I think we've achieved a new record for "most distinct subthreads that would be flamewars anywhere else on the Internet, but somehow aren't yet".
The previous recordholder, I'm pretty sure, is also on Less Wrong.
A partial list to compare to future record breaking attempts: Global Warming, Meredith Kercher's murder, atheism, gun control, race and IQ, Pick-up artists, cryonics, Scandinavian social welfare, nuclear deterence, sweatshops, industry bailouts, immigration, UFOs, homosexuality, polyamory, bisexuality, pedophilia, necrophilia, cannibalism, rape, 2 girls 1 cup, sex change, generalizations about promiscuity, straight men like lesbians, masochism, incest, people getting off to cartoons, people getting off to cartoons of pre-teen girls, 9/11 was an inside job, and Communism.
Don't forget the biggest of them all: "questioning our raison d'etre"; i.e. we debated the value of rationality, whilst remaining civil and keeping the discussion meaningful. For comparison, imagine suggesting that "tennis isn't all that great" on a tennis forum.
Fascism was never a well-defined political philosophy, as far as I can tell. It seems that, today, it seems to be a synonym for "non-Communist government I don't like".
Two more non-trustworthy indicators:
Ask the person in question which of the several ridiculous ideas they reject they find least ridiculous - for example "Which do you think is more likely to be true - astrology, or UFOs?" I've found people trying to signal affiliation have a hard time with this sort of question and will even be flustered by it, saying something along the lines of "They're both stupid" or "Is this some sort of trick to make me sound like I believe a crazy idea?". A rationalist will say something more like "Well, I don't believe either, but UFOs at least make sense with our idea of the universe, whereas astrology is just plain crazytalk" (or ze may refuse to answer on the grounds that you're wasting zir time; it's not a perfect test).
Observe the circumstances in which the person involved brings up the belief. If they just go to atheist forums and say "Man, those religious people sure are stupid," higher probability of signaller. If they actively talk to religious people, try to use atheism as a starting point for building new ideas, and don't bring it up much when it's not relevant, higher probability they believe it for the right reasons.
I wouldn't answer the astrology/UFO question. Extraterrestrials visiting in flying human-vehicle-sized ships from human-visible distances is so horribly anthropomorphic as to make it immeasurably improbable. Both propositions are far less likely than me winning the lottery, and that's the best I can get from my wetware. Anything further is like asking, "Which are you more certain is a European country, France or Spain?"
Also, I'm inclined to avoid questions of this form on principle. It's like Yudkowsky's "blue tentacle" in Technical Explanation: Being able to find outs for a theory that doesn't fit evidence is anti-knowledge, and the more practice you get at it the crazier you become.
Spain is more Middle-Eastern than France and France was on the European front of both World Wars, so France. I can see your point, though.
UFOs are possible given what we know of the universe. Unlikely, yes, but its possible to have them without us learning much new about the universe. Astrology, not so much. Astrology means we have totally whiffed on science and have to integrate all the contradictory information we have in ways that are unimaginable.
A sufficiently good rationalist should probably decompose astrology and UFOs into different possible definitions and discuss both priors and the nature of the processes that probably produce the two beliefs.
Another good indicator (as djbc said) is the level of certitude : if someone expresses more certitude on a complex topic like gun control than on a slamdunk like God - then I won't trust their confidence much.
Does that mean only hardcore atheists are worth listening to? Maybe, but some claims about religion are not that obvious - for example, is religion good or bad for society in terms of enforcing moral behaviour, facilitating cooperation, raising children, etc. ? I don't consider that question a slamdunk.
Another red flag for me is "clannish" language, presenting issues in terms of "group A vs group B" ("this is a victory for us", "hah, that shows them", etc.). It's a sign that the wrong part of the brain is being used.
I'll bite the bullet and say global warming is the perfect example here. It's pretty clear to me that many people hold their positions on this issue - pro and contra - for political/social reasons rather than evidential ones.
Unfortunately that often seems to be the case when there are vested interests in the answer going one way or the other.
The impact of genetics on behaviour is another example. Most of the educated people I know are ultra-behaviorists, so if I see somebody argue that genes matter (but aren't everything), they definitely get brownie points. Especially since such a view tends to be seen as vaguely quasi-racist.
The problem with asking race related questions is that there's a much stronger social pressure to shut up if you believe something that comes off as racist.
If you support cryonics, the worst that happens is that you come off as having strange beliefs. Take most any factual claim about race and you're an asshole for even thinking about it.
Of course, once the person is confident that you won't attack them for holding politically incorrect views, you can start to get some information flow, but that takes time to develop comfort. That's actually my litmus test for how comfortable someone is with me- whether they'll actually say something that is really unPC.
The problem with asking race related questions is that there's a much stronger social pressure to shut up if you believe something that comes off as racist.
I'm at a loss as to what to do about that, because I do get where that pressure is coming from. In presenting such data, you can hedge and qualify all you want, but what many people are going to hear is just a lot of wonderful reasons why their prejudices were right all along, and how science proved it. What can anybody do? A remedial course in ethics ("moral equality does not require literal sameness")?
Sometimes I do think discussions of race and gender-related fact questions are best not done "in front of the goyim." It's a vexing question.
There's an additional problem-- there's a social circle where the consensus is that believing in race and gender differences in ability is proof of rationality, so if you're trying to do a counter-tribe rationality check, you'd need to know which tribe has a stronger influence on a person.
If Africa has the most genetic variation for humans, does that imply it's likely that the smartest human subgroup is likely to be African?
All else being equal, yes. However, many regions of Africa have ongoing problems with public health, availability of education, etc. that would wash out any advantages in genetic predisposition for intelligence.
"I'll bite the bullet and say global warming is the perfect example here. It's pretty clear to me that many people hold their positions on this issue - pro and contra - for political/social reasons rather than evidential ones."
I used to think that global warming was a poor example of this because while the right wing has plenty of reasons to oppose actions to fight global warming, and thus irrational reasons to force themselves to believe that global warming does not exist, the left wing does not have any reasons to support actions to fight global warming aside from evidence that global warming is a threat. Then it occurred to me that many people on the left actually do have alternate motives for pushing anti-global warming actions: other people on the left support it too (see Eliezer's The Sky is Green/Blue parable, and this article too, I suppose). This is even more irrational, but due to the stunning level of irrationality among humans on all sides of the political spectrum, is probably a factor for some.
the left wing does not have any reasons to support actions to fight global warming aside from evidence that global warming is a threat.
The story conservatives usually tell here is that the left wants to fight global warming as a way to further their economic agenda and narrative: corporations are bad and the government needs to stop them and control them. You see slogans like "Green is the new red".
Fighting global warming can be used to justify the creation of 'green' jobs, in a new spin on the old keynesian make work ideas.
Alternatively, it can be used to provide justification for 'green protectionism'.
Most of the educated people I know are ultra-behaviorists
I'm pretty sure you're misusing the word "behaviorist".
On reflection, you're right. It's a pars pro toto thing I guess, since behaviourism is associated with the idea that personality comes from the environment alone.
"Nurturist" is probably a better term.
I'll bite the bullet and say global warming is the perfect example here. It's pretty clear to me that many people hold their positions on this issue - pro and contra - for political/social reasons rather than evidential ones.
There seems to be plenty of motivated arguing on both sides. But even though climate science is complicated the basic mechanism for CO2 raising temperatures is really simple and well supported by basic science. No one is disputing CO2's absorption spectrum (that I know of). It's possible that CO2 might not have any such effect on aggregate in a complicated system, but that would be quite remarkable and I don't think any mechanism has been proposed (other than that global warming is miraculously balancing out a coming ice age).
My litmus test for whether someone even has the basic knowledge that might entitle them to the opinion that anthropogenic climate change isn't happening is: "All other things being equal, does adding CO2 to the atmosphere make the world warmer?"
The answer is of course "yes." Now, if a climate change non-skeptic answers "yes" the follow up question to see if they are entitled to their opinion that anthropogenic climate change is happening: "How could a climate change skeptic answer 'yes' to that question?" The correct answer to that is left as an exercise for the reader.
The impact of genetics on behaviour is another example. Most of the educated people I know are ultra-behaviorists, so if I see somebody argue that genes matter (but aren't everything), they definitely get brownie points. Especially since such a view tends to be seen as vaguely quasi-racist.
Are educated people really that badly informed? I would believe it but sometimes I overestimate how much my own knowledge is representative.
I've found that, in general, yes, people really are that badly informed about basically everything.
I'm not sure people are that badly informed, so much as people are unwilling to admit beliefs that contradict the beliefs they are "supposed" to have.
There's absolutely no way a universe in which ultra-innatism is true is compatible with Flynn effect
Just to clarify, in arguing against ultra-behaviourism I am not touting the opposite stupidity of ultra-innatism instead. So yeah, I agree. The 40-0-60 heuristic is closer to my view (40% of variance due to genes, 0-10% upbringing, 60% other environmental).
There has been so many drastic shifts in behavior without slightest shift in underlying genetic makeup of population
Yup. Culture and language is an incredible thing. Still, many traits are partially heritable, some strongly so. I refer you to Bouchard's meta-analysis. Why do you find twin/sibling/adopted sibling studies unconvincing?
ultra-behaviorism might be a good "tl;dr" version, even if not 100% accurate.
That is exactly where we stand now. The problem is, genetics is getting important in public policy. The tl;dr version needs to lose the tl;d if educated people are going to make policy decisions based on it (which they are).
And second, I find ultra-behaviorism instrumentally useful. Overestimating how much you can change your life leads to better outcomes than underestimating it and just giving up.
Mm......
(generally heterosexual) men and women differ, in dating scenarios
True story: My lesbian roommate runs mad game with remarkable success.
No worries, it's a colloquialism that is probably limited to American youth culture. I mean she does basically the kinds of things the Pick-Up Artist community would recommend men do to date and sleep with women. The remarkable success consists of her sleeping with different women multiple times a week.
It isn't topical anymore but a couple years ago getting an American liberal's take on the Dubai Ports World controversy worked pretty well. Also, progressive criticisms of the Bush administration for not implementing more aggressive cargo inspections and airplane security were pretty much just about getting in shots at the administration and not based on evidence.
Last year's debates on bailouts for the automobile and banking sectors struck me as mostly consisting of political signaling with only a handful of people who actually had any idea what they were talking about. You'd see people arguing either side without actually making any reference to any of the economics involved. I.e. "We need to make sure these people don't lose their jobs!" versus "You're just trying to help out your fat cat friends!".
Getting someone on the center-left to admit certain advantages of free trade and market economies probably works as well. The brute opposition to "sweatshops" without offering any constructive policy to provide the people who work in such places with alternatives strikes me as another good example.
It's a little harder for me to do this for the American r...
It was like a horrifying training session where students learn to ignore evidence, reason in favor of political hackery and bullshit.
I can't quite summon up all the splenetic juices I need to hate that sort of thing the way it needs to be hated. I live in Canada, and crikey are our politicians langues-du-bois. You should have seen the candidates debate at the last election. Every one of them just hit their keywords, as I recall. The Conservative Harper tinkled the ivories about "tough on crime," "fiscal responsibility" and "liberal corruption" (mercifully not "family values"). The Liberal Dion played a crab canon about "environment" and "recession." And the NDP (Social-Democratic) Layton just did a sort of Ambrosian chant incorporating every word that has ever made a progressive feel warm and fuzzy inside: "rights" "working families" "aboriginals" "choice" "fat cats" and "social spending." It made me want to elect Silvio Berlusconi.
I did not understand any of this post, but I enjoyed all of it.
ETA: I am now envisioning a Canadian man just chanting those phrases, over and over, clapping his hands and stomping his feet.
A lot of times you can tell when someone holds a position for political reasons just by their diction.
Very true. When I was fourteen years old, there were presidential elections after Mitterand's two terms (Did I tell you I was French? I'm French.). I remember a friend saying we needed change "after fourteen years of socialism", and at the time I thought there was no way that was his opinion, and that he was merely repeating what (most likely) his father said.
I guess it's even easier to recognize talking points in kids, because it's things they would never spontaneously say. I also remember my mom pointing out that a "letter to the editor" in a Children's newspaper was probably just the kid parroting a parent, because no child would write things like that - and I was mildly embarrassed because I hadn't noticed at first. Hmm, I'll have to point that kind of stuff to my kids too.
For right-wingers, something like getting them to admit that Scandinavia is doing something right with its high tax system and consequent high happiness.
Is the causation really that clear?
The phrasing might be better in a different direction:
"...getting them to admit that Scandinavia is not doing something inherently wrong with it's high tax system, given that they have relatively high happiness and quality of life."
(in that right-wing conservatives state that high taxes inherently will cause reduction of standard of living/happiness)
Whether or not the nuclear deterrent should in fact be renewed, inability to see the point of (as opposed to mere considered disagreement with) "if you want peace, prepare for war" seems like valid proof of political derangement.
Oh, I see! You mean that a deranged liberal is likely to say "nuclear armament cannot possibly be a solution for anything in principle?" Yeah, that makes sense.
Come to think of it, the fear of anything nuclear, period, is probably a good predictor of irrationality on the left, as is a knee-jerk negative response to, i.a., GE crops.
There's an additional issue of subtlety that isn't addressed here. People will typically reveal "improper" views by starting small and seeing if their audience is sympathetic, not because they are irrational, but because they aren't stupid and they care about consequences.
That is, if I'm in some highly religious town, I'm not going to open my conversation with, "So, this whole God thing makes about as much sense as Santa Claus, am I right?" I'm going to open with, "You know, there's something about the story of Job that just doesn't sit right with me," or something else small, safe, and exploratory.
Agreed. There's another reason why people might give religion the "respect" of treating it worthy of debate, while not doing so with astrology. One might feel that religious people are taking their agendas into politics and school classrooms to the detriment of society in a way that astrologists are not, and might therefore give religionists the respect necessary to engage them in debate and hopefully change their minds.
Proposed litmus test: infanticide.
General cultural norms label this practice as horrific, and most people's gut reactions concur. But a good chunk of rationality is separating emotions from logic. Once you've used atheism to eliminate a soul, and humans are "just" meat machines, and abortion is an ok if perhaps regrettable practice ... well, scientifically, there just isn't all that much difference between a fetus a couple months before birth, and an infant a couple of months after.
This doesn't argue that infants have zero value, but instead that they should be treated more like property or perhaps like pets (rather than like adult citizens). Don't unnecessarily cause them to suffer, but on the other hand you can choose to euthanize your own, if you wish, with no criminal consequences.
Get one of your friends who claims to be a rationalist. See if they can argue passionately in favor of infanticide.
Once you've used atheism to eliminate a soul, and humans are "just" meat machines, and abortion is an ok if perhaps regrettable practice ...
Kudos to you for forthrightness. But em... no. Ok, first, it seems to me you've swept the ethics of infanticide under the rug of abortion, and left it there mostly unaddressed. Is an abortion an "ok if regrettable practice?" You've just assumed the answer is always yes, under any circumstances.
I personally say "definitely yes" before brain development (~12 weeks I think), "you need to talk to your doctor" between 12 and 24 weeks, and "not unless it's going to kill you" after 24 weeks (fully functioning brain). Anybody who knows more about development is welcome to contradict me, but those were the numbers I came up with a few years ago when I researched this.
If a baby/fetus has a mind, in my books it should be accorded rights - more and more so as it develops. I fail to see, moreover, where the dividing line ought to be in your view. Not to slippery-slope you but - why stop at infants?
*(Also note that this is a first-principles ethical argument which may have to be modified based on social ex...
Is an abortion an "ok if regrettable practice?" You've just assumed the answer is always yes, under any circumstances.
Sorry, you have a point that my test won't apply to every rationalist.
The contrast I meant was: if you look at the world population, and ask how many people believe in atheism, materialism, and that abortion is not morally wrong, you'll find a significant minority. (Perhaps you yourself are not in that group.)
But if you then try to add "believes that infanticide is not morally wrong", your subpopulation will drop to basically zero.
But, rationally, the gap between the first three beliefs, and the last one, is relatively small. Purely on the basis of rationality, you ought to expect a smaller dropoff than we in fact see. Hence, most people in the first group are avoiding the repugnant conclusion for non-rational reasons. (Or believing in the first three, for non-rational reasons.)
If you personally don't agree with the first three premises, then perhaps this test isn't accurate for you.
If a baby/fetus has a mind, in my books it should be accorded rights - more and more so as it develops. I fail to see, moreover, where the dividing line ought to be in your view. Not to slippery-slope you but - why stop at infants?
The standard answer is that at that point there is no longer a conflict with the rights of the women whose body the infant was hooked into. We don't generally require that people give up their bodily autonomy to support the life of others.
Very much agreed. This is also why we place much more moral value in the life of a severely brain-damaged human than a more intelligent non-human primate.
Despite some jokes I made earlier, things that could arguably depend on values don't make good litmus tests. Though I did at one point talk to someone who tried to convert me to vegetarianism by saying that if I was willing to eat pork, it ought to be okay to eat month-old infants too, since the pigs were much smarter. I'm pretty sure you can guess where that conversation went...
I'm pretty sure you can guess where that conversation went...
You started eating month-old infants?
Option zero: "There's an interesting story I once wrote..."
Option one: "Well then, I won't/don't eat pork. But that doesn't mean I won't eat any animals. I can be selective in which I eat."
Option two: "mmmmm... babies."
Option three: "Why can't I simply not want to eat babies? I can simply prefer to eat pigs and not babies"
Option four: "Seems like a convincing argument to me. Okay, vegetarian now." (after all, technically you said they tried, but you didn't say the failed. ;))
Option five: "actually, I already am one."
Am I missing any (somewhat) plausible branches it could have taken? More to the point, is one of the above the direction it actually went? :)
(My model of you, incidentally, suggests option three as your least likely response and option one as your most likely serious response.)
Well, not quite option two, but yes, "You make a convincing case that it should be legal to eat month-old infants." One person's modus ponens is another's modus tollens...
I actually did a presentation arguing for the legality of eating babies in a Bioethics class.
And I don't eat pigs, on moral grounds.
Option six: "I was a vegetarian, but I'm okay with eating babies, and if pigs are just as smart, it should be okay to eat them too, so you've convinced me to give up vegetarianism."
This reminds me of the elves in Dwarf Fortress. They eat people, but not animals.
I'm imagining this conversation while you're both holding menus...
In seriousness, there are good instrumental reasons not to allow people to eat month-old infants that are nothing to do with greatly valuing them in your terminal values.
No, saying a baby and a pig can be considered equally intelligent is like saying a midget and an 11-year-old can be considered equally tall.
I like this test, with the following cautions:
The regrettability of abortion is connected to the availability of birth control, and so similarly, the regrettability of infanticide should be connected to the availability of abortion. A key difference is that while birth control may fail, abortion basically doesn't. I can think of a handful of reasons for infanticide to make sense when abortion didn't, and they're all related to things like unexpected infant disability the parents aren't prepared to handle, or sudden, badly timed, unanticipated financial/family stability disasters.
In either case, given that the baby doesn't necessarily occupy privileged uterine real estate the way a fetus must, I think it makes sense to push adoption as strongly preferred recourse before infanticide reaches the top of the list. Unlike asking a woman who wants an abortion to have the baby and give it up for adoption, this imposes no additional cost on her relative to the alternative.
Additionally, I think any but the most strongly controlled permission for infanticide would lead to cases where one parent killed their baby over the desire of the other parent to keep it. It seems obvious to me that either parent's wish that the baby live - assuming they're willing to raise it or give it up for adoption, and don't just vaguely prefer that it continue being alive while the wants-it-dead parent deal with its actual care - should be a sufficient condition that it live. I might even extend this to other relatives.
Basically, this is a variant on the argument from marginal cases; infants don't differ from relatively intelligent nonhuman animals in capabilities, so they ought to have the same moral status. If it's okay to euthanize your dog, it should also be okay to euthanize your newborn.
(The most common use of the argument from marginal cases is to argue that animals deserve greater moral consideration, and not that some humans deserve less, but one man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.)
(The most common use of the argument from marginal cases is to argue that animals deserve greater moral consideration, and not that some humans deserve less, but one man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.)
Cerca 1792 after Wollstonecrafts A Vindication of the Rights of Women a philosopher name Thomas Taylor published a reductio ad absurdum/ parody entitled A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes which basically took Wollstonecrafts arguments for more gender equality and replaced women with animals. It reads more or less like an animal rights pamphlet written by Peter Singer.
any species with at least one member capable of Calculus,
Any species with at least one member who has demonstrated to humans the capability of Calculus.
So it's perfectly acceptable to use a time machine to gather your experimental subjects from before the 17th century.
Also, once a human solves the problem of friendly AI, aliens will stop abducting us and accept us as moral agents.
That's an amusing example because infanticide was extremely common among human cultures, so all good cultural relativists should be fine with this practice.
Usually there was a strong distinction between actually killing a baby (extremely wrong thing to do), and abandoning it to elements (acceptable). I'm not talking about any exotic cultures, ancient Greece and Rome and even large parts of Christian Medieval Europe practiced infant abandonment. There are even examples of Greek and Roman writers noting how strange it is that Egyptians and Jews never kill their children - perfect stuff for any cultural relativists. It was only once people switched from abandoning infants to elements to abandoning them at churches when it ceased being outright infanticide.
Anyway, pretty much the only reason babies are cute is as defense against abandonment. This shows it was never anything exceptional and was always a major evolutionary force. By some estimates up to 50% of all babies were killed or abandoned to certain death in Paleolithic societies (all such claims are highly speculative of course).
Infant abandonment is normal, and people should have the same right to abandon their babies as they always had. Especially since these days we just put them into orphanages. Choosing infanticide over abandonment is pretty pointless, so why do it?
A lot of sources can be easily found here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infanticide
A key point is that they don't need to advocate the legalization of infanticide, they just need to be able to cogently address the arguments for and against it. Personally, I think that in the US at this time optimal law might restrict abortion significantly more than it currently does and also that in many past cultural contexts efforts to outlaw or seriously deter infanticide would have been harmful. Just disentangling morality from law competently gets a person props.
Infanticide and abortion are okay, as long as doing so increases paperclip production.
However, infanticide and abortion are obviously not alone in that respect.
I'll be the first to disagree outright.
First, when a woman is pregnant but will be unable to raise her child we do not force a woman to give birth to give up the baby for adoption. This is because bringing a child to term is a painful, expensive and dangerous nine-month ordeal which we do not think women should be forced into. In what possible circumstances is infanticide ethically permissible when the baby is born, the woman has already paid the cost of pregnancy and giving birth, and adoption is an option?
In general, I'm not sure it follows from the fact that persons aren't magic that persons are less valuable than we thought. Maybe babies are just glorified goldfish. Maybe they aren't valuable in the way we thought they were. But I haven't seen that evidence.
My mother made this argument to me probably when I was in high school. Given my position as past infanticide candidate, it was an odd conversation.
Hey, now you know you were kept around because you were actually wanted, not out of a dull sense of obligation. It's like having a biological parent who is totally okay with giving up children for adoption - and stuck around!
I have said before "I'm a moderate on abortion -- I feel it should be okay up to the fifth trimester." While this does shock people into adjusting what boundaries might be considered acceptable, I no longer think it is something useful to say in most fora. Too much chance of offending people and just causing their brains to shut off.
Draw a gradient rather than a line. You don't need sharp boundaries between categories if the output of your judgment is quantitative rather than boolean. You can assign similar values to similar cases, and dissimilar values to dissimilar cases.
See also The Fallacy of Gray. Now you're obviously not falling for the one-color view, but that post also talks about what to do instead of staying with black-and-white.
I'm not sure what "arbitrary" means here. You don't seem to be using it in the sense that all preferences are arbitary.
a story in which a logician tries to argue me down a slippery slope of moral nihilism
If the nihilist makes a sufficiently circuitous argument, they can ensure that there's no step you can point to that's very wrong. But by doing so, they will make slight approximations in many places. Each such step loses an incremental amount of logical justification, and if you add up all the approximations, you'll find that they've approximated away any correlation with the premises. You don't need to avoid following the argument too far, if you appropriately increase your error bars at each step.
In short: "similar" is not a transitive relation.
Obvious truth? Maybe it is given all available information — I don't know — but certainly not given the information most people have. (And "rational truth" is just a positive-affect type error.)
I would agree, if "believes" were replaced by "is willing to entertain the hypothesis" or "doesn't think one must be a racist to believe".
What makes you think this is obvious?
Looking at the totality of facts without letting my wishes color my judgment.
The reasonable and helpful interpretation of Alicorn's question was "What evidence are you basing this strongly-held belief on?" Asserting that you are basing your belief on evidence is not an answer. We get that you think this position is tantamount to being an atheist in the past. You don't have to keep making that analogy. Instead, give us the evidence. We can handle the ugly truth if you're right.
Asserting that you are basing your belief on evidence is not an answer
Basically you are right. I tried to answer the question without saying anything which would invite a debate on the actual race/iq question.
Looking back at my response, I should have made it clear that I wasn't giving the answer Allicorn was looking for. But I admit it now.
I'm a bit torn, but I will try to put together a blog post which lays out my case and link to it.
I honestly wish I never saw the damn thing.
This sounds like you're a bit too scared that it has an "unnatural" explanation. If it did happen, there's a normal explanation for it. Curious, yes, scared, no.
No, I don't believe in UFOs either
Sometimes things are in flight and the observers can't identify them. What we don't believe in is paranormal or space alien explanations for UFOs.
I've seen undiscriminating skepticism applied to doubting the reports of slightly weird things in the sky.
Of course, once you pick a test you have to keep it secret - a well known test will be memorized as a shibboleth.
Talk to the experts in psychometrics, and they'll tell you that this is still an open question. It was a plurality (not majority or consensus) view in psychometrics that there was some genetic influence (beyond the obvious, e.g. black skin attracting discrimination, etc) back in 1984, but since then there has been other work that changes the picture, e.g. that of James Flynn, Will Dickens, and Richard Nisbett. It's unclear what a poll done today would reveal.
The experiments that would give huge likelihood ratios just haven't been done. Transracial adoption studies have been very few, flawed in design, and delivered conflicting results. And so far, genomics has revealed almost nothing positive about the genetic architecture of intelligence in any ethnicity, much less differences between ethnicities. Cheap genome sequencing may well bring answers there in the next 5-7 years, pinning down this debate with utterly overwhelming evidence, but it hasn't done so yet.
I think it's also important to mention that not having a (strong) opinion on something may be the best (rational) thing to do, when things are not so clear.
For many things (say, the AGW controversy) it's not so clear-cut as to where to find the 'truth' (I do happen to find it more likely that there is a thing called AGW and that it really could lead to great problems... but to what extent? Hard to say). Saying that you don't know may sometimes be the best answer.
Now all we need is a test to separate 'I don't know' from ignorance to 'I don't know' because your epistemic error margins are too big...
(btw, I found this an excellent article)
I don't believe in UFOs.
To my own great embarrassment, I have experienced a "UFO sighting". It was in the late 1990s in Phoenix, Arizona. What I saw was 7 or 8 bright orbs in the shape of a triangle traveling very slowly over the Phoenix/Scottsdale area (which is why I thought it was a blimp at first). After about a minute and comparing it to a nearby mountain I decided that it couldn't possibly be a blimp. The length and width were way too large. Next, I thought that perhaps it was flares, but after watching it for about 10 more minutes was sure they they had either floated higher into the sky or stayed the same altitude and were still in the same configuration with respect to each other (an isosceles triangle).
Before my personal experience, I had assumed that the people on those ridiculous documentary shows on the Discovery Channel were simply fools or people suffering from a psychological illness. I wasn't the kind of person who believed in that stuff. The next day I started questioning if I even saw it (after all, I would probably has ridiculed someone who told me they saw such a thing the previous day). It must have been a mistake. A few months later, I rationalized it by telling myself that it had been a dream. This worked until my mother (who also saw it) reminded me about something that happened on that same day.
Well, not believing in "UFOs" is just silly to start. They are definitely up there. The disagreement is usually over what they are.
You should certainly not be embarrassed. What you describe doesn't even rank as a sign of foolishness or psychological illness. Probably at worst it means you're not used to looking at aerial phenomena, so you couldn't identify it. On a bad day, it's taken me a little while to identify the Moon.
If you would have discounted as crazy someone who made a report like you just did, that was a rationalist error. Strangely moving lights in the sky are often reported by multiple witnesses and captured on videotape.
it is a grave mistake to believe that ultra-rationality means immediate dismissal of sensory experiences that (currently) have no good explanation.
My father was once involved in an UFO sighting - he built the UFO, and did the sound effects too, when the other kids got close. Summer camp was involved.
Hope no one ever told those kids it was a flock of birds...
Nothing that travels from one star to another has cause to be scared of us. If they're worried about future war, they'd just wipe us out, and in any case wouldn't do fancy acrobatics with their exterior lights on.
I have heard it suggested, in jest, that abduction and anal-probing of humans found alone on rural roads is a sign that even societies sufficiently advanced to travel between solar systems still can't figure out how to efficiently allocate research grant money.
People will come here and think that Less Wrong doesn't really care. I realize that people in these threads are providing arguments, but they seem too calm and impartial, given the issues involved.
You mean not appearing to have been mind-killed is a bad thing?
Did anyone read this post and worry whether they're one of the poseurs and not one of the true-blooded rationalists?
I could believe I'm a poseur with respect to this group, i.e. adopting the opinions of the average Less Wrong reader without doing much thinking myself. But this might be rational in the case of issues where the average Less Wrong reader has done more thinking than me, right?
But I do propose that before you give anyone credit for being a smart, rational skeptic, that you ask them to defend some non-mainstream belief. And no, atheism doesn't count as non-mainstream anymore, no matter what the polls show. It has to be something that most of their social circle doesn't believe, or something that most of their social circle does believe which they think is wrong.
Maybe we should have a thread where we all do this? Heh, what a cult initiation ceremony that would be: loudly proclaim to the cult what they're wrong about.
What makes you think this is obvious? While racial IQ differences certainly aren't ruled out a priori (Ashkenazi Jews are the quintessential example), Occamian reasoning about the black/white divide doesn't indicate that genetics is part of the best and most parsimonious explanation. There are adequate other factors at work - you can pick up a lot of data from studies on things like stereotype threat, for instance. And the fact that biracial children do better on IQ when the mother is the white parent than when the mother is black seems strong evidence to me that genetics are not the whole story, if they play any part at all.
What sort of human variable doesn't correlate with race? Are any of weight, height, blood pressure, athletic ability, or any other more measurable characteristic uncorrelated? How about if we measure these at birth, to work around environmental effects?
Athletic ability at birth isn't really all that variable. Besides, "at birth" doesn't eliminate in utero environmental effects.
Correlation with race does not mean genetic causation. Having 100% recent African ancestry correlates highly with living in Africa.
This would predict that the difference would be seen in biracial boys, but not in biracial girls. I've never heard anything to that effect - have you?
It is not evidence for that at all
It may not be proof, but it's certainly evidence.
renatal environment, which is determined by the mother's genetics exclusively.
Err, what? Smoking? Just to name the most obvious counter example.
Mitochondrial DNA would also be a possibility ("white" mitochondria being optimized for neurons, "black" mitochondria for muscle cells, say), but environmental factors seems by far the most obvious explanation.
the prenatal environment, which is determined by the mother's genetics exclusively.
I don't know about exclusively.
I honestly wish I never saw the damn thing.
I totally empathize with the psychology, but there's no good reason to regret seeing it. You saw something you didn't understand. You still don't understand it. Such things will happen. I think it's admirable that you hope for a rational explanation even when one isn't forthcoming - moreover, in the teeth of our human need for some explanation, even if it's a bad one.
To extend on Eliezer's point here, it's trivially easy to be a skeptic when the believer's epistemic position is foreign to you. Much harder when you're the experiencer-of-experiences, and the object of scrutiny.
We're nearly all of us materialists here; how many of us would still be if we had a powerful religious experience? And yet we (rightly) reject the truth claims of people who have had such experiences.
There was a time that I prayed intensely and experienced the presence of God on a nearly daily basis. Reading identical reports from people of other religions and learning about the many frailties of the brain helped me greatly to discount these experiences.
I hope I don't sound too effusive if I say that's borderline heroic.
But yeah, I suppose if you read "The Varieties of Religious Experience" or some other such book, you realize pretty fast that an experience like that is not really evidence.
I'm nonetheless surprised at your ability to do that calculus, as opposed to just closing the book. It impresses me almost as much as, say, the family of a murder victim speaking up in the defendant's cause. You were surely working through the Venus-of-Willendorf of all biases (I would imagine).
We're nearly all of us materialists here; how many of us would still be if we had a powerful religious experience?
I once experienced "Hag syndrome", I must have been around eleven. I woke up during the night, unable to move and convinced I had a witch sitting on me.
The next day when I could think about it in bright daylight I thought it was kinda cool that my brain could make me believe something so clearly supernatural, but it seemed just as obvious it had only been the same kind of thing as a nightmare, only more powerful. I didn't mention it to my parents or anything, just filed it as "one of those things". (It was downright scary at the time though; I don't recommend the experience, which as you can see still, um, haunts me.)
To what extent does "ability to choose the right tribe" mitigate "undiscriminating skepticism"? There are lots of different tribes with different beliefs, and people often explicitly choose what tribe to affiliate with...
As far as I can tell, "not-mainstream" (for the right value of "mainstream") is almost always a huge hurdle to overcome...
You're proving taw's point. You are so eager to find faults that you don't even double check long enough to realize that the table is ordered form poorest to wealthiest. If that's not selective perception I don't know what is.
Poincare said: “To doubt everything or to believe everything are two equally convenient solutions; both dispense with the necessity of reflection.”
biracial children do better on IQ when the mother is the white parent than when the mother is black
.
Actually, there is some evidence that many intelligence genes are carried on the X chromosome.
So, there's four cases, which I will give names: boy with a black mom and white dad ("Joe"), boy with white mom and black dad ("Rob"), girl with black mom and white dad ("Sal"), and girl with white mom and black dad ("Eve").
Joe has a black X chromosome and a white Y chromosome.
Rob has a white X chromosome and a black Y chromosome.
Sal and Eve both have one black and one white X chromosome.
If X chromosomes have lots of intelligence-related genes, and if white parents contribute smarter chromosomes than black parents do, then there's no difference between Sals and Eves (they've both got one of each), but Robs should be smarter than Joes on average, because Rob has his g-loaded genes from a white parent and Joe doesn't.
...using a similar method of estimating probabilities based on my knowledge, common sense, etc., I am satisfied that...
This statement is roughly equivalent to "My opinions on topic X are soundly arrived at". Show, don't tell.
In the instance, the blog where you said you were going to publish "evidence and arguments" in support of the above view has, to a first approximation, zero useful or interesting content at this time. Meanwhile you have wasted the time and attention of many LW readers as you submitted cupholder to an interrogation that would have tried anyone's patience.
I wish you'd stop doing that.
That adds some weight. But it's still not particularly convincing. Even assuming he's not being intentionally deceptive or deceptively cut (which I'm not sure is true), it's not anything close to extraordinary evidence, as a claim like that requires.
Remember that witnesses perceptions and memories will be distorted. Clearly, events were confused (look at his statement at 4:39, where he's confused on whether he's standing on a landing or hanging). He "knows" he heard explosions, apparently based on his experience as "a boiler guy"; even setting aside the possibility of actual explosions from (eg) fuel oil tanks, it's certainly possible that he mistook other sound associated with a massive fire and collapsing building for explosions. The devastation, dead bodies, etc, are likewise consequences of the fires and damage.
There is some evidence supporting the conspiracy theory, but it's not nearly enough to outweigh the low prior and evidence against it.
I've used AI as a sniff test many times (>10 tests), along with better-than-human humans (posthumans) and engineered immortality (SENS). Very few people, even those who are smart and educated, are able to argue against them rationally. Every time I've been given more than 10 minutes to discuss the point with someone who disagrees they're possible, it comes down to some sort of mystical mysteriousness which humankind cannot fathom or recreate. Quite often (>20%), it's even revealed a religiosity in the person they don't express in any other way apparent to me (god of the gaps).
Sorry if this is overly tangential, but as a sex educator I'm interested to know what you all think are your tribal beliefs around sexuality, and what kind of sexuality-related arguments would lead you to consider someone to be defending a non-mainstream belief.
Heh. My tribal beliefs are from reading Spider Robinson books as a teen. Ciphergoth is an example of the sort of person I grew up thinking of as normal, and I've always felt a little guilty about not being bisexual. You have to get up pretty early in the morning to go outside that mainstream, which is one reason I went to the lengths of postulating legalized rape in Three Worlds Collide.
I'm sure you know this, but I don't think it makes any sense to think you should enjoy X.
Why doesn't it make sense? If there were a pill to turn me bisexual, I'd take it, modulo the fact that in general I take almost no pills (it'd have to be really really safe, but I hold all mind-affecting substances to that standard, don't drink etcetera, it's not a special case for the bisexuality pill).
I'm somewhat sympathetic to that idea (I haven't felt guilty about being straightish, but I've wished I were more bisexual once in a while, and succeeded in pushing myself in that direction in some cases), but I'm curious now: is gender the only dimension you'd apply that to? Would you also take a pill (again assuming it's really really safe) that would make all outward physical attributes irrelevant to how attractive you find someone? Would you take a pill that would make you enjoy every non-harmful sexual practice/fetish (not necessarily seeking them out, but able to enjoy it if a partner initiated it)?
(I originally started writing this comment thinking something like "hmm, I'd take the bi-pill, but let's take that reasoning to its vaguely-logical conclusion and see if it's still palatable", but now I'm actually thinking I'd probably take both of those pills too.)
Well, to ask the non-mainstream-relative-to-this-community version of the question, ask "Would I take the loli pill?"
If it meant the former, I would take the loli pill if the (unlikely) circumstances called for it. Why not? If it meant the latter, then you would have to tell your libido "no" a lot, but it wouldn't necessarily lead to doing bad things. I doubt it would be worth the hassle, though, except in very special circumstances.
Actually, the biggest drawback to either version of the loli pill would probably be how society would react if they ever found out. It probably wouldn't matter if the one you're sleeping with is really 700 years old; you'd still get put on every sex offender registry out there, and shunned vigorously, at the very least. People are damn tense on this subject. Just look at how much trouble Christopher Handley got in for his manga collection.
Edit: I felt pretty uncomfortable writing this post, even though I know I shouldn't be. Looks like this really is a good question.
How do you distinguish the sort of fun it's worth changing your values to enjoy from the sort of fun (like wireheading) it's worth not having access to?
Of course, it's nothing like half the fun you're missing. Adding a gender would increase your fun by less than 100% since it's not that different in many ways. Adding all the sexual variation in the world would be a humongous amount of fun, but you'd start to hit diminishing returns after a while.
Technically, given that most people are heterosexual, Woody Allen's quote - "The good thing about being bisexual is that it doubles your chance of a date on a Saturday night." - is inaccurate. It only increases your chances by the percentage of people of your gender who are open to same-sex encounters.
I think I have enough evidence to say this confidently without unfairly stereotyping: On balance, gay men are so much more promiscuous than straight women that being bisexual really might double or triple the opportunities for a man to have sex. But your point is well taken and certainly applies to chances for a monogamous relationship.
Point of curiosity if anyone knows the answer: How promiscuous are bisexual men and do they tend to have more m-m than m-f sex because the m-m sex is much easier to obtain? If not, why not?
deny that there even are true bisexual men.
I, meanwhile, am not entirely sure that there are straight women.
(Every woman I have met has fallen into one of the following categories: 1) She would not know if she were non-straight, due to inadequate self-examination or understanding of the concept of orientation. 2) I would not know if she were not straight, due to not having a close enough relationship with her or due to social constraints on her end preventing her from being out or due to the topic never having come up. 3) I know her to be bisexual, gay, asexual, or some other non-straight sexuality.)
Counterexamples are welcome to present themselves, of course.
Reminds me of a study I read about. They basically showed men and women different types of porn and measured genital arousal. The results were straightforward for men: if they identified as straight, girl-on-girl porn caused the greatest arousal, girl-on-guy was ok, and guy-on-guy caused almost no arousal. For gay men, the results were reversed. For girls, there were no simple categories, and their identification as straight or gay didn't predict which images would be the biggest turn-on.
The thread seems to be resurrected, so I'll present myself. :)
I am a cissexual slightly genderqueer exclusively androsexual monogamously married woman. I think about sexuality and orientation a lot. Including my own. I don't recall ever being sexually or romantically attracted to a woman. Intellectually, monosexuality seems a little weird to me, but nevertheless it seems to describe me. In fact I think of my monosexuality as a gender fetish, but I hesitate to apply that paradigm to other people's monosexuality.
So there is actually new evidence since we had this conversation. Bisexual men do exist! Past studies found that the men they studied who identified as bisexual weren't.
The different results are likely due to the different procedures used to determine the participant pool. The 2005 study took it's sample of bisexual men mainly from college campus LGBTQ student associations while the more recent study advertised on craigslist M/F for M and, on top of that, refused to include anyone whose claim to bisexuality they didn't believe.
I think I have enough evidence to say this confidently without unfairly stereotyping: On balance, straight men are so turned on by the idea of girl on girl sex that being bisexual really might double or triple the opportunities for a woman to have sex.
Well, not really. The having enough evidence part at least.
I'll settle for the bisexuality pill, an attractive female-shaped body (including the "vagina-shaped penis"), some time to get used to moving around in it, and the capacity for having multiple orgasms. "Gay man in a woman's body" is close enough for my purposes. ;)
Someone who believes that homosexuality is not immoral, but believes it is a dysfunction.
Actually I have more answers, but this question is just too toxic. So I'll go meta: Anyone who responds to this question either by saying that rationality is indicated either by signalling acceptance of more-outlandish sexuality, or by signalling intolerance, is indicating their own irrationality; they are turning this question into a tribal test.
There's a large community where you are expected to be open to anything except sex with children; and a large community where you are expected to not be open to anything except sex between a monogomous man and woman.
I'm not arguing whether either of these points of view is valid. But both have enough adherents that no position that can be characterized entirely as more liberal or less liberal can identify its holder as rational. Therefore, anyone who says that such a position (for instance, being open to polyamory) indicates rationality, is merely stating their tribal affiliation. The fact that they think that such a stance demonstrates rationality in fact demonstrates their irrationality.
I can think of a few possible exceptions (sexual practices that are far enough beyond the pale that even tongue-pierced goths disclaim them, yet which have no rational basis for being banned), but they're too toxic for me to mention.
Therefore, anyone who says that such a position (for instance, being open to polyamory) indicates rationality, is merely stating their tribal affiliation.
"Merely" is incorrect. If people are employing consistent justifications for their beliefs, that indicates rationality. If their beliefs rely on inconsistent justifications, then they are not.
Suppose I believe polyamory is OK, because I believe that sex between consenting parties will make people happier. If you provided me with overwhelming evidence that most people who practice polyamory are especially miserable specifically because they practice polyamory, that would test my rationality. If I continue to be OK with it, I have an inconsistent belief system. If I cease being OK with it, I am consistently adhering to my beliefs.
Conversely, suppose I believe, "Homosexual sex is wrong because two men can't procreate." If you point out, "Post-menopausal women can't procreate," then, if I say, "Well, they shouldn't have sex either!" then I may be a bit crazy, but I'm consistent. If I say, "Well, that's different" without providing a very specific "that's different" princi...
If this observation is correct, beliefs about sexuality are a very strong indicator of rationality.
The problem is if the supposedly rational beliefs also happen to be the tribal belief system of a large, pre-existing tribe. Then someone was rational, sometime back in the history, but it isn't necessarily the person you're talking to right now.
A better test would be to ask them to defend a sexual view of theirs that they see as unconventional, or at least, not a typical view of their tribe as yet.
If you uploaded, would you be willing to let someone else eat your body if they were, y'know, into that sort of thing?
If you wanted to kill yourself you could satisfy the desires of quite a few fringe people at once: have a psychopath kill you, a necrophiliac rape you, and a cannibal eat you. Hell, if done under the right medical supervision it might even be possible to save the organs too (of course, if I were a cannibal I'd probably be bummed out if I didn't get any liver).
I am constantly amazed by the number of people who commit suicide without getting on the evening news.
Hey, good idea. New question for getting evidence of rationality: "How do you feel about cannibalism? Not killing people, just the act of eating human meat. Imagine that the meat was vat-grown, or you're a starving survivor of a plane crash, or something."
I remember once reading Richard Stallman saying that when he dies, if his body cannot be used for medical research, he would want it to be used for cannibalism or necrophilia.
A rather weird thing to say, but on reflection, not quite as weird as people's usual thoughts on death — "I want my body to be put into the ground so it can decompose" or "I want my body to be burned so it can be of no use to anybody" — right?
Well, along with medical research, organ donation and cryonics also probably exceed the expected utility of cannibalism or necrophilia.
That said, I'm not sure they would be mutually exclusive. My head for my future self, my innards for the sick, my penis and anus for lovers, and my arms and legs for the hungry.
My head for my future self, my innards for the sick, my penis and anus for lovers, and my arms and legs for the hungry.
NEW UTILITARIAN LITMUS TEST
Emotionally, I feel I have two tribes: the meatspace upper-middle-class collegiate culture and my Internet circle of acquaintances.
In the meatspace tribe, vanilla heterosexuality or homosexuality are considered normal and unremarkable, things like 2 girls 1 cup, goatse, etc. are considered disgusting/gross-out material - and I cannot remember anyone acknowledging anything else.
In the Internet tribe, sexual relations of any kind between consenting adults are considered fine provided that they are carried out in private, sexual intercourse between teenage minors is considered normal (fine or not may vary), and crossing the line ... well, I haven't heard Snape/Hermione strongly condemned, but pedophilia is definitely out. I note that no-one I know talks about anything involving permanent damage, however.
Hi Clarisse, and Welcome to LessWrong! I've seen your blog, and I'm happy to see you commenting here. (I comment as "Doug S." on various feminism-related blogs - I'm not very prolific, but you may have seen a couple here and there.)
The problem with discussing racial differences is that when people say "black", they're already making inherent assumptions about genetics. "Black" incorporates an incredible amount of genetic diversity, far more than the label "white". The common error in these debates is that an awful lot of the population will see the label "black" and fail to distinguish between all people labelled as such. People distinguish between, say, east Asians and south-east Asians and Indians, but they say "black" as if all of Africa are the same.
Look at the performance at the Olympics running races. Would you note the fact that "100m winners are always black"? Would you be willing to make the statement that "black people are naturally better sprinters"? How about distance runners? As it turns out, the good sprinters are usually Jamaican or African-American, with little success from Africa itself. The good distance runners almost entirely come from the Nandi area of Kenya - hardly representative of Africa as a whole. Plenty of areas of Africa have fewer good runners, and probably lots of areas have just the same proportion as Europea...
The problem with discussing racial differences is that when people say "black", they're already making inherent assumptions about genetics. "Black" incorporates an incredible amount of genetic diversity, far more than the label "white".
I don't see why this is necessarily a problem. For example, if I observed that generally speaking, the South is warmer than Minnesota, I would be correct even though the South incorporates a lot more geographic diversity than Minnesota.
People distinguish between, say, east Asians and south-east Asians and Indians, but they say "black" as if all of Africa are the same.
For purposes of this discussion, it's a reasonable category. If there were a large subgroup of blacks which was highly intelligent, then it might be appropriate to use different categories.
Would you note the fact that "100m winners are always black"?
Generally speaking, yes.
Would you be willing to make the statement that "black people are naturally better sprinters"?
Probably not, since sprinting ability seems concentrated in a subgroup of blacks. (Relatively) low intelligence does not seem to be this way.
Perha...
The kind that comes from more than a single person, for a start. An unequivocal sign of a conspiracy (like an actual explosive attached to a support).
Failing that, a report free of clear signs of confusion (like the aforementioned confusion at 4:39). Reports of explosions from people actually familiar with explosions, and/or experience and a track record of cool under threat ("a boiler guy" and bureaucrat don't qualify, without more of a evidence). A witness who hasn't changed his story back and forth. Etcetera.
You're now not only assuming aliens, but also assuming aliens with a peculiar psychology. Parsimony is dropping fast.
A cultural explanation could exclude a genetic one. Simply put, the culture transmitted by black parents is not conducive to intellectual growth, just as the culture transmitted by Ashkenazi Jews is conducive to intellectual growth. This would also explain Alicorn's example, as the mother is more likely to do most of the cultural transmission, it would explain that data.
I'm not advocating this position, and I'm certainly not generalizing about every single member of a very large group, but this would explain the observed discrepancy and data without requiring a genetic basis. The actual explanation is doubtlessly more complicated; the point is that there are certainly other ways of explaining observed data that do not rely on genetics. That doesn't mean that genetics isn't a factor, only that it's not the case that it must be a significant one.
Also, while we're at it, I hate the term "significant." It's one of the most effective weasel words in existence.
If I wanted to claim that any one of these factors plays a significant role in the difference, I'd need to provide evidence. Because genetics is hard to see and so directly intertwined with other factors (the parents wh...
On reflection, polyamory really is just wrong. Count me as a skeptic on this unnatural alliance.
(Yes, yes, I can hear the comebacks already: "Playing with the use-mention distinction" isn't "everything in life, you know".)
Geh - It's the new "pun".
"polyamory" really is just wrong.
Really? Do you have the same problem with "television"? What about zoological binomial nomenclature?
That's only if you feel you need to rely on scientific studies to reach conclusions. Some things don't require such a study.
Yes, but you have to be super careful when deciding which things need scientific studies.
A few years ago I would've said women were so much more chatty than men - and that the difference in chattiness was so obvious - that it would be a waste of time to check it out scientifically. But sometimes, when you check things out systematically, you're surprised. I think the argument about blacks, whites and IQ is a bit like that, although that argument is more about the cause of the differences and not their mere existence.
From what I can tell of your blog post, you said, "there's evidence, it's so obvious, people have alternative explanations but they're bogus, there's evidence, I bet whites do better than blacks on tests, there's tons of evidence."
Where's the evidence?
Here's Rushton and Jensen making their best case for significant genetic influences on intergroup differences in a 2005 review article, and a critical response from Richard Nisbett, one of the leading proponents of the hypothesis that there are no significant B-W genetic differences. Taken together, they are much more informative than selective presentations by amateurs.
I agree that the idea of skin-color defined races as the units you should look for genetic variation between is unhelpful in the context of pure science, but if you politically define all sub-par outcomes compared to the privileged group that are not caused by genes (or something else politically defined as untouchable) as needing to be fixed you need to know about genetic differences between politically defined groups to make sensible decisions.
I don't think we're qualified to answer this last set of questions.
We're qualified to inquire into any topic that seems worthy of curiosity.
There seems to be much convergent evidence that people who self-identify as "black" tend to test more poorly on some standard measures of cognitive ability than do people who self-identify as "white", and I don't think acknowledging that makes someone racist.
I'm in violent agreement with you that a) self-identification as a member of some ethnic group is a cultural phenomenon, not obviously related to any "natural kinds" or empirical clusters, b) standard measures of cognitive ability are a very poor proxy for what we may generally think of as "competencies", whereby individual humans contribute value to the world, c) it's unclear even if the 'genetic' claim were established as fact what influence it should have on social policies.
If we think about a) clearly enough we might be able to dissolve the confusing term "race" and that seems perhaps a worthy goal. If we think about b) clearly we might be able to dissolve the confusing term "intelligence" and its cortege of mysterious questions, and if we think about c) clearly enough the mysterious questions of ethics.
Isn't that what this site has been about all along?
I wish to explicitly distance myself from the analogy you use. The implications are not desirable (and in a way that is not quite accurate either).
And what scientific theories are these categories part of?
I really don't think science has much to do with the bulk (or strength) of objections you will get on this subject. You're doing yourself no good by continuing to argue about it. Even the terrible arguments made against you will receive positive support by virtue of being sandwitched between two of yours - reading need not be involved.
It is probably better to make the ethnic-group references a bit more specific than a two category split. It is fairly clear what 'black/white' labels refer to in co...
My prior is based on the following:
-Mitochondrial DNA has 16,569 base pairs but only 13 of them code for protein (and most of those are dedicated to the electron transport chain, a pretty darn fundamental thing), so while the mutation rate of mtDNA is higher than nuclear DNA there's a limited number of possible variations that will have an effect. There's also a very constrained number of functional changes; most mutations of the protein-coding genes correspond to known mitochondrial diseases, which vary in their effects but do so on the basis of impaired ...
Your debating style resembles more an interrogation than a friendly discussion, and this I consider rude, but it may be only my personal feeling.
More importantly, you deliberately derailed the debate about racial differences in IQ asking about cupholder's religious beliefs, while being apparently not interested in the question. It seemed to me that the purpose of the long debate was only to prepare positions for your final argument again about racial differences in IQ. This is also on my list of rude behaviour. I don't like people asking questions in orde...
I'll try and clarify with the non-race and IQ related example that first put the idea into my head: gravity. The idea of things falling to the floor is so obvious to me, and agrees so well with my common sense, that I would not even bother to debate somebody who wanted to argue that things don't fall to the floor. That's the behaviour I'm saying it's a good idea to be super careful about: rejecting challenges to your existing view out of hand.
Stepping back to the race and IQ argument, I'm saying that I would exercise a lot of care before I put the argument...
Consider the point Brazil was making in the context, by making the claim more realistically comparable now to making the "no God" claim some time ago.
I think it is really important that we bring up the fact that the statement we're arguing about is fundamentally [religiously intollerant] and treating this question as just a question of fact lends way too much respectability to the question.
I would expect similar social pressure for the God question historically (in a god-denying but PC heavy context). It seems to me that the comparison is an accurate one.
In this discussion you have waited for other people to bring forward the very kind of evidence that underpins your claims, which, seeing as you were the one making a claim in the first place, was your responsibility. From where I sit you're the one who is causing others to waste their time. Your contributions have been vague and overbroad, those of your interlocutors precise and information-rich.
Why should we pay attention to you?
How can you reason about the motives of alien interstellar travelers? Maybe they've been poking holes in my socks and interfering with my TV reception.
Past singularity we have the technology to make people intelligent and therefore intelligence can't be truly innate.
And it would be correct.
Is hair color innate?
variance of a trait within a given population that's due to genetics
which is a completely meaningless concept and cannot be measured.
Twin studies etc?
Huh, I had completely forgotten that P&T did an anti-cryonics bit. Disappointing. On the other hand, their basic point ("Why not spend that $125,000 on hookers?") reminded me of Reedspacer's Lower Bound.
I think this is wrong: saying you'd yell real loud or call the police or break the game somehow is exactly the right response. It shows that someone is engaging with the problem as a serious moral one,
It is not clear to me that that is a more "right" response than engaging with the problem as a pedagogic tool in a way that aligns with the expectations of the person who set it to me. Indeed, I'm inclined to doubt it.
In much the same way: if I'm asked to multiply 367 by 1472 the response I would give in the real world is to launch a calculator a...
"Choosing infanticide over abandonment is pretty pointless, so why do it?" "Killing another living thing doesn't qualify as "euthanasia" if you do it for your benefit, not that being's."
I once was a friend with a boy with a progressive muscular dystrophy. It is a degenerative disease, where gradually, Your muscles stop wor...
If not, can you summarize your arguments in favor of choosing B?
Well, if I choose B, I'll be alive for a very large number of years. I'll be alive so long, that I expect that I'll get used to anything deployed to torture me. And I'll be alive so long, I'd need to study a fair amount of cosmology just to understand what my lifetime will involve, by way of the deaths and rebirths of whole universes or whatever. Some of that would be interesting to see.
The easy thought experiment would be dust speck vs. 3 years of torture followed by death. I think there, I'd go with the speck.
I'll be alive so long, that I expect that I'll get used to anything deployed to torture me.
Is this based on the experience of torture victims? I think that "get used to" would more closely resemble "catatonic" than "unperturbed." I don't think your ability to be interested would survive very long.
One thing I'm afraid of is that the forces of political correctness would only permit inquiring into sensitive topics as long as the questions are framed and definitions (of things such as "intelligence") redefined to such a state, that it's not possible to get a politically incorrect answer, facts be damned.
Is it irrational to find it quite troubling that someone you're talking to would want to discuss the issue of whether one race is inferior to another race, for any reason?
I don't know if it's "irrational", but I find it troublin...
So before the 19th century a rationalist could not reasonably conclude that the atheistic position is correct?
Do you really take this to be a reasonable interpretation / inference based on what Morendil said?
I think we might just have to stop feeding the troll.
I've been following Alicorn's sequence on luminousness, that is, on getting to know ourselves better. I had lowered my estimate of my own rationality when she mentioned that we tend to think too highly of ourselves, but now I can bump my estimate back up. There is at least one belief which my tribe elevates to the rank of scientific fact, yet which I think is probably wrong: I do not believe in the Big Bang.
Of course, I don't believe the universe was created a few thousand years ago either. I don't have any plausible alternative hypothesis, I just think th...
There is no particular reason to assume that if the stars are moving away from each other right now, then they must always have done so. They could be expanding and contracting in a sort of sine wave, or something more complicated.
The key is there at the end of your quote. From the first set of observations (of relatively close galaxies), the simplest behavior that explained the observations was that everything was flying apart fast enough to overcome gravity. This predicted that when they had the technology to look at more distant galaxies, these too should be flying away from us, and at certain rates depending on their distance.
When we actually could observe those more distant galaxies, we did in fact see them red-shifted as predicted. This alone should be enough to put the "sine wave" theory in the epistemic category of "because the Dark Lords of the Matrix like red shifts", because the light left these galaxies at all different times! It would take a vast conspiracy for them all to line up as red-shifted right now, from our perspective.
With strong evidence in hand that the galaxies had been flying apart for billions and billions of years, the scientis...
You win. I did not realize that we knew that galaxies have been flying apart for billions and billions of years, as opposed to just right now. If something has been going on for so long, I agree that the simplest explanation is that it has always been going on, and this is precisely the conclusion which I thought popular science books took for granted.
Your other arguments only hammer the nail deeper, of course. But I notice that they have a much smaller impact on my unofficial beliefs, even thought they should have a bigger impact. I mean, the fact that the expansion has been going on for at least a billion years is a weaker evidence for the Big Bang than the fact that it predicts the cosmic background radiation and the age of the universe.
I take this as an opportunity to improve the art of rationality, by suggesting that in the case where an unofficial belief contradicts an official belief, one should attempt to find what originally caused the unofficial belief to settle in. If this original internal argument can be shown to be bogus, the mind should be less reluctant to give up and align with the official belief.
Of course, I'm forced to generalize from the sole example I've noticed so far, so for the time being, please take this suggestion with a grain of salt.
I prefer the meme where you've just won by learning something new; you now know more than most people about the justifications for Big Bang cosmology, in addition to (going meta) the sort of standards for evidence in physics, and (most meta and most importantly) how your own mind works when dealing with counterintuitive claims. I won too, because I had to look up (for the first time) some claims I'd taken for granted in order to respond adequately to your critique.
I take this as an opportunity to improve the art of rationality
Good idea! It's especially helpful, I think, that you're writing out your reactions and your analysis of how it feels to update on new evidence. We haven't recorded nearly as much in-the-moment data as we ought on what it's like to change one's mind...
When two people argue, and they both realize who is actually right, without drama or flaring tempers, then everybody wins. Even people down the block who weren't participating at all, a bit; they don't know it yet, but their world has become slightly awesomer.
but now I can bump my estimate back up. There is at least one belief which my tribe elevates to the rank of scientific fact, yet which I think is probably wrong: I do not believe in the Big Bang.
I don't think we can reasonably elevate our estimate of our own rationality by observing that we disagree with the consensus of a respected community.
Second, the background radiation which is said to be leftover stray photons from the big bang. If the background radiation was a prediction of Big Bang theory, then I might have been convinced by this experimental evidence, but in fact the background radiation was discovered by accident. Only afterwards did the proponents of Big Bang theory retrofit it as a prediction of their model.
I am wary of this kind of argument. I should not be able to discredit a theory by the act of collecting all possible evidence and publishing before they have a chance to think things through.
If the background radiation was a prediction of Big Bang theory, then I might have been convinced by this experimental evidence, but in fact the background radiation was discovered by accident. Only afterwards did the proponents of Big Bang theory retrofit it as a prediction of their model.
Not true; Alpher & Gamow predicted the radiation, although they were off by a few kelvins.
there is no particular reason to assume that if the stars are moving away from each other right now, then they must always have done so. They could be expanding and contracting in a sort of sine wave, or something more complicated.
True, but this lacks parsimony, & the mechanism by which the "sine wave" (or whatever) could be produced is unknown. The universe is expanding now, implying some force behind the expansion. Gravity is attractive only. Celestial objects almost all have net electric charge as close to 0 as makes no odds, so they do not repel each other. The strong nuclear force is always attractive too. You see what I mean? What could possibly cause the outward oscillation, if not extreme density? It's not like when stars come close to each other they suddenly feel a repulsio...
A single eyewitness account, presumable handpicked and stagemanaged by people with an agenda, does not make particularly strong evidence.
Okay. Here is the enumerated list of what I consider to be non-human intelligences, ranked in order of decreasing intelligence, by the measure I deem most appropriate:
Clippys
You need to define what you mean with molecular self-organization. presumably you don't believe that some supernatural force is involved in arranging water molecules in snow flakes.
If alien ships actually got close enough to earth to observe, they would quickly notice that you annihilate each other based on minor differences in your makeup, realize that they are far more different, and then decide it's in their best interest to leave immediately before they are detected.
They don't have telescopes? They can't watch our TV? If the aliens need to hover around in front of some Idaho farm boy and maybe give him an anal probe in order to figure out that humans are sometimes violent, they're idiots.
You can always make up some loophole. Ockham's razor should mitigate against it though.
I cannot answer for Eliezer, but I can (perhaps) explain why the belief is "visibly insane".
Awesome. =]
If say, "This isn't about a test of rationality itself, but a test for true free-thinking. All good rationalists must be free-thinkers, but not all free-thinkers are necessarily good rationalists", is that a good summary?
Here's a discussion of this post at the James Randi forums. Reaction seems net negative with high variance: http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=5726673
If you disagree with your tribe, you get rationality points for independent thinking; but you lose rationality points for failing to update. Is the total positive or negative?
Unfortunately cupholder was rather evasive in our discussion.
Evidence please.
I see one answer to one of your questions in this atheism discussion that I answered in a cutesy way - though I still think my implication there was quite clear. For your other questions in this subthread I either replied in enough detail to answer your questions, where they were relevant (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8), or pointed out that your question was underspecified or had a false premise.
That's his fault not mine.
If you felt my answers to your questions were unsatisfactory, it wo...
If God really were love, praying would be a complete waste of time. I suspect such statements are not actually expressions of factual content.
Not according to the Richard Carrier definition of "supernatural", which I would argue is a more accurate interpretation of the term.
Ditto for global surface temperatures. Take the temperature label off the graph and tell people it's the dollar to yen exchange rate. I bet 10 out of 10 statisticians will say the rate is basically flat for the last 10 years.
cupholder has the empirical data - which, you will note, is increasing in all cases - but do you really imagine that no-one's tried a blind test?
1) Use longer sentences and bigger words. The community appears to react favorably to academic styling in prose.
2) State all the givens. Things which I believed would be understood automatically and omitted to save time are much more likely to be picked apart as flaws, where the other person assumes I have not thought the matter through.
3) Be careful about how much you share. People here are far more willing to do research and analysis to pick apart every claim you make, even if its a metaphor, and they will look into your background. Any of the informatio...
For better or worse, [EY] enjoys a special status in this community.
A status earned precisely by writing posts that people enjoy reading!
If you're suggesting that the ordinary academic/intellectual norm of only allowing high-status people to write informally, with everyone else being forced to write in soporific formal-sounding prose, is operative here, then I suggest we make every effort to nip that in the bud ASAP.
This is a blog; let's keep it that way.
You appear to be referring to Nisbett's paragraph starting with
Hedges and Nowell (1998) found improvement on almost all tests for African American 12th graders compared with other 12th graders over the period 1965-1994.
A few sentences below that Nisbett refers to NAEP data to say that the reading score gap could be gone in 25 years and the science score gap in 75 years, if trends continue. [ETA: this is the 'largest study' that Nisbett cites. I'm sad Nisbett didn't give a more specific citation for it.]
The page you link appears to have data on the NAEP...
Not really. Of that (relatively short) post, the only part that counts as a prediction is "you see it pretty much everywhere in the United States and the rest of the world; further, various attempts to eliminate this gap have failed". And this is compatible with a non-genetic explanation: environmental in African countries, and from discrimination in rich countries. Attempts at eliminating other kinds of discrimination (e.g. gender) have also been less than successful.
How does a world in which the causal origin of the black/white IQ gap is genetic look different from a world in which that gap has a different explanation?
This is clearly a good way to do skepticism, if you're going to do it. However, I wonder, at my blog (http://aretae.blogspot.com/2010/03/cognitive-antivirus.html), whether skepticism is generally wise at all, and whether religion is a much more useful and effective cognitive antivirus system (especially for the only normally intelligent) than anyone else here seems to give it credit for.
The stem cell "controversy" for example is the result of a prima facie pretty innocuous doctrine that life begins at conception.
Let's suppose that cryonically preserved human brains are found to be especially useful for the treatment of several terrible diseases, because of some quirk of the vitrification process. Should we haul out cryonically suspended people and use them for medicine?
I think this is pretty disanalogous. We're basically talking about killing people who are unconscious in the cryonics case, versus harvesting non-to-semi-differentiated cells in the other.
Let me clarify that although ''life" is a good, quick word, it doesn't really capture what we value morally, which is mind or consciousness. That's why we don't cry when our appendix is taken out, and why we remove people from ventilators when they're braindead, even though they are "still alive" in the sense of breathing and having a pulse. A frozen brain is a conscious entity that's temporarily unconscious. The stem cells never were in the first place.
You have to choose if you value actual fellow humans, or just fetishize that blip on a monitor.
I'm guessing that you value short-future conciousness - a suspended person (or a sleeping person) can in principle be concious in five minutes, while an embryo cannot.
I think there is a more salient difference, which is that it's not the embryo that will be conscious in ~20 weeks, whereas it is the brain.
The next stage of the argument asks about infants and animals and so on, but I said I'd shut up.
By all means continue, I always enjoy parsing these things. My friends are so sick of hearing about trolley cases they'd throw themselves on the tracks.
If it turns out that pig and chimp brains don't have the same effect, that would be less convenient, yes. I still wouldn't regret having run the trials.
In such a case, the next step would be to run tests on volunteers (that is, suicides) or people sentenced to be executed. If it turns out that criminals and those who wanted to die are also unsuitable, I'll allow people with those horrible diseases to sign up for treatment on the condition that, if it doesn't work, they get their brains vitrified and used to treat the next generation of patients, as a stopgap measure until strictly synthetic treatments becomes available.
The real world is not maximally inconvenient. Training your mind to respond to binary decisions by ruling out any options not explicitly presented is a deliberate subversion of the drive to cheat, which might, in the long term, compromise your ability to win.
More generally, if I were put in some sadistic moral dilemma (say, choosing between rescuing my love-interest or my sidekick) where either option is repugnant but inaction is somehow worse than both of them put together, I've got no reason to believe I'd have either enough knowledge of the consequences or enough time for my moral calculus to run in full. Under those circumstances, I would flip the fairest coin I had handy and decide between the two least-repugnant options on that basis, then try not to get backed into such situations in the future.
Speaking as someone that has been going to a therapist off and on for the past three years I have come to be pretty skeptical of the idea. Pretty much all the progress I have made in coping with and solving my problems has been on my own. I currently see one mainly because it is required of me by my college and because of the entertainment value of talking about myself for an hour or so.
Therapy has worked well for me, but usually as a more effective means of rubber ducking, i.e. getting to discuss out loud problems that I'd been ruminating unproductively on. This often makes it clear which parts of my internal monologue actually make sense, and which parts might be covering up for my real priorities. A good therapist can help in other aspects, but I'd say most of the benefit just comes from this phenomenon.
The main reason therapy works for this and talking with friends doesn't is that I'm much more likely to filter my thoughts when talking to a friend, lest it come back to hurt me socially.
(Take this all with a grain of YMMV; I'm not contradicting your experience.)
For the same reason, it helps a lot to honestly write up one's understanding of one's ideas where no one is supposed to see them.
What are some questions without a standard LW in-group response that I could use to prove my own conclusion-reaching soundness?
I know the Meredith Kurcher murder case has been offered as an example "rationality test".
The "skeptic" tries to scare you away from the belief in their very first opening remarks: for example, pointing out how UFO cults beat and starve their victims (when this can just as easily happen if aliens are visiting the Earth). The negative consequences of a false belief may be real, legitimate truths to be communicated; but only after you establish by other means that the belief is factually false - otherwise it's the logical fallacy of appeal to consequences.
This can be legitimate for a reporter wanting someone to read the story, and to show why the subject of the story matters practically.
Want to know if someone is a good rationalist? Ask them what the best arguments are for a belief he strongly opposes on a complex issue. See if the arguments he gives are the strongest ones, or the weak ones. To strongly oppose a belief on a complex issue, requires hearing the best arguments from both sides. Being unaware of the best opposing arguments, or being unwilling to speak them, is pretty good evidence that he let his biases get in the way of his reasoning.
Summary: People's beliefs are very strongly influenced by their culture. We can't cure that by encouraging contrarianism, because most people aren't suited for that. We should work more on group rationality instead.
So, this is well written and does bring up some valid points. But there are some serious issues:
First, your comment about defining racism misses the point: The issue there was specifically whether individuals are being racist and what that means. You seem to be arguing that that might not be terrible relevant. But that doesn't undermine that discussion at all.
Another issue is that there a large set of minorities which have succeeded quite well in the US despite having had serious issues in the past. The Chinese and the Jews are excellent examples (the sec...
While it may literally mean "unidentified flying object", in the USA it is synonymous for "Extra-Terrestrial Craft"
Video footage.
Of course, video footage does exist and shows no explosions, but does show a plane hitting the tower.
I approve of the potential for humor and found the joke amusing until I noticed that it is flawed.
Here's your updated answer from the post, and my reply:
I’m a little confused. Do you deny that whites, generally speaking, outperform blacks on tests of cognitive ability?
You have presented no evidence that they do, therefore there is no evidence for me to deny.
It's settled science, the psychometric consensus (although genetic causation of these gaps is not consensus).
There are two kinds of fools:
One says, "This is old therefore it is good.": Conservatism, when the person is holding beliefs for irrational reasons (fear, ick-factor, a desire to avoid all change, etc.)
The other one says, "This is new therefore it is better.": Change advocates, when they fail to take into account the possibility that conservative positions may be robust or long standing solutions to difficult problems that made sense for a large period of time or in certain cultures.
Both sides can hold the correct position for irrational reasons, and one should put thought into it, and obtain more knowledge, before deciding which is correct.
I mean, who cares if one genetic group has a higher average IQ than another genetic group?
For purposes of this discussion, the reason I care is that the racial IQ gap is the big taboo of our age just as the existence of God was the big taboo at some point in the past (and still is to a certain extent).
The real test for whether or not somebody is a "cheap credit" skeptic will necessarily involve inflammatory issues, it seems to me.
The real test for whether or not somebody is a "cheap credit" skeptic will necessarily involve inflammatory issues, it seems to me.
Wow, yeah. This suggests another Umeshism to me:
If you haven't horrified or offended anyone you care about, you're not a genuine skeptic.
(It goes without saying that the inverse of this statement is false.)
Only if you also assume that there are many robust factors with long histories contributing to do the following:
1) Encourage you to think of pretty people as an out-group
2) Strongly bias you towards considering garden-variety not-niceness in pretty people indicative of sociopathy, while doing no such thing about garden-variety not-niceness in ugly people
3) Prompt pretty people to act more sociopathic in a variety of circumstances due to psychological factors working on them
4) Make examples of pretty sociopaths dramatically more accessible in media and public cached thoughts than examples of ugly sociopaths or pretty non-sociopaths
I read the entirety of your post at the time you first advertised it here, and I'm less than impressed by your implication that I wasn't careful then.
Your later expansion adds no new prediction beyond what I already conceded in the grandparent counts as a prediction. I am already on record as stating that non-genetic explanations can adequately account for the observations you report. See also this comment.
I am disinclined to spend much more time arguing the issue with you. I'll sit back and let others participate if they wish.
If I understand correctly, loli only refers to cartoon depictions of preteen girls (and maybe roleplaying with that theme). Being attracted to actual preteen girls is just pedophilia.
(At least that's what loli fans say. I've always been a bit confused by the distinction — I've known people into loli and shota who seemed to find actual children as unappealing as any normal person does, but I can't quite figure out why a person would be turned on only by a cartoon and not the real thing.)
This is a really a frustrating exchange given the number of terms that need googling and the fact that I am in a public library.
Have you looked into autocatalytic networks? There is actual research on this topic (e.g. Julius Rebek) with experiments suggesting a likely model for abiogenesis. Don't press me for details, my sources are popularizations from the likes of Stuart Kaufmann and Richard Dawkins. I've just looked enough to confirm that the evidence seems in fact to exist.
As a non-mainstream hypothesis panspermia has some appeal, but it only moves the issue - if life came to Earth from elsewhere it had to appear elsewhere first, and the evidence we possess about the Universe seems to demand that life had to originate from non-life at some point.
I'm not sure I understand your point. Bill_McGrath seems to say that statements about "blacks" are not useful (whatever that means) because the group "blacks" contains too much diversity. And yet all of the categories I listed contain far more diversity than "blacks," at least as far as I know.
It is not unreasonable to expect people making socially controversial hypotheses to do so by referring to real entities.
How do I know if an entity is "real" or not?
I really recommend you look through the discussion on this subject from Spring 2010 (the ancestors and distant cousins of this thread) to make sure that a) the people you are going back and forth with are likely to argue honestly and productively on this subject and b) your contributions aren't repeating facts or myths that have already been covered many times before.
For obvious reasons, comments on this subject should be in the upper 10-20% of Less Wrong comments in terms of evidence cited, intellectual honesty, tone, grammar etc.
You can stop worrying after your brain's been properly frozen. The question is what to worry about.
I actually find the genetic explanation more hopefull. Genetic engineering would be a cheap and easy fix to the problem at least compared to the price of current and past attempts to close the gap.
If its culture then we are stuck with doing more or less the same things we have already done for 50 or so years, just with more money and more energy this time.
If its a mysterious hereditary factor but not the culture... I'm even less optimistic unless it would turn out to be a family of infectious agents that cause damage in the prenatal environment or alter gene expression.
The other thing is that poor man's genetic engineering -- i.e. eugenics -- has been available for some time now and people are very reluctant to embrace it. Even without forced sterilization, it hardly seems outrageous to tweak public policy so as to incentivize the smartest people to reproduce more and discourage the stupidest.
It is widely employed in the US by parents using (for whatever reason) modern reproductive technology.
Of course we don't call it that, but please what else is it, when the eggs of women with very high SAT or even GRE scores cost thousands of dollars to obtain than those that are merely average? What else is it when you search for a tall/athletic/musically talented/ academically successful sperm donor? Or terminating a pregnancy where the fetus is identified to have a genetic disorder?
Dog breeders know that trying to improve one feature often has deleterious effects on other, seemingly unrelated features.
Since we're basically talking about IQ, the negative side effects on anything like personality or health would have to be really big to outweigh the sheer socio-economic benefits one can statistically expect for say a boost of 10 or 20 or 30 IQ points.
I kinda doubt that the people towards the bottom of the IQ spectrum have much interest in boosting the intelligence of their children. This is based on general observation of the kind of traits they select for in mating.
Depressingly plausible.
The adverse effects quite possibly are that significant in the context of the ancestral environment, but probably not in the context of the modern world.
You need to develop that a bit more. It is important for the benefit of the reader and thinking in general to precisely and clearly separate genetic fitness and general well being in addition to pointing out the environment has changed.
I suggest people read up on Algernon's Law and its loopholes. In short:
Any simple major enhancement to human intelligence is a net evolutionary disadvantage.
Bostrom's formulation, called “evolutionary optimality challenge” (EOC):
If the proposed intervention would result in an enhancement, why have we not already evolved to be that way?
The loopholes as given by Bostrom are:
In the same way that you are reasonably confident that God does not exist despite evidence to the contrary.
The existence of God has probably the lowest prior probability of any hypothesis ever seriously considered by humans. Further**, any evidence in favor of theism has been swamped by opposing evidence: evil, scientific explanations for nearly every phenomena previously attributed to God, evidence human brains are innately susceptible to believing in gods absent good evidence (and subsequent altering of the God hypothesis to account for the new eviden...
I am happy to discuss things here.
I'm not. This style of argumentation is ineffective and wasteful of people's time, and I'm unhappy, bordering on angry, that it has gone on that long. I prefer to let this emotion find a productive outlet, namely a top-level post to put a name to the pattern I prefer, so as to encourage more useful discussions in future.
Unfortunately cupholder was rather evasive in our discussion
Claim. Unsupported by evidence.
That's his fault not mine.
Blame. Irrelevant to truth-seeking.
Ok, and the stronger the agenda, the more you should trust your common sense over claims made by the person with the agenda.
Cool. I feel more comfortable now that you've expressed this in continuous terms. There's still a catch, though: using your definition of having an agenda, I can't really tell whether someone has an agenda without also knowing the facts (because 'having an agenda' here is being used to mean that someone's making a slanted presentation of the facts), and if I know the facts already, I have little need for your has-an-agenda heuristi...
I'm still waiting for y'all to agree on what God is so I can decide. Everyone seems to have a different idea of the bugger. In the meantime I'll carry on spending brain energy on less fuzzy things, like race and IQ and global warming.
I don't believe that (i), (ii) and (iii) are real reasons. In fact, I think your real reasons may be better in as much as they are normative and I probably accept them in a somewhat milder form.
You weren't just presenting evidence. You were making an argument. Some people believed that you were engaged in motivated reasoning and/or privileging the hypothesis.
Please discuss the merits of the argument in the original thread, if desired. I'd prefer to keep the discussions of the merits of the argument and the reactions to it separate.
The one graph I looked at at random doesn't seem to support the claim that the gap (generally speaking) is narrowing and headed towards disappearing. Agreed?
When I see your random graph, I see the gap halving[!] from 1973 to 1990, widening through the 1990s, and maybe gradually shrunking since then. I see contradictory trends over the past 40 years, but it's more likely than not that the gap has resumed narrowing. So I'm not sure I do agree with you.
Since you write 'generally speaking' I guess you might be asking about the general trend as a whole from...
I can see that it would be useful to have a fast filter for rationality, but how possible is it?
There are some opinions which are irrational (frex, there doesn't seem to be any solid arguments for the idea that homosexuality is bad, and if it can't be eliminated, it should at least be kept out of public view), but that's not the same thing as having a positive test for rationality.
There comes a point when there's no substitute for actual knowledge, and in this case, it means looking at people's thinking rather than their opinions.
I suggest asking people wh...
Certainly, "self-organisation" can be used as a mysterious answer. But who are you arguing against, who is using it like that? It doesn't occur in the post you're commenting on.
If you disregard the happiness of the women, anyway
No, it suffices if less women's happiness sacrificed are needed than the amount of men whose happiness will be increased (assuming the "amount of happiness" - whatever that is to mean in the first place - is equal per individual). Then you can regard the happiness of women and still score a net increase in happiness. That's the whole point of the argument.
I don't understand what you were saying in the second sentence.
We don't have a magical cure for depression, but if someone is depressed, they cannot make rational decisions for themselves anyway, so they cannot decide to kill themselves legitimately.
Suppose I say now, in my non-depressed state, that if I were ever to become so depressed that I wanted to die, I'd prefer that this want be fulfilled.
Ah, that's too specific an interpretation of Hanlon's razor. The razor does not say that the malice and the stupidity need all come from the same party.
The link provided in the grandparent is important:
And DON'T EVEN GET ME STARTED on people who think Wikipedia is an "Artificial Intelligence", the invention of LSD was a "Singularity" or that corporations are "superintelligent"!
"Education" is "brain modification technology" in about the same way the invention of LSD was a singularity.
It was a long time ago so my memory is hazy... was that post actually written as a direct response to you back in the day or was the "corporations are super-intelligent" guy someone else?
There is also no reason to consider it to be more likely than the possibility that there are groups A and B with intelligence slightly less than the mean (of everyone in the category "black"), groups C and D about equal, and a group E significantly above average, in which case your argument that the mean value of IQ unfairly discriminates against blacks is exactly reversed.
I see no reason to consider it more likely that the mean unfairly discriminates against blacks as opposed to the hypothesis that the mean unfairly inflates the "true"...
I think that when I asked "would you like to see some evidence," the reasonable interpretation is that I can gather and present the evidence with a small but non-zero amount of effort.
However, if you did not understand my comment that way, that's what I meant.
And again, it would have been easy enough for the other poster to say "Yes, I am skeptical of your claim and would like to see the evidence." Since he didn't do it, I infer that he doesn't want to invest any further energy in the interaction. Which is fine, but if he doesn't want to invest further energy, I don't want to either.
How can you tell anything with certainty? The fact is that you can't. Respectfully, it seems to me you are playing the "I'm such a skeptic" game.
Sorry. I was being sloppy in my earlier comment, and using 'certainty' as a shorthand for 'certainty enough for me to label you as Having An Agenda, and therefore to reject your interpretation of the data as Tainted With An Agenda.' It is of course true that you can't tell anything inductive with cast-iron 100% certainty, but what I'm getting at is the question of how to get to what you or I would pra...
Here's a thought experiment: You show the graph I linked to to 10 statisticians, except you replace the labels with something less politically charged. For example, the price of winter wheat versus the price of summer wheat. And you ask them to interpret the graph as far as long term trends go. I'm pretty confident that 10 out of 10 would interpret the graph the same way I did.
I am far less confident.
...Ditto for global surface temperatures. Take the temperature label off the graph and tell people it's the dollar to yen exchange rate. I bet 10 out of 10
Of course there are ways to interpret the graph to argue that the gap is narrowing and on track to disappear, but if you look at it and use your common sense, it's just not a reasonable conclusion.
You put more trust in your common sense than I do. I try to avoid depending exclusively on what my common sense infers from eyeballing noisy time series - that way lies 'global warming stopped in 1998'esque error.
I find your preferred interpretation reasonable, but I don't see why it would be unreasonable to look at the entire data and see a net narrowing. (Especially if we lacked the 2008 data, as Nisbett did.)
I have found the persona required to interact positively with this community to be very different than the others I have adopted in the past, and the scrutiny is merciless.
Which is to say, I have mixed feelings on the matter, and am willing to continue engagement.
Another test:
Could smoking during pregnancy have a benefit? Could drinking during pregnancy have a benefit? It's not necessary that someone know what the benefit could be, just acknowledge the nicotine and alcohol are drugs that have complex effects on the body.
As for smoking, it's definitely a bad idea, but it reduces the chances of pre-eclampsia. I don't know of any benefit for alcohol.
Once you've left out the pain I no longer think killing the baby is ethically permissible. And I don't see how knowing that people don't have souls alters my position.
I like what Hook wrote. If I believed that babies were valuable because they have souls and then was told, "no they don't have souls", I might for a while value them less. But it has been a very long time since I believed in souls and the value I assign to babies is no longer related at all to my belief about souls (if it ever was).
After all, in the space of "things that one can construct out of atoms", humans and goldfish are very, very close.
Sure, they just don't resemble each other in many morally significant ways (the exception, perhaps, being some kind of experience of pain). There is no reason to think the facts that determine our ethical obligations make use of the same kinds of concepts and classifications we use to distinguish different configurations of atoms. Humans and wet ash are both mostly carbon and water, and so have a lot more in common than, say, the Sun. But wet ash and the sun and share more of the traits we're worried about when we're thinking about morality. The same goes for aesthetic value, if we need a non-ethics analogy.
Imagine I proposed that pretty people were more likely to carry genes for sociopathy. Ask yourself what kind of evidence it would take to convince you of this claim. Use that as a reference for the amount of evidence you should present for the claim that "a signifcant amount of the black/white difference in cognitive abilities is genetic in origin."
Back in the good old days, there was a simple test for this syndrome that would get quite a lot of mileage: You could just ask me what I thought about God.
Don't you mean the "bad old days"?
Experts on both sides of the 9/11 conspiracy debate:
http://www.takeonit.com/question/46.aspx
I didn't spend much time on this question, because there didn't seem to be compelling enough evidence to warrant further research.
That is indeed a valid argument-form, in basic classical logic. To illustrate this we can just change the labels to ones less likely to cause confusion:
The problem arises when instead of sticking a label on the set like "Snarfly" or "bulbous" or whatever you use a label such as "likely to be correct", and people start trying to pull meaning out of that label and apply...
Okay, so astrology to me sounds extremely unscientific. But I haven't read anything on the subject, and other than knowing that it's something a lot of scientists thing is.. unscientific. To be perfectly fair, I can't just dismiss it because other people dismiss it.
I'd like to be able to dismiss it for scientific reasons. Because I was reading my horoscope, and I was like, "Hmm, well these are extremely vague statements that could apply to anyone and I don't particularly identify with." But then I was reading a friends, and I majorly freaked out ...
A simple exercise to see whether further theoretical research is justified might be to have a friend print out the horoscopes for all the Zodiac signs or whatever, remove identifying characteristics from each one, and have you rank all of them every day for a month in terms of how accurate they are. Then see whether the horoscope accuracy correlates better with the ones for your sign than the ones for other signs.
Believing in "stereotype threat" as the main reason for the black/white IQ gap is like believing in Aquinas' arguments for the existence of God.
In what sense, exactly? Some of his arguments look logical, like the ontological argument, and others like the argument from design look empirical (and falsified by evolution).
Stereotype threat, on the other hand, looks entirely empirical, should be measurable, and can be argued against by pointing to a meta-analysis showing publication bias (I checked just now, and a full paper does not seem to have b...
Google it.
It's not really my responsibility to do research trying to figure out what you mean by "real entity." Is "elephants" a "real entity"? What about "worms"? Is "the South" a real entity? What about "Minnesota"?
Because you don't like hurting people? Because racism is evil? Because racism is low status? Because you would look less stupid? Because it would be less embarrassing for all of Less Wrong? Because you prefer to avoid downvotes?
This illustrates my point very well. A few hu...
Something about this pro-appeasement argument strikes me as really wrong, though I wish I were able to better explain why. It just seems to me that the people historically interested in the rule of religion - say, Church hierarchy - would find it better for their agendas that any closet atheists should keep kowtowing rather than become vocal about their disbelief. Surely if nobody ever challenged orthodox ideas, they'd never get overturned?
Well, I'm no historian. But in any case, if a medievial equivalent of Less Wrong, some group of people unusually interested in forming true beliefs formed in those times, then they should be able to discuss atheism at least among themselves, surely. It would be contrary to their common goal to do otherwise. It might prevent them from figuring out that atheism is probably correct, you see.
Sure, atheism may be low status and immoral and evil and "not useful" to know about if true - but if for whatever reason they already decided they are interested in forming true beliefs, then they should consider atheism anyway.
We're on Less Wrong because we are unusually interested in pursuing true beliefs, and methods of forming them. If other factor...
I reckon the principle applies in general - there's too much diversity within the classification "black" for it to be particularly useful, I reckon. Perhaps if it was geographically specific, it might be more useful.
So the same reasoning would apply to the categories commonly referred to as "worms," "birds," "penguins," "bears," "elephants," "baboons," "chimpanzees," "rats," and "mice," Agreed?
Genetic relatedness, which I hope you'll agree is kind of relevant when discussing genetics.
I don't understand this response. I am asking how one decides if a group is a "natural group" or a "socially-constructed" group. Simply answering "genetic relatedness" doesn't answer the question. I prefer not to guess at what you mean.
Irrelevant; I'm talking about how different groups were actually defined in history
Then I don't understand your argument. I thought you were arguing that (1) the group known as "blacks&quo...
Is it irrational to find it quite troubling that someone you're talking to would want to discuss the issue of whether one race is inferior to another race, for any reason?
I don't know about that. I just know that it has the instrumental consequence of me holding the 'you' in question in utter contempt. I pretty much write off people as intellectually irrelevant unless I have reason to believe that their epistemic incompetence is an isolated event.
The people with the advocated flaw of thought should be expected to be extremely prejudiced. Because they ar...
Blacks have higher testosterone, a hormone that increases muscularity by decreases IQ(in large amounts) There is more testosterone in the uterine environment of a black women, and that may depress > IQ.
Citation please.
I disagree with you on points of fact (namely the causal mechanism behind a difference in intelligence between two subgroups of H. sapiens) about which you claim to have as-yet-unrevealed evidence. I will reply to you no further until you provide that evidence, preferably in the form of a peer-reviewed study published more recently than 1987 Q 4 conclusively supporting your hypothesis.
Furthermore, if you persist in dodging the question and playing games with 'obviousness,' I will take that as a sign of bad faith on your part, an attempt to manipulate me into saying something embarrassing.
Would you like to see some evidence? I'm happy to provide it.
This seems to imply that you already have the evidence, and are only waiting for confirmation that it's wanted to provide it.
It takes time and energy to gather evidence.
If this is relevant, it implies that you don't have the evidence yet.
Please don't imply that you have evidence when you don't.
Would you like to see some evidence? I'm happy to provide it.
Never say this again. It's a cheap, time-wasting dodge.
If you actually have evidence, simply lay it out as soon as it might be relevant.
To be honest, before Darwin, the Argument from Design was a pretty good reason to be a theist. (And I got this from the aforementioned Darwin's Dangerous Idea.)
It would be futile to try and pinpoint the first chronologically, but for the one that most pointedly refuted a previously established truth, namely that "God made Man in His image", I'd start with Darwin's Origin of Species.
Though, actually, Dennett's Darwin's Dangerous Idea is probably a better starting point, for being a gloss on Darwin.
You should know, before you ask your next pseudo-Socratic question: given that you seem intent on sticking to that style of "argumentation", I'm going to take your advice and not engage you anymore.
On the contrary, it is quite possible that there could be evidence that would convince me of either of those things. It is just that the evidence would have to be strong enough to go head-to-head with basic physics. If it could somehow be demonstrated that Avogadro's number were 300 orders of magnitude too tiny, and that molecules were a googol times smaller than we thought, and could explain why our earlier experiments had led us to our original estimates of Avogadro's number and molecular sizes, then that would tend make the effectiveness of homeopathy (more) plausible.
How is it a poor analogy? The general for the last 50 years is upwards, but the trend over the last couple years is flat or downwards.
A quick Google for house price data led me to this graph of US house prices from 1970 up until what looks like last year. It is immediately clear to me that there is far less noise obscuring the changes in trends than in the global temperature data. The recent house price crash looks about an order of magnitude larger than the seasonal(?) fuzz, so it's easy to distinguish it from the earlier upward trend.
Compare the tempe...
I would suggest you practice. It also helps to read people who contradict eachother. It also helps if you learn some of the facts.
I reckon the first two things only help in as much as they help you do the third. Learning the facts is what really matters - and in my experience, once I feel I know enough about an issue to decide who has an agenda (in your sense of the phrase), I typically feel I know enough to make my own judgement of the issue without having to tie my colours to the talking head I like the most.
...Lol, I guess that means American housing
And do you agree that according to Phil Jones, there has been no statistically significant warming between 1995 and the present?
The fact that you quote this doesn't help your credibility. The Economist: Journalistic malpractice on global warming
By "having an agenda," I mean that Nisbett is emphasizing the facts that support a particular point of view and de-emphasizing the facts which undermine that point of view in order to persuade the reader.
So defined, one can ask whether Nisbett has an agenda. Do you have any doubt that Nisbett has an agenda?
Not much. I think it is very likely that Nisbett suffers from confirmation bias about as much as everybody else.
So by your definition, the temperature trend is NOT basically flat between 1995 and the present, correct?
Eyeballing it I'd sa...
If you're trying to convey a system of thought you don't agree with, you might as well include all the bits and pieces.
The interesting thing about that anti-homosexual argument is it considers the costs of repressing homosexuality to be so low for homosexuals that they aren't even generally conscious for the conservative.
Also, there are costs to non-homosexuals-- frex, it's rough for a heterosexual to be married to a homosexual who'd hoped (with support from their culture) that they'd get over their homosexuality.
And if a homosexual is driven to suicide, it's very hard on their family.
I'm claiming that this one data set does not by itself support rejection of the body of theory that suggests global warming is occurring, and that it is intellectually dishonest to imply that it does.
The question might be less "do humans have some special moral place in the world" than "do human beings have some special moral place in the world". For example: are we privileging humans over cows to an excessive extent?
You seem to be referring to entirely different thing also called "behaviorism". One I talk about answers nature-vs-nurture by siding almost totally on the nurture side - it says virtually all variety of human behavior comes from different environments humans live in, not from them having different genes. The one you refer to is a particular theory of learning which is completely unrelated. It's not the only case of unrelated things having the same name.
Also, can you explain how you find twin studies "unconvincing"!?
Culture acts on g...
I agree, byrnema. Speaking that way is status lowering.
Talking matter-of-factly about things that the other person finds displeasing or offensive.
It makes people feel bad. So it's no surprise site stumbler (from certain groups) are bound to sprint. But that wouldn't prove they couldn't talk controversials.
Side note: I have a mixed background.
Yes, but in that case you aren't looking at the data that Nisbett referred to. As cupholder pointed out
Clicking on the 'White-Black Gap' button, and then on the 'Age 17' tab (as Nisbett refers to 12th graders, so I am guessing that is what he and you are talking about...?)
First of all, I wanted to create a claim which was similar in scope, strength, and kind. Pretty people are probably no more common than black people in the First World; the proposed difference is not an on-or-off switch, but a statistical distinction; and it relates to genetic effects on personality.
Second, I wanted it to be similarly provocative to brazil84's claim. It is widely considered bad to call people stupid; it is widely considered bad to call people sociopaths.
Third, it is not inconceivable that someone could draw the conclusion. Numerous studies...
it has no visible basis in evidence.
Are you sure? The Sociopath Next Door: The Ruthless Versus the Rest of Us
How do we recognize the remorseless? One of their chief characteristics is a kind of glow or charisma that makes sociopaths more charming or interesting than the other people around them. They’re more spontaneous, more intense, more complex, or even sexier than everyone else, making them tricky to identify and leaving us easily seduced.
I don't know how much scientific evidence there is to back up the claims in this book but I remembered heari...
WTC7 contained a CIA field office, so it seems rather likely that it contained an armory and that that armory contained some explosives. This would explain any apparent explosions that occurred after the fires started, in a way that screens off those explosions from being evidence for anything interesting.
ISTM that the most likely evolutionary origin of disgust is a warning sign of a high risk of infection or poisoning, which would be present in the plane crash scenario so I wouldn't even necessarily call it an irrational feeling.
Moreover not being content with someone merely acting rationally when being confronted with a powerful impulse towards a certain reaction that in this particular situation happens to be irrational, but going so far as requiring that they not even feel this impulse in that situation seems to be asking a bit much. One might say that displaying this attitude towards humans is rather irrational.
I love the epicycle metaphor and plan to use it in the future, but it's not like there have never been ''overly simple'' explanations of phenomena in the past, either. Phlogiston, for example.
I believe what Morendil et al. wanted was closer to this degree of analysis.
Before attempting to demonstrate the logical falsity of an informally-stated claim, I recommend testing to see if it can be reasonably interpreted as:
a. metaphor
b. hyperbole
c. approximate
...and determine if the resultant interpretation is reasonable.
simplicio is correct, here - parsimony is dropping fast. I wager that's what Eliezer Yudkowsky was saying.
but there is also no sound basis to distinguish sex from murder
There clearly is, at least on my contractarian view. You would not consent to a social contract that left you vulnerable to murder, if it could be avoided.
The best general argument for conservativism I've encountered is that we should pay attention to established social customs and innate moral intuitions because the world is a complex place and practices that persist over time probably exist for a good reason. The fact that we don't fully understand the reason for a practice is not enough to discard it, we should exercise caution when messing with established customs because we don't fully understand what customs are key to society achieving whatever level of success it has so far achieved.
I don't fully buy this argument but I think it has some merit. Thus it is not necessarily irrational to see an intuitive "eww" reaction as a reason to think that we should exercise caution when liberalizing attitudes towards the provoking practice. I think the generous interpretation of the social conservative attitude to homosexuality is that the "eww" reaction probably exists for some 'good' reason and should not be totally ignored. Generating hypotheses to explain why the "eww" is beneficial is not necessarily an irrational first step to understanding what's really going on.
Relatively few social conservatives can articulate this argument but some can and I don't think it is fair to dismiss them as irrational. Indeed the more thoughtful conservatives tend to think that most people are not capable of thinking rationally about the costs and benefits of certain behaviours and so social customs must do the work of preserving the 'good' society.
mattnewport's comment was much more broad and insightful than "This is old therefore it is good".
His point (paraphrasing the general conservative thesis) is that social customs arise as solutions to difficult problems and have highly immodular interplay. Therefore, before relaxing them, you should at least identify what problem it was (believed to be) solving, and how it interplays with the other customs and factors (including the ick factor in others).
In the case of homosexuality, the taboo against it is extremely common across cultures, which suggests some kind of mechanism like, "Cultures that didn't have a taboo against it were outbred or otherwise dominated by a more populous culture."
Of course, no one actually argues for such a taboo against it today on that basis, though it has the trappings of a good argument: "If we don't have pro-reproduction customs, we'll be unable to withstand the memetic overload from cultures that do, and will be unable to perpetuate our values across generations." (Several European countries provide good examples of cultures slowly losing their ability to protect Western values by being outbred by those who don't shar...
I agree with the sentiment here.
However, in a community like this one, Aumann's agreement theorem would suggest that most of the commonly held views, at least the views commonly held to be very likely, rather than just somewhat likely, should be correct.
Responding to an old post:
...If I recall correctly, the US Air Force's Project Blue Book, on UFOs, explained away as a sighting of the planet Venus what turned out to actually be an experimental aircraft. No, I don't believe in UFOs either; but if you're going to explain away experimental aircraft as Venus, then nothing else you say provides further Bayesian evidence against UFOs either. You are merely an undiscriminating skeptic. I don't believe in UFOs, but in order to credit Project Blue Book with additional help in establishing this, I would have to
If a lot of crazy people believe in UFOs, it's probably not because every crazy person picked a random page in the dictionary and said "I'll have a crazy belief about that". Rather, it's probably because the human mind has intrinsic flaws for which characteristics of the UFO meme happen to be a good match. If I conclude that UFOs exist, it is more likely that my reasoning process was corrupted by these intrinsic human flaws and therefore that my argument has an unnoticed flaw than if I conclude something else which isn't a subject of cult behav...
Doesn't appreciably constrain your behavior, though, unless you happen to be the star of a popular Showtime series or something. Declaring a policy is only meaningful if it actually affects your choices, which in this case only makes sense if you expect to be considering mass murder as a solution to your problems.
And in a situation as extreme as that, I wouldn't be surprised if some otherwise unthinkable subjective downsides came up.
It shows that someone is engaging with the problem as a serious moral one
I think it shows someone is trying to "solve" a hypothetical or be clever, because with a trivial amount of deliberation they would anticipate the interlocutors response and reform. Moreover, none of this engages the point of the exercise for which you're free to argue without being opaque. E.g., "okay, clearly the point of this trolley experiment is to see if my moral intuitions align with consequentialism or utilitarianism, I don't think this experiment does that because blah blah blah."
Moreover, moral reasoning is hypothetical if you're sufficiently reflective.
We cannot allow this any more than we can allow people to sold themselves to slavery as a loan guarantee.
Which doesn't preclude allowing both. I can see benefits of allowing the latter. Or, more to the point, I can see situations where forbidding the latter is morally abhorrent. Specifically, when there is not a safety net in place that prevents people starving or otherwise suffering for the lack of finances that they should be able to acquire.
We pretty much know how to deal with even the most severe pain - very large doses of opiates to get rid of it, and large doses of stimulants like amphetamines to counter the side effects.
I'd be incredibly surprised if this actually worked clinically.
You have essentially dismissed the vast majority of all useful reasoning as invalid.
You are correctly restating my claim. The vast majority of all useful reasoning is invalid. And by "invalid" I mean that it would not be self-contradictory to affirm the premises and deny the conclusion.
And, incidentally, are more likely to be fertile overall.
By fertile you mean “able to have children, whether they actually have them or not”? Otherwise, that's wrong.
I don't think everyone is born with what we consider proficient rationality. Perhaps a majority could be taught to be rational, I am not denying this possibility, but I do not think that it is economically feasible.
I'd doubt the feasibility without brain modification tech.
Excuse delay getting back to this.
Okay, I think I can explain. Let's say that we have 5 ethnic groups under the umbrella "black." All of approximately equal size. Groups A and B are found to, in general, be slightly above average intelligence, C and D are about equal, and E are significantly below. The average intelligence for "blacks" is now below average, and this is mathematically correct, while in reality, 4 out 5 black people you meet will tend to be of average or higher intelligence.
Perhaps this is a common statistical fallacy, bu...
Just to add a note here: using the "height" example, suppose I told you that research has shown black people were on average shorter than white people. Then, it turns out, that my sample of "blacks" was from the area with the pigmy ethnicities, and if I excluded those from my definition of "blacks" then they were on average taller than white people. This is an extreme example, but here the statement "the mean height of black people is less than the mean height of white people" might be TRUE, but it won't be USEFUL.
T...
Suggested alternate that captures what I think Phil means by the first definition "a person who believes the distribution of traits differs among races in a way that matters in some deep sense." That doesn't make it much more precise but I think it captures what he is trying to say in terms of your objection.
If I know that I can pull the evidence up on my computer screen with about 60 seconds of work, do I "have" it?
If you spend more time arguing about definitions than it would take to present your facts and settle the original point, that constitutes evidence that your motive has little or nothing to do with the pursuit of mutual understanding.
Please either present the evidence you originally offered w/r/t the correlation between race and IQ, or desist in your protestations.
I read through the chapter. Interesting.
Not being an American I have been exposed to different kinds of discrimination stories, both historic and current. I'm also not sure how relevant the original study would be here, unless there is actually a direct relationship between skin pigmentation and IQ. Prior to European settlement the people in Australia were isolated for tens of thousands of years, leaving skin tone a relatively poor indicator of genetic kinship. That is a lot of time for selection to work on both IQ and pigmentation.
The studies examined IQ among blacks and found that whether the person was light-skinned or dark-skinned had more or less no bearing on that person's IQ (the assumption being that skin tone is a rough proxy for degree of African descent).
Being more precise (pedantic?), Nisbett wrote:
the correlation between lightness of skin and IQ, averaged over a large number of studies reviewed by Shuey (1966), is in the vicinity of .10.
Assuming that correlation's not a chance fluctuation, that would imply that there is a positive correlation between skin tone and IQ. But a meager one.
it's possible to be reasonable confident of a conclusion based on general knowledge, common sense, and despite scientific studies to the contrary.
This is true. It's also possible to be way too overconfident, based on these same things, and unacknowledged confounders. This is the problem that scientific studies try to address.
I've read the book, which was mentioned favorably in Dennett's Consciousness Explained and forms part of the backstory to Stephenson's Snow Crash. Curiosity compelled me to look further.
My level of understanding of the book's thesis is mostly level-0, i.e. there is a "bicamerality" password but I'd have to reread the book to reacquaint myself with its precise predictions, and I'd be hard pressed to reconstruct the theory myself.
I do have a few pieces of understanding which seem level-2-ish; for instance, the hypothesis accounts for the feeling th...
So "reject the evidence" can mean 1) deny that the evidence exists and 2) not consider the evidence convincing. You find the interpretation 2) obvious and 1) unreasonable in the given context. Am I right? If so, well, after thinking about it for a while I admit that 2) is a lot better interpretation, but nevertheless I wouldn't call the other one unreasonable, nor I suspect cupholder of deliberate misinterpretation; people sometimes interpret others wrongly.
Which question are you talking about?
The question by what standard you reject the evidence for the existence of God?
Well, the atheism/theism issue is a decent example of a situation where it's possible to be reasonably confident in a position without exhaustive scientific studies of the matter. And indeed, even if there are scientific studies going against your position.
Agreed, but I don't understand the relevance.
As noted above, cupholder clearly chose an unreasonable interpretation of my question.
I found all his interpretations (or what I think to be his interpretations) quite natural. Clearly we have conflicting intuitions. What interpretation did you have in ...
Of course it muddies things and we should not be interested in small deviations. That's the basic point of your argument.
?!
The point I was making in the first 550 words of the grandparent comment is that one shouldn't automatically disregard a small deviation from flatness merely because it's (barely) statistically insignificant. I am not sure how you interpreted it to mean that 'we should not be interested in small deviations.'
...Well can you give me an example of a statement about temperature in the last 10 years which is not an "interpretation&qu
Unfortunately cupholder was rather evasive in our discussion. That's his fault not mine.
No, you were aggressive and rude in the discussion. You have demanded a detailed answer while your questions weren't clear, and in repeated queries you didn't even try to explain what sort of answer you want. That all only to allow yourself to reply "well, I use the same standards".
The same standard I use to reach an a-homeopathic conclusion notwithstanding the evidence for homeopathy working, or an a-alien-abduction conclusion notwithstanding the evidence for people being beamed up and anally probed by aliens.
Namely, can I fit the idea of God existing/homeopathy working/alien abduction into my broader understanding of the world, or would it require overturning practically my whole understanding of how reality works?
Rejecting an interpretation of the evidence != rejecting evidence.
(Incidentally, I tried pulling up meta-analyses on the effect of prayer and found this Cochrane meta-analysis which finds no consistent effect of being prayed for on ill health.)
Note that changing the beginning data point to either 1997 or 1999 makes the regression line have a positive slope. It's not at all surprising that there is enough variability that cherry-picking data is possible. Stuffing a positive outlier at the beginning will, of course, tend to do this.
None of the premises are examined; they're all assumed. Clearly, as we all agree the argument is unsound at least one of them (including those implied but not delineated) must be false, and it's not particularly important which. What Morendil asked for, more or less, was a rational argument against private homosexuality.
Obviously, no unsound argument should be stable under reflection, but from the point of view of Classical Logic this seems to satisfy the requirements.
If you'd like it more formally, I'll write out all the premises in full and come up with ...
I'm not saying the absence of a significant cooling trend is the same thing as the presence of a significant warming trend - that would be a stupid thing to say. As for the remainder: I don't trust your judgment, but the data you provided is interesting. I will examine the composite NOAA temperature data (ocean, land, and combined) and update accordingly.
(It should be noted, however, that if anthropogenic inputs are significant, as claimed by the climate scientists whose work we are discussing, predicting the climate would require predicting all anthropogenic climate forcings - and therefore we might expect the predictions to be worse than anticipated.)
Yes. It's almost as if I was merely supplying an interesting quote.
And as much as I do not appreciate being called a fool when you make no attempt to discern my reasoning, likewise, I do not appreciate passive aggressive questions whose intent is apparently to state my comment is worthless to you.
I'm sorry that I took the valuable 4 seconds it took to read the quote, and that it spawned this subthread where you have continued to complain about my posting of the comment. I'm sorry that it bothers you enough that you feel the need to indirectly call me a fool, and to indirectly say my comment is worthless.
Did you read the linked article?
In a blind test, the AP gave temperature data to four independent statisticians and asked them to look for trends, without telling them what the numbers represented. The experts found no true temperature declines over time.
"If you look at the data and sort of cherry-pick a micro-trend within a bigger trend, that technique is particularly suspect," said John Grego, a professor of statistics at the University of South Carolina.
[...]
...The AP sent expert statisticians NOAA's year-to-year ground temperature changes
So is social deference the missing ingredient in my post?
It would help, but the difference I was refer to was that Jayson was embarrassed by his failure of rationality, while you either failed to recognize yours or were proud of it.
Could you be more specific in what exactly was/is my failure and why/how I was arrogant about it, and what are the ad hominems?
Ad hominem arguments are attacks against the arguers, rather than the arguments. For example:
what can we say about the epistemological waterline here?
Comments like that will not impress peopl...
As per http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1193450, this could use a catchier title.
Post alternative title suggestions here.
Ignore it. At the margin such effort would be far better spent on bigger, easier to fix issues. On average humor seems (to me) to push away from bullshit rather than towards it so counters would need to be fine tuned.
Something most of us do automatically is reduce association with people who don't share our sense of humor. People who actively use humor for anti-epistemic purposes (ie. not you) I tend to avoid unconscously. They feel evil.
...Hedges and Nowell (1998) found improvement on almost all tests for African American 12th graders compared with other 12th graders over the period 1965– 1994. The best estimates in terms of the stability the scores provide, and in terms of their correlations with IQ, are in the form of composites, for example, reading + vocabulary + mathematics for the EEO survey. The Black–White gap on these composites over the period decreased on average by 0.13 standard deviation per decade, yielding an estimate of a reduction of the gap by around 0.39 standard devia
But Nisbett is quoting from a study "which found improvement on almost all tests for African American 12th graders". That study may not even have contained the data on 9-year-olds. You can ask "Why didn't that study include that data?", well because they were comparing data for 12th graders.
Explosives that weren't planted are completely irrelevant to "I don't believe there were explosives planted in the World Trade Center."
P(B|A) P(A)
P(A|B) = -----------
P(B)
A is explosives. B is 9/11. I already told you P(A) is small, I assume P(B) was small, and I just said that P(B|A) is small. What is small times small over small?
On 9/10, WTC 7 was an occupied skyscraper barely distinguished from any other by being near to a skyscraper which had previously been the subject of a terrorist bombing.
On 9/11, WTC 7 was struck by rubble from an adjacent skyscraper that collapsed in an uncontrolled fashion, burned for several hours, then collapsed in turn.
None of this is made substantially more likely by the addition of explosives to the story.
I'm talking about WTC 7, which wasn't hit by any plane.
It's a fact that fires were burning on several floors of the WTC7. The official version states that those were cause by the fallen debris but AFAIK explosives were never actually excluded as a possibility.
Nor was the involvement of Mortimer Q. Snodgrass. I find it perfectly plausible that a crashed plane might cause a fire and that a fire might cause partial or total structural collapse of a skyscraper, and those two combined would explain all observations very simply - I see no need to investigate more complex hypotheticals.
AFAIK explosives were never actually excluded as a possibility.
Neither were fire breathing dragons.
What do you mean "hypocritically"
A google search for:
vatican prostitution ring, or
anti-gay congressman
should be amusing.
I would think that higher levels of overt religious antagonism indicate low agreeableness. It may be an indicator not so much of irrationality as of a sort of intellectual laziness or poor judgement, as it's an unconstructive behaviour that generates a great deal of self-satisfaction for not doing anything particularly difficult.
That said, I was rather closer to that kind of atheism when I was younger, so I'm decidedly biased.
I can't tell if you are honestly trying to help or making fun of me. Although it is possible that it was the things that you mentioned, it feels like it would if I thought I saw an eagle in my backyard and you asked "are you sure it wasn't a pigeon?"
Fair enough - I was quibbling, to a large part because:
The weather in my home region has gotten weird compared to my childhood - many mild winters and summer droughts, for example.
An Alaskan on DeviantArt a while ago wrote a prose piece about how she was always freezing, never warming enough in the summer to withstand the following winter ... and prefaced it with a matter-of-fact note about how that wasn't the case in recent years.
Hence, when you commented that "[i]t's not like a normal person, can observe such changes", that seemed to con...
You can tell someone is irrational if they don't believe global warming is happening.
It's not like a normal person can observe such changes - we're talking fraction of a degree over lifetime so far (Wikipedia says 0.74 ± 0.18 °C over entire 20th century).
It's a matter of your level of trust in "mainstream" scientists, and there's nothing particularly irrational about not having terribly much trust here.
And even global warming is real, it's still instrumentally rational to be wrong - let other people limit their carbon emissions, the world in w...
"Oh all right," said the old man. "Here's a prayer for you. Got a pencil?"
"Yes," said Arthur.
"It goes like this. Let's see now: 'Protect me from knowing what I don't need to know. Protect me from even knowing that there are things to know that I don't know. Protect me from knowing that I decided not to know about the things that I decide not to know about. Amen.' That's it. It's what you pray silently inside yourself anyway, so you may as well have it out in the open."
"Hmmm," said Arthur. "Well thank you --"
"There's another prayer that goes with it that's very important," said the old man, "so you'd better jot this down, too."
"Okay."
"It goes, 'Lord, lord, lord...' It's best to put that bit in just in case. You can never be too sure. 'Lord, lord, lord. Protect me from the consequences of the above prayer. Amen.' And that's it. Most of the trouble people get into in life comes from leaving out that last part."
In all seriousness, ignorance may sometimes be bliss, but conscious, willful ignorance is reprehensible. Let's actually make an effort to be all right with the way the world is, before we throw up our hands.
Are some claims/people just not worth arguing against?
"On what planet do you spend most of your time?" is often a very effective rebuttal. ;)
I was only criticizing Editor:Eliezer_Yudkowksy's reasoning, not trying to argue that non-human intelligences exist (although they do).
I have been thinking about nano/AI skepticism somewhat. I feel that most people have nothing to gain from knowing the truth, and admit myself sometimes wishing I could un-know it. I mean really, the implications of rationality for futurism are just plain unpleasant. Sometimes I even look at the good community and favorable gender ratio of religious people and wonder whether being religious is a better deal.
Motivated cognition surely doesn't cause people to pursue beliefs chosen at random: rather it seems to do some limited inference about whether the beli...
People who as their first reaction start pulling excuses why this must be wrong out of their asses get big negative points on this rationality test.
I don't need to explain why this is not mainstream. It is also extremely unlikely to be significantly wrong.
People who as their first reaction start pulling excuses why this must be wrong out >of their asses get big negative points on this rationality test.
Well, if people are absolutely, definitely rejecting the possibility that this might ever be true, without looking at the data, then they are indeed probably professing a tribal belief.
However, if they are merely describing reasons why they find this result "unlikely", then I'm not sure there's anything wrong with that. They're simply expressing that their prior for "Communist economies did no worse than capitalist economies" is, all other things being equal, lower than .5.
There are several non-obviously-wrong reasons why one could reasonably put a low prior on this belief. The most obvious is the fact that when the wall fell down, economic migration went from East to West, not the other way round (East-West Germany being the most dramatic example).
Of course, this should not preclude a look at the hard data. Reality is full of surprises, and casual musings often miss important points. So again, saying "this just can't be so" and refusing to look at the data (which I presume is what you had in mind) is indeed probably tribal. Saying "hmmm, I'd be surprised if it were so" seems quite reasonable to me. Maybe I'm just tribalised beyond hope.
I'm increasingly inclined to use reactions to data that Communist economies did no worse on average than Capitalist economies as a new litmus test.
This is extremely problematic for a number of reasons.
You are using (or at least citing) one study to argue for an extremely unorthodox claim that is highly values dependent. For example, what does it mean "to do worse on average" than capitalist countries? The paper you cite only demonstrates that GDP growth was not much worse for communist countries than for less liberalized non-communist countries. Perhaps the totalitarian communist systems were worse, even if their arbitrary GDP numbers, inflated by massive military spending, were fairly respectable.
Be careful, using this as a "litmus test" for rationality could make you dismiss arguments for why you should actually change your opinion about whether communist countries did "worse on average".
After glancing at the study [and after editing again after RobinZ's comment]:
It criticizes other studies for not controlling for such details as ethnolinguistic fractionalization, religion, natural resource abundance, or the wealth of neighboring countries. It's full of references to other variables that ought to be controlled for, like climate, resource-richness, and social mores. But the only thing this study claims to control for is initial wealth.
Much of the article lists rankings of growth rates that control for nothing at all. It has a large initial section claiming that communism performed well because a bunch of Communist countries that started out poor, grew faster than a bunch of non-Communist countries that started out rich. Then, in the other section of the paper, it claims that we can't compare Russia to Western Europe, because Russia started out poor, and of course every economist knows that poor countries grow faster than rich countries! So we must compare Russia to Mexico. Besides the fact that they conveniently ignored this in the first half of the paper, that doesn't make sense. A comparison that showed Russia growing slower than Western Europe (as it did)...
It's not a good litmus test until you also point to what you consider the best honest skeptical response - albeit this is often damned hard to do with poor skepticism, cryonics being exhibit A in point.
You should offer a reward for the best top-level anti-cryonics post. Something to entice quiet dissenters to stick their necks out.
You can post it together with a pro-cryonics reading list, so people know what they're up against and only post arguments that haven't already been refuted.
EDIT: reworded for clarity, punctuation
Yo dawg, heard you like conceiving of the inconceivable, so we put some noumena in your phenomena so you can identify with the unidentified.
The terms "valid" and "invalid" have a precise logical meaning; that is the meaning Jayson_Virissimo intends, as they have said many times now.
I have no problem parsing Jayson's claims. I would even repeat them if I wanted to guess the password of my highschool math teacher. However it is my assertion that the precise logical meaning has been applied incorrectly in this context. The problem is one of applying basic knowledge about logic without knowing enough about how to reason logically about probability.
...As you are using them, yo
but the different means might be within a standard deviation of each other because single groups have a spread much wider than the difference between them
I don't recall anyone arguing that in this thread, but this argument -- to the extent it makes any sense at all -- lacks merit.
Let's take your analogy.
...Suppose I got together all the worms and all the insects and measured their volume, and found the mean size of a worm and the mean size of an insect. And suppose (I have no idea what the truth is here, but it seems about as plausible as anything else
So stereotype threat exists but only explains a smallish part of the gap, with most of the rest due to genetics? 'kay.
Quantifying diversity is hard: genetic variation I don't know (KHAN!), specific genes even less, ancestry data isn't available, samples like "famous people" are skewed, etc. I mostly meant "Barack Obama: a definitely white and a definitely black parent, and he's black in the US race system. That seems common".
But here's a way to test: pick people with a race system in common (typically the US one, and I could do an Europ...
Believing in "stereotype threat" as the main reason for the black/white IQ gap is like believing in Aquinas' arguments for the existence of God.
More or less.
No, I think his example of 5 ethnic groups is flawed, because he's using the wrong metric to calculate the average. If he was using the median instead of the mean -- which is the right thing to do in this case -- he'd obtain the result that "most blacks have average intelligence", and his conclusion would no longer follow.
(Edited: typo)
I do not think you understand biology (either in the context of the race/IQ discussion or in general) well enough for it to be worth arguing with you further.
But they did pretty-uniformly judge the peoples they grouped into the category "black", which just to be clear is the group I specified and the group you're talking about too.
I apologize, I thought you were referring to non-whites all over the world when you talked about distinct populations being grouped by skin color.
...Who were originally grouped long ago, on the basis of the exceedingly superficial detail of skin color, a trait that turned out to be a red herring since they don't form a "natural group" in the sense that was assume
I'm afraid we're offending minority groups reading this site
There is probably a substantial population of people who are minorities and more offended by your projection of them as emotionally fragile and thin skinned, if you'll pardon the expression.
An attempt to eliminate the gap could be considered successful in the long term if it resulted in consistent, cumulative reductions in the gap over time, without (yet) eliminating the gap outright. It's cold comfort, like a cancer patient considered 'cured' because they died of something else first, but still worthy of recognition.
And I am not claiming otherwise.
Then please either concede the point that the intelligence gap might be entirely explained by such factors, or provide a more detailed analysis of why it cannot be. For example, how much of the...
I am seriously skeptical that there is such a difference "pretty much everywhere," that is, without variance along geographical, political, and economic lines.
"Various attempts have failed" taken literally means almost nothing; I am seriously skeptical that the gap has never been reduced as the result of any deliberate intervention.
If you don't yet have evidence, it's not dishonest to offer to find and present it, but it is dishonest to claim that you already have it, since by making that claim you're claiming something that's not true - namely that you have already confirmed that the evidence exists.
My concern (or at least the one that I'm elaborating on in this thread) is that those clusters can be made to map onto folk racial categories, or made to be only partly consistent with folk racial categories, or made to be contradictory to folk racial categories, depending upon how one's own preconceptions of race color one's cluster analyses.
Do you think our folk racial categories aren't the product of observable phenotypes?
No.
Do you think those categories at least approximate a valid scientific taxonomy?
Valid for which scientific purpose? They ar...
Not really a reply to you. I just found this and needed to put it somewhere. Anyone who has been following this discussion will be interested. It's an interesting way of posing the question.
...Now plot the genome of each human as a point on our lattice. Not surprisingly, there are readily identifiable clusters of points, corresponding to traditional continental ethnic groups: Europeans, Africans, Asians, Native Americans, etc. (See, for example, Risch et al., Am. J. Hum. Genet. 76:268–275, 2005.) Of course, we can get into endless arguments about how we de
Hsu's blog post makes two claims about race. The first argument is that 'Hypothesis 2' could be correct - i.e., that there could be genetically driven differences in exciting traits like IQ between races (or 'groups,' but I think we all know which 'groups' we're really interested in). I agree with this argument.
I completely disagree with the second claim, which is that genetic clustering studies constitute 'the scientific basis for race.' It's true that scientists can extract clusters from genetic data that match what we call races. If you gave me a bunch of human genotypes sampled from around the world and let me fuck around with that data and run it through PCA for a few hours, I'm sure I could do the same. But it doesn't automatically follow that my classification is correct.
For example, if you sample some whites, sample some blacks, and expect those two categories to automatically pop out of your analysis, you might be surprised. Here's a recent paper that estimated the European ancestry in African-Americans by analyzing genotypes from samples of US whites, US blacks, and several subgroups of Africans. Running PCA on all of the genotype data, and plotting the first two principa...
"Due", not "do".
Also, I think the confusion merely arises from arrangement and Gricean-maxim(-like?) considerations - I predict adding "Further" before "[a]ny evidence" would suffice to invoke the correct interpretation.
Yes. They are a) necessary and b) already done. (The "question" I have in mind is a specific one, that of a personal God who, etc. as stated above.)
Prior to, say, the invention of writing, it would perhaps have been legitimate to consider the existence of a personal God (or gods) an open question, susceptible of being settled by investigation. In fact under a hypothesis like Julian Jaynes' humans about 3000 years ago might have had overwhelming evidence that Gods existed... yet they'd still have been mistaken about that.
My estimate of the probability of homeopathy working and the current laws of physics being very different would have to be of similar order to my estimate of the probability of the current laws of physics being correct.
It may be reasonable to suppose so, but it doesn't change the fact that temperatures have been basically flat for the last 10 (or 15) years.
I don't believe it is true that 'temperatures have been basically flat' for the last 15 years: I see a net gain of 0.1 to 0.2 Kelvin, depending on the data set (HadCRUT3 v. GISTEMP v. UAH v. RSS). And it looks to me like temperatures have only been 'flat' for the last 10 years in the sense that a short enough snippet of a noisy time series will always look 'flat.'
...In any event, it's quite possible -- even likely --
That matches my experience as well - I think it is a necessarily supernatural description in the Carrier sense of the word, though, if it is to be taken at face value. It's not like saying "God is Thom Yorke" (to pick the first name that comes to mind - I don't even know who Thom Yorke is), and then cheerfully conceding that God is not, in fact, omnipotent or omniscient, etc. - the God-is-Love god still has the usual properties, just (or not "just", depending) also that description.
I see - along the lines of theological noncognitivism, then. It's an unusual position, in my experience.
More rigorously, the distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" must be in the map, not in the territory. As Aleister Crowley put it in his Book of Lies:
“Explain this happening!”
“It must have a natural cause!” }____Let these two asses be set to grind corn.
“It must have a supernatural cause!” }
Thankyou. It jumped out at me too upon rereading. I wonder why my browser has stopped spell checking for me.
Every 10-year trendline in cupholder's data was increasing.
If you give a statistician the 30-year or 130-year data set with the y-axis label taken off, they will tell you that there is no sign of a levelling-off.
How can mentioning of evidence ever be a failure of rationality?
It can't, but the way you communicate it can imply a failure of rationality. (i. e. the conclusions you imply and your expectations of the effect of the evidence on others)
They were also both written in English. The question is, can you see the difference?
Jayson apologetically expressed misunderstanding of rationality combined with an apparent willingness to be corrected. You arrogantly expressed your failure, and responded to criticism with ad hominems and whining.
Edit: In that post. Some of you responses were productive, and one is, at time of this writing, at positive karma.
Have you thought about which of these you would change?
They were observations about how I've had to alter myself to fit in successfully. I wasn't trying to judge whether they were good or bad, and I'm not sure any of them really need changing.
The only thing I'd look into further is the amount of time people spend "on the clock" or sparring in the dojo, preferring a bit more tolerance of lighter material. But this desire appears at odds with the standards of the community, as it seems to consider lighter material as pure noise in the signal/noi...
Depending on exactly what you mean, I might or might not agree with the premise that the segregation is greater. But in any case, I don't think it has the same effect.
Geographic segregation means some whites may encounter very few blacks. Economic and political segregation doesn't mean that men do not encounter women and vice-versa. Social segregation is one of those fuzzy things again. Yes, most people have a biased sex-ratio of friends, but the world isn't Saudi Arabia, and men and women do see each other daily. The fact that blacks are a minority, whereas women and men are near parity also affects things.
Where it came from: 2005 US Census. Probably doesn't make any such distinctions between married and unmarried women.
It would probably work well if you rattle it off quickly in a real-time conversation because it would show that you are engaged and have some wits about you, but what does it contribute to a conversation in which participants have hours to formulate a reply before the reply becomes stale?
Maybe I'm missing something: is there a truth or half-truth buried in, "There are 1 types of people in the world: those who start indexes at 0, and those who don't," that I have missed?
I think you are saying "yes," [...]
No, I am not. I don't know how to explain it - what I am trying to describe is the number and variety of bits of evidence you need to overwhelm the beliefs of those who are disagreeing with you here. You need to present the kind of proofs which would convince you that something you currently doubt for good reasons, something which is not a simple slam-dunk "this happens" but a complicated "the statistical distributions have different means and variances" claim, is decisively true.
The example is of less than zero importance - it's the standards of evidence I am trying to describe.
No. Your prior has to be different: how many skyscrapers that were severely damaged by actions and in contexts consistent with the use of explosives had in fact explosives being used in them?
What's the probability that explosives just happen to have been successfully placed, but not yet detonated in the WTC in any specific hour? Let's say an expected 1 hour every 10 years -> 1/(10 * 365* 24) = 0.0000114
It was extremely irrational to assume that this one point of evidence would shift the posterior probability enough to reach a substantially different conclusion. Whether the posterior probability is 0.000001 [edit: should be 0.00001] or 0.0001 doesn't matter all that terribly much.
Can you make an effort to state in more detailed terms what it would mean to find that "genetics play a significant role in the black/white IQ difference", in other words what precise predictions this theory makes? (And more precisely, what predictions it makes that distinguish it from the predictions of alternative theories, such as "environmental differences resulting from e.g. discrimination play a significant role in the black/white IQ difference".)
I don't think this is a fair assessment. I was a global warming supporter up until I saw that awful movie by Al Gore; his inept, unscientific presentation drove me to start looking into the situation.
What I found was a great deal of controversy over the figures - some of the charts cited by Gore tended to suggest the opposite of his thesis (assuming he even had a thesis - that man's all over the place); that CO2 follows warming, rather than triggers it.
After looking into it further - and hearing a dozen different sets of conflicting data - I eventually ga...
After looking into it further - and hearing a dozen different sets of conflicting data - I eventually gave up on understanding. I don't know enough about the subject matter to make an accurate judgement, and various sources on all sides of the debate have proved themselves to be biased or incompetent.
I sympathize. Frankly, most of us don't know anywhere near enough (nor should we, realistically) about climate science to truly assess the evidence ourselves, particularly when the models necessary for prediction are so complex. What to do in this case? I think we should consider the weight of opinion of actual experts. If you do this, the balance tips markedly towards AGW.
What about vested interests, you say? Well they exist on both sides, but on one side we have the fossil fuel lobby and on the other... conflict of interest wrt research grants (which is not just a problem in the case of global warming!).
Bottom line: If you can't assess the evidence directly yourself, delegate wisely.
You should clarify that you're talking about epistemic rationality a lot sooner than the 8th paragraph.
...The "skeptic" opens by remarking about the crazy true believers and wishful thinkers who believe in X, where there seem to be a surprising number of physicists making up the population of those wacky cult victims who believe in X. (The physicist-test is not an infallible indicator of rightness or even non-stupidity, but it's a filter that rapidly picks up on, say, strong AI, molecular nanotechnology, cryonics, the many-worlds interpretation, and so on.) Bonus point losses if the "skeptic" remarks on how easily physicists are seduced
Both humbleness and arrogance are rationalist sins, but arrogance is worse. I can think of at least 4 different things wrong with this level of self-assurance in this context, and none of them have anything to do with cryonics in particular.
No level of self assurance is specified or implied by me. My reply to was your complaint regarding the qualitative nature of the judgement - that is, that the dishonest people are being judged as irrational rather than unethical when their irrational seeming arguments are in fact not sincere.
...I'm saying that mentall
I'm thinking of moral reasoning as the kind of reasoning you're morally responsible for: if you reason rightly, you ought to be praised and proud, and if you reason wrongly, you ought to be blamed and ashamed. That sort of thing.
Can't that apply to hypotheticals? If you come to the wrong conclusion you're a horrible person, sort of thing.
I would probably call "moral reasoning" something along the lines of "reasoning about morals". Even using your above definition, I think reasoning about morals using hypotheticals can result in a judgment, about what sort of action would be appropriate in the situation.
What if someone has rational reasons for rejecting a belief such as cryonics, but is deliberately using Dark Art rhetoric to talk more convincingly about that belief by associating it with low-status people? You'd class them as irrational when you should class them as unethical.
I don't think filtering people by rationality is a good idea at all. It's pretty much the definition of an ad hominem argument, and also a more-harmful-than-average case of the fundamental attribution error. Yes, it might be able to give you an early advantage on deciding whether they are right in any particular case; but that advantage would quickly evaporate as you got new data, and in most cases you'd already have enough data from the start for it to be a disadvantage (given limited human bandwidth).
I'm thinking of moral reasoning as the kind of reasoning you're morally responsible for: if you reason rightly, you ought to be praised and proud, and if you reason wrongly, you ought to be blamed and ashamed.
That can't be what people normally mean by "moral reasoning". Do you have a philosophy background?
I'm suggesting that no moral reasoning can be hypothetical
I don't see why that would be the case. Cheap illustration:
TEACHER: Jimmy, suppose I tell you that P, and also that P implies Q. What does that tell you about Q?
JIMMY: Q is true...
I'm thinking of moral reasoning as the kind of reasoning you're morally responsible for: if you reason rightly, you ought to be praised and proud, and if you reason wrongly, you ought to be blamed and ashamed.
Oh!
I understand you now.
Thanks for clarifying this.
Suppose I sit down at time T1 to consider the hypothetical question of what responses I consider appropriate to various events, and I conclude that in response to event E1 I ought to take action A1. Then at T2, E1 occurs, and I take action A1 based on reasoning of the form "That's E1, and I've previously decided that in case of E1 I should perform A1, so I'm going to perform A1."
If I've understood you correctly, the only question being discussed here is whether the label "moral reasoning" properly applies to what occurs at T1, T2, both...
In case of a possible misunderstanding: I didn't mean to imply that moral reasoning is literally hypothetical, but that hypotheticals can be a form of moral reasoning (and I hope we aren't arguing about what 'reasoning' is). The problem that I think you have with this is that you believe hypothetical moral reasoning doesn't generalize? If so, let me show you how that might work.
...Hmm, save one person or let five people die.
My intuition tells me that killing is wrong.
Wait, what is intuition and why should I trust it?
I guess it's the result of experience: cu
This would go quicker if you gave your conclusion and then we talked about the assumptions, rather than building from the assumptions to the conclusion (I think it's that you want to say hypotheticals produce different results than reality). But to answer your question, I don't think that giving a result to the trolley problem merely results in a judgement. I think it also potentially results in reflective equilibrium of moral intuitions, which then possibly results in different decisions in the future (I've had this experience). I think it also potentially affects the interlocutor or audience.
An evaluative judgement is an action; you're fundamentally saying moral reasoning has consequences. I agree with that, of course. I don't think it disguishes it from theorical reasoning.
Also...
Though my response was very much intended to be a joke.
Can you please clarify which of your comments in this thread you stand by, and which ones you don't stand by?
Until you posted this comment, I thought your response was intended as humor.
Edit: And not of the ha ha only serious type.
Moral reasoning should inform your moral intuitions--what you'll do in the absence of an opportunity to reflect. How do you prepare your moral intuitions for handling future scenarios?
An interesting article.
"Reform of the rules governing consent is often accompanied by an overhaul and improvement of the logistical system, and it is this—not the letter of the law—that makes a difference. Cadaveric organ procurement is an intense, time-sensitive and very fluid process that requires a great deal of co-ordination and management. Countries that invest in that layer of the system do better than others, regardless of the rules about presumed and informed consent."
In our country, we have an opt-out donation, but I guess the relatives ...
Killing another living thing doesn't qualify as "euthanasia" if you do it for your benefit, not that being's.
Wow. You just decreed it impossible for euthanasia to be done professionally.
Instead of:
IF all evidence available indicates p(B|A) = 0.95
you mean:
IF all evidence available indicates p(A|B) = 0.95
Right?
It has generally been my experience, when a term proves problematic in discussion, that providing my definition for that term doesn't work as well as either (a) agreeing to use the other person's definition, when I understand it well enough to do so, or (b) not using the term.
Is your experience different?
That argument is a simple and valid deduction (with an implied premise of 'rudimentary probability theory'). The conclusion cannot be (coherently) denied without denying a premise. This is what we are doing when we reason probabilistically ('we' referring to 'people while they are lesswrong thinking mode or something similar).
We can argue from first principles about logic and probability until the cows come home, but all it would take for me affirm your original critique of my position would be for you to supply an instance of an argument from authority...
Agreed. Probabilistic arguments are necessarily invalid (except when the probability of every relevant premise is equal to 1).
Is this an example of the persuasion tactic advocated (or described) recently? That is, you open with 'agreed' and then clearly say something that would undermine drethelin's whole comment.
If your use of the term valid is such that arguments from authority are (necessarily) invalid then your use of the term is simply wrong. The very wikipedia link that you provide explains it as one of the many forms of potentially valid argument that is often used fallaciously.
The link I provided (here) does not contain the string "valid" as of 01:43 1/22/2012 Phoenix, Arizona time. What is does say is:
...Although certain classes of argument from authority do on occasion constitute strong inductive arguments, arguments from authority are commonl
The following is an example of a valid argument form:
- Person X has reputation for being an expert on Y.
- Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are likely to be correct.
- Person X said Z about Y.
- Z is likely to be correct.
That argument is not valid. Valid arguments don't become invalid with the introduction of additional information, but the argument you provided does. For instance, compare these two arguments:
1.)
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
2.)
All men are mortal.
S
Well if you want to use wealth as a proxy for intelligence, one approach would be to dramatically raise the tax exemption for children.
I was thinking about solutions which wouldn't significantly affect the total fertility rate, but now that I think about it, increasing it wouldn't be a “seriously undesirable side effect”, at least in (say) continental Europe or Japan.
In this world people use reproductive technology even when perfectly capable of conceiving naturally because it has become much more advanced, more convenient and because children gain a considerable measurable advantage. Also I assume these would be plausible numbers because contraceptive technology has advanced, the male pill for starters or perhaps a safer, more advanced, multi-year version of something like Depo-Provera.
Basically Gattaca to reach for a fictional portrayal.
Tl;dr: Since it can be cheap and easy to attack everything your tribe doesn't believe, you shouldn't trust the rationality of just anyone who slams astrology and creationism; these beliefs aren't just false, they're also non-tribal among educated audiences. Test what happens when a "skeptic" argues for a non-tribal belief, or argues against a tribal belief, before you decide they're good general rationalists. This post is intended to be reasonably accessible to outside audiences.
I don't believe in UFOs. I don't believe in astrology. I don't believe in homeopathy. I don't believe in creationism. I don't believe there were explosives planted in the World Trade Center. I don't believe in haunted houses. I don't believe in perpetual motion machines. I believe that all these beliefs are not only wrong but visibly insane.
If you know nothing else about me but this, how much credit should you give me for general rationality?
Certainly anyone who was skillful at adding up evidence, considering alternative explanations, and assessing prior probabilities, would end up disbelieving in all of these.
But there would also be a simpler explanation for my views, a less rare factor that could explain it: I could just be anti-non-mainstream. I could be in the habit of hanging out in moderately educated circles, and know that astrology and homeopathy are not accepted beliefs of my tribe. Or just perceptually recognize them, on a wordless level, as "sounding weird". And I could mock anything that sounds weird and that my fellow tribesfolk don't believe, much as creationists who hang out with fellow creationists mock evolution for its ludicrous assertion that apes give birth to human beings.
You can get cheap credit for rationality by mocking wrong beliefs that everyone in your social circle already believes to be wrong. It wouldn't mean that I have any ability at all to notice a wrong belief that the people around me believe to be right, or vice versa - to further discriminate truth from falsity, beyond the fact that my social circle doesn't already believe in something.
Back in the good old days, there was a simple test for this syndrome that would get quite a lot of mileage: You could just ask me what I thought about God. If I treated the idea with deeper respect than I treated astrology, holding it worthy of serious debate even if I said I disbelieved in it, then you knew that I was taking my cues from my social surroundings - that if the people around me treated a belief as high-prestige, high-status, I wouldn't start mocking it no matter what the state of evidence.
On the other hand suppose I said without hesitation that my epistemic state on God was similar to my epistemic state on psychic powers: no positive evidence, lots of failed tests, highly unfavorable prior, and if you believe it under those circumstances then something is wrong with your mind. Then you would have heard a bit of skepticism that might cost me something socially, and that not everyone around me would have endorsed, even in educated circles. You would know it wasn't just a cheap way of picking up cheap points.
Today the God-test no longer works, because some people realized that the taking-it-seriously aura of religion is in fact the main thing left which prevents people from noticing the epistemic awfulness; there has been a concerted and, I think, well-advised effort to mock religion and strip it of its respectability. The upshot is that there are now quite wide social circles in which God is just another stupid belief that we all know we don't believe in, on the same list with astrology. You could be dealing with an adept rationalist, or you could just be dealing with someone who reads Reddit.
And of course I could easily go on to name some beliefs that others think are wrong and that I think are right, or vice versa, but would inevitably lose some of my audience at each step along the way - just as, a couple of decades ago, I would have lost a lot of my audience by saying that religion was unworthy of serious debate. (Thankfully, today this outright dismissal is at least considered a respectable, mainstream position even if not everyone holds it.)
I probably won't lose much by citing anti-Artificial-Intelligence views as an example of undiscriminating skepticism. I think a majority among educated circles are sympathetic to the argument that brains are not magic and so there is no obstacle in principle to building machines that think. But there are others, albeit in the minority, who recognize Artificial Intelligence as "weird-sounding" and "sci-fi", a belief in something that has never yet been demonstrated, hence unscientific - the same epistemic reference class as believing in aliens or homeopathy.
(This is technically a demand for unobtainable evidence. The asymmetry with homeopathy can be summed up as follows: First: If we learn that Artificial Intelligence is definitely impossible, we must have learned some new fact unknown to modern science - everything we currently know about neurons and the evolution of intelligence suggests that no magic was involved. On the other hand, if we learn that homeopathy is possible, we must have learned some new fact unknown to modern science; if everything else we believe about physics is true, homeopathy shouldn't work. Second: If homeopathy works, we can expect double-blind medical studies to demonstrate its efficacy right now; the absence of this evidence is very strong evidence of absence. If Artificial Intelligence is possible in theory and in practice, we can't necessarily expect its creation to be demonstrated using current knowledge - this absence of evidence is only weak evidence of absence.)
I'm using Artificial Intelligence as an example, because it's a case where you can see some "skeptics" directing their skepticism at a belief that is very popular in educated circles, that is, the nonmysteriousness and ultimate reverse-engineerability of mind. You can even see two skeptical principles brought into conflict - does a good skeptic disbelieve in Artificial Intelligence because it's a load of sci-fi which has never been demonstrated? Or does a good skeptic disbelieve in human exceptionalism, since it would require some mysterious, unanalyzable essence-of-mind unknown to modern science?
It's on questions like these where we find the frontiers of knowledge, and everything now in the settled lands was once on the frontier. It might seem like a matter of little importance to debate weird non-mainstream beliefs; a matter for easy dismissals and open scorn. But if this policy is implemented in full generality, progress goes down the tubes. The mainstream is not completely right, and future science will not just consist of things that sound reasonable to everyone today - there will be at least some things in it that sound weird to us. (This is certainly the case if something along the lines of Artificial Intelligence is considered weird!) And yes, eventually such scientific truths will be established by experiment, but somewhere along the line - before they are definitely established and everyone already believes in them - the testers will need funding.
Being skeptical about some non-mainstream beliefs is not a fringe project of little importance, not always a slam-dunk, not a bit of occasional pointless drudgery - though I can certainly understand why it feels that way to argue with creationists. Skepticism is just the converse of acceptance, and so to be skeptical of a non-mainstream belief is to try to contribute to the project of advancing the borders of the known - to stake an additional epistemic claim that the borders should not expand in this direction, and should advance in some other direction instead.
This is high and difficult work - certainly much more difficult than the work of mocking everything that sounds weird and that the people in your social circle don't already seem to believe.
To put it more formally, before I believe that someone is performing useful cognitive work, I want to know that their skepticism discriminates truth from falsehood, making a contribution over and above the contribution of this-sounds-weird-and-is-not-a-tribal-belief. In Bayesian terms, I want to know that p(mockery|belief false & not a tribal belief) > p(mockery|belief true & not a tribal belief).
If I recall correctly, the US Air Force's Project Blue Book, on UFOs, explained away as a sighting of the planet Venus what turned out to actually be an experimental aircraft. No, I don't believe in UFOs either; but if you're going to explain away experimental aircraft as Venus, then nothing else you say provides further Bayesian evidence against UFOs either. You are merely an undiscriminating skeptic. I don't believe in UFOs, but in order to credit Project Blue Book with additional help in establishing this, I would have to believe that if there were UFOs then Project Blue Book would have turned in a different report.
And so if you're just as skeptical of a weird, non-tribal belief that turns out to have pretty good support, you just blew the whole deal - that is, if I pay any extra attention to your skepticism, it ought to be because I believe you wouldn't mock a weird non-tribal belief that was worthy of debate.
Personally, I think that Michael Shermer blew it by mocking molecular nanotechnology, and Penn and Teller blew it by mocking cryonics (justification: more or less exactly the same reasons I gave for Artificial Intelligence). Conversely, Richard Dawkins scooped up a huge truckload of actual-discriminating-skeptic points, at least in my book, for not making fun of the many-worlds interpretation when he was asked about in an interview; indeed, Dawkins noted (correctly) that the traditional collapse postulate pretty much has to be incorrect. The many-worlds interpretation isn't just the formally simplest explanation that fits the facts, it also sounds weird and is not yet a tribal belief of the educated crowd; so whether someone makes fun of MWI is indeed a good test of whether they understand Occam's Razor or are just mocking everything that's not a tribal belief.
Of course you may not trust me about any of that. And so my purpose today is not to propose a new litmus test to replace atheism.
But I do propose that before you give anyone credit for being a smart, rational skeptic, that you ask them to defend some non-mainstream belief. And no, atheism doesn't count as non-mainstream anymore, no matter what the polls show. It has to be something that most of their social circle doesn't believe, or something that most of their social circle does believe which they think is wrong. Dawkins endorsing many-worlds still counts for now, although its usefulness as an indicator is fading fast... but the point is not to endorse many-worlds, but to see them take some sort of positive stance on where the frontiers of knowledge should change.
Don't get me wrong, there's a whole crazy world out there, and when Richard Dawkins starts whaling on astrology in "The Enemies of Reason" documentary, he is doing good and necessary work. But it's dangerous to let people pick up too much credit just for slamming astrology and homeopathy and UFOs and God. What if they become famous skeptics by picking off the cheap targets, and then use that prestige and credibility to go after nanotechnology? Who will dare to consider cryonics now that it's been featured on an episode of Penn and Teller's "Bullshit"? On the current system you can gain high prestige in the educated circle just by targeting beliefs like astrology that are widely believed to be uneducated; but then the same guns can be turned on new ideas like the many-worlds interpretation, even though it's being actively debated by physicists. And that's why I suggest, not any particular litmus test, but just that you ought to have to stick your neck out and say something a little less usual - say where you are not skeptical (and most of your tribemates are) or where you are skeptical (and most of the people in your tribe are not).
I am minded to pay attention to Robyn Dawes as a skillful rationalist, not because Dawes has slammed easy targets like astrology, but because he also took the lead in assembling and popularizing the total lack of experimental evidence for nearly all schools of psychotherapy and the persistence of multiple superstitions such as Rorschach ink-blot interpretation in the face of literally hundreds of experiments trying and failing to find any evidence for it. It's not that psychotherapy seemed like a difficult target after Dawes got through with it, but that, at the time he attacked it, people in educated circles still thought of it as something that educated people believed in. It's not quite as useful today, but back when Richard Feynman published "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman" you could pick up evidence that he was actually thinking from the fact that he disrespected psychotherapists as well as psychics.
I'll conclude with some simple and non-trustworthy indicators that the skeptic is just filling in a cheap and largely automatic mockery template:
I'll conclude the conclusion by observing that poor skepticism can just as easily exist in a case where a belief is wrong as when a belief is right, so pointing out these flaws in someone's skepticism can hardly serve to establish a positive belief about where the frontiers of knowledge should move.