There are lots of arguments about how to test for general intelligence and I see debates about what thresholds count for generality, but it seems to me that a more interesting problem occurs after we attain a sufficient test for general intelligence — that the test becomes generally intelligent itself....
Maximizing paperclips is the de facto machine ethics / AI alignment meme. I showcase some practical problems with Nick Bostrom's paperclip thought experiment and posit that if we really tried to maximize paperclips in the universe we would have to sacrifice utility measurements as a result. Let's Start Making Paperclips...
I argue that there is a convergent axiological framework by which all intelligent life in the universe trends towards — that there is a universal-like account of the resource constraints, psychology, and game theory of all species across all worlds. I argue for this to help flesh out cross-disciplinary understandings...
There are lots of arguments about how to test for general intelligence and I see debates about what thresholds count for generality, but it seems to me that a more interesting problem occurs after we attain a sufficient test for general intelligence — that the test becomes generally intelligent itself.
There is currently no game I am aware of that you can play over the internet which is immune to AI supremacy,[1] meaning there is no online game that requires general intelligence to play (and consistently win). But let's grant someone eventually designs a game that requires general intelligence to play and win and which you can play online against... (read 1050 more words →)
When you look at the “bioethics” fiasco, you discover bioethicists writing mainly for an audience of other bioethicists. Bioethicists aren’t writing to doctors or bioengineers, they’re writing to tenure committees and journalists and foundation directors.
Mathematicians mainly write to other mathematicians. This is a problem that effects every field in academia, and it probably always will, simply because people are interested in their fields and not other fields.
Worse, bioethicists are not using their ethical sense in bio-work, the way a doctor whose patient might have incurable cancer must choose how and what to tell the patient.
Most bioethicists are effectively legal counsel for hospitals, where they very much use their ethical sense in bio-work, dictating what... (read more)
I don't really understand the point you're making here.
And you probably never will.
Maximizing paperclips is the de facto machine ethics / AI alignment meme. I showcase some practical problems with Nick Bostrom's paperclip thought experiment and posit that if we really tried to maximize paperclips in the universe we would have to sacrifice utility measurements as a result.
How do we actually maximize paperclips? Ought we make tiny nano-scale paperclips or large planet-sized paperclips?[1] Do we need to increase the number of paperclips in the universe or can we simply increase the paperclip-ness of the universe instead? Assuming the same amount of mass gets converted to paperclips either way, which way of producing paperclips is best?
To be very clear, I don't want to... (read 2081 more words →)
you'll eventually hit bottom
Laughs for eternity.
Oh, you used a ruler? How do you know the ruler is accurately measuring 3 inches? And furthermore, how do you know your eyes and brain can be trusted to read the ruler correctly to assess the height of the would-be FPS? For that matter, how do you even know what an inch is, and why was 3 inches the true height of an FPS anyway?
Heck, what does it even mean to "know" that something is "true"?
"Who is Descartes? Myth of the given? What are you talking about? I just want to define sandwiches."
The kind of work that I try to do is not about language. It is about reducing mentalistic models to purely causal models, about opening up black boxes to find complicated algorithms inside, about dissolving mysteries - in a word, about cognitive science.
And as we all know, language has nothing to do with cognitive science.
Which examples?
Convergence is a pretty well understood phenomenon in evolutionary theory and biology more broadly these days. Anything outside of our biosphere will likely follow the same trends and not just for the biological reasons given, but for the game theoretical ones too.
Acausal trade seems unrelated since what I'm talking about is not a matter of predicting what some party might want/need in a narrow sense, but rather the broad sense that it is preferable to cooperate when direct contact is made. As a tangent, acausal trade is named poorly, since there is a clear causal chain involved. I wish they called it remote reasoning or distant games or something else.
I argue that there is a convergent axiological framework by which all intelligent life in the universe trends towards — that there is a universal-like account of the resource constraints, psychology, and game theory of all species across all worlds. I argue for this to help flesh out cross-disciplinary understandings of how value systems work and to draw laws in the study of axiology with which we can make accurate predictions of intelligences we have yet to encounter.
Convergent evolution is a phenomenon in biology that selects for otherwise complex biological structures across independent evolutionary tracks. For example, eyes have independently evolved over a 100 different times in myriad environments. This is because... (read 1463 more words →)
Do you have numbers on how many students were using AI friend apps?