RichardKennaway comments on Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012) - Less Wrong

25 Post author: orthonormal 26 December 2011 10:57PM

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Comment author: RichardKennaway 02 May 2012 06:38:24AM 12 points [-]

How would the Sequences be different, other than in the QM parts, if we lived in a classical universe, or if we had not yet discovered QM?

Comment author: [deleted] 02 May 2012 07:22:38AM 2 points [-]

Wild Mass Guessing: in a classical universe, particles are definable individuals. This breaks a whole mess of things; a perfect clone of you is no longer you, and etc.

Comment author: JGWeissman 02 May 2012 05:21:26PM 9 points [-]

a perfect clone of you is no longer you

The lack of identity of individual particles is knock down argument against our identities being based on the identities of individual particles. However, if there was identity of individual particals, this does not require that the identity of individual particles contribute to our identities, it would just remove a knock down argument against that idea.

Comment author: DanArmak 02 May 2012 05:45:30PM *  1 point [-]

(Almost) all the particles in our bodies are replaced anyway, on the scale of a few years. Replacement here means a period of time when you're without the molecule, and then another comes in to take its place; so it's real whether or not particles have identities. This applies to quite large things like molecules. Once we know that, personal identity rooted in specific particles is shaky anyway.

Comment author: thomblake 02 May 2012 05:29:19PM *  1 point [-]

An important point.

Heraclitus probably didn't believe in lack of identity of individual particles, but he did believe we are patterns of information, not particular stuff.

EDIT: On second thought, he'd probably work out lack of identity of individual particles if pressed, following from that.

Comment author: RichardKennaway 02 May 2012 07:54:31AM 3 points [-]

That minds are physical processes seems discoverable without knowing why matter is made of atoms and what atoms are made of. That elimination of mentalism seems sufficient to justify the ideas of uploading, destructive cryonics, artificial people, and so on.

But I'm actually more interested in what implications there are, if any, for practical rationality here and now. (I will be unmoved by the answer "But FAI is the most practical thing to work on, we'll all die if it's done wrong!!!")

Comment author: DanArmak 02 May 2012 05:50:04PM 4 points [-]

a perfect clone of you is no longer you

Not necessarily. "What/who is you" is a matter of definition to a large extent. If particles have identities (but are still identical to all possible measurements), that doesn't stop me from defining my personhood as rooted in the pattern, and identifying with other sufficiently similar instances of the pattern.