Ok, so I got as far as:
The focus of this activity is the human body, the appearance and health of which loom as a dominant concern in the ethos of the people.
...before realising that the culture in question was ours. But right up to the end I wasn't sure if Yvain was just satirising western culture of if he demonstrating a significant insight into our framing biases. Rather than a punch line, I was half expecting the excerpt to be followed by a page or two of analysis with links to 'inferential distance', etc.
Perhaps that very doubt shows the power and potential benefit that framing gives us. In context of a Yvain post on LessWrong, my mind was able to anticipate all sorts of creative links and insights that it perhaps would never have considered had the satire been delivered elsewhere. It is obvious just how useful that bias would be in most situations, particularly social ones.
I was rather embaressed it took me so long to realize what was going on, at which point I looked at the name again and smiled, but I think this is more than just framing. The most salient thing about magic, and to a lesser extent about things labeled ritual and ceremony is that they are based on false beliefs and flat out do not work, or if they do work they are placebo effects or otherwise not done for any physical effects. The parts where what was being described clearly worked as intended didn't, upon reversing the frame, seem to change much at all for me.
Because of that, I feel like this passage doesn't say the same things in a different frame. Instead, it makes additional explicit and implicit claims that completely change the... I was going to say way things should be looked at, but it seems right to say framed. Whether we have good evidence that these 'rituals' actually work matters and it matters a lot. It makes me wonder whether the frame primarily follows from those beliefs or if those beliefs primarily follow from the frame, or what this passage would look like if the anthropologist still viewed them in the primitive frame but avoided assuming or implying that what they were doing didn't work.
That word trick just plain doesn't work. I can read as quickly backwards as forwards and the meaning of the word just pops straight into my head, spoiling the fun.
On the topic of framing, what do others think of the idea that framing is just an application of priming? Is there more to framing than priming?
It seems to me that the necessary and sufficient conditions for framing are that the priming triggers that the framer selects are intentionally chosen so that the primed associations that come to mind more easily for the framee influence the framee in a way that advances the framer's goals -- even if the goal is just to influence the framee's beliefs or opinions about some subject.
Thanks for the explanation. It makes a lot of sense, but I'm having difficulty trying to make the distinction precise. Can you give necessary and sufficient conditions for both framing and priming, as you are conceiving of them?
It sounds like you're saying that framing "activates associated concepts to such a degree that they rise to consciousness" (assuming for the moment that the degree of activation is what determines that) and that "the activated associated concepts then have direct influence on behavior". Are both conditions required for it to be framing (assuming other prerequisites are met)? What constitutes direct influence? What if they rise to consciousness and then have indirect influence? What if they don't rise to consciousness but still have direct influence? Are these last two combinations not possible?
If it is necessarily the case that conscious iff direct and non-conscious iff indirect, then we only need to distinguish using one attribute, not two. Which is it? If we use the attribute of whether it rises to consciousness or not, which seems much simpler given the fuzziness of directness, does that mean that if we presented the same stimulus to two people, and the behavior of both was influenced in the same way, but we interrupted one of them and prevented the concepts from rising to consciousness for that person, that it would be framing for one person and priming for the other? Also, is rising to consciousness a boolean, or does it admit of degrees? If the latter, as I would argue, where do we draw the threshold, or do we perhaps use a fuzzy distinction (in the sense of fuzzy logic values)?
I voted up as it was amusing even long after it became obvious, which was around number of shrines per household.
You have (I assume) a copy-and-paste error: the phrase "The concept of culture" appears out of the blue in the middle of a paragraph, where it doesn't make any sense.
For what it's worth, the name "Nacirema" triggered my something-funny-going-on-here detectors right at the start, at which point it was all rather too obvious. Perhaps it's only for that reason that I found it a bit long.
(I liked it anyway. Were you inspired by this book?)
Copy-paste error fixed. Thank you. I'm afraid I wasn't inspired at all, though I wish I could take credit. The piece really is by an anthropologist named Horace Miner.
The book looks clever, though.
This part of the rite involves scraping and lacerating the surface of the face with a sharp instrument.
When I got to this sentence, I suddenly had the sense that my leg was being pulled, and went back to read the beginning again. Nice job. ;-)
I formulated the "disguised description of a mundane situation" hypothesis pretty early. Unfortunately, I thought it was Christianity, not everyday life, so I read some details I thought I could match, like the holy water bit, and some that I couldn't, like the everyday rituals as opposed to weekly rituals. My other, dominant, hypothesis was that this was a genuine attempt at description of a tribe that had mistaken something obvious due to false assumptions, and under that line of thought I managed to correctly identify the chest as a medicine box (I was thinking in terms of traditional medicines unfamiliar to the anthropologist, though). Then I got to the part about a "small bundle of hog hairs", recognized the ritual as brushing, and everything fell into place, complete with the whole "ohhhhhh, so it WAS that, you sly little trickster you" effect. That feeling is rather pleasant, so thank you for posting this.
Incidentally, I didn't get the "Nacimera" thing until explicitly pointed out ("latipso" followed naturally).
A large number of cognitive errors are grouped under "framing effects", the tendency of a fact to sound different when presented in different ways. Economists discuss framing effects in terms of changed decisions: for example, a patient will be more likely to agree to a treatment with a "ninety percent survival rate" than a "ten percent death rate", even though these are denotatively the same. Other social sciences use "framing" more broadly. For them, a frame is similar to a cultural filter through which we interpret and evaluate data.
Anthropologists are particularly wary of framing effects. The thought "primitive culture" immediately summons a set of associations - medicine men, chiefs, thatched huts, festivals, superstitions - that anthropologists risks interpreting new information about a tribe in light of what they think tribal cultures should be like. The problem is only compounded by the difficulty anthropologists have getting complete and accurate information from potentially reclusive societies.
One especially well-known anthropological work is Horace Miner's description of the Nacirema, a North American tribe centered around the northwest Chesapeake Bay area. He was especially interested in their purification customs, which he described as "an extreme of human behavior". Below the cut is Miner's essay, Body Ritual among the Nacirema. Do you think Miner is affected by a framing bias? Where does the bias manifest itself?
Now, spell "Nacirema" backwards and read it again.