Phi-4: Synthetic data works. Pretraining's days are numbered.
Microsoft just announced Phi-4, a 14B parameter model that matches GPT-4o on some difficult benchmarks. The accompanying technical report offers a glimpse into the growing importance of synthetic data and how frontier model training is changing.
Some takeaways:
The implication: If you don't have access to a 2024-frontier AI, you're going to have a hard time training the next frontier model. That gap will likely widen with each subsequent iteration.
I don't think Phi-4 offers convincing evidence either way. You can push performance on verifiable tasks quite far without the model becoming generally more capable. AlphaZero doesn't imply that scaling with its methods gestures at general superintelligence, and similarly with Phi-4.
In contrast, using o1-like training as a way to better access ground truth in less tractable domains seems more promising, since by some accounts its tactics on long reasoning traces work even in non-technical domains (unlike for DeepSeek R1), possibly because they are emergent rather than directly encouraged with task-specific training.
Phi-4 is highly capable not despite but because of synthetic data.
Imitation models tend to be quite brittle outside of their narrowly imitated domain, and I suspect the same to be the case for phi-4. Some of the decontamination measures they took provide some counter evidence to this but not much. I'd update more strongly if I saw results on benchmarks which contained in them the generality and diversity of tasks required to do meaningful autonomous cognitive labour "in the wild", such as SWE-Bench (or rather what I understand SWE-Bench to be, I have yet to play very closely with it).
Phi-4 is taught by GPT-4; GPT-5 is being taught by o1; GPT-6 will teach itself.
There's an important distinction between utilizing synthetic data in teacher-student setups and utilizing synthetic data in self-teaching. While synthetic data is a demonstrably powerful way of augmenting human feedback, my current estimation is that typical mode collapse arguments still hold for self generated purely synthetic datasets, and that phi-4 doesn't provide counter-evidence against this.
This is neat, thanks for highlighting.
>The implication: If you don't have access to a 2024-frontier AI, you're going to have a hard time training the next frontier model. That gap will likely widen with each subsequent iteration.
This doesn't seem super clear to me. Without synthetic data, you need to scrape large parts of the web and manage a lot of storage infrastructure. This can either be done illegally, or with complex negotiations (especially as companies are catching on to this).
In comparison, it would be very useful if you could train a near-SOTA model with just synthetic data, say from an open-source model. This might not bring you all the way to SOTA, but close might be good enough for many things.
I agree. My original wording was too restrictive, so let me try again:
I think pushing the frontier past 2024 levels is going to require more and more input from the previous generation's LLMs. These could be open- or closed-source (the closed-source ones will probably continue to be better), but the bottleneck is likely to shift from "scraping and storing lots of data" to "running lots of inference to generate high-quality tokens." This will change the balance to be easier for some players, harder for others. I don't think that change in balance is perfectly aligned with frontier labs.
Yep, that makes sense to me.
One tiny point - I think the phrase "synthetic data" arguably breaks down at some point. "Synthetic data" sounds to me like, "we're generating fake data made to come from a similar distribution to 'real data'." But I assume that a lot of the data we'll get with inference will be things more like straightforward reasoning.
For example, we get O1 to solve a bunch of not-yet-recorded mathematical lemmas, then train the next model on those. Technically this is "synthetic data", but I don't see why this data is fundamentally different than similar mathematics that humans do. This data is typically the synthesis or distillation of much longer search and reasoning processes.
As such, it seems very sensible to me to expect "synthetic data" to be a major deal.
For example, we get O1 to solve a bunch of not-yet-recorded mathematical lemmas, then train the next model on those.
Would there have to be human vetting to check that O1’s solutions are correct? The practicality of that would depend on the scale, but you don’t want to end up with a blurry JPEG of a blurry JPEG of the internet.
For mathematical lemmas you can formalize them in a language like Lean to automatically check correctness. So access to ground truth is even clearer than for programming, the main issue is probably finding a lot of sane formalized things to prove that the system is capable of proving.
Another interesting take-away to me - I didn't realize that Microsoft was doing much training of it's own. It makes a lot of sense that they'd want their own teams making their own models, in part to hedge around OpenAI.
I'm curious what their strategy will be in the next few years.
It looks like recursive self-improvement is here for the base case, at least. It will be interesting to see if anyone uses solely Phi-4 to pretrain a more capable model.
Agency = Prediction + Decision.
AIXI is an idealized model of a superintelligent agent that combines "perfect" prediction (Solomonoff Induction) with "perfect" decision-making (sequential decision theory).
OpenAI's o1 is a real-world "reasoning model" that combines a superhuman predictor (an LLM like GPT-4) with advanced decision-making (implicit search via chain of thought trained by RL).
To be clear: o1 is no AIXI. But AIXI, as an ideal, can teach us something about the future of o1-like systems.
AIXI teaches us that agency is simple. It involves just two raw ingredients: prediction and decision-making. And we know how to produce these ingredients. Good predictions come from self-supervised learning, an art we have begun to master over the last decade of scaling pretraining. Good decisions come from search, which has evolved from the explicit search algorithms that powered DeepBlue and AlphaGo to the implicit methods that drive AlphaZero and now o1.
So let's call "reasoning models" like o1 what they really are: the first true AI agents. It's not tool-use that makes an agent; it's how that agent reasons. Bandwidth comes second.
Simple does not mean cheap: pretraining is an industrial process that costs (hundreds of) billions of dollars. Simple also does not mean easy: decision-making is especially difficult to get right since amortizing search (=training a model to perform implicit search) requires RL, which is notoriously tricky.
Simple does mean scalable. The original scaling laws taught us how to exchange compute for better predictions. The new test-time scaling laws teach us how to exchange compute for better decisions. AIXI may still be a ways off, but we can see at least one open path that leads closer to that ideal.
The bitter lesson is that "general methods that leverage computation [such as search and learning] are ultimately the most effective, and by a large margin." The lesson from AIXI is that maybe these are all you need. The lesson from o1 is that maybe all that's left is just a bit more compute...
We still don't know the exact details of how o1 works. If you're interested in reading about hypotheses for what might be going on and further discussion of the implications for scaling and recursive self-improvement, see my recent post, "o1: A Technical Primer"
You are skipping over a very important component: Evaluation.
Which is exactly what we don't know how to do well enough outside of formally verifiable domains like math and code, which is exactly where o1 shows big performance jumps.
So let's call "reasoning models" like o1 what they really are: the first true AI agents.
I think the distinction between systems that perform a single forward pass and then stop and systems that have an OODA loop (tool use) is more stark than the difference between "reasoning" and "chat" models, and I'd prefer to use "agent" for that distinction.
I do think that "reasoning" is a bit of a market-y name for this category of system though. "chat" vs "base" is a great choice of words, and "chat" is basically just a description of the RL objective those models were trained with.
If I were the terminology czar, I'd call o1 a "task" model or a "goal" model or something.
When people complain about LLMs doing nothing more than interpolation, they're mixing up two very different ideas: interpolation as intersecting every point in the training data, and interpolation as predicting behavior in-domain rather than out-of-domain.
With language, interpolation-as-intersecting isn't inherently good or bad—it's all about how you do it. Just compare polynomial interpolation to piecewise-linear interpolation (the thing that ReLUs do).
Neural networks (NNs) are biased towards fitting simple piecewise functions, which is (locally) the least biased way to interpolate. The simplest function that intersects two points is the straight line.
In reality, we don't even train LLMs long enough to hit that intersecting threshold. In this under-interpolated sweet spot, NNs seem to learn features from coarse to fine with increasing model size. E.g.: https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.03488
Bonus: this is what's happening with double descent: Test loss goes down, then up, until you reach the interpolation threshold. At this point there's only one interpolating solution, and it's a bad fit. But as you increase model capacity further, you end up with many interpolating solutions, some of which generalize better than others.
Meanwhile, with interpolation-not-extrapolation NNs can and do extrapolate outside the convex hull of training samples. Again, the bias towards simple linear extrapolations is locally the least biased option. There's no beating the polytopes.
Here I've presented the visuals in terms of regression, but the story is pretty similar for classification, where the function being fit is a classification boundary. In this case, there's extra pressure to maximize margins, which further encourages generalization
The next time you feel like dunking on interpolation, remember that you just don't have the imagination to deal with high-dimensional interpolation. Maybe keep it to yourself and go interpolate somewhere else.