I am a Manifund Regrantor. In addition to general grantmaking, I have requests for proposals in the following areas:
"Physical community spaces for AI safety in AI hubs outside of the SF Bay Area or London (e.g., Japan, France, Bangalore)"- I love this initiative. Can we also consider Australia or New Zealand in the upcoming proposal?
In theory, sure! I know @yanni kyriacos recently assessed the need for an ANZ AI safety hub, but I think he concluded there wasn't enough of a need yet?
Hi! I think in Sydney we're ~ 3 seats short of critical mass, so I am going to reassess the viability of a community space in 5-6 months :)
Hourly stipends for AI safety fellowship programs, plus some referents. The average AI safety program stipend is $26/h.
Edit: updated figure to include more programs.
My main metric is "How smart do these people seem when I talk to them or watch their presentations?". I think they also tend to be older and have more research experience.
I think there some confounders here:
Also, MATS is generally trying to further a different research porfolio than PIBBSS, as I discuss here, and has substantial success in accelerating hires to AI scaling lab safety teams and research nonprofits, helping scholars found impactful AI safety organizations, and (I suspect) accelerating AISI hires.
I suspect that your estimation of "how smart do these people seem" might be somewhat contingent on research taste. Most MATS research projects are in prosaic AI safety fields like oversight & control, evals, and non-"science of DL" interpretability, while most PIBBSS research has been in "biology/physics-inspired" interpretability, agent foundations, and (recently) novel policy approaches (all of which MATS has supported historically).
I think this is less a matter of my particular taste, and more a matter of selection pressures producing genuinely different skill levels between different research areas. People notoriously focus on oversight/control/evals/specific interp over foundations/generalizable interp because the former are easier. So when one talks to people in those different areas, there's a very noticeable tendency for the foundations/generalizable interp people to be noticeably smarter, more experienced, and/or more competent. And in the other direction, stronger people tend to be more often drawn to the more challenging problems of foundations or generalizable interp.
So possibly a MATS apologist reply would be: yeah, the MATS portfolio is more loaded on the sort of work that's accessible to relatively-mid researchers, so naturally MATS ends up with more relatively-mid researchers. Which is not necessarily a bad thing.
I don't agree with the following claims (which might misrepresent you):
Y'know, you probably have the data to do a quick-and-dirty check here. Take a look at the GRE/SAT scores on the applications (both for applicant pool and for accepted scholars). If most scholars have much-less-than-perfect scores, then you're probably not hiring the top tier (standardized tests have a notoriously low ceiling). And assuming most scholars aren't hitting the test ceiling, you can also test the hypothesis about different domains by looking at the test score distributions for scholars in the different areas.
We don't collect GRE/SAT scores, but we do have CodeSignal scores and (for the first time) a general aptitude test developed in collaboration with SparkWave. Many MATS applicants have maxed out scores for the CodeSignal and general aptitude tests. We might share these stats later.
Note that governance/policy jobs pay less than ML research/engineering jobs, so I expect GovAI, IAPS, and ERA, which are more governance focused, to have a lower stipend. Also, MATS is deliberately trying to attract top CS PhD students, so our stipend should be higher than theirs, although lower than Google internships to select for value alignment. I suspect that PIBBSS' stipend is an outlier and artificially low due to low funding. Given that PIBBSS has a mixture of ML and policy projects, and IMO is generally pursuing higher variance research than MATS, I suspect their optimal stipend would be lower than MATS', but higher than a Stanford PhD's; perhaps around IAPS' rate.
That said, maybe you are conceptualizing of an "efficient market" that principally values impact, in which case I would expect the governance/policy programs to have higher stipends. However, I'll note that 87% of MATS alumni are interested in working at an AISI and several are currently working at UK AISI, so it seems that MATS is doing a good job of recruiting technical governance talent that is happy to work for government wages.
No, I meant that the correlation between pay and how-competent-the-typical-participant-seems-to-me is, if anything, negative. Like, the hiring bar for Google interns is lower than any of the technical programs, and PIBBSS seems-to-me to have the most competent participants overall (though I'm not familiar with some of the programs).
I don't think it makes sense to compare Google intern salary with AIS program stipends this way, as AIS programs are nonprofits (with associated salary cut) and generally trying to select against people motivated principally by money. It seems like good mechanism design to pay less than tech internships, even if the technical bar for is higher, given that value alignment is best selected by looking for "costly signals" like salary sacrifice.
I don't think the correlation for competence among AIS programs is as you describe.
Interesting, thanks! My guess is this doesn't include benefits like housing and travel costs? Some of these programs pay for those while others don't, which I think is a non-trivial difference (especially for the bay area)
Is “CHAI” being a CHAI intern, PhD student, or something else? My MATS 3.0 stipend was clearly higher than my CHAI internship stipend.
CHAI interns are paid $5k/month for in-person interns and $3.5k/month for remote interns. I used the in-person figure. https://humancompatible.ai/jobs
Then the MATS stipend today is probably much lower than it used to be? (Which would make sense since IIRC the stipend during MATS 3.0 was settled before the FTX crash, so presumably when the funding situation was different?)
MATS lowered the stipend from $50/h to $40/h ahead of the Summer 2023 Program to support more scholars. We then lowered it again to $30/h ahead of the Winter 2023-24 Program after surveying alumni and determining that 85% would be accept $30/h.
LASR (https://www.lasrlabs.org/) is giving a £11,000 stipend for a 13 week program, assuming 40h/week it works out to ~$27
Why does the AI safety community need help founding projects?
I agree with this, I'd like to see AI Safety scale with new projects. A few ideas I've been mulling:
- A 'festival week' bringing entrepreneur types and AI safety types together to cowork from the same place, along with a few talks and lot of mixers.
- running an incubator/accelerator program at the tail end of a funding round, with fiscal sponsorship and some amount of operational support.
- more targeted recruitment for specific projects to advance important parts of a research agenda.
It's often unclear to me whether new projects should actually be new organizations; making it easier to spin up new projects, that can then either join existing orgs or grow into orgs themselves, seems like a promising direction.
- Talent leaves MATS/ARENA and sometimes struggles to find meaningful work
I'm surprised this one was included, it feels tail-wagging-the-dog to me.
I would amend it to say "sometimes struggles to find meaningful employment despite having the requisite talent to further impactful research directions (which I believe are plentiful)"
This still reads to me as advocating for a jobs program for the benefit of MATS grads, not safety. My guess is you're aiming for something more like "there is talent that could do useful work under someone else's direction, but not on their own, and we can increase safety by utilizing it".
I expect that Ryan means to say one of the these things:
I'm pretty sure that Ryan does not mean to say that MATS grads cannot do useful work on their own. The point is that we don't yet have the institutional infrastructure to absorb, enable, and scale new researchers the way our civilization has for existing STEM fields via, say, PhD programs or yearlong fellowships at OpenAI/MSR/DeepMind (which are also pretty rare). AFAICT, the most valuable part of such infrastructure in general is the ability to co-locate researchers working on the same or similar research problems -- this is standard for academic and industry research groups, for example, and from experience I know that being able to do so is invaluable. Another extremely valuable facet of institutional infrastructure that enables researchers is the ability to delegate operations and logistics problems -- particularly the difficulty of finding grant funding, interfacing with other organizations, getting paperwork handled, etc.
I keep getting more and more convinced, as time passes, that it would be more valuable for me to work on building the infrastructure to enable valuable teams and projects, than to simply do alignment research while disregarding such bottlenecks to this research ecosystem.
@Elizabeth, Mesa nails it above. I would also add that I am conceptualizing impactful AI safety research as the product of multiple reagents, including talent, ideas, infrastructure, and funding. In my bullet point, I was pointing to an abundance of talent and ideas relative to infrastructure and funding. I'm still mostly working on talent development at MATS, but I'm also helping with infrastructure and funding (e.g., founding LISA, advising Catalyze Impact, regranting via Manifund) and I want to do much more for these limiting reagents.
Also note that historically many individuals entering AI safety seem to have been pursuing the "Connector" path, when most jobs now (and probably in the future) are "Iterator"-shaped, and larger AI safety projects are also principally bottlenecked by "Amplifiers". The historical focus on recruiting and training Connectors to the detriment of Iterators and Amplifiers has likely contributed to this relative talent shortage. A caveat: Connectors are also critical for founding new research agendas and organizations, though many self-styled Connectors would likely substantially benefit as founders by improving some Amplifier-shaped soft skills, including leadership, collaboration, networking, and fundraising.
I interpret your comment as assuming that new researchers with good ideas produce more impact on their own than in teams working towards a shared goal; this seems false to me. I think that independent research is usually a bad bet in general and that most new AI safety researchers should be working on relatively few impactful research directions, most of which are best pursued within a team due to the nature of the research (though some investment in other directions seems good for the portfolio).
I've addressed this a bit in thread, but here are some more thoughts:
I interpret your comment as assuming that new researchers with good ideas produce more impact on their own than in teams working towards a shared goal
I don't believe that, although I see how my summary could be interpreted that way. I agree with basically all the reasons in your recent comment and most in the original comment. I could add a few reasons of my own doing independent grant-funded work sucks. But I think it's really important to track how founding projects tracks to increased potential safety instead of intermediates, and push hard against potential tail wagging the dog scenarios.
I was trying to figure out why this was important to me, given how many of your points I agree with. I think it's a few things:
I just left a comment on PIBBSS' Manifund grant proposal (which I funded $25k) that people might find interesting.
Main points in favor of this grant
- My inside view is that PIBBSS mainly supports “blue sky” or “basic” research, some of which has a low chance of paying off, but might be critical in “worst case” alignment scenarios (e.g., where “alignment MVPs” don’t work, or “sharp left turns” and “intelligence explosions” are more likely than I expect). In contrast, of the technical research MATS supports, about half is basic research (e.g., interpretability, evals, agent foundations) and half is applied research (e.g., oversight + control, value alignment). I think the MATS portfolio is a better holistic strategy for furthering AI alignment. However, if one takes into account the research conducted at AI labs and supported by MATS, PIBBSS’ strategy makes a lot of sense: they are supporting a wide portfolio of blue sky research that is particularly neglected by existing institutions and might be very impactful in a range of possible “worst-case” AGI scenarios. I think this is a valid strategy in the current ecosystem/market and I support PIBBSS!
- In MATS’ recent post, “Talent Needs of Technical AI Safety Teams”, we detail an AI safety talent archetype we name “Connector”. Connectors bridge exploratory theory and empirical science, and sometimes instantiate new research paradigms. As we discussed in the post, finding and developing Connectors is hard, often their development time is on the order of years, and there is little demand on the AI safety job market for this role. However, Connectors can have an outsized impact on shaping the AI safety field and the few that make it are “household names” in AI safety and usually build organizations, teams, or grant infrastructure around them. I think that MATS is far from the ideal training ground for Connectors (although some do pass through!) as our program is only 10 weeks long (with an optional 4 month extension) rather than the ideal 12-24 months, we select scholars to fit established mentors’ preferences rather than on the basis of their original research ideas, and our curriculum and milestones generally focus on building object-level scientific skills rather than research ideation and “gap-identifying”. It’s thus no surprise that most MATS scholars are “Iterator” archetypes. I think there is substantial value in a program like PIBBSS existing, to support the development of “Connectors” and pursue impact in a higher-variance way than MATS.
- PIBBSS seems to have decent track record for recruiting experienced academics in non-CS fields and helping them repurpose their advanced scientific skills to develop novel approaches to AI safety. Highlights for me include Adam Shai’s “computational mechanics” approach to interpretability and model cognition, Martín Soto’s “logical updatelessness” approach to decision theory, and Gabriel Weil’s “tort law” approach to making AI labs liable for their potential harms on the long-term future.
- I don’t know Lucas Teixeira (Research Director) very well, but I know and respect Dušan D. Nešić (Operations Director) a lot. I also highly endorsed Nora Ammann’s vision (albeit while endorsing a different vision for MATS). I see PIBBSS as a highly competent and EA-aligned organization, and I would be excited to see them grow!
- I think PIBBSS would benefit from funding from diverse sources, as mainstream AI safety funders have pivoted more towards applied technical research (or more governance-relevant basic research like evals). I think Manifund regrantors are well-positioned to endorse more speculative basic research, but I don’t really know how to evalutate such research myself, so I’d rather defer to experts. PIBBSS seems well-positioned to provide this expertise! I know that Nora had quite deep models of this while Research Director and in talking with Dusan, I have had a similar impression. I hope to talk with Lucas soon!
Donor's main reservations
- It seems that PIBBSS might be pivoting away from higher variance blue sky research to focus on more mainstream AI interpretability. While this might create more opportunities for funding, I think this would be a mistake. The AI safety ecosystem needs a home for “weird ideas” and PIBBSS seems the most reputable, competent, EA-aligned place for this! I encourage PIBBSS to “embrace the weird”, albeit while maintaining high academic standards for basic research, modelled off the best basic science institutions.
- I haven’t examined PIBBSS’ applicant selection process and I’m not entirely confident it is the best version it can be, given how hard MATS has found applicant selection and my intuitions around the difficulty of choosing a blue sky research portfolio. I strongly encourage PIBBSS to publicly post and seek feedback on their applicant selection and research prioritization processes, so that the AI safety ecosystem can offer useful insight. I would also be open to discussing these more with PIBBSS, though I expect this would be less useful.
- My donation is not very counterfactual here, given PIBBSS’ large budget and track record. However, there has been a trend in typical large AI safety funders away from agent foundations and interpretability, so I think my grant is still meaningful.
Process for deciding amount
I decided to donate the project’s minimum funding ($25k) so that other donors would have time to consider the project’s merits and potentially contribute. Given the large budget and track record of PIBBSS, I think my funds are less counterfactual here than for smaller, more speculative projects, so I only donated the minimum. I might donate significantly more to PIBBSS later if I can’t find better grants, or if PIBBSS is unsuccessful in fundraising.
Conflicts of interest
I don't believe there are any conflicts of interest to declare.
Main takeaways from a recent AI safety conference:
An incomplete list of possibly useful AI safety research:
A systematic way for classifying AI safety work could use a matrix, where one dimension is the system level:
Another dimension is the "time" of consideration:
There would be 5*4 = 20 slots in this matrix, and almost all of them have something interesting to research and design, and none of them is "too early" to consider.
There is still some AI safety work (research) that doesn't fit this matrix, e.g., org design, infosec, alignment, etc. of AI labs (= the system that designs, manufactures, operates, and evolves monolithic AI systems and systems of AIs).
AI alignment threat models that are somewhat MECE (but not quite):
In particular, the last threat model feels like it is trying to cut across aspects of the first two threat models, violating MECE.
Great overview! I find this helpful.
Next to intrinsic optimisation daemons that arise through training internal to hardware, suggest adding extrinsic optimising "divergent ecosystems" that arise through deployment and gradual co-option of (phenotypic) functionality within the larger outside world.
AI Safety so far research has focussed more on internal code (particularly CS/ML researchers) computed deterministically (within known statespaces, as mathematicians like to represent). That is, rather than complex external feedback loops that are uncomputable – given Good Regulator Theorem limits and the inherent noise interference on signals propagating through the environment (as would be intuitive for some biologists and non-linear dynamics theorists).
So extrinsic optimisation is easier for researchers in our community to overlook. See this related paper by a physicist studying origins of life.
Cheers, Remmelt! I'm glad it was useful.
I think the extrinsic optimization you describe is what I'm pointing toward with the label "coordination failures," which might properly be labeled "alignment failures arising uniquely through the interactions of multiple actors who, if deployed alone, would be considered aligned."
Reasons that scaling labs might be motivated to sign onto AI safety standards:
However, AI companies that don’t believe in AGI x-risk might tolerate higher x-risk than ideal safety standards by the lights of this community. Also, I think insurance contracts are unlikely to appropriately account for x-risk, if the market is anything to go by.
Types of organizations that conduct alignment research, differentiated by funding model and associated market forces:
Can the strategy of "using surrogate goals to deflect threats" be countered by an enemy agent that learns your true goals and credibly precommits to always defecting (i.e., Prisoner's Dilemma style) if you deploy an agent against it with goals that produce sufficiently different cooperative bargaining equilibria than your true goals would?
This is a risk worth considering, yes. It’s possible in principle to avoid this problem by “committing” (to the extent that humans can do this) to both (1) train the agent to make the desired tradeoffs between the surrogate goal and original goal, and (2) not train the agent to use a more hawkish bargaining policy than it would’ve had without surrogate goal training. (And to the extent that humans can’t make this commitment, i.e., we make honest mistakes in (2), the other agent doesn’t have an incentive to punish those mistakes.)
If the developers do both these things credibly—and it's an open research question how feasible this is—surrogate goals should provide a Pareto improvement for the two agents (not a rigorous claim). Safe Pareto improvements are a generalization of this idea.
MATS' goals:
"Why suicide doesn't seem reflectively rational, assuming my preferences are somewhat unknown to me," OR "Why me-CEV is probably not going to end itself":
Note: I'm fine; this is purely intellectual.
Are these framings of gradient hacking, which I previously articulated here, a useful categorization?
- Masking: Introducing a countervailing, “artificial” performance penalty that “masks” the performance benefits of ML modifications that do well on the SGD objective, but not on the mesa-objective;
- Spoofing: Withholding performance gains until the implementation of certain ML modifications that are desirable to the mesa-objective; and
- Steering: In a reinforcement learning context, selectively sampling environmental states that will either leave the mesa-objective unchanged or "steer" the ML model in a way that favors the mesa-objective.
How does the failure rate of a hierarchy of auditors scale with the hierarchy depth, if the auditors can inspect all auditors below their level?