Here's the structure of the argument that I am most compelled by (I call it the benchmarks + gaps argument), I'm uncertain about the details.
One reason I like this argument is that it will get much stronger over time as we get more difficult benchmarks and otherwise get more data about how quickly the gaps are being crossed.
I have a longer draft which makes this argument but it's quite messy and incomplete and might not add much on top of the above summary for now. Unfortunately I'm prioritizing other workstreams over finishing this at the moment. DM me if you'd really like a link to the messy draft.
RE-bench tasks (see page 7 here) are not the kind of AI research where you’re developing new AI paradigms and concepts. The tasks are much more straightforward than that. So your argument is basically assuming without argument that we can get to AGI with just the more straightforward stuff, as opposed to new AI paradigms and concepts.
If we do need new AI paradigms and concepts to get to AGI, then there would be a chicken-and-egg problem in automating AI research. Or more specifically, there would be two categories of AI R&D, with the less important R&D category (e.g. performance optimization and other REbench-type tasks) being automatable by near-future AIs, and the more important R&D category (developing new AI paradigms and concepts) not being automatable.
(Obviously you’re entitled to argue / believe that we don’t need need new AI paradigms and concepts to get to AGI! It’s a topic where I think reasonable people disagree. I’m just suggesting that it’s a necessary assumption for your argument to hang together, right?)
I disagree. I think the existing body of published computer science and neuroscience research are chock full of loose threads. Tons of potential innovations just waiting to be harvested by automated researchers. I've mentioned this idea elsewhere. I call it an 'innovation overhang'. Simply testing interpolations and extrapolations (e.g. scaling up old forgotten ideas on modern hardware) seems highly likely to reveal plenty of successful new concepts, even if the hit rate per attempt is low. I think this means a better benchmark would consist of: taking two existing papers, finding a plausible hypothesis which combines the assumptions from the papers, designs and codes and runs tests, then reports on results.
So I don't think "no new concepts" is a necessary assumption for getting to AGI quickly with the help of automated researchers.
Both? If you increase only one of the two the other becomes the bottleneck?
My impression based on talking to people at labs plus stuff I've read is that
(Very open to correction by people closer to the big scaling labs).
My model, then, says that compute availability is a constraint that binds much harder than programming or research ability, at least as things stand right now.
There was discussion on Dwarkesh Patel's interview with researcher friends where there was mention that AI reseachers are already restricted by compute granted to them for experiments. Probably also on work hours per week they are allowed to spend on novel "off the main path" research.
Sounds plausible to me. Especially since benchmarks encourage a focus on ...
For context in a sibling comment Ryan said and Steven agreed with:
It sounds like your disagreement isn't with drawing a link from RE-bench to (forecasts for) automating research engineering, but is instead with thinking that you can get AGI shortly after automating research engineering due to AI R&D acceleration and already being pretty close. Is that right?
Note that the comment says research engineering, not research scientists.
Now responding on whether I think the no new paradigms assumption is needed:
(Obviously you’re entitled to argue / believe that we don’t need need new AI paradigms and concepts to get to AGI! It’s a topic where I think reasonable people disagree. I’m just suggesting that it’s a necessary assumption for your argument to hang together, right?)
I generally have not been thinking in these sorts of binary terms but instead thinking in terms more like "Algorithmic progress research is moving at pace X today, if we had automated research engineers it would be sped up to N*X." I'm not necessarily taking a stand on whether the progress will involve new paradigms or not, so I don't think it requires an assumption of no new paradigms.
However:
I think I’m objecting to (as Eli wrote) “collapsing all [AI] research progress into a single "speed" and forecasting based on that”. There can be different types of AI R&D, and we might be able to speed up some types without speeding up other types. For example, coming up with the AlphaGo paradigm (self-play, MCTS, ConvNets, etc.) or LLM paradigm (self-supervised pretraining, Transformers, etc.) is more foundational, whereas efficiently implementing and debugging a plan is less foundational. (Kinda “science vs engineering”?) I also sometimes use the example of Judea Pearl coming up with the belief prop algorithm in 1982. If everyone had tons of compute and automated research engineer assistants, would we have gotten belief prop earlier? I’m skeptical. As far as I understand: Belief prop was not waiting on compute. You can do belief prop on a 1960s mainframe. Heck, you can do belief prop on an abacus. Social scientists have been collecting data since the 1800s, and I imagine that belief prop would have been useful for analyzing at least some of that data, if only someone had invented it.
Indeed. Not only could belief prop have been invented in 1960, it was invented around 1960 (published 1962, "Low density parity check codes", IRE Transactions on Information Theory) by Robert Gallager, as a decoding algorithm for error correcting codes.
I recognized that Gallager's method was the same as Pearl's belief propagation in 1996 (MacKay and Neal, ``Near Shannon limit performance of low density parity check codes'', Electronics Letters, vol. 33, pp. 457-458).
This says something about the ability of AI to potentially speed up research by simply linking known ideas (even if it's not really AGI).
Came here to say this, got beaten to it by Radford Neal himself, wow! Well, I'm gonna comment anyway, even though it's mostly been said.
Gallagher proposed belief propagation as an approximate good-enough method of decoding a certain error-correcting code, but didn't notice that it worked on all sorts of probability problems. Pearl proposed it as a general mechanism for dealing with probability problems, but wanted perfect mathematical correctness, so confined himself to tree-shaped problems. It was their common generalization that was the real breakthrough: an approximate good-enough solution to all sorts of problems. Which is what Pearl eventually noticed, so props to him.
If we'd had AGI in the 1960s, someone with a probability problem could have said "Here's my problem. For every paper in the literature, spawn an instance to read that paper and tell me if it has any help for my problem." It would have found Gallagher's paper and said "Maybe you could use this?"
I just wanted to add that this hypothesis, i.e.
I think I’m objecting to (as Eli wrote) “collapsing all [AI] research progress into a single "speed" and forecasting based on that”. There can be different types of AI R&D, and we might be able to speed up some types without speeding up other types.
…is parallel to what we see in other kinds of automation.
The technology of today has been much better at automating the production of clocks than the production of haircuts. Thus, 2024 technology is great at automating the production of some physical things but only slightly helpful for automating the production of some other physical things.
By the same token, different AI R&D projects are trying to “produce” different types of IP. Thus, it’s similarly possible that 2029 AI technology will be great at automating the production of some types of AI-related IP but only slightly helpful for automating the production of some other types of AI-related IP.
I disagree that there is a difference of kind between "engineering ingenuity" and "scientific discovery", at least in the business of AI. The examples you give-- self-play, MCTS, ConvNets-- were all used in game-playing programs before AlphaGo. The trick of AlphaGo was to combine them, and then discover that it worked astonishingly well. It was very clever and tasteful engineering to combine them, but only a breakthrough in retrospect. And the people that developed them each earlier, for their independent purposes? They were part of the ordinary cycle of engineering development: "Look at a problem, think as hard as you can, come up with something, try it, publish the results." They're just the ones you remember, because they were good.
Paradigm shifts do happen, but I don't think we need them between here and AGI.
I don't think this distinction between old-paradigm/old-concepts and new-paradigm/new-concepts is going to hold up very well to philosophical inspection or continued ML progress; it smells similar to ye olde "do LLMs truly understand, or are they merely stochastic parrots?" and "Can they extrapolate, or do they merely interpolate?"
I find this kind of pattern-match pretty unconvincing without more object-level explanation. Why exactly do you think this distinction isn't important? (I'm also not sure "Can they extrapolate, or do they merely interpolate?" qualifies as "ye olde," still seems like a good question to me at least w.r.t. sufficiently out-of-distribution extrapolation.)
We are at an impasse then; I think basically I'm just the mirror of you. To me, the burden is on whoever thinks the distinction is important to explain why it matters. Current LLMs do many amazing things that many people -- including AI experts -- thought LLMs could never do due to architectural limitations. Recent history is full of examples of AI experts saying "LLMs are the offramp to AGI; they cannot do X; we need new paradigm to do X" and then a year or two later LLMs are doing X. So now I'm skeptical and would ask questions like: "Can you say more about this distinction -- is it a binary, or a dimension? If it's a dimension, how can we measure progress along it, and are we sure there hasn't been significant progress on it already in the last few years, within the current paradigm? If there has indeed been no significant progress (as with ARC-AGI until 2024) is there another explanation for why that might be, besides your favored one (that your distinction is super important and that because of it a new paradigm is needed to get to AGI)"
The burden is on you because you're saying "we have gone from not having the core algorithms for intelligence in our computers, to yes having them".
And I think you're admitting that your argument is "if we mush all capabilities together into one dimension, AI is moving up on that one dimension, so things will keep going up".
Would you say the same thing about the invention of search engines? That was a huge jump in the capability of our computers. And it looks even more impressive if you blur out your vision--pretend you don't know that the text that comes up on your screen is written by a humna, and pretend you don't know that search is a specific kind of task distinct from a lot of other activity that would be involved in "True Understanding, woooo"--and just say "wow! previously our computers couldn't write a poem, but now with just a few keystrokes my computer can literally produce Billy Collins level poetry!".
Blurring things together at that level works for, like, macroeconomic trends. But if you look at macroeconomic trends it doesn't say singularity in 2 years! Going to 2 or 10 years is an inside-view thing to conclude! You're making some inference like "there's an engine that is very likely operating here, that takes us to AGI in xyz years".
I'm not saying that. You are the one who introduced the concept of "the core algorithms for intelligence;" you should explain what that means and why it's a binary (or if it's not a binary but rather a dimension, why we haven't been moving along that dimension in recent past.
ETA: I do have an ontology, a way of thinking about these things, that is more sophisticated than simply mushing all capabilities together into one dimension. I just don't accept your ontology yet.
Here's why I'm wary of this kind of argument:
First, we know that labs are hill-climbing on benchmarks.
Obviously, this tends to inflate model performance on the specific benchmark tasks used for hill-climbing, relative to "similar" but non-benchmarked tasks.
More generally and insidiously, it tends to inflate performance on "the sort of things that are easy to measure with benchmarks," relative to all other qualities that might be required to accelerate or replace various kinds of human labor.
If we suppose that amenability-to-benchmarking correlates with various other aspects of a given skill (which seems reasonable enough, "everything is correlated" after all), then we might expect that hill-climbing on a bunch of "easy to benchmark" tasks will induce generalization to other "easy to benchmark" tasks (even those that weren't used for hill-climbing), without necessarily generalizing to tasks which are more difficult to measure.
For instance, perhaps hill-climbing on a variety of "difficult academic exam" tasks like GPQA will produce models that are very good at exam-like tasks in general, but which lag behind on various other skills which we would expect a human expert to possess if t...
@elifland what do you think is the strongest argument for long(er) timelines? Do you think it's essentially just "it takes a long time for researchers learn how to cross the gaps"?
Or do you think there's an entirely different frame (something that's in an ontology that just looks very different from the one presented in the "benchmarks + gaps argument"?)
Thanks. I think this argument assumes that the main bottleneck to AI progress is something like research engineering speed, such that accelerating research engineering speed would drastically increase AI progress?
I think that that makes sense as long as we are talking about domains like games / math / programming where you can automatically verify the results, but that something like speed of real-world interaction becomes the bottleneck once shifting to more open domains.
Consider an AI being trained on a task such as “acting as the CEO for a startup”. The...
I think the gaps between where we are and roughly human-level cognition are smaller than they appear. Modest improvements in to-date neglected cognitive systems can allow LLMs to apply their cognitive abilities in more ways, allowing more human-like routes to performance and learning. These strengths will build on each other nonlinearly (while likely also encountering unexpected roadblocks).
Timelines are thus very difficult to predict, but ruling out very short timelines based on averaging predictions without gears-level models of fast routes to AGI would be a big mistake. Whether and how quickly they work is an empirical question.
One blocker to taking short timelines seriously is the belief that fast timelines mean likely human extinction. I think they're extremely dangerous but that possible routes to alignment also exist - but that's a separate question.
I also think this is the current default path, or I wouldn't describe it.
I think my research career using deep nets and cognitive architectures to understand human cognition is pretty relevant for making good predictions on this path to AGI. But I'm biased, just like everyone else.
Anyway, here's very roughly why I think the gaps are smaller than they appear.
Current LLMs are like humans with excellent:
They can now do almost all short time-horizon tasks that are framed in language better than humans. And other networks can translate real-world systems into language and code, where humans haven't already done it.
But current LLMs/foundation models are dramatically missing some human cognitive abilities:
Those lacks would appear to imply long timelines.
But both long time-horizon tasks and self-directed learning are fairly easy to reach. The gaps are not as large as they appear.
Agency is as simple as repeatedly calling a prompt of "act as an agent working toward goal X; use tools Y to gather information and take actions as appropriate". The gap between a good oracle and an effective agent is almost completely illusory.
Episodic memory is less trivial, but still relatively easy to improve from current near-zero-effort systems. Efforts from here will likely build on LLMs strengths. I'll say no more publicly; DM me for details. But it doesn't take a PhD in computational neuroscience to rederive this, which is the only reason I'm mentioning it publicly. More on infohazards later.
Now to the capabilities payoff: long time-horizon tasks and continuous, self-directed learning.
Long time-horizon task abilities are an emergent product of episodic memory and general cognitive abilities. LLMs are "smart" enough to manage their own thinking; they don't have instructions or skills to do it. o1 appears to have those skills (although no episodic memory which is very helpful in managing multiple chains of thought), so similar RL training on Chains of Thought is probably one route achieving those.
Humans do not mostly perform long time-horizon tasks by trying them over and over. They either ask someone how to do it, then memorize and reference those strategies with episodic memory; or they perform self-directed learning, and pose questions and form theories to answer those same questions.
Humans do not have or need "9s of reliability" to perform long time-horizon tasks. We substitute frequent error-checking and error-correction. We then learn continuously on both strategy (largely episodic memory) and skills/habitual learning (fine-tuning LLMs already provides a form of this habitization of explicit knowledge to fast implicit skills).
Continuous, self-directed learning is a product of having any type of new learning (memory), and using some of the network/agents' cognitive abilities to decide what's worth learning. This learning could be selective fine-tuning (like o1s "deliberative alignment), episodic memory, or even very long context with good access as a first step. This is how humans master new tasks, along with taking instruction wisely. This would be very helpful for mastering economically viable tasks, so I expect real efforts put into mastering it.
Self-directed learning would also be critical for an autonomous agent to accomplish entirely novel tasks, like taking over the world.
This is why I expect "Real AGI" that's agentic and learns on its own, and not just transformative tool "AGI" within the next five years (or less). It's easy and useful, and perhaps the shortest path to capabilities (as with humans teaching themselves).
If that happens, I don't think we're necessarily doomed, even without much new progress on alignment (although we would definitely improve our odds!). We are already teaching LLMs mostly to answer questions correctly and to follow instructions. As long as nobody gives their agent an open-ended top-level goal like "make me lots of money", we might be okay. Instruction-following AGI is easier and more likely than value aligned AGI although I need to work through and clarify why I find this so central. I'd love help.
Convincing predictions are also blueprints for progress. Thus, I have been hesitant to say all of that clearly.
I said some of this at more length in Capabilities and alignment of LLM cognitive architectures and elsewhere. But I didn't publish it in my previous neuroscience career nor have I elaborated since then.
But I'm increasingly convinced that all of this stuff is going to quickly become obvious to any team that sits down and starts thinking seriously about how to get from where we are to really useful capabilities. And more talented teams are steadily doing just that.
I now think it's more important that the alignment community takes short timelines more seriously, rather than hiding our knowledge in hopes that it won't be quickly rederived. There are more and more smart and creative people working directly toward AGI. We should not bet on their incompetence.
There could certainly be unexpected theoretical obstacles. There will certainly be practical obstacles. But even with expected discounts for human foibles and idiocy and unexpected hurdles, timelines are not long. We should not assume that any breakthroughs are necessary, or that we have spare time to solve alignment adequately to survive.
Great reply!
On episodic memory:
I've been watching Claude play Pokemon recently and I got the impression of, "Claude is overqualified but suffering from the Memento-like memory limitations. Probably the agent scaffold also has some easy room for improvements (though it's better than post-it notes and tatooing sentences on your body)."
I don't know much about neuroscience or ML, but how hard can it be to make the AI remember what it did a few minutes ago? Sure, that's not all that's between claude and TAI, but given that Claude is now within the human expert ...
Thanks, this is the kind of comment that tries to break down things by missing capabilities that I was hoping to see.
Episodic memory is less trivial, but still relatively easy to improve from current near-zero-effort systems
I agree that it's likely to be relatively easy to improve from current systems, but just improving it is a much lower bar than getting episodic memory to actually be practically useful. So I'm not sure why this alone would imply a very short timeline. Getting things from "there are papers about this in the literature" to "actually suffi...
I've been arguing for 2027-ish AGI for several years now. I do somewhat fall into the annoying category of refusing to give my full details for believing this (publicly). I've had some more in-depth discussions about this privately.
One argument I have been making publicly is that I think Ajeya's Bioanchors report greatly overestimated human brain compute. I think a more careful reading of Joe Carlsmith's report that hers was based on supports my own estimates of around 1e15 FLOPs.
Connor Leahy makes some points I agree with in his recent Future of Life interview. https://futureoflife.org/podcast/connor-leahy-on-why-humanity-risks-extinction-from-agi/
Another very relevant point is that recent research on the human connectome shows that long-range connections (particularly between regions of the cortex) are lower bandwidth than was previously thought. Examining this bandwidth in detail leads me to believe that efficient decentralized training should be possible. Even with considering that training a human brain equivalent model would require 10000x parallel brain equivalents to have a reasonable training time, the current levels of internet bandwidth between datacenters worldwide should be more than sufficient.
Thus, my beliefs are strongly pointint towards: "with the right algorithms we will have more than good enough hardware and more than sufficient data. Also, those algorithms are available to be found, and are hinted at by existing neuroscience data." Thus, with AI R&D accelerated research on algorithms, we should expect rapid progress on peak capabilities and efficiency which doesn't plateau at human-peak-capability or human-operation-speed. Super-fast and super-smart AGI within a few months of full AGI, and rapidly increasing speeds of progress leading up to AGI.
If I'm correct, then the period of time from 2026 to 2027 will contain as much progress on generally intelligent systems as all of history leading up to 2026. ASI will thus be possible before 2028.
Only social factors (e.g. massively destructive war or unprecedented international collaboration on enforcing an AI pause) will change these timelines.
Further thoughts here: A path to human autonomy
Lots of disagree votes, but no discussion. So annoying when that happens.
Propose a bet! Ask for my sources! Point out a flaw in my reasoning! Don't just disagree and walk away!
Don't just disagree and walk away!
Feeding this norm creates friction, filters evidence elicited in the agreement-voting. If there is a sense that a vote needs to be explained, it often won't be cast.
One argument I have been making publicly is that I think Ajeya's Bioanchors report greatly overestimated human brain compute. I think a more careful reading of Joe Carlsmith's report that hers was based on supports my own estimates of around 1e15 FLOPs.
Am I getting things mixed up, or isn’t that just exactly Ajeya’s median estimate? Quote from the report: ”Under this definition, my median estimate for human brain computation is ~1e15 FLOP/s.”
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1IJ6Sr-gPeXdSJugFulwIpvavc0atjHGM82QjIfUSBGQ/edit
I think the algorithm progress is doing some heavy lifting in this model. I think if we had a future textbook on agi we could probably build one but AI is kinda famous for minor and simple things just not being implemented despite all the parts being there
See ReLU activations and sigmoid activations.
If we're bottlenecking at algorithms alone is there a reason that isn't a really bad bottleneck?
An AGI broadly useful for humans needs to be good at general tasks for which currently there is no way of finding legible problem statements (where System 2 reasoning is useful) with verifiable solutions. Currently LLMs are slightly capable at such tasks, and there are two main ways in which they become more capable, scaling and RL.
Scaling is going to continue rapidly showing new results at least until 2026-2027, probably also 2028-2029. If there's no AGI or something like a $10 trillion AI company by then, there won't be a trillion dollar training system and the scaling experiments will fall back to the rate of semiconductor improvement.
Then there's RL, which as o3 demonstrates applies to LLMs as a way of making them stronger and not merely eliciting capabilities formed in pretraining. But it only works directly around problem statements with verifiable solutions, and it's unclear how to generate them for more general tasks or how far will the capabilities generalize from the training problems that are possible to construct in bulk. (Arguably self-supervised learning is good at instilling general capabilities because the task of token prediction is very general, it subsumes all sorts of things. But it's not legible.) Here too scale might help with generalization stretching further from the training problems, and with building verifiable problem statements for more general tasks, and we won't know how much it will help until the experiments are done.
So my timelines are concentrated on 2025-2029, after that the rate of change in capabilities goes down. Probably 10 more years of semiconductor and algorithmic progress after that are sufficient to wrap it up though, so 2040 without AGI seems unlikely.
I agree with this picture pretty closely. I think 2025 is unlikely, because there are probably a couple of tricks left to invent. But 2026-30 carries a lot of probability mass, and the rest is spread out over decades.
I have seen a poll asking "when will indefinite lifespans be possible?", and Eric Drexler answered "1967", because that was when cryonic suspension first became available.
Similarly, I think we've had AGI at least since 2022, because even then, ChatGPT was an intelligence, and it was general, and it was artificial.
(To deny that the AIs we have now have general intelligence, I think one would have to deny that most humans have general intelligence, too.)
So that's my main reason for very short timelines. We already crossed the crucial AGI threshold through the stupid serendipity of scaling up autocomplete, and now it's just a matter of refining the method, and attaching a few extra specialized modules.
I agree with this view. Deep neural nets trained with SGD can learn anything. (“The models just want to learn.”) Human brains are also not really different from brains of other animals. I think the main struggles are 1. scaling up compute, which follows a fairly predictable pattern, and 2. figuring out what we actually want them to learn, which is what I think we’re most confused about.
Summary: Superintelligence in January-August, 2026. Paradise or mass death, shortly thereafter.
This is the shortest timeline proposed in these answers so far. My estimate (guess) is that there's only 20% of this coming true, but it looks feasible as of now. I can't honestly assert it as fact, but I will say it is possible.
It's a standard intelligence explosion scenario: with only human effort, the capacities of our AIs double every two years. Once AI gets good enough to do half the work, we double every one year. Once we've done that for a year, our now double-smart AIs help us double in six months. Then we double in three months, then six weeks.... to perfect ASI software, running at the the limits of our hardware, in a finite time. Then the ASI does what it wants, and we suffer what we must.
I hear you say "Carl, this argument is as old as the hills. It hasn't ever come true, why bring it up now?" The answer is, I bring it up because it seems to be happening.
So I think we're somewhere in the "doubling in one year" phase of the explosion. If we're halfway through that year, the singularity is due in August 2026. If we're near the end of that year, the date is January 2026.
There are lots of things that might go wrong with this scenario, and thereby delay the intelligence explosion. I will mention a few, so you don't have to.
First, the government might stop the explosion, by banning AI being used for the development of AI. Or perhaps the management of all major AI labs will spontaneously not be so foolish as to. This will delay the problem for an unknown time.
Second, the scenario has an extremely naive model of intelligence explosion microeconomics. It assumes that one doubling of "smartness" produces one doubling of speed. In Yudkowsky's original scenario, AIs were doing all the work of development, and this might be a sensible assumption. But what has actually happened is that successive generations of AI can handle larger and larger tasks, before they go off the rails. And they can handle these tasks far faster than humans. So the way we work now is that we ask the AI to do some small task, and bang, it's done. It seems like testing is showing that current AIs can do things that would take a human up to an hour or two. Perhaps the next generation will be able to do tasks up to four hours. The model assumes that this allows a twofold speedup, then fourfold, etc. But this assumption is unsupported.
Third, the scenario assumes that near-term hardware is sufficient for superintelligence. There isn't time for the accelerating loop to take effect in hardware. Even if design was instant, the physical processes of mask making, lithography, testing, yield optimization and mass production take more than a year. The chips that the ASI will run on in mid-2026 have their design almost done now, at the end of 2024. So we won't be able to get to ASI, if the ASI requires many orders of magnitude more FLOPs than current models. Instead, we'll have to wait until the AI designs future generations of semiconductor technology. This will delay matters by years (if using humans to build things) or hours (if using nanotechnology.)
(I don't think the hardware limit is actually much of a problem; AIs have recently stopped scaling in numbers of parameters and size of training data. Good engineers are constantly figuring out how to pack more intelligence into the same amount of computation. And the human brain provides an existence proof that human-level intelligence requires much less training data. Like Mr. Helm-Burger above, I think human-equivalent cognition is around 10^15 Flops. But reasonable people disagree with me.)
For at least six months now, we’ve had software assistants that can roughly double the productivity of software development.
Is this the consensus view? I've seen people saying that those assistants give 10% productivity improvement, at best.
In the last few months, there’s been a perceptible increase in the speed of releases of better models.
On the other hand, the schedules for headline releases (GPT-5, Claude 3.5 Opus) continue to slip, and there are anonymous reports of diminishing returns from scaling. The current moment is interesting in that there are two essentially opposite prevalent narratives barely interacting with each other.
We should expect a significant chance of very short (2-5 year) timelines because we don't have good estimates of timelines.
We are estimating an ETA by having good estimates of our position and velocity, but not a well-known destination.
A good estimate of the end point for timelines would require a good gears-level models of AGI. We don't have that.
The rational thing to do is admit that we have very broad uncertainties, and make plans for different possible timelines. I fear we're mostly just hoping tinmelines aren't really short.
This argument is separate from and I think stronger than my other answer with specific reasons to find short timelines plausible. Short timelines are plausible as a baseline. We'd all probably agree that LLMs are doing a lot of what humans do (if you don't, see my answer here and in slightly different terms in my response to Thane Ruthenis' more recent Bear Case for AI Progress. - my point is that "most of what humans do" is highly debatable. And we should not be reasoning with point estimates.
no 2. is much more important than academic ML researchers which is the majority of the surveys done. When someone delivers a product and is the only one building it and they tells you X, you should belive X unless there is a super strong argument for the contrary and there just isn't.
I have a meta-view on this that you might think falls into the bucket of "feels intuitive based on the progress so far". To counter that, this isn't pure intuition. As a side note I don't believe that intuitions should be dismissed and should be at least a part of our belief updating process.
I can't tell you the fine details of what will happen and I'm suspicious of anyone who can because a) this is a very complex system b) no-one really knows how LLMs work, how human cognition works, or what is required for an intelligence takeoff.
However, I can say that for the last decade or so most predictions of AI progress have been on consistently longer timescales than what has happened. Things are happening quicker than the experts believe they will happen. Things are accelerating.
I also believe that there are many paths to AGI, and that given the amount of resources currently being put into the search for one of those paths, they will be found sooner rather than later.
The intelligence takeoff is already happening.
It's worthy of a (long) post, but I'll try to summarize. For what it's worth, I'll die on this hill.
General intelligence = Broad, cross-domain ability and skills.
Narrow intelligence = Domain-specific or task-specific skills.
The first subsumes the second at some capability threshold.
My bare bones definition of intelligence: prediction. It must be able to consistently predict itself & the environment. To that end it necessarily develops/evolves abilities like learning, environment/self sensing, modeling, memory, salience, planning, heuristics, skills, etc. Roughly what Ilya says about token prediction necessitating good-enough models to actually be able to predict that next token (although we'd really differ on various details)
Firstly, it's based on my practical and theoretical knowledge of AI and insights I believe to have had into the nature of intelligence and generality for a long time. It also includes systems, cybernetics, physics, etc. I believe a holistic view helps inform best w.r.t. AGI timelines. And these are supported by many cutting edge AI/robotics results of the last 5-9 years (some old work can be seen in new light) and also especially, obviously, the last 2 or so.
Here are some points/beliefs/convictions I have for thinking AGI for even the most creative goalpost movers is basically 100% likely before 2030, and very likely much sooner. A fast takeoff also, understood as the idea that beyond a certain capability threshold for self-improvement, AI will develop faster than natural, unaugmented humans can keep up with.
It would be quite a lot of work to make this very formal, so here are some key points put informally:
- Weak generalization has been already achieved. This is something we are piggybacking off of already, and there is meaningful utility since GPT-3 or so. This is an accelerating factor.
- Underlying techniques (transformers , etc) generalize and scale.
- Generalization and performance across unseen tasks improves with multi-modality.
- Generalist models outdo specialist ones in all sorts of scenarios and cases.
- Synthetic data doesn't necessarily lead to model collapse and can even be better than real world data.
- Intelligence can basically be brute-forced it looks like, so one should take Kurzweil *very* seriously (he tightly couples his predictions to increase in computation).
- Timelines shrunk massively across the board for virtually all top AI names/experts in the last 2 years. Top Experts were surprised by the last 2 years.
- Bitter Lesson 2.0.: there are more bitter lessons than Sutton's, which are that all sorts of old techniques can be combined for great increases in results. See the evidence in papers linked below.
- "AGI" went from a taboo "bullshit pursuit for crackpots", to a serious target of all major labs, publicly discussed. This means a massive increase in collective effort, talent, thought, etc. No more suppression of cross-pollination of ideas, collaboration, effort, funding, etc.
- The spending for AI only bolsters, extremely so, the previous point. Even if we can't speak of a Manhattan Project analogue, you can say that's pretty much what's going on. Insane concentrations of talent hyper focused on AGI. Unprecedented human cycles dedicated to AGI.
- Regular software engineers can achieve better results or utility by orchestrating current models and augmenting them with simple techniques(RAG, etc). Meaning? Trivial augmentations to current models increase capabilities - this low hanging fruit implies medium and high hanging fruit (which we know is there, see other points).
I'd also like to add that I think intelligence is multi-realizable, and generality will be considered much less remarkable soon after we hit it and realize this than some still think it is.
Anywhere you look: the spending, the cognitive effort, the (very recent) results, the utility, the techniques...it all points to short timelines.
In terms of AI papers, I have 50 references or so I think support the above as well. Here are a few:
SDS : See it. Do it. Sorted Quadruped Skill Synthesis from Single Video Demonstration, Jeffrey L., Maria S., et al. (2024).
DexMimicGen: Automated Data Generation for Bimanual Dexterous Manipulation via Imitation Learning, Zhenyu J., Yuqi X., et in. (2024).
One-Shot Imitation Learning, Duan, Andrychowicz, et al. (2017).
Model-Agnostic Meta-Learning for Fast Adaptation of Deep Networks, Finn et al., (2017).
Unsupervised Learning of Semantic Representations, Mikolov et al., (2013).
A Survey on Transfer Learning, Pan and Yang, (2009).
Zero-Shot Learning - A Comprehensive Evaluation of the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, Xian et al., (2018).
Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision, Radford et al., (2021).
Multimodal Machine Learning: A Survey and Taxonomy, Baltrušaitis et al., (2018).
Can Generalist Foundation Models Outcompete Special-Purpose Tuning? Case Study in Medicine, Harsha N., Yin Tat Lee et al. (2023).
A Vision-Language-Action Flow Model for General Robot Control, Kevin B., Noah B., et al. (2024).
Open X-Embodiment: Robotic Learning Datasets and RT-X Models, Open X-Embodiment Collaboration, Abby O., et al. (2023).
It surveyed 2,778 AI researchers who had published peer-reviewed research in the prior year in six top AI venues (NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, AAAI, IJCAI, JMLR); the median time for a 50% chance of AGI was either in 23 or 92 years, depending on how the question was phrased.
Doesn't that discrepancy (how much answers vary between different ways of asking the question) tell you that the median AI researcher who published at these conferences hasn't thought about this question sufficiently and/or sanely?
It seems irresponsible to me to update even just a small bit to the specific reference class of which your above statement is true.
If you take people who follow progress closely and have thought more and longer about AGI as a research target specifically, my sense is that the ones who have longer timeline medians tend to say more like 10-20y rather than 23y+. (At the same time, there's probably a bubble effect in who I follow or talk to, so I can get behind maybe lengthening that range a bit.)
Doing my own reasoning, here are the considerations that I weigh heavily:
that o3 seems to me like significant progress in reliability, one of the things people thought would be hard to make progress on
Given all that, it seems obvious that we should have quite a lot of probability of getting to AGI in a short time (e.g., 3 years). Placing the 50% forecast feels less obvious because I have some sympathy for the view that says these things are notoriously hard to forecast and we should smear out uncertainty more than we'd intuitively think (that said, lately the trend has been that people consistently underpredict progress, and maybe we should just hard-update on that.) Still, even on that "it's prudent to smear out the uncertainty" view, let's say that implies that the median would be like 10-20 years away. Even then, if we spread out the earlier half of probability mass uniformly over those 10-20 years, with an added probability bump in the near-term because of the compute scaling arguments (we're increasing training and runtime compute now but this will have to slow down eventually if AGI isn't reached in the next 3-6 years or whatever), that IMO very much implies at least 10% for the next 3 years. Which feels practically enormously significant. (And I don't agree with smearing things out too much anyway, so my own probability is closer to 50%.)
Doesn't that discrepancy (how much answers vary between different ways of asking the question) tell you that the median AI researcher who published at these conferences hasn't thought about this question sufficiently and/or sanely?
We know that AI expertise and AI forecasting are separate skills and that we shouldn't expect AI researchers to be skilled at the latter. So even if researchers have thought sufficiently and sanely about the question of "what kinds of capabilities are we still missing that would be required for AGI", they would still be lacking the additional skill of "how to translate those missing pieces into a timeline estimate".
Suppose that a researcher's conception of current missing pieces is a mental object M, their timeline estimate is a probability function P, and their forecasting expertise F is a function that maps M to P. In this model, F can be pretty crazy, creating vast differences in P depending how you ask, while M is still solid.
I think the implication is that these kinds of surveys cannot tell us anything very precise such as "is 15 years more likely than 23", but we can use what we know about the nature of F in untrained individuals to try to get a sense of what M might be like. My sense is that answers like "20-93 years" often translate to "I think there are major pieces missing and I have no idea of how to even start approaching them, but if I say something that feels like a long time, maybe someone will figure it out in that time", "0-5 years" means "we have all the major components and only relatively straightforward engineering work is needed for them", and numbers in between correspond to Ms that are, well, somewhere in between those.
Suppose that a researcher's conception of current missing pieces is a mental object M, their timeline estimate is a probability function P, and their forecasting expertise F is a function that maps M to P. In this model, F can be pretty crazy, creating vast differences in P depending how you ask, while M is still solid.
Good point. This would be reasonable if you think someone can be super bad at F and still great at M.
Still, I think estimating "how big is this gap?" and "how long will it take to cross it?" might quite related, so I expect the skills to be correlated or even strongly correlated.
I think their relationship depends on whether crossing the gap requires grind or insight. If it's mostly about grind then a good expert will be able to estimate it, but insight tends to unpredictable by nature.
Another way of looking at my comment above would be that timelines of less than 5 years would imply the remaining steps mostly requiring grind, and timelines of 20+ years would imply that some amount of insight is needed.
we're within the human range of most skill types already
That would imply that most professions would be getting automated or having their productivity very significantly increased. My impression from following the news and seeing some studies is that this is happening within copywriting, translation, programming, and illustration. [EDIT: and transcription] Also people are turning to chatbots for some types of therapy, though many people will still intrinsically prefer a human for that and it's not affecting the employment of human therapists yet. With o3, math (and maybe physics) research is starting to be affected, though it mostly hasn't been yet.
I might be forgetting some, but the amount of professions left out of that list suggests that there are quite a few skill types that are still untouched. (There are of course a lot of other professions for which there have been moderate productivity boosts, but AFAIK mostly not to the point that it would affect employment.)
+1
On lesswrong, everyone and their mother has an opinion on AI timelines. People just stating their views without any arguments doesn't add a lot of value to the conversation. It would be good if there was a single (monthly? quarterly?) thread that collates all the opinions that are stated without proof. And outside of this thread only posts with some argumentation are allowed.
P.S. Here's my post
P.P.S. Sorry for the wrong link, it's fixed now
If all the positions were collated in one place it'll also be easy to get some statistics about them a few years from now.
I think it depends on some factors actually.
For instance if we don’t get AGI by 2030 but lots of people still believe it could happen by 2040, we as a species might be better equipped to form good beliefs on it, figure out who to defer to, etc.
I already think this has happened btw. AI beliefs in 2024 are more sane on average than beliefs in say 2010 IMO.
P.S. I’m not talking about what you personally should do with your time and energy, maybe there’s other projects that appeal to you more. But I think it is worthwhile for someone to be doing the thing I ask. It won’t take much effort.
You probably won't find good arguments because there don't seem to be any. Unless, of course, there's some big lab somewhere that, unlike the major labs we're aware of, has made massive amounts of progress and kept it secret, and you're talking to one of those people.
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/sTDfraZab47KiRMmT/views-on-when-agi-comes-and-on-strategy-to-reduce
Most arguments I see in favor of AGI ignore economic constraints. I strongly suspect that we can't actually afford to create AGI yet; world GDP isn't high enough. They seem to be focused on inside-view arguments for why method X will make it happen, which sure, maybe, but even if we achieve AGI, if we aren't rich enough to run it or use it for anything it hardly matters.
So the question in my mind is, if you think AGI is soon, how are we getting the level of economic growth needed in the next 2-5 years to afford to use AGI at all before AGI is created?
I'm seeing a lot of people on LW saying that they have very short timelines (say, five years or less) until AGI. However, the arguments that I've seen often seem to be just one of the following:
At the same time, it seems like this is not the majority view among ML researchers. The most recent representative expert survey that I'm aware of is the 2023 Expert Survey on Progress in AI. It surveyed 2,778 AI researchers who had published peer-reviewed research in the prior year in six top AI venues (NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, AAAI, IJCAI, JMLR); the median time for a 50% chance of AGI was either in 23 or 92 years, depending on how the question was phrased.
While it has been a year since fall 2023 when this survey was conducted, my anecdotal impression is that many researchers not in the rationalist sphere still have significantly longer timelines, or do not believe that current methods would scale to AGI.
A more recent, though less broadly representative, survey is reported in Feng et al. 2024, In the ICLR 2024 "How Far Are We From AGI" workshop, 138 researchers were polled on their view. "5 years or less" was again a clear minority position, with 16.6% respondents. On the other hand, "20+ years" was the view held by 37% of the respondents.
Most recently, there were a number of "oh AGI does really seem close" comments with the release of o3. I mostly haven't seen these give very much of an actual model for their view either; they seem to mostly be of the "feels intuitive" type. There have been some posts discussing the extent to which we can continue to harness compute and data for training bigger models, but that says little about the ultimate limits of the current models.
The one argument that I did see that felt somewhat convincing were the "data wall" and "unhobbling" sections of the "From GPT-4 to AGI" chapter of Leopold Aschenbrenner's "Situational Awareness", that outlined ways in which we could build on top of the current paradigm. However, this too was limited to just "here are more things that we could do".
So, what are the strongest arguments for AGI being very close? I would be particularly interested in any discussions that explicitly look at the limitations of the current models and discuss how exactly people expect those to be overcome.