Curiously overlooked in this whole wiki section on women’s preferences is the fact that kindness is repeatedly found to be among the most desired qualities in large-scale, cross-cultural studies of mate preferences.
The second article is paywalled; the abstract says: "Men, more than women, prefer attractive, young mates, and women, more than men, prefer older mates with financial prospects. Cross-culturally, both sexes have mates closer to their own ages as gender equality increases. Beyond age of partner, neither pathogen prevalence nor gender equality robustly predicted sex differences or preferences across countries." No mention of kindness there; but maybe it is in the article.
The first article is freely available. First 13 ½ pages are the article itself, followed by 25 pages of "open peer commentary", followed by 7 pages of author's response, and the rest is a list of references.
I have only read carefully the first 13 pages, there was no mention of kindness. Ctrl+F "kindness" finds two occurrences. The first one is in the peer commentary, under "Some psychoanalytic considerations" written by a different author, asking: "Is it implied that similarities between the sexes in mate preference are actually more important than differences? Here the psychoanalyst would observe that the elaborateness of mother-child interaction has greatly increased in the course of hominid evolution, and that adults of both sexes have learned to value kindness and intelligence specifically in the context of early interaction with the mother. Both sexes are looking for signals of future parental investment; what better mechanism for learning these signals than lessons learned from the mother - that is, the parent who invests the most?"
The second occurrence is in the author's response, in section "Is there a species-typical or sex-typical human
nature?", where the author specifically considers the overlapping parts of male and female preferences. And within that part, kindness and intelligence are most highly valued by men and women of all cultures.
So... hey, I know that I suck at reading scientific papers, so it is quite possible that I have missed something important here... but it seems to me like it is the complaining guy who misrepresents the conclusions of one of the papers he links. (I just noticed that he is a co-author of the paywalled article, so that one probably supports his conclusions better.)
More precisely, if we know that "both men and women value X highly" and "women value Y more than men", it is not enough to conclude whether women value X or Y higher. These statements are consistent with the universes where (a) both men and women value X at 10 points, and women value Y at 5 points, and men value Y at 0 points; or (b) both men and women value X at 10 points, and women value Y at 15 points, and men value Y at 0 points. In both situations, X is preferable than the minimum/average value of Y, but in the former women prefer X to Y, and in the latter they prefer Y to X.
*
A different objection could be made against using questionnaires as tools to reveal preferences. First, there will be bias toward socially acceptable answers. Notice that kindness and intelligence also happen to be universally non-controversial good traits (except for intelligence being recently problematic among the woke).
Second... as a thought experiment, imagine that everyone chooses X over Y, and everyone feels bad about their choice afterwards. (It could be because they changed their minds and now think that Y is better than X. But it could also be that they wanted both, and now their need for X is saturated, so they wish they could have Y, too.) The questionnaires will all tell you about the importance of Y. But the revealed preferences tell a different story.
2Thanks for checking the sources in that article! I hadn't done that.
I now took a quick look at the first paper as well. While "kindness" did only have two hits, searching for "kind" also brought up this bit from the article itself:
4.1. Qualifications and limitations [...]
Several important qualifications must attend the interpretation of these findings. [...] Third, neither earning potential nor physical appearance emerged as the highest rated or ranked characteristic for either sex, even though these characteristics showed large sex differences. Both sexes ranked the characteristics "kind-understanding" and "intelligent" higher than earning power and attractiveness in all samples, suggesting that species-typical mate preferences may be more potent than sex-linked preferences
EDIT: Looks like the second paper was accessible via sci-hub; it has this:
Mate preferences were standardized across countries prior to analysis, so this and all b values can be interpreted as equivalent to Cohen’s ds. The average for women was 5.48, 95% CI = [5.46, 5.51], and the average for men was 5.11, 95% CI = [5.08, 5.14]. The smallest sex difference was in Spain, b = −0.12, and the largest sex difference was in China, b = −0.56. Furthermore, men reported a higher preference for a physically attractive ideal mate than women, on average, b = 0.27, SE = 0.03, p < .001. The average for women was 5.56, 95% CI = [5.53, 5.58], and the average for men was 5.85, 95% CI = [5.83, 5.88]. The sex difference (b) ranged from −0.07 in China to 0.50 in Brazil.
Furthermore, we found small but still-significant sex differences in reported ideal preference for kindness, intelligence, and health. However, both men and women reported higher preferences for these traits in an ideal partner than for good financial prospects or for physical attractiveness. Women reported preferences for kinder ideal mates than men, on average, b = −0.12, SE = 0.02, p < .001. The average for women was 6.23, 95% CI = [6.21, 6.26], and the average for men was 6.12, 95% CI = [6.10, 6.15]. The sex difference (b) ranged from −0.23 in the United States to 0.06 in Uganda. Women also reported preferences for greater intelligence in ideal mates, on average, b = −0.12, SE = 0.02, p < .001. The average for women was 6.03, 95% CI = [6.01, 6.05], and the average for men was 5.92, 95% CI = [5.89, 5.94]. The sex difference (b) ranged from −0.35 in China to 0.04 in Algeria.
11Great, thanks! I missed that. Especially this part is interesting:
Women reported preferences for kinder ideal mates than men, on average, b = −0.12, SE = 0.02, p < .001.
Now that I think about it, there is also a problem with using general information to solve one's personal problems.
As an example, suppose that women want traits A, B, C, where A is more important than B, and B is more important than C. You happen to have traits A, C, D. Obviously, the part you should worry about is B, even if the research says "A is more important than B". The relation is not linear; you can't compensate for lack of B by having even more A. (Also, there are probably diminishing returns at trying to be even more A.)
So, to use a specific example, if you are kind and smart, but have no money, you should get a job. This advice is useful in both universes where kindness is more important than money, or where money is more important than kindness. You already have the kindness, but you don't have the money.
*
Eh, I guess this may seem like "Viliam was wrong, but he still insists that he was right in some sense". Well, I am out of the dating game, already 15 years in a monogamous relationship, so this is not a sensitive topic for me now. But I remember the moment in the past when my dating success dramatically increased practically overnight, and it definitely wasn't caused by a sudden increase in IQ, or by me becoming more kind. It felt more like a move in the direction opposite to kindness, a kind of "fuck trying to be nice and do the right thing, let's just do the things the dark parts of internet recommend in order to get laid", and yes it worked. (On the other hand, things like kindness seem to be valued more in hindsight, in the sense that a girl who breaks up with me later says to her friends that she sometimes misses my kindness.) So whenever I am reading about how all the cynics on the internet are wrong, I feel some cognitive dissonance that I am trying to solve.
At this moment my best guess is that kindness is generally nice, but there is also such thing as too much kindness. I want my friends to be nice to me, but I also want them to be able to defend me and themselves from our potential enemies; and I need some credible signal that they could do that if necessary. (Or, as Jordan Peterson would say, "good" is not the same as "harmless". A good person is one who could hurt you, but chooses not to.) There is "kindness" that is a choice, and "kindness" that is a strategy to survive by avoiding conflict. I suppose the former is attractive, and the latter is not. But to make it clear that your kindness is a choice, you must sometimes be visibly not-kind.
At this moment my best guess is that kindness is generally nice, but there is also such thing as too much kindness. I want my friends to be nice to me, but I also want them to be able to defend me and themselves from our potential enemies; and I need some credible signal that they could do that if necessary. (Or, as Jordan Peterson would say, "good" is not the same as "harmless". A good person is one who could hurt you, but chooses not to.) There is "kindness" that is a choice, and "kindness" that is a strategy to survive by avoiding conflict. I suppose the former is attractive, and the latter is not. But to make it clear that your kindness is a choice, you must sometimes be visibly not-kind.
Yeah this sounds right to me.
On the “student with a trauma history” thing:
The commentary (both the quote of the original, and your own) seems to entirely dismiss the possibility of selective ways of looking at the issue, opting to only consider corrective approaches (which indeed are unlikely to work) and (in a rather one-sided way) structural approaches. This seems to me to be a huge blind spot.
My own view is that the analysis given in the original source is extremely bad, and the approach described therein creates horrible incentives, in ways well understood. The world absolutely is worse because the student in question declares a need for accommodation, and gets it.
Ignoring selective dynamics prevents you from seeing how these negative consequences could be possible even in principle (never mind whether they occur true in practice). Seems bad.
The commentary (both the quote of the original, and your own) seems to entirely dismiss the possibility of selective ways of looking at the issue, opting to only consider corrective approaches (which indeed are unlikely to work) and (in a rather one-sided way) structural approaches.
Would the selective approach in this case be something like "ignore the request and let them drop out if they can't handle that", or something else?
My own view is that the analysis given in the original source is extremely bad, and the approach described therein creates horrible incentives, in ways well understood. The world absolutely is worse because the student in question declares a need for accommodation, and gets it.
I agree that there are definite incentive problems to take into account. However in this specific case, where the cost of accommodation is basically zero (just using slightly different language), I don't think they're an issue.
Would the selective approach in this case be something like “ignore the request and let them drop out if they can’t handle that”, or something else?
Yep. (Of course “ignore” can be finessed, but you’ve certainly got the gist of it.)
(I will also note that the strategy is “ignore the request”; “let them drop out if they can’t handle that” sneaks in a model of the consequences. It is not an entirely unreasonable model, but it’s certainly not the only plausible one. We should be very wary of privileging one possibility in such cases.)
I agree that there are definite incentive problems to take into account. However in this specific case, where the cost of accommodation is basically zero (just using slightly different language), I don’t think they’re an issue.
I strongly disagree with your evaluation of the cost, and am surprised to see you make such a claim. Surely you must know that “just” using (“slightly”) different language is far from costless?
As for incentives, you pay lip service to them, but I don’t think you are taking them at all seriously. Assume the cost of one accommodation to be “basically zero”. It does not follow from this that the expected total cost of all requested accommodations, conditional on the policy of “grant requested accommodations” being instituted, will be “basically zero”, or even “less than astronomical”. (Indeed, we can observe that such an optimistic prediction turns out to be manifestly false.)
(Quite often, the second-order consequences, the effects of incentive gradients, etc., are the downsides of some proposed policy. Saying “but incentives aside…” is the equivalent of the proverbial “other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?”.)
Yep. (Of course “ignore” can be finessed, but you’ve certainly got the gist of it.)
Okay. In that case I'm not sure why you say that my commentary is dismissing the selective ways of looking at the issue. When I wrote it, the two options I had in mind were "agree to the request" or "deny/ignore the request". (I mean, I did "dismiss" the selective ways in the sense that I thought they'd be a bad way of dealing with the issue, but I interpret you to have meant "dismiss" in the sense of "not consider at all".)
I strongly disagree with your evaluation of the cost, and am surprised to see you make such a claim. Surely you must know that “just” using (“slightly”) different language is far from costless?
In the general case it's not necessarily costless. But in this particular case, at least her teacher seemed to think that it was, if not literally costless, then a very small cost. And if I was in his position, I think it would be a very negligible cost for me to implement. Remembering to use different language would take a little bit of effort at first, but then become automatic very quickly.
(I'm again assuming that the request can be incorporated while still delivering all of the teaching and grading etc. essentially unchanged. If it was the case that she couldn't easily be corrected on mistakes in assignments or something similar, that would substantially change my position.)
Assume the cost of one accommodation to be “basically zero”. It does not follow from this that the expected total cost of all requested accommodations, conditional on the policy of “grant requested accommodations” being instituted, will be “basically zero”, or even “less than astronomical”. (Indeed, we can observe that such an optimistic prediction turns out to be manifestly false.)
I agree. I did not mean to argue for a blanket policy of granting all requested accommodations, nor did I interpret the original poster to be arguing for that.
Okay. In that case I’m not sure why you say that my commentary is dismissing the selective ways of looking at the issue. When I wrote it, the two options I had in mind were “agree to the request” or “deny/ignore the request”. (I mean, I did “dismiss” the selective ways in the sense that I thought they’d be a bad way of dealing with the issue, but I interpret you to have meant “dismiss” in the sense of “not consider at all”.)
Because you talk quite a bit about what will or will not fix this student’s problem, whether it is easy or hard for this student to “get over it”, how long it would take for this student to fix the problem, what this student’s experience is like, etc., etc. (Likewise the author of the quoted original post.)
These concerns all belong to a corrective view. From a selective view, all of them are irrelevant. What is relevant instead is questions like: supposing that we adopt a policy of granting such requests, what will the student body (likewise: the class, the results of the course, etc.) be like? If we adopt a policy of not granting such requests, what will said things be like? And so on.
So, you say that you thought that selective ways would be a bad way of dealing with the issue. Well, that’s a perfectly coherent view. But it needs to be argued for, not just left as a totally unstated background assumption.
But in this particular case, at least her teacher seemed to think that it was, if not literally costless, then a very small cost.
I would not conclude this from the quoted post. I would conclude only that this person found it prudent or desirable to make a Facebook post that claimed such things. While there is surely a correlation between these two things, it is not nearly strong enough to allow us to treat them as identical.
(And, in this particular case, the post is strongly performative in tone, further weakening said correlation.)
And if I was in his position, I think it would be a very negligible cost for me to implement. Remembering to use different language would take a little bit of effort at first, but then become automatic very quickly.
For one thing, cognitive costs of alterations like this vary across individuals. Some may find such adjustments as easy as you describe them being for you; others will not. Instituting a policy of making, and requiring, such adjustments, selects against the latter sort of individual. (There’s that selective view again!)
Some of my best teachers, instructors, professors, etc. have seemed very much like the latter sort. I find this unlikely to be coincidence.
For another thing, some obvious questions we could ask would be: ok, so you’re going to not ever tell this student that she’s wrong. Are you also not going to tell the other students that they’re wrong? What if they ask you “so, am I wrong about this?”, or “so, is this wrong?”? What if they ask you “so, what so-and-so just said—that’s wrong, isn’t it?” You might be tempted to describe various evasions which you could use, but now suppose that another student is (again, to take just one possible example) on the autism spectrum, and has a difficult time understanding euphemisms, indirection, etc.? Suppose that they’re not a native speaker? Suppose that they’re on the spectrum and they’re not a native speaker?
(It took me barely a minute to come up with this example. And it’s far from being unrealistic—I can tell you that from personal experience! How many other such “competing access needs” scenarios are induced by granting this one “almost costless” accommodation?)
What if one of the other students tells this student that she’s wrong? Must you now police the speech of your students for this particular linguistic landmine, in addition to your own speech?
What if someone of your students are (like the professors described earlier) the sorts of people who find it difficult to “adjust” their language in this manner?
In short, it is very easy to say that making some adjustment would be nearly costless. It is quite another thing to actually consider all the costs. This is doubly so because there are considerable incentives (!) to make such claims.
And I haven’t even gotten to the distortionary effect on your own cognition, from not just avoiding such straightforward constructions as “you’re wrong” (and similar), but automatically avoiding them! Perhaps one could make an argument that having your brain automatically flinch away from responding to a clearly wrong statement with “that’s wrong” is not as bad as it sounds… but that certainly wouldn’t be the way I’d bet.
(I’m again assuming that the request can be incorporated while still delivering all of the teaching and grading etc. essentially unchanged. If it was the case that she couldn’t easily be corrected on mistakes in assignments or something similar, that would substantially change my position.)
Well, that’s certainly an assumption, yes…
I agree. I did not mean to argue for a blanket policy of granting all requested accommodations, nor did I interpret the original poster to be arguing for that.
I believe that you did not mean to argue for such a blanket policy, but I do not believe for a moment that the original poster wasn’t.
o Because you talk quite a bit about what will or will not fix this student’s problem, whether it is easy or hard for this student to “get over it”, how long it would take for this student to fix the problem, what this student’s experience is like, etc., etc. (Likewise the author of the quoted original post.)
These concerns all belong to a corrective view. From a selective view, all of them are irrelevant. What is relevant instead is questions like: supposing that we adopt a policy of granting such requests, what will the student body (likewise: the class, the results of the course, etc.) be like? If we adopt a policy of not granting such requests, what will said things be like? And so on.
So, you say that you thought that selective ways would be a bad way of dealing with the issue. Well, that’s a perfectly coherent view. But it needs to be argued for, not just left as a totally unstated background assumption.
Fair enough, I'll elaborate then.
You're thinking about the selective view in a way that focuses on people who have the incentive to make these kinds of requests. Meanwhile I'm more focused on the people who wouldn't have an incentive to make these kinds of requests, if not for the fact that their trauma makes it excessively costly for them to not have their requests accommodated. It's not even the case that, as your link to the Vladimir_M comment implies, that they have developed this as an unconscious strategy for getting something that makes them better off. Having this problem just makes them worse off.
If such people make requests that are low-cost for us to grant, while very costly for them if we do not grant them, that has the consequence of making it significantly costlier and harder for them to graduate. And even if they do manage to graduate, it may make it significantly harder for them to overcome their problems later in life. So then one selective effect is that the school as a whole loses people who would otherwise have been good students. But also on a broader level, society as a whole suffers as these people become increasingly worse off and less capable of contributing, when a more accommodating policy could have allowed them to thrive.
(This is a somewhat personal topic for me, as I have a close relative who had to drop out of university due to mental health problems and ultimately ended up on an early disability pension when they would have preferred to be working. And things wouldn't have needed to go very differently for something similar to happen to me.)
So my view is that it's bad to take an "ignore/deny" type approach because the selective effects have an overall negative composition on both the student body of that particular school, as well as on the composition of society in general.
Instituting a policy of making, and requiring, such adjustments, selects against the latter sort of individual. (There’s that selective view again!)
Some of my best teachers, instructors, professors, etc. have seemed very much like the latter sort.
That's true. Though if these people have difficulty making accommodations that would make some of their students significantly better off, then that seems to me like evidence that they're not among the best teachers, and that it might be good to select against them.
Also this bit sounds like we are now talking about something like... what university-level policies should be like, and while that's not an unreasonable direction to be going in, I was originally thinking of this just as a discussion of the choices of this particular teacher. It seems to me like one should first get on the same page about whether his specific decision was good or bad, before trying to consider possible policy implications. (Since it can be that a particular choice made individually is good or bad, but trying to create an institution-wide policy that everyone/no-one should make the same choice has unintended effects; but one can't talk about the policy-level tradeoffs before first knowing what the effects on the individual level are.)
For another thing, some obvious questions we could ask would be: ok, so you’re going to not ever tell this student that she’s wrong. Are you also not going to tell the other students that they’re wrong? What if they ask you “so, am I wrong about this?”, or “so, is this wrong?”? What if they ask you “so, what so-and-so just said—that’s wrong, isn’t it?” You might be tempted to describe various evasions which you could use, but now suppose that another student is (again, to take just one possible example) on the autism spectrum, and has a difficult time understanding euphemisms, indirection, etc.? Suppose that they’re not a native speaker? Suppose that they’re on the spectrum and they’re not a native speaker?
It's easy to generate lots of "what ifs", but a long list of them doesn't mean they'd be hard to answer in practice. Your first two questions in particular seem to me to have obvious answers - automatically extending the policy to all students only makes sense, but if someone explicitly wants to know if they are wrong or not, then they presumably won't mind being told if they are.
On my Facebook wall where I originally shared this post, various people chimed in with their experiences from either teaching or work, and several mentioned that this wouldn't really come up for them because they had never had a reason to tell anyone "you're wrong" anyway. E.g. one person said:
I don't have much experience of university teaching but I do have some, and I don't recall ever having to tell a student "you are wrong", or even words with similar meaning. That's simply because no student has ever presented a claim that has simple yes or no truth value. The closest I have come to "you are wrong" is something like "it's partially like you said, but also..." My academic field is history, if that matters.
That said, even if a student made a clearly wrong statement, I would probably state my answer as something like, "an interesting point but it didn't go quite like that". I haven't thought about this in any kind of "woke" scenario, for me it's just simply a part of good manners that a teacher shouldn't directly embarass a student.
And another said:
I don't remember when was the last time at my job I told anyone they are wrong - and I don't remember when anyone told me I'm wrong. And I work with a lot of people from many walks of life.
There have been plenty of cases where a person (me or someone else) says "here's how I see it" and the other goes "Ooh, right". Telling the other person they're wrong is both useless and counter productive. [...]
Here's how I see things happening in the places I go to for work. People skip the "that's not right" or "that's wrong", because it does not add anything to the discussion.
Instead depending on the veracity of their own claim, they might say "This is how it is", "Have you read this piece of research that shows A and B?". There's no need to rub the fact that one person was wrong on anybody's face. It is especially bad form, if one tries to convince the other person to change their mind.
While not everyone agreed, many people seemed to have the position that avoiding "you're wrong"-type language is just a net improvement and that they've never ran into a situation where one would need to use it (and I think at least some of those people do also work in fields with people on the spectrum). This also matches my own experience, and makes me skeptical of how likely it is for any of your scenarios to turn out to be a problem in practice.
If anything, the systematic effects seem positive, in that applying the same policy to all students would likely also make several others feel more comfortable.
Of course, it would be silly to argue that there could never be any costs associated with this. It's certainly likely that trying to accommodate, if not this particular request, then some other request of vaguely the same type would eventually get us into a challenging scenario. But if that happens, one can figure out the best course of action when it happens, and then possibly re-evaluate the overall approach if it does turn out to be more costly.
In any case, it would seem bad to me if this teacher, in considering whether to grant the request, would conclude that he has to deny it because of some complicated hypothetical scenario that assumed other students reacted in very specific ways. Given that it's also very plausible that none of that happens and everything goes just fine.
In short, it is very easy to say that making some adjustment would be nearly costless. It is quite another thing to actually consider all the costs.
Fair enough, so I'll rephrase: there seem to be very small immediate costs for this particular teacher to accommodate the request. It is of course possible that some major unexpected cost comes up, but if that happens, he can consider them and then shift his approach accordingly.
And I haven’t even gotten to the distortionary effect on your own cognition, from not just avoiding such straightforward constructions as “you’re wrong” (and similar), but automatically avoiding them! Perhaps one could make an argument that having your brain automatically flinch away from responding to a clearly wrong statement with “that’s wrong” is not as bad as it sounds… but that certainly wouldn’t be the way I’d bet.
I have a hard time seeing this as particularly problematic, given the previously mentioned view that saying "you're wrong" just doesn't seem to be necessary in general. "Having your brain automatically flinch away from" something sounds bad if you phrase it like that, but part of the process of acquiring any skill is to learn to automatically flinch away from performing the skill in a bad way. Similarly, if there's little reason to ever say "you're wrong" while there are good reasons to avoid it, then I see this less as distorting cognition and more as optimizing it (or more specifically optimizing the skill of good communication).
(This is a somewhat personal topic for me, as I have a close relative who had to drop out of university due to mental health problems and ultimately ended up on an early disability pension when they would have preferred to be working. And things wouldn’t have needed to go very differently for something similar to happen to me.)
That’s unfortunate for your relative, of course, and they have my sympathies. But I don’t think anyone would call it implausible that this person would’ve benefited from being granted accommodations for their difficulties. The question is what this would cost their professors, the other students, society in general, etc.
You could in theory make several arguments here, and you seem to be making some of them—but it’s not clear which and when. You could say:
(a) It would cost the professors / other students / society so little to accommodate your relative that, on altruistic grounds, we should do this, because the benefit to the accommodated person is so great and the total cost is so low.
(b) The professors / other students may pay a non-trivial cost to accommodate your relative, but this is outweighed by the benefit to society from having this person be accommodated, so we should do it (which is to say, we should force any unwilling cost-bearers to bear the cost against their wishes, as a form of redistribution of resources).
(c) The professors, the other students, and society would all benefit from accommodating your relative, so we should obviously do it because it’s good for everyone.
(d) The professors / other students / society may pay a non-trivial cost to accommodate your relative, but we should do it anyway, because… something. (Social justice?)
Argument (d) seems hard to justify morally. Argument (c) is very implausible empirically. Argument (b) also seems hard to justify morally, but perhaps marginally less so than (d). Argument (a) also seems implausible empirically, as I’ve already discussed.
So my view is that it’s bad to take an “ignore/deny” type approach because the selective effects have an overall negative composition on both the student body of that particular school, as well as on the composition of society in general.
How can this be true? Why is it better to have the student body contain students who have this sort of mental disability, than to not have the student body contain such students?
I have described some of the costs and negative effects of such a thing. But here you seem to be saying not merely that the costs and negative effects are very low, but that actually there are benefits? What could they be…?
Meanwhile I’m more focused on the people who wouldn’t have an incentive to make these kinds of requests, if not for the fact that their trauma makes it excessively costly for them to not have their requests accommodated. It’s not even the case that, as your link to the Vladimir_M comment implies, that they have developed this as an unconscious strategy for getting something that makes them better off. Having this problem just makes them worse off.
I am not sure why you say this. Why do you say that such people can’t be getting something that makes them better off? If they successfully get their preferences (a.k.a. “needs”, etc.) acknowledged and accommodated, that is a distinct advantage relative to the base case where they are just a regular person with no special needs! This seems very obvious!
If such people make requests that are low-cost for us to grant, while very costly for them if we do not grant them, that has the consequence of making it significantly costlier and harder for them to graduate. And even if they do manage to graduate, it may make it significantly harder for them to overcome their problems later in life. So then one selective effect is that the school as a whole loses people who would otherwise have been good students. But also on a broader level, society as a whole suffers as these people become increasingly worse off and less capable of contributing, when a more accommodating policy could have allowed them to thrive.
This seems to be making the assumption that such people (on average) “would otherwise have been good students”. I do not think that this is the least bit warranted.
Additionally, this perspective suffers from the problem of “the seen vs. the unseen”. The student who needs such an accommodation is taking the place of the student who doesn’t. Which of them is more likely to be a good student generally, and to contribute to society later? I think it’s clear that it’s the latter.
Casting such accommodations as improvements in the expected social benefit provided by the university is just not remotely plausible.
If they successfully get their preferences (a.k.a. “needs”, etc.) acknowledged and accommodated, that is a distinct advantage relative to the base case where they are just a regular person with no special needs! This seems very obvious!
I mean, yes, but having that preference gives them no special advantage relative to not having it.
Suppose that I have a gluten intolerance and need to have gluten-free food available. It's of course true that getting to have gluten-free food is now a distinct advantage to me, compared to a scenario where I couldn't get gluten-free food. But the fact that I have a gluten intolerance doesn't make me better off overall. If I get accommodated, then at best I get to the same neutral level of "can eat food without getting terrible symptoms" that everyone else is at. And more realistically, I won't even get to that zero level but rather will sometimes accidentally eat food with gluten, will miss out on tasty foods I'd enjoy, etc., so it'd be better for me to not have the intolerance.
Likewise, if someone gets terribly upset about being told "you're wrong", then if that's accommodated, at best they get to the same zero level as everyone who doesn't get terribly upset about it. And it's more likely that they won't get perfectly accommodated, so not only will they gain nothing, but will also need to endure discomfort they wouldn't need to endure if they didn't have that sensitivity. So if they don't already have that pre-existing sensitivity, there's no incentive for them to develop it.
I do not think that this is the least bit warranted.
Why not? I know plenty of otherwise intelligent, creative etc. people who also have serious mental health problems.
I mean, yes, but having that preference gives them no special advantage relative to not having it.
But of course it does! It grants them a reason to seek to have the preference satisfied, which is an advantage if (a) having the preference satisfied is a sufficiently superior state to not having the preference at all, and (b) conditional on having the preference, satisfaction is sufficiently likely.
(Basically all of this is explained in the previously-linked Vladimir_M comments, so I do encourage you to reread them if you haven’t done so.)
Suppose that I have a gluten intolerance and need to have gluten-free food available. It’s of course true that getting to have gluten-free food is now a distinct advantage to me, compared to a scenario where I couldn’t get gluten-free food. But the fact that I have a gluten intolerance doesn’t make me better off overall. If I get accommodated, then at best I get to the same neutral level of “can eat food without getting terrible symptoms” that everyone else is at. And more realistically, I won’t even get to that zero level but rather will sometimes accidentally eat food with gluten, will miss out on tasty foods I’d enjoy, etc., so it’d be better for me to not have the intolerance.
On the contrary, it is not only plausible but very easy to end up in a superior end state in this scenario. Suppose that having gluten-free food provided for you is costly and difficult, and that you can convince or otherwise cause others to expend their resources on providing you with gluten-free food. This is a signal of your social status, clearly visible to anyone who observes such behavioral interactions. And, in turn, there are many, many situations when an even relatively small advantage in social status is more important (by any relevant measure) than an even quite substantial loss in sensory pleasure from food. (I trust that no examples are needed to illustrate this general point.)
In such a case, it would indeed be better for you to have the gluten intolerance than not to have it.
Note that this logic predicts that we should see people who don’t actually have gluten intolerance, to pretend to do so (as any status signal will attract imitators/fakers). And indeed this is precisely what we do see.
Likewise, if someone gets terribly upset about being told “you’re wrong”, then if that’s accommodated, at best they get to the same zero level as everyone who doesn’t get terribly upset about it. And it’s more likely that they won’t get perfectly accommodated, so not only will they gain nothing, but will also need to endure discomfort they wouldn’t need to endure if they didn’t have that sensitivity. So if they don’t already have that pre-existing sensitivity, there’s no incentive for them to develop it.
The above logic applies here too. (And this is definitely, and very comprehensively, treated in the linked discussion thread…)
I do not think that this is the least bit warranted.
Why not? I know plenty of otherwise intelligent, creative etc. people who also have serious mental health problems.
That is not the correct question. The correct question is whether, on average, such people are equally good students to people without such serious mental problems (“such”, note; mental health problems, serious or no, are not monolithic, nor uniform in their effects on academic performance), or better, or worse. (And remember that we are not comparing to general population averages here, but to the population subsets selected for going to college!)
For your assumption to be warranted, it would have to be the case that someone who has a mental breakdown when told that they’re wrong would, if accommodated for that particular disability, be about as good a student on average as… well, the average student. This is highly implausible. (For one thing, remember that mental disorders are highly correlated with one another!)
You’re thinking about the selective view in a way that focuses on people who have the incentive to make these kinds of requests.
Sorry, but I think you’re somewhat misunderstanding me. The incentive to make such requests is one part of the selective view. But it’s not the only part. “What will the student body be like if we [ do / don’t ] adopt a policy of granting such accommodations” is a question that can coherently be asked (and which has a non-trivial answer) even if we totally set aside questions of incentives!
That’s true. Though if these people have difficulty making accommodations that would make some of their students significantly better off, then that seems to me like evidence that they’re not among the best teachers, and that it might be good to select against them.
On the contrary, it is nothing of the sort. The best teachers are those who are best at teaching, period. Making accommodations for mental illness is, at best, orthogonal to this. If one teacher is better at teaching than another, that’s that.
Also this bit sounds like we are now talking about something like… what university-level policies should be like, and while that’s not an unreasonable direction to be going in, I was originally thinking of this just as a discussion of the choices of this particular teacher. It seems to me like one should first get on the same page about whether his specific decision was good or bad, before trying to consider possible policy implications. (Since it can be that a particular choice made individually is good or bad, but trying to create an institution-wide policy that everyone/no-one should make the same choice has unintended effects; but one can’t talk about the policy-level tradeoffs before first knowing what the effects on the individual level are.)
Sorry, but I do not find this plausible. The quoted original post is very clearly advocating for people to do as he describes himself doing.
What’s more, in such a case, the choices of any particular teacher are, in fact, effectively part of the university’s policies, if they affect other students. We do not know for a fact whether that’s so, but my examples show, I think, that it’s hard for them to avoid doing so.
It’s easy to generate lots of “what ifs”, but a long list of them doesn’t mean they’d be hard to answer in practice. Your first two questions in particular seem to me to have obvious answers—automatically extending the policy to all students only makes sense, but if someone explicitly wants to know if they are wrong or not, then they presumably won’t mind being told if they are.
Ah, and so you demonstrate the point I just made. Now we’ve got a situation where the accommodations granted to one student immediately and substantially degrade the clarity of communication to all the other students. Having made what is allegedly just a personal choice on one teacher’s part, we’ve barely started exploring the consequences and we’re already into “making the learning environment worse for everyone” territory!
On my Facebook wall where I originally shared this post, various people chimed in with their experiences from either teaching or work, and several mentioned that this wouldn’t really come up for them because they had never had a reason to tell anyone “you’re wrong” anyway.
I’m not surprised that it’s easy to find any number of anecdotes like this. (Although I was particularly amused by “My academic field is history, if that matters”—oh, I’d say it matters quite a bit!) But what is the use of such things? I can recall plenty of times where my teachers have said “that’s wrong” or “you’re wrong”, where my college professors have said such things, my coworkers to me or to each other, my bosses to me or to my coworkers, and of course I to various people… but what does any of this prove? Only that people’s experience is different…
While not everyone agreed, many people seemed to have the position that avoiding “you’re wrong”-type language is just a net improvement and that they’ve never ran into a situation where one would need to use it (and I think at least some of those people do also work in fields with people on the spectrum). This also matches my own experience, and makes me skeptical of how likely it is for any of your scenarios to turn out to be a problem in practice.
I find this position to be wildly implausible. A net improvement, really? I’m sorry, but this does not pass the smell test… and as I said, I have encountered scenarios similar to those which I have described, many times.
… applying the same policy to all students would likely also make several others feel more comfortable.
This is possible. Does it outweigh the downsides? It seems to me that it can’t even plausibly begin to do so.
In any case, it would seem bad to me if this teacher, in considering whether to grant the request, would conclude that he has to deny it because of some complicated hypothetical scenario that assumed other students reacted in very specific ways. Given that it’s also very plausible that none of that happens and everything goes just fine.
Indeed, the teacher should not deny the request for such a reason. He should deny the request on far more general principles than that, namely that (a) that there are many possible ways for other students to react that would impose serious costs and cause detrimental effects, (b) the very predictable (and not at all hypothetical) effects of granting the request would be bad even aside from any specific reactions on the part of any specific students, and (c) the incentives created by granting the request would be far-reaching and almost universally bad.
(There is also an even more general principle, which is that the default response to any requests that one change one’s behavior in order to mitigate some supposed problem that someone else is having, should be “no”. Of course, in this particular case we have many more specific reasons to respond in the negative, but still this is a solid default, and well worth keeping in mind, because the aforementioned specific reasons exhibit patterns which recur in many other circumstances.)
It is of course possible that some major unexpected cost comes up, but if that happens, he can consider them and then shift his approach accordingly.
Can he? One of the effects of having such requests granted is the creation of precedent, and the shifting of the Overton window. In other words, decisions like this exhibit hysteresis. This is yet another of the many dangers and downsides of granting requests like this: you limit your ability to say “no” in the future, and restrict not only your own future choices, but those of your colleagues, etc.
Grant such a request once, and you will find very quickly that you have incurred an obligation.
(Of course, I am quite sure that the author of the quoted original post is well aware of this, and indeed that this is his explicit goal. But that just gives us another reason to resist such advocacy!)
I have a hard time seeing this as particularly problematic, given the previously mentioned view that saying “you’re wrong” just doesn’t seem to be necessary in general. “Having your brain automatically flinch away from” something sounds bad if you phrase it like that, but part of the process of acquiring any skill is to learn to automatically flinch away from performing the skill in a bad way. Similarly, if there’s little reason to ever say “you’re wrong” while there are good reasons to avoid it, then I see this less as distorting cognition and more as optimizing it (or more specifically optimizing the skill of good communication).
I’m sorry, but this reads to me like naked Dark Arts. Having your brain flinch away from thinking “that’s wrong” when you hear something that is wrong is disastrous—the worst kind of cognitive distortion. We should be doing everything in our power to identify and root out such flinches, not encouraging them!
In English
What would happen if a superintelligent AI was aligned with your values?
The details here are a little too much in the “superintelligence is magic that can achieve anything” direction to my taste (I don’t think that anything will just be instantly teleported into safety, superintelligent AI or not), but I don’t doubt that the same results could be achieved via more mundane means. And it’s nice to have some more uplifting visions of the future.
The Choose Your Own Adventure Book or Ghost Ship Model of Will
Patri Friedman on political views
On Anchor Collapse and Actually Deciding
See also:
Adam Davis on a student with an apparent trauma history
There was a lot of debate of this on my Facebook.
Some people were saying that “we should get this person to work on her problem rather than accommodating her in this way”. But actually accommodating her can be an important first step in helping her fix the problem!
Often people with these kinds of issues experience strong shame about it because others send the message that it’s unreasonable/not okay. That shame then makes it harder to deal with the original issue because it’s painful to think about.
If there are people who communicate with their behavior that the person doesn’t need to feel deep shame about their problem, then that actually makes it easier to work on the problem itself.
There was also a bunch of debate about whether this was reasonable, whether it’s even possible to finish a degree without being told you’re wrong, etc.. I think this was a bit ambiguous from the original post. My interpretation was that the specific phrasing of “you’re wrong” was triggering to the student, but she was open to having the same point communicated with a different phrasing, and that e.g. having assignments marked down for problems wouldn’t be an issue. The fact that her lecturer didn’t consider there to be an issue would be in line with this interpretation.
Some people with experience in education also chimed in, pointing out that they’ve never had a reason to say “you’re wrong” to a student – that there’s always a better way of expressing it, and it just seems like common decency not to embarrass a student.
In any case, even if it was the case that “she can’t realistically expect people to accommodate her this way”… if someone has this issue, it’s likely due to something like cPTSD, which can easily take years to recover from. So it’s simultaneously true that it will be a major problem for her until she gets over it, and that getting over it may take very long and require accommodation and external support to get there. That combination of facts sucks, but just saying “she should get over it” isn’t going to solve anything.
How the incels warped my research
“I lost trust”: Why the OpenAI team in charge of safeguarding humanity imploded
Spurious Correlations
Compare enough statistics, some of them are going to correlate closely just by random chance. For example, the popularity of the first name “Eleanor” in the US closely correlates with the amount of wind power generated in Poland, r=0.993, p<0.01.
Apparently I organised a student protest against a teacher
This is the best thing I’ve read in a long time. Autistic child who has problems understanding social norms reacts to a mean teacher, without realizing it ends up organizing a student revolt and causing the teacher to get replaced.
A military historian speculates on the in-universe design intent of the Star Wars Imperial Star Destroyer
The One Essential Quality
A Woman Who Left Society to Live With Bears Weighs in on “Man or Bear”
Spencer Greenberg on distributions and personality traits
Suomeksi (In Finnish)
Paljon puhetta tyhjästä – Tekoäly ja tunteet, vieraana Kaj Sotala.
Olin vieraana Paljon puhetta tyhjästä -podcastissa, kolmena isona pääteemana tekoälyn uhkakuvat, tekoälyn mahdollisuudet, sekä mielen rakenne ja toiminta. Ei tullutkaan kuin neljän tunnin keskustelu.
Karkea sisällysluettelo:
0:00:00 – Intro
0:04:14 – Transhumanismi, teknologinen singulariteetti, tekoälyn uhkakuvat
2:06:03 – Tekoälyn myönteiset mahdollisuudet
2:46:40 – Mielen rakenne ja toiminta
(Käytänpä mä paljon “silleen” -sanaa.)
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