I would like to distinguish between two forms of pay inequality:
a) some people are bad at understanding money and/or suck at negotiation, so they are willing to work for a fraction of the money they could actually get if they only asked for a raise. The money they leave on the table can be distributed between their employer and some of their colleagues. With pay transparency, they could finally learn their market price. (Conclusion: pay transparency is good for autists.)
b) some people are superstars and there is a good reason why the employers are happy to pay them more than they pay the average muggles. But humans are jealous, and pay transparency ruins this for everyone, because the muggles won't get paid as much as the superstar gets, the superstar will leave the company if their high salary is threatened, and the muggles will create an unpleasant working environment for the superstar if nothing is changed. (Conclusion: pay transparency is bad for superstars.)
Everyone seems to automatically assume that pay inequality is the latter, when in fact it could be both. Actually, both can happen at the same time at the same company.
The model says that within a business, once they have taken the job, people care deeply about relative pay.
Yeah, I assume that most people are like that, but do they really care about the relative pay qua status marker, or is the relative pay simply their proxy for what they could make in a different company?
A rational agent with a lot of free time would keep applying to different jobs, just to get the idea of what is their market price. But many people just follow their intuition, and procrastinate on job market research. Knowing that my colleagues make more money can be a wake-up call that maybe my intuition was wrong, and maybe the money my colleagues make is actually the market salary for my kind of job.
Who has an alternative hypothesis that explains this data? Anyone? Ooh ooh, pick me, pick me. Perhaps being depressed has something to do with your life being depressing, due to things like lack of human capital or job opportunities, life and career setbacks or alienation from one’s work. Income increases life satisfaction, as I assume does the prospect of future income.
It is amazing to see the ‘depression is purely a chemical imbalance unrelated to one’s physical circumstances’ attitude in this brazen a form. Mistaking correlation for causation here seems like a difficult mistake for a reasonable and reflecting person to make.
They measured depression at ages 27-35 in 1992 and outcomes at age 50. They control for "age, gender, race, for level of education by age 26, parental education, r marital status in 1992 survey, years of work experience accumulated by 1992 survey, the average percentage of weeks the person’s work history data is unaccounted for by 1992 survey, health status during childhood, a dummy for number of cigarettes consumed by 1992 survey, year indicators, local unemployment rate in 1992, 1998, 2004, and the year the person’s outcome variable is collected."
So it's not like they just correlated depression and wages from a cross-sectional survey and claimed causation. They did some work here.
For a while, I’ve been keeping a bookmark folder called ‘Papers, Please’ of all the papers I’d like to check out in the future. For those I do get to look at, I’ve compiled my observations, with the intent of making this another kind of roundup. I noticed a bunch of them were focused on questions of employment, wages and productivity, so it made sense to pull those out into a post, and stay on the lookout for similar groupings in the future as the section expands.
If there is a central theme here, it is the outsized role of norms, expectations and comparisons in determining outcomes, as well as underlying differences, and how such considerations seem to be neglected in many of the papers.
What interventions are implied, if any, although that is very much not the question I’m looking to ask here? Highly unfashionable ones.
This seems right to me. If you can check off a standard set of boxes that make you capable of ‘normal work’ and you are willing to accept what the market has on offer, you will be highly employable. When you lose one job, you will be able to find another. It would take quite a lot of AI automation or economic decline to change this.
Whereas if you can’t check enough of the boxes, and you have some incompatibility with the jobs on offer and can’t find a niche that fixes this that you will accept, you will struggle. And it makes sense that there’s mostly a sharp line between these two groups, with a third group that doesn’t always want to work and is mostly in category two when they try.
Note that a large majority of workers can check off the necessary boxes. This rules out anything too onerous, or the possession of an especially valuable skill, as a barrier to joining the first group.
At this point I strongly believe that horizontal within-firm pay transparency is a large negative. If pay is known then it will be forced to reflect the status hierarchy. People will spend far more time and effort on comparisons. That means what I pay you will help determine what I pay everyone else, so I am forced to negotiate hard with everyone, and the effective marginal cost of giving out a raise has a large multiplier attached.
Pay transparency between firms plausibly leads to good competition, the danger being that it can effectively also lead to the dynamics of within-firm transparency. So you need to be careful to not give away too much specific information. Transparency on future expectations seems good, again if direct personal comparisons can be avoided.
The model in people’s heads was ‘if workers can compare salaries, they will know to demand raises and negotiate higher salaries.’
The actual model is ‘if workers can compare salaries, management cannot negotiate.’
- Everyone’s salary, when visible to others, is a claim about their relative status.
- Thus, one cannot pay (for example) superstar programmers what they are worth.
- Raising the minimum wage raises wages for many other workers, perhaps all.
- The cost of raising your wage for new hires is likely also raising wages for most or all workers.
- Thus, it often makes sense not to raise wages, even if the new hire is needed.
Under this model, when you pass pay transparency laws, you change relative pay from being based on market value to being based on social status and what can be justified.Who has an alternative hypothesis that explains this data? Anyone? Ooh ooh, pick me, pick me. Perhaps being depressed has something to do with your life being depressing, due to things like lack of human capital or job opportunities, life and career setbacks or alienation from one’s work. Income increases life satisfaction, as I assume does the prospect of future income.
It is amazing to see the ‘depression is purely a chemical imbalance unrelated to one’s physical circumstances’ attitude in this brazen a form. Mistaking correlation for causation here seems like a difficult mistake for a reasonable and reflecting person to make.
I can no longer take this kind of language seriously. This is all overwhelming evidence of what we knew already, that job seekers do not do enough searching, even if one does not ‘believe one’s own press’ here. It would completely blow my mind if people were engaging in adequate job search.
What was their intervention?
Yes. That does lower the psychological cost. It also raises salience, puts active social pressure on someone, makes it seem like the default and so on. I do not think it is reasonable to mostly call this ‘lowering psychological costs.’ Calling someone is one of our best known technologies for selling things to people, selling them on a job application is no different.
What are the results?
No. You can’t know that equal numbers of interviews implies equal value in applying, even if you hold compensation, hours and commute time constant. There are plenty of other reasons why someone might prefer one job to another. We also can’t equate interviews with marginal value of getting hired even if all jobs were random or identical, because we can’t assume zero correlation between applications. Job seekers reasonably assume that one rejection means likely additional rejections for similar jobs.
Economists (and other academics) have a long history of thinking that because the things they measured were the same, that two groups of things are the same.
They propose a theory of psychological cost of applications as the explanatory variable. This is no doubt one important factor, yet they do not earn their claims.
Even dumber, we have this:
Seriously, what? It’s fine to say ‘each individual job seeker is wrong not to apply more.’ It’s also fine to say ‘increased applications improve job-applicant fit, reduce search times for employers and create value.’
You can’t equate interviews with jobs.
It’s not fine to say that applicants seeking out lots more interviews don’t hurt the job prospects of others because the others still get similar interview rates. Indeed, it is mathematically impossible for people who submit more applications to benefit in any real way here, without hurting those who don’t submit more applications. The only way would be to assume the job market improves so much, and employment improves so much, that even those now at a relative disadvantage are better off due to improved general matching driving growth. Which, in the short term, seems pretty ludicrous.
In a matching competition, you putting in more effort to match better and faster hurts others. Deal with it.