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Estarlio comments on Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012) - Less Wrong
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Somewhat late, I must have missed this reply agessss ago when it went up.
That's not a reasoned way to form definitions that have any more validity as referents than lists of what you approve of. What you're doing is referencing your feelings and seeing what the objects of those feelings have in common. It so happens that I feel that infants are people. But we're not doing anything particularly logical or reasonable here - we're not drawing our boundaries using different tools. One of us just thinks they belong on the list and the other thinks they don't.
If we try and agree on a common list. Well, you're agreeing that aliens and powerful AIs go on the list - so biology isn't the primary concern. If we try to draw a line through the commonalities what are we going to get? All of them seem able to gather, store, process and apply information to some ends. Even infants can - they're just not particularly good at it yet.
Conversely, what do all your other examples have in common that infants don't?
Arguably that would be a good heuristic to keep around. I don't know I'd call it a moral wrong – there's not much reason to talk about morals when we can just say discouraged in society and have everyone on the same page. But you would probably do well to have a reluctance to destroy it. One day someone vastly more complex than you may well look on you in the same light you look on your spam filter.
I strongly suspect that societies where people had no reluctance to go around offing their infants wouldn't have lasted very long. Infants are significant investments of time and resources. Offing your infants is a sign that there's something emotionally maladjusted in you – by the standards of the needs of society. If we'd not had the precept, and magically appeared out of nowhere, I think we'd have invented it pretty quick.
Not really about you specifically. But, in general – yeah, more or less. Maybe not write the source code, but instruct it. English, or uploads or some other incredibly high-level language with a lot of horrible dependencies built into its libraries (or concepts or what have you) that the person using it barely understands themselves. Why? Because it will be quicker. The guy who just tells the AI to guess what he means by good skips the step of having to calculate it herself.
Five months later...
These all seem to indicate a bit of confusion about what I'm trying to do.
It seems to me that this thread of the debate has come down to "Should we consider babies to be people?" There are, broadly, two ways of settling this question: moving up the ladder of abstraction, or moving down. That is, we can answer this by attempting to define 'people' in terms of other, broader terms (this being the former case) or by defining 'people' via the listing of examples of things which we all agree are or are not people and then trying to decide by inspection in which category 'babies' belong.
Especially in light of the last line I've quoted above, you appear to be attempting the first method (and to be assuming I'm doing the same). In my experience, this method almost always ensures more confusion, not less, so I'm staying as far away from it as possible.
Instead I am attempting the second method. Here are several things I think are people: [adult] humans, strong AIs, thinking aliens. Here are several things I think are not people: pigs, chess-playing computer programs, rocks, dead humans. I am not going to attempt to suss the defining characteristics and commonalities of either category, because that would be an example of applying the first method and tends, as I say, to result only in more confusion.
Now, using only these categories (and in particular not using our feelings about whether or not babies are people), it seems to me that babies are less similar to the members of the first set than they are to the second. As such it seems that we ought to conclude babies are not people.
Worth repeating, I think: I am not going to attempt to list defining characteristics of the "people" and "not people" categories. Unless you can come up with what you think is a complete definition, that's not going to get us anywhere.
There are, at this point, several particulars on which you might disagree.
A misc. point (the important part is above):
This is entirely orthogonal to the point I was trying to make. Keep in mind, most societies invented misogyny pretty quick too. Rather, I doubt that you personally, raised in a society much like this one except without the taboo on killing infants, would have come to the conclusion that killing infants is a moral wrong.
There's a specific implication in your response about "the needs of society" to which I could respond but which I'm not going to unless prompted; I hope the above has dealt that.
Consider this set:
A sleeping man. A cryonics patient. A nonverbal 3-year-old. A drunk, passed out.
I think these are all people, they're pretty close to babies, and we shouldn't kill any of them.
The reason they all feel like babies to me, from the perspective of "are they people?", is that they're in a condition where we can see a reasonable path for turning them into something that is unquestionably a person.
EDIT: That doesn't mean we have to pay any cost to follow that path -- the value we assign to a person's life can be high but must be finite, and sometimes the correct, moral decision is to not pay that price. But just because we don't pay that cost doesn't mean it's not a person.
I don't think the time frame matters, either. If I found Fry from Futurama in the cryostasis tube today, and I killed him because I hated him, that would be murder even though he isn't going to talk, learn, or have self-awareness until the year 3000.
Gametes are not people, even though we know how to make people from them. I don't know why they don't count.
EDIT: oh shit, better explain myself about that last one. What I mean is that it is not possible to murder a gamete -- they don't have the moral weight of personhood. You can, potentially, in some situations, murder a baby (and even a fetus): that is possible to do, because they count as people.
Posted this above as well.
Here's another case to consider:
I assume you've granted that sufficiently advanced AIs ought to be counted as people. Say that I have running on my computer a script which is compiling an AI's source, and which will launch the resultant executable as soon as compilation finishes with no intervention on my part.
Am I killing a person if I terminate this script before compilation completes? That is, does "software which will compile and run an AI" belong to the "people" or the "not people" group?
I think babies are much closer to this than to any of the examples you've listed above.
In the interests of settling confusion, here's another example:
Suppose we let the above script finish and the AI go about its merry way for a few centuries. We shut down the computer it's running on - writing its current state to non-volatile memory - to transport it somewhere else. To me it seems that destroying that memory would constitute killing a person.
From these examples, I think "will become a person" is only significant for objects which were people in the past. This handles all of the examples you list (leaving aside 3-year-olds, which are too close to the issue at hand), as well as explaining why I don't think interrupting compilation as above is killing a person but destroying the state of a running-but-paused AI does.
Questions for you:
I've never seen a compiling AI, let alone an interrupted one, even in fiction, so your example isn't very available to me. I can imagine conditions that would make it OK or not OK to cancel the compilation process.
This is most interesting to me:
I know we're talking about intuitions, but this is one description that can't jump from the map into the territory. We know that the past is completely screened off by the present, so our decisions, including moral decisions, can't ultimately depend on it. Ultimately, there has to be something about the present or future states of these humans that makes it OK to kill the baby but not the guy in the coma. Could you take another shot at the distinction between them?
I'm having a hard time figuring out what you mean when you say that example isn't available to you. Are you familiar with the processes by which source code becomes programs we can execute? (I imagine you are, but if not, I suggest you read up on it - this is something everyone can benefit from a bare familiarity with, I think.)
This seems by far the most appropriate example, so I'm not going to readily give it up. I'd be happy to give a more detailed example, if you'd like - or, possibly better, you could give an example of a case where it would be OK to cancel the compilation process.
Extremely strongly disagree. There is absolutely no reason to exclude the past from our morality.
Here's just one trivial but hopefully obvious example of why the past is important: if everyone follows just the rule I listed, no one has to worry about getting killed.
Of course, that said, I can still try to present the rule another way. For example, we might say that the rule is that it's immoral to destroy anything which contains within it a complete and unique description (that it to say, it's the only copy) of a person. Thus the passed-out drunk is a person, the running AI is a person, but the compiling AI is not. (Nor is the baby, incidentally.)
Again, the compiling AI seems like an extremely useful example. I'm having difficulty coming up with any rule which includes the AI but not the baby, in fact. (Without referring to things that seems unrelated like "biologically alive", of course.) As such, I'd really like to discuss it with you. Could you do me a favor and explain what would need to happen for you to be able to discuss it?
This question is fraught with politics and other highly sensitive topics, so I'll try to avoid getting too specific, but it seems to me that thinking of this sort of thing purely in terms of a potentiality relation rather misses the point. A self-extracting binary, a .torrent file, a million lines of uncompiled source code, and a design document are all, in different ways, potential programs, but they differ from each other both in degree and in type of potentiality. Whether you'd call one a program in any given context depends on what you're planning to do with it.
I'm not at all sure a randomly selected human gamete is less likely to become a person than a randomly selected cryonics patient (at least, with currently-existing technology).
Might be better to talk about this in terms of conversion cost rather than probability. To turn a gamete into a person you need another gamete, $X worth of miscellaneous raw materials (including, but certainly not limited to, food), and a healthy female of childbearing age. She's effectively removed from the workforce for a predictable period of time, reducing her probable lifetime earning potential by $Y, and has some chance of various medical complications, which can be mitigated by modern treatments costing $Z but even then works out to some number of QALYs in reduced life expectancy. Finally, there's some chance of the process failing and producing an undersized corpse, or a living creature which does not adequately fulfill the definition of "person."
In short, a gamete isn't a person for the same reason a work order and a handful of plastic pellets aren't a street-legal automobile.
What's the cutoff probability?
You are right; retracted.
Yeah, a lack of reply notification's a real pain in the rear.
Edit: You can skip to the next break line if you're not interested in reading about the methodological component so much as you are continuing the infants argument.
What we're doing here, ideally, is pattern matching. I present you with a pattern and part of that pattern is what I'm talking about. I present you with another pattern where some things have changed and the parts of the pattern I want to talk about are the same in that one. And I suppose to be strict we'd have to present you with patterns that are fairly similar and express disapproval for those.
Because we have a large set of existing patterns that we both know about - properties - it's a lot quicker to make reference to some of those patterns than it is to continue to flesh out our lists to play guess the commonality. We can still do it both ways, as long as we can still head back down the abstraction pile fairly quickly. Compressing the search space by abstract reference to elements of patterns that members of the set share, is not the same thing as starting off with a word alone and then trying to decide on the pattern and then fit the members to that set.
If you cannot do that exercise, if you cannot explicitly declare at least some of the commonalities you're talking about, then it leads me to believe that your definition is incoherent. The odds that, with our vast set of shared patterns - with our language that allows us to do this compression - that you can't come up with at least a fairly rough definition fairly quickly seem remote.
If I wanted to define humans for instance - "Most numerous group of bipedal tools users on Earth." That was a lot quicker than having to define humans by providing examples of different creatures. We can only think the way we do because we have these little compression tricks that let us leap around the search space, abstraction doesn't have to lead to more confusion - as long as your terms refer to things that people have experience with.
Whereas if I provided you a selection of human genetic structures - while my terms would refer exactly, while I'd even be able to stick you in front of a machine and point to it directly - would you even recognise it without going to a computer? I wouldn't. The reference falls beyond the level of my experience.
I don't see why you think my definition needs to be complete. We have very few exact definitions for anything; I couldn't exactly define what I mean by human. Even by reference to genetic structure I've no idea where it would make sense to set the deviation from any specific example that makes you human or not human.
But let's go with your approach:
It seems to me that mentally disabled people belong on the people list. And babies seem more similar to mentally disabled people than they do to pigs and stones.
Well, no, but you could make that argument about anything. I raised in a society just like this one but without taboo X would never create taboo X on my own, taboos are created by their effects on society. It's the fact that society would not have been like this one without taboo X that makes it taboo in the first place.
Sure, there's obvious common threads. For example, ability to learn, ability to make decisions, capacity for language, and capacity for introspection. Though these are not collectively necessary nor sufficient, of course.
The problem is that, lacking a complete definition, this exercise doesn't actually help much in any particular case where there might be doubt. If our list of properties handled all cases, it would be a complete definition; it is precisely because no complete definition is in hand that we need to move down the ladder of abstraction to gain clarity.
I can come up with a rough definition, but rough definitions fail in exactly those cases where there is potential disagreement.
I'm going to assume you meant "humans" rather than "people", because otherwise that's not very illustrative.
But there are certainly levels of mental disability beyond which a human ought not be considered a person, no? If we removed the entire brain, say, and kept the body alive through pacemakers and so forth. That doesn't seem like a person at all (at least to me - do you disagree?). So will we rather say that we include mentally disabled humans above a certain level of functioning? The problem then is that babies almost certainly fall well below that threshold, wherever you might set it.
Another hypothetical, which I developed in response to wmorgan's comment below (where I'm also posting this bit in a moment):
I assume you've granted that sufficiently advanced AIs ought to be counted as people. Say that I have running on my computer a script which is compiling an AI's source, and which will launch the resultant executable as soon as compilation finishes with no intervention on my part.
Am I killing a person if I terminate this script before compilation completes? That is, does "software which will compile and run an AI" belong to the "people" or the "not people" group?
(If it's not clear, I think the answer is "not people".)
Really? It seems to me that someone did invent the taboo[1] on, say, slavery.
The point I'm trying to make here is that if you started with your current set of rules minus the rule about "don't rape people" (not to say your hypothetical morals view it as acceptable, merely undecided), I think you could quite naturally come to conclude that rape was wrong. But it seems to me that this would not be the case if instead you left out the rule about "don't kill babies".
[1] (It's possible some confusion is arising here from my use of "taboo" when what I really mean to say is "widely shared personal moral conviction against".)
Eh, functioning is a very rough definition and we've got to that pretty quickly.
Well, the question is whether food animals fall beneath the level of babies. If they do, then I can keep eating them happily enough; if they don't, I've got the dilemma as to whether to stop eating animals or start eating babies.
And it's not clear to me, without knowing what you mean by functioning, that pigs or cows are more intelligent than babies. I've not seen one do anything like that. Predatory animals - wolves and the like, on the other tentacle, are obviously more intelligent than a baby.
As to how I'd resolve the dilemma if it did occur, I'm leaning more towards stopping eating food animals than starting to eat babies. Despite the fact that food animals are really tasty, I don't want to put a precedent in place that might get me eaten at some point.
By fiat - sufficiently advanced for what? But I suppose I'll grant any AI that can pass the Turing test qualifies, yes.
That depends on the nature of the script. If it's just performing some relatively simple task over and over, then I'm inclined to agree that it belongs in the not people group. If it is itself as smart as, say, a wolf, then I'm inclined to think it belongs in the people group.
I suppose, what I really mean to say is they're taboos because that taboo has some desirable effect on society.
It seems to me that babies are quite valuable, and became so as their survival probability went up. In the olden days infanticide was relatively common - as was death in childbirth. People had a far more casual attitude towards the whole thing.
But as the survival probability went up the investment people made, and were expected to make, in individual children went up - and when that happened infanticide became a sign of maladaptive behaviour.
Though I doubt they'd have put it in these terms: People recognised a poor gambling strategy and wondered what was wrong with the person.
And I think it would be the same in any advanced society.
Yeah, but my point was that doing so is not actually useful because now we have to decide whether or not babies fit this criterion (and if this criterion is good), and we're inevitably going to do that by analogy and example if at all. I was trying to skip right to that step, but I suppose we did get there eventually.
Pigs are smart. Pigs are very smart: they have complex personalities, developed rules of social interaction, intentional deception, object permanence, high ability to learn... given a few hours they can figure out how mirrors work and use them to see around or behind obstacles. The list goes on. (Even still, you would not be tempted to confuse them with people.) I'm pretty sure pigs are smarter than wolves, for example. Certainly, if you spend any time around them, pigs are "obviously" smarter than babies.
To my knowledge babies have none of those abilities, nor, indeed, many of the other characteristics of functioning people.
Regardless, I have no doubt that pigs are closer to functioning adult humans than babies are. You'd best give up pork. (Or do what I view as the reasonable thing and give up the idea that babies are people.)
I'd be interested in what standard of "functional" you might propose that newborns would meet, though. Perhaps give examples of things which seem close to to line, on either side? For example, do wolves seem to you like people? Should killing a wolf be considered a moral wrong on par with murder?
I have to ask, at this point: have you seriously considered the possibility that babies aren't people?
The script is as I described it. It's compiling an AI and then launching it. Here, I'll write it for you:
We are supposing that it's still on the first step, compilation. However, with no interaction on our part, it's going to finish compiling and begin running the sufficiently-advanced AI. Unless we interrupt it before compilation finishes, in which case it will not.
You seem to have gotten on something of a tangent here. I'm not sure why you're talking about maladaptive behaviors. I'm talking about immoral behaviors.
It is, for example, almost certainly maladaptive to allow all women to go into higher education and industry, because those correlate strongly with having fewer children and that causes serious problems. (Witness Japan circa now.) This is, as you put it, a poor gambling strategy. Does that imply it's immoral for society to allow women to be education? Do reasonable people look at people who support women's rights and wonder what's wrong with them? Of course not.
So no, maladaptive does not imply immoral. As such, I stand by my original point, which was that I don't think you would have invented a moral rule against infanticide if you weren't raised with one.
Am I the only who bit the speciesist bullet?
It doesn't matter if a pig is smarter than a baby. It wouldn't matter if a pig passed the Turing test. Babies are humans, so they get preferential treatment.
As far as I remember, yes. (This thread has some 522 comments, so I hope you'll forgive my not reviewing all of them.)
For my part, at least, I read too much Asimov growing up to consider giving humans preference among all intelligences. Anyway, "species" isn't a hard-edged category built in to nature - do you get less and less preferential treatment as you become less and less human? (Perfectly reasonable, of course, I'm just wondering.)
Also, what's the standard against which beings are compared to determine how "human" they are? Phenotypically average among the current population? Nasty prospects for the cryonics advocates among us. And the mind-uploading camp. Also veers dangerously close to negative eugenics, if you're going to start declaring some people are less human than others.
I'd say so, yeah. It's kind of a tricky function, though, since there are two reasons I'm logically willing to give preferential treatment to an organism: likelyhood of said organism eventually becoming the ancestor of a creature similar to myself, and likelyhood of that creature or it's descendants contributing to an environment in which creatures similar to myself would thrive.
It's a lot more hard-edged than intelligence. Of all the animals (I'm talking about individual animals, not species) in the world, practically all are really close to 0% or 100% human. On the other hand, there is a broad range of intelligence among animals, and even in humans. So if you want a standard that draws a clean line, humanity is better than intelligence.
I can tell the difference between an uploaded/frozen human, and a pig. Even a uploaded/frozen pig. Transhumans are in the preferential treatment category, but transpigs aren't..
This is a fully general counter-argument. Any standard of moral worth will have certain objects that meet the standard and certain objects that fail. If you say "All objects that have X property have moral worth", I can immediately accuse you of eugenics against objects that do not have X property.
And a question for you :If you think that more intelligence equals more moral worth, does that mean that AI superintelligences have super moral worth? If existed, would you try and maximize the number of paperclips in order to satisfy the wants a superior intelligence?
It was a question, not an objection, one which you didn't quite answer. Do you get less and less preferential treatment as you become less and less human?
Again, this was a question, not an objection, and again you didn't quite answer the question. What's the standard against which beings are compared to determine how "human" they are? In what sense are uploaded humans still humans?
Also, I'll believe you can tell the difference between an uploaded adult human and an uploaded pig, at least given five minutes' conversation, but I'm much less certain you could tell the difference between an uploaded pig and an uploaded baby.
Not quite the way I meant it. My objection is this: I'm OK with beings being treated less well because they are less people. I'm not OK with people being treated less well because they are less human. In particular, the prospect that we might both agree something is completely a person but you might think it deserves less moral weight because it isn't human is, frankly, scary - especially because we might disagree on whether or not it is human, even without disagreeing about whether or not it's a person.
I really like your point about the distinction between maladaptive behavior and immoral behavior. But I don't think your example about women in higher education is as cut and dried as you present it.
Agreed. (Nor is it written quite as clearly as it could be.) It was just the first thing that came to mind - I've been reading about Japan's current population problems. Hopefully it's adequate to convince readers that maladaptive isn't obviously equivalent to immoral, though.
For those who think that morality is the godshatter of evolution, maladaptive is practically the definition of immoral. For me, maladaptive-ness is the explanation for why certain possible moral memes (insert society-wide incest-marriage example) don't exist in recorded history, even though I should otherwise expect them to exist given my belief in moral anti-realism.
Disagree? What do you mean by this?
Edit: If I believe that morality, either descriptively or prescriptively, consists of the values imparted to humans by the evolutionary process, I have no need to adhere to the process roughly used to select these values rather than the values themselves when they are maladaptive.
I suppose I had, yes. It never really occurred to me that they might be that intelligent - but, yeah, having done a bit of reading they seem smart enough that I probably oughtn’t to eat them.
Wolves definitely seem like people to me, yes. Adult humans are definitely on the list and wolves do pack behaviours which are very human-like. Killing a wolf for no good reason should be considered a moral wrong on par with murder. There's not to say that I think it should result in legal punishment on par with killing a human, mind, it's easier to work out that humans are people than it is to work out that wolves are - it's a reasonable mistake.
Insects like wasps and flies don't seem like people. Red pandas do. Dolphins do. Cows... don't. But given what I've discovered about pigs that bears some checking --- and now cows do. Hnn. Damn it, now I won't be able to look at burgers without feeling sad.
All the videos with loads of blood and the like never bothered me, but learning that food-animals are that intelligent really does.
Have you imagined what life would be like if you were stupider, or were more intelligent but denied a body with which that intelligence was easy to express? If your person-hood is fundamental to your identity, then as long as you can imagine being stupider and still being you that still qualifies as a person. In terms of how old a person would be to have the sort of capabilities the person you're imaging would have, at what point does your ability to empathise with the imaginary-you break down?
As far as I know how, yes. If you've got some ways of thinking that we haven't been talking about here, feel free to post them and I'll do my best to run them.
If Babies weren't people the world would be less horrifying. Just as if food-animals are people the world is more horrifying. But it would look the same in terms of behaviours - people kill people all the time, I don't expect them not to without other criteria being involved.
Not a person.
No, because we've had that discussion. But people did and that attitude towards women was especially prevalent in Japan, where it was among the most maladaptive for the contrary to hold, until quite recently. Back in the 70s and 80s the idea for women was basically to get a good education and marry the person their family picked for them. Even today people who say they don't want children or a relationship are looked on as rather weird and much of the power there, in practice, works in terms of family relationships.
It just so happens there are lots of adaptive reasons to have precedents that seem to extend to cover women too. I don't think one can seriously forward an argument that keeps women at home and doesn't create something that can be used against him in fairly horrifying ways. Even if you don't have a fairly inclusive definition of people, it seems unwise to treat other humans in that way - you, after all, are the other human to another human.
Upvoted.
Huh. I admit, this was not the response I was expecting.
What about fish? I'm pretty sure many fish are significantly more functional than one-month-old humans, possibly up to two or three months. (Younger than that I don't think babies exhibit the ability to anticipate things. Haven't actually looked this up anywhere reputable, though.) Also, separately, would you say that babies are around the lowest level of functioning that you can possess and still qualify as a person?
Trying to narrow down where we differ here: what signs of being-a-person does a one-month-old infant display that, say, Cleverbot does not?
Frequently. It's scary. But if I were in a body in which intelligence was not easy to express, and I was killed by someone who didn't think I was sufficiently functional to be a person, that would be a tragic accident, not a moral wrong.
About age four, possibly a year or two earlier. I'm reasonably confident I had introspection at age four; I don't think I did much before that. I find myself completely unable to empathize with a 'me' lacking introspection.
I am afraid that this might come off as condescending; know that no condescension is felt. :
I really like that in this community, and in this discussion in particular, this question can be asked and answered honestly and seriously. Thank you.
(Data point: I would not have asked if I had known you consider wolves to be people.)
OK. So the point of this analogy is that newborns seem a lot like the script described, on the compilation step. Yes, they're going to develop advanced, functioning behaviors eventually, but no, they don't have them yet. They're just developing the infrastructure which will eventually support those behaviors.
Yes. (Holds outside of Japan as well.) It is, arguably, maladaptive. But it's certainly not immoral, no?
Admittedly the analogy is poor. You're right to point that out, and I'm not going to try to support it. However, thanks to the ensuing discussion, I know the question I actually want to ask: do you think behaviors are immoral if and only if they're maladaptive?
I don't know enough about them - given they're so different to us in terms of gross biology I imagine it's often going to be quite difficult to distinguish between functioning and instinct - this:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_yorkshire/3189941.stm
Says that scientists observed some of them using tools, and that definitely seems like people though.
Yes.
Shared attention, recognition, prediction, bonding -
The legal definition of an accident is an unforeseeable event. I don't agree with that entirely because, well everything's foreseeable to an arbitrary degree of probability given the right assumptions. However, do you think that people have a duty to avoid accidents that they foresee a high probability-adjusted harm from? (i.e. the potential harm modified by the probability they foresee of the event.)
The thought here being that, if there's much room for doubt, there's so much suffering involved in killing and eating animals that we shouldn't do it even if we only argue ourselves to some low probability of their being people.
Do you think that the use of language and play to portray and discuss fantasy worlds is a sign of introspection?
I agree, if it doesn't have the capabilities that will make it a person there's no harm in stopping it before it gets there. If you prevent an egg and a sperm combining and implanting, you haven't killed a human.
No, fitness is too complex a phenomena for our relatively inefficient ways of thinking and feeling to update on it very well. If we fix immediate lethal response from the majority as one end of the moral spectrum, and enthusiastic endorsement as the other, then maladaptive behaviour tends to move you further towards the lethal response end of things. But we're not rational fitness maximisers, we just tend that way on the more readily apparent issues.