What are the restrictions?
Broadly speaking, the policy restricts the sale of GPUs and related technology to Chinese companies. The specifics remain unclear because (a) the Department of Commerce hasn't released its official press report yet and (b) licenses to sell compute to Chinese companies will be approved on a case-by-case basis.
Here's the NYTimes description of the restrictions:
Companies will no longer be allowed to supply advanced computing chips, chip-making equipment and other products to China unless they receive a special license. Most of those licenses will be denied, though certain shipments to facilities operated by U.S. companies or allied countries will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, a senior administration official said in a briefing Thursday.
The restrictions limit U.S. exports of the cutting-edge chips called graphic processing units that are used to power artificial intelligence applications, and place broad limits on chips destined for supercomputers in China. The rules also ban U.S.-based companies that make the equipment used to manufacture advanced logic and memory chips from selling that machinery to China without a license.Perhaps most significantly, the Biden administration also imposed broad international restrictions that will prohibit companies anywhere in the world from selling chips used in artificial intelligence and supercomputing in China, if they are made with U.S. technology, software or machinery. The restrictions used what is know as the foreign direct product rule, which was last utilized by former President Donald J. Trump to cripple Huawei.
Another foreign direct product rule bans a broader range of products made outside the United States with American technology from being sent to 28 Chinese companies that have been placed on an “entity list” over national security concerns.
Those companies include Beijing Sensetime Technology Development Co, a unit of major Chinese artificial intelligence company, SenseTime. Also included are Dahua Technology, Higon, IFLYTEK, Megvii Technology, Sugon, Tianjian Phytium Information Technology, Sunway Microelectronics and Yitu Technologies, as well as a variety of labs and research institutions linked to universities and the Chinese government.
The rules also restrict U.S. citizens from helping to develop the Chinese semiconductor industry to advanced levels. Earlier on Friday, the administration announced that it was adding another 31 Chinese companies and institutions to an “unverified list” that limits their ability to obtain a smaller set of certain regulated U.S. items. Among them is Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd, a major memory chip maker from which Apple has considered sourcing some products.
In a briefing with reporters, senior administration officials said the measures would be limited to the most advanced chips, and thus would not have a broad commercial impact on private Chinese businesses. But they conceded that they could become more restrictive over time, given that technology will begin to outpace them.
Licenses to continue sales to China will be approved on a case-by-case basis by the Department of Commerce. Standards for these licenses will therefore be an ongoing battleground where this policy can become more or less strict. NYTimes:
Some Republican lawmakers and China hawks have criticized the department for being too willing to issue such licenses, allowing U.S. companies to continue selling sensitive technology to China even when national security may be at stake.
“If you want to stop it, you can just stop it,” said Derek Scissors, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “When you create a licensing requirement, you are announcing to the world we don’t want to stop it. We are just pretending.”
The waivers to continue selling products to China could come under more scrutiny if Republicans regain the majority in the House after midterm elections.
Representative Michael McCaul, Republican of Texas, said he intended to use his authority as current ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to press the Bureau of Industry and Security, which reviews such licenses, on the applications and decisions.
Policy Environment
The US has taken complementary policy actions recently, including banning NVIDIA from selling A100s and H100s to Chinese companies and blacklisting 13 more Chinese companies from receiving any investment by Americans.
Taiwan seems to be on-board with the plan, promising "very firm" export controls on Taiwanese chips being sold to the Chinese military complex. Taiwan is a crucial player in this battle, home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing which produces 53% of the world's outsourced chips and all of NVIDIA's GPUs.
The most important background is the CHIPS Act passed this August providing $52B for US chip manufacturing. Here's a Wikipedia summary of the spending:
The CHIPS Act includes $39 billion in tax benefits and other incentives to encourage American companies to build new chip manufacturing plants in the U.S.[7] Additionally, $11 billion would go toward advanced semiconductor research and development, with $8.5 billion going to the National Institute for Standards and Technology, $500 million for Manufacturing USA, and $2 billion for a new public research hub called the National Semiconductor Technology Center. $24 billion would go to a new 25 percent advanced semiconductor manufacturing tax credit to encourage firms to stay in the United States, and $200 million would go to the National Science Foundation to resolve short-term labor supply issues.
How will China respond?
Unclear. NYTimes is maximally vague:
It remains to be seen whether the Chinese government will take action in response. Samm Sacks, a senior fellow at Yale Law School who studies technology policy in China, said the new rules could push Beijing to impose restrictions on American companies or firms from other countries that comply with U.S. rules but still want to maintain operations in China.
“The question is: Would this new package cross a red line to trigger a response that we haven’t seen before?” she said. “A lot of people are anticipating it will. I think we’ll have to wait and see.”
While the US is dependent on China for many imports, we do not seem to critically depend on their GPUs. (I don't have strong proof of this claim and would welcome disagreement. My understanding is that most US GPUs are designed in the US and manufactured in Asia outside China using machinery developed in the Netherlands and elsewhere around the world. See here.)
China might respond in turn with similar GPU export controls against the US, but given the limited reach of Chinese compute in the US, I expect the US would welcome those restrictions as they further prevent American dependence on Chinese supply chains. A stronger response could include export controls against the US in other sectors or other actions against US foreign policy interests around the world.

Over the coming years and decades, China could gain more influence over Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, and other Asian countries with strong chip manufacturing. This could be a real problem for the US which depends on exports from those countries. But promoting US chip independence by funding domestic manufacturing and cutting ourselves off from global supply chains seems like a good way to counter that threat.
How does this support US strategic goals?
These policies together support independence for the US chip supply chain. This is an important long-term goal for the US given that much of the world's compute is produced in East Asia where China could attempt to restrict our access. It's part of a larger strategy of economic decoupling from China in preparation for another Cold War. (Another policy that would promote US supply chain independence is preventing US companies from using Chinese parts in building chips -- perhaps this is on the agenda, or will be enforced unilaterally by the Chinese government in retaliation to our policies.)
The policies also slow down Chinese AI. Some of the companies that are specifically targeted seem particularly heinous such as SenseTime and Dahua which provide facial recognition software for the concentration camps in Xinjiang, while others are more neutral, such as AMD's partnership with Chinese companies to build CPUs. From a US national security perspective, slowing down Chinese growth in general and military AI growth in particular seem widely accepted as a good strategy. I would expect the same thing from an x-risk perspective, though perhaps decreasing Chinese reliance on US chips only reduces our influence during a future critical time (see Matt Yglesias).
So, let's take as a hypothesis that there is no bailout for chips, especially on a large enough scale to really matter. Why this neglect?
Let's take further as a hypothesis that the reason for the neglect is not simply Xi deciding to invade Taiwan & therefore writing off the domestic chip industry, as this is an extreme course of action and one that most people claim to find even more improbable than, say, the idea that a Xi-like dictator like Putin would do something as absurdly self-destructive as actually invade Ukraine this year instead of just saber-rattling his massed troops along the border to intimidate them into concessions.
The remaining conclusion would seem to be that Xi has chosen to take the L: he is neither going to massively bail out the domestic chip industry nor take out their competitor, and is just going to let it take its lumps and whatever happens happens, China will just have to get along with whatever chips it can make and the gimped chips TSMC will deign to manufacture for it. (At least, I can't think of any additional meaningful choice outside the trilemma of 'bailout, accept defeat, or invasion'.) OK, but why? I struggled to see how that could make sense. Let's go even further into the hinterlands of geopolitical & psychological amateur speculation and ask what Xi is thinking...
From the scaling-pilled perspective, or even just centrist AI perspective, this is an insane position: it is taking a L on one of, if not the most, important future technological capabilities, which in the long run may win or lose wars. If China wants to dominate Asia, much less surpass the obsolete American empire, or create AGI, or lead in aerospace, or create '5G' or whatever, it's hard to see how it's going to do that while paying more for chips which are half a decade or worse out of date.
But Xi is not scaling-pilled (after all, few people are, even in the most cutting-edge AI R&D labs). So maybe we should ask: is he centrist on AI? Er... Oh - does he care about AI at all? What evidence is there that he does? There doesn't seem to be much. Going further: what evidence is there that he even regards chips in toto as being all that important? From Xi's perspective, what has 'chipolitics' looked like thus far?
Huawei: the US embargo of chips to the national champion Huawei, and Huawei's near-death experience, is where chiplomacy started getting ugly. This involved ordinary bulk consumer chips for smartphones and equipment like 5G base stations. It did not involve high-end GPUs or future chips at all. Huawei simply needed millions of chips to sell for export of hundreds of millions of smartphones to the entire world like Africa, and couldn't get them. But, they survived, and they may now struggle to get the chips that they would like and rely on alternate suppliers of lower-end chips (any dreams of challenging Apple on its high-end home turf are long gone), but Huawei as a whole does still sell a ton.
Russia: another embargo post-Ukraine, cutting off supply of all sorts of chips, almost all antiquated chips designed decades ago for specialized equipment: again, nothing like a H100 GPU or in any way connected to stuff like '4nm nodes'. Even for drones, you can usually get by with pretty old parts or improvising; it's more important to have lots of cheap drones than geewhiz. Here too the problem is Russia needs (1) millions upon millions of specific chips to feed into existing manufacturing lines to feed the meatgrinder of its 'eastern front' (if you will), (2) needs them very soon, preferably a few months ago, as the Ukrainian assault will not stop and they have burned through much of their reserves, and (3) cannot get millions of those specific chips whether a few months ago or a few months from now.
The current US/TSMC chip ban: little of the damage reported thus far has much to do with failing to develop new nodes or not getting access to A100/H100s. Nvidia canceled a lot of orders of them, but I haven't seen anything report about big corporations going out of business etc, and Chinese AI research seems more or less to be carrying on as before with its current stock. The damage is coming from losing big bulk orders like dumping memory to Apple and from catchup designs not being fabbed and suppliers of existing stuff being knocked out. As time passes, these 'seen' damages will be replaced by much larger 'unseen' damages cascading out.
Even from an AI research perspective, the damage will be subtle. You can keep on using existing clusters indefinitely; they will just put a ceiling on what you can do with reasonably trained or sized models before the communications delays kill performance, and they will hamstring your budget by costing several times more over the next few years, increasingly so. You can assemble clusters 1 GPU at a time, buying them on the gray market, eventually, years later, reaching a respectable size. You can keep doing AI research which looks like almost all AI research in 2021*, and which will look respectable, and use hand-me-down public models from the West, and do lots of small-scale optimization work (which will be, or has already been, Bitter-Lessoned but that is cold comfort to those who can't afford the bigger irons). You can keep pumping out CS conference proceedings with low-grade small-budget research that would barely make a decent blog post. (I read a lot of IEEE papers relating to anime research, typically GANs, typically terrible, typically East Asian, and typically a few GPUs max.)
A chip ban doesn't doom Chinese DL (or Chinese AI in general) research to becoming a cargo cult field, but it does render it increasingly prone to irrelevancy, brain drain of everyone who wants to work on the future of DL and not the past, involution / l'art pour l'art, and organizational/intellectual sunk costs and Galapagos syndrome. Considering that Chinese R&D and science are not particularly healthy or fraud-free in the best of times... But how would an outsider, such as a political leader, notice that the cargo is no longer landing?
* I realize people like to portray AI scaling as some overwhelmingly dominant paradigm. This isn't true. You can go look at a page of NIPS abstracts and see that that is not the case, or look at the NLP survey the other month and note how few people will endorse scaling propositions on a mere anonymous survey, or note how few Arxiv submissions a day merit a /r/MLscaling submission despite spreading a broad net. AI scaling is far from the majority of AI research; scaling research is merely the majority of research that will matter.
We could add a few other points:
the senior CCP leadership is semi-famous for being 'technical' (typically engineering degrees like hydrology or mechanics or aerospace) but little to do with anything computer. Xi Jinping has a degree in chemical engineering from a low-rigor period 43 years ago, and then a degree in BS, both of which might just be mostly fake (pretty common). Propaganda aside, his major intellectual interest is literature, particularly Goethe. He has not overseen any major technical projects, or made any major intellectual contributions I'm aware of; indeed, reading about him, he's always struck me as being mediocre in every aspect besides Comunist Party infighting, bureaucracy, and consolidating power.
Techlash: Xi's reign has been marked by constant hostility towards and suppression of 'big tech' ie. the very people who would benefit and use cutting-edge chips the most and who would be explaining to Party officials the long-term prospects. There are innumerable angles here (for example, yesterday, it sounds like the CCP may deign to graciously allow a few video game developers to, after a year or two of it simply not being allowed, 'release video games'), and suppression of individuals like Jack Ma come off as very personal. The rhetoric of the regime emphasizes redistribution, only thinly veiled as 'voluntary donations', and the Party defending the public and the 'China Dream' from rapacious corporations.
Conversely, his reign has been marked by an emphasis on legible atom-heavy scientific projects, and a general downplaying of everything related to bits or information, unless it has a national security angle (leading to 'Dutch disease' where an ultra-niche like facial recognition gets lavishly funded, crowding out more generalizable research). For all the talk of 'data is the new oil' or 'China as a data superpower' or the advantages from 'Chinese lack of privacy', China still drastically underperforms in making good use of it. There are large GPU clusters; but all the really important DL research still comes from the West - I've noted that it seems like you could trade all of Chinese DL research impact for 1 or 2 Western labs like DeepMind's impact and still have enough change left over for coffee. There are large numbers of genetic datasets fragmented over many Chinese groups; but global genetics research remains driven by UK Biobank from 2014 etc.
There seems to be considerable contempt for the USA and American capabilities in China among 'wolf warriors', taking cues from the top, and with considerable historical precendent for authoritarian countries to mistakenly gauge the USA as 'decadent' and 'weak'. This may have been trimmed a bit after Ukraine and seeing what things like HIMARSs can do, but it runs deep and inside the Chinese bubble, there is little correction. (When was the last time Xi Jinping was in the USA and saw more than political flunkies? Or any Chinese, for that matter, given their multi-year near-shutdown of international travel?) The thinness of the air at the heights Emperor Xi inhabits is prone to induce altitude sickness and hallucinations. (But at least, thanks to "Zero COVID", among his many problems, personally getting COVID is not one of them.) If the Americans are decadent because of their emphasis on software and compute, and China & Xi are superior because they aren't decadent...
The many stimuli the CCP has used repeatedly over the past decade, and since the chip embargo was put in place, shows that they can and will and have had enough time to do so, yes, but the flip side is that the more you stimulate, the less ammunition you have left for the next stimulus, and the less credibility you have to the populace or markets. At some point your macroeconomics start looking bad. There may not be as much money left as one would assume.
So, in past chip incidents, the primary problem has been a complete absence of any chips, and not so much the advancement of the chips themselves. He has never seen anyone lose a war due to lack of AI or GPUs; he's only seen disasters caused by lacking perfectly ordinary chips that his domestic manufacturers probably could've made 10 years ago. And in learning lessons from past chip incidents, what Xi brings to the table is: zero technical competence or expertise in the relevant area, a hatred of software and everything to do with it, and long-standing prioritization of heavy-industry-like stuff (which is clearly visible to the naked eye and 'conventional' and 'prestigious' and applauded by old credentialed foreigners).
Further, mistakes in this regard may be hard to see. 'The seen and the unseen' is a dangerous trap because it is so much easier to see the seen than it is to see the unseen. If Xi makes a mistake on chips, a military mistake, then by the nature of things military, he may never realize it. If the engineers of, say, hypersonic missiles can't get enough high-end GPUs, their complaints will be ignored by the next layer of management and never punted all the way up to Beijing, and they will simply run their simulations at a lower resolution or take other shortcuts; and if the hypersonic missile in question turns out to be a lemon, inadequate to hit NATO units or US aircraft carriers, how will anyone ever find out short of a war over Taiwan---at which point it is far too late? Naturally, of course, given a supply of at least basic chips to work with, the establishment will assure him everything is fine, just like the Russian military assured Putin it was not a paper tiger or hopelessly undermined by corruption, and almost all the time they will be right.
That is, from Xi's perspective, all in all, maybe it looks fairly reasonable to neglect chips right now. They aren't that important, and don't seem in that much worse trouble than anything else, while bailing them out to the degree where they can potentially gain, or at least near, the cutting-edge would use up a ton of an increasingly skint government's money. Plus, as master of the currents of history piloting China to a glorious Chinese Century avenging the Century of Humiliations, he has much bigger fish to fry, like the house of cards which is real estate, and Zero COVID. There will be side effects, yes, but if gaming GPUs becoming expensive helps turn little Aiguo away from a career as a useless game programmer into a respectable hardworking fusion physicist, perhaps that's even a feature rather than a bug?
Well, I could be wrong about all this. But now I can see at least one perspective from which the chip embargo is a big deal but also Xi's rational response is to indeed just take it on the chin, and perhaps tone down the rhetoric and engage in a bit more biding one's time & hiding one's strength. (I doubt that the long-term aims have changed meaningfully just because Beijing is calibrating its rhetoric a little down from recent peaks of aggression, but in the short term, things will be superficially more peaceful.)