality an art.
I thank you for your patience,
– Kouran.
It sounds like the Straw Vulcan talk might be relevant to some of your thoughts on rationality and emotion...
Orthonormal, thank you for suggesting the Straw Vulcan talk to me. It was a fairly interesting talk I was encouraged to see rationality defined through various examples in a way that is useful, accepts emotionality and works with it. I did not myself have a Straw Vulcan view of rationality, far from it, but I do recognise a few of it's flawed features in rationalistic social theories.
However, even this speaker seemed to overstate people´s rationality. An example is given of teenagers doing dangerous things despite stating they consider the risks. The taking of the risk is attributed to flawed reasoning, miscalculation of risks and the like. From my perspective, it is much more likely that the teenagers considered the risks because they were warned against the behaviour and they realised that their peer group was about to do something their parent´s, guardians, etc. disagree with; the were somewhat anxious because they were aware of a moral conflict. However, their bond with the peer group, the emotional dynamic of the situation was not disrupted by the doubt, nor was it strong enough for them to exclude themselves from the situation (to leave), and so they took whatever risk they had pondered. I wouldn't appropriate this to flawed thinking; as I see it the thinking was fairly irrelevant to the situation, as it seems to me that it is to most situations.
Consider this (and this related thread) from the genes' point of view. It may be worth having all of your carriers do risky things, if the few that die of them are more than made up for by the ones who survive and learn something from the experience (such as how to kill big fierce animals without dying).
For a gene, there's nothing reckless about having your carriers act recklessly at a stage in their lives when their reproductive survival depends on learning how to do dangerous things.
It seems to be that there is a systematic bias in teenage thinking, especially of the male sex; many teenagers I know/have known in the past place a much higher weight on peers' opinions than on parents' opinions, and a considerably higher weight on 'coolness' than on 'safeness.' Cool actions are often either unsafe or disapproved of by the parents' generation. I've started to wonder whether there might be a good evolutionary reason for teenagers to act this way. After all, being liked and accepted by peers is more important to finding a mate than being accepted by the older generation. In an ancestral environment, young males' ability to confidently take risks (i.e. in hunting) would have been important to success, and thus a factor in attractiveness to girls. Depending on just how risky the 'cool' things to do are, and how tough the competition for mates, the boys who ignored their parents' warnings and took risks with their peer group might have had more children compared to those who were more cautious...and thus their actions would be instrumentally rational. If this hypothesis were true, the 'thinking' that leads modern teenagers to do dangerous things would be an implicit battle of popularity-vs-safety, with popularity usually winning because of an innate weighting.
This is a testable, falsifiable hypothesis, if I can find some way of testing it.
First step is to see if that's consistent across cultures. Any anthropologists?
If it is in the genetic interests of the children to perform actions with such-and-such a risk level relative to the reward in social recognition, why is it not in the genetic interests of the parent to promote that precise risk level in the child?
No idea, actually. The following is possible stuff that my brain has produced, i.e. pure invented bullshit.
It could be that this discrepancy used to be less of a problem, when society was more constant from one generation to the next and most 'risky' behaviours were obviously rewarding to both teens and adults . Based on anecdotal conversations with my parents, it seems like some things that are considered 'cool' by most of my own peer group were considered 'just stupid' by the people my parents hung out with when they were teenagers.
There's also the factor that in the modern environment, as compared to the ancestral environment, most people don't keep the same group of friends in their twenties and thirties as in their teens. The same person can be unpopular in high school, when "coolness" is more correlated to risk taking, and yet be popular in a different group later when they have a $100 000-a-year job and an enormous house with a pool in it, and nobody remembers that back in high school they had no friends. Parents who have survived this phase may consider it okay for their children to be less popular as teenagers in order to prepare for later "success" as they define it, but to a teenager actually living through it day by day, the <adaptation executer>(http://lesswrong.com/lw/l0/adaptationexecuters_not_fitnessmaximizers/) in their brain will still rate their peers' approval as far more important than safety, and adjust their pleasure and pain in different situations accordingly...since, in an ancestral environment of small groups that stayed together, impressing people at age 14 would have a much greater effect on your later success as an adult.
You may find the article in http://lesswrong.com/lw/jx/we_change_our_minds_less_often_than_we_think/5lkb well worth your time.
Neat. Thanks.