Dust theory implies that everything outside of my perception is in flux. Your experiences have to find themselves in a world in which they could have conceivably formed. Of course, you exist in every possible world which would produce that mindstate, but some are 'vaster' than others, leading you down the most probable courses.
Suppose that going to sleep or losing grasp of your surroundings opens a wider space of worlds you could exist in, which jumps you into another reality along with consistent memories of it. I can't figure out if this would be the case, or if my consciousness would most likely just dissolve, with only those beating trillion-to-one odds waking up in the morning. Or maybe my pool of 'experience' stays active when I sleep, even if I'm not aware of it. Either way (though I think Dust Theory is probably false) I'm afraid to go to sleep anymore.
I also do not understand the argument being made here: http://lesswrong.com/lw/1jm/getting_over_dust_theory/. Can someone explain to me please?
I posted these questions on other threads but I didn't get many answers. Sorry.
EDIT: Look, the first question boils down to: does my unconscious mind affect my measure? If so, than it isn't much different from being awake. If not, then all my problems seem to apply.
It occurs to me that not only would signing up for cryonics and then killing yourself before you could sleep is rational under these circumstances, but that the death of the universe can be escaped by simply rearranging your mind to believe it is in a universe where eternal life is possible, then ceasing its activity.
Apologies, I've no idea what you are saying. What do you mean by 'all the measure I send in will come out?' Why shouldn't I be terrified if I faced a 50% probability of death every second?
(That scenario wouldn't work in any case; I'd just wind up like Durham's copy).
Not sure what you mean about Durham's copy (I've only read summaries of Egan), but the situation seems pretty isomorphic to your sleep issue if I read in correctly. The question is whether having a bunch of measure added to your life and then taken away should be seen as a chance of death.
I guess if you're utility function values death avoidance rather than life lived, then for some definitions of death your conclusions follow? But a "death" event that does not cause you to be in any way less alive and does not have any of the secondary effects of death (i.e. grief) maybe doesn't deserve the name "death".