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On the OpenPhil / OpenAI Partnership

Epistemic Note: 
The implications of this argument being true are quite substantial, and I do not have any knowledge of the internal workings of Open Phil. 

(Both title and this note have been edited, cheers to Ben Pace for very constructive feedback.)

Premise 1: 
It is becoming increasingly clear that OpenAI is not appropriately prioritizing safety over advancing capabilities research.

Premise 2:
This was the default outcome. 

Instances in history in which private companies (or any individual humans) have intentionally turned down huge profits and power are the exception, not the rule. 

Edit: To clarify, you need to be skeptical of seemingly altruistic statements and commitments made by humans when there are exceptionally lucrative incentives to break these commitments at a later point in time (and limited ways to enforce the original commitment).

Premise 3:
Without repercussions for terrible decisions, decision makers have no skin in the game

Conclusion:
Anyone and everyone involved with Open Phil recommending a grant of $30 million dollars be given to OpenAI in 2017 shouldn't be allowed anywhere near AI Safety decision maki... (read more)

[-]Buck6441

From that page:

We expect the primary benefits of this grant to stem from our partnership with OpenAI, rather than simply from contributing funding toward OpenAI’s work. While we would also expect general support for OpenAI to be likely beneficial on its own, the case for this grant hinges on the benefits we anticipate from our partnership, particularly the opportunity to help play a role in OpenAI’s approach to safety and governance issues.

So the case for the grant wasn't "we think it's good to make OAI go faster/better".

Why do you think the grant was bad? E.g. I don't think "OAI is bad" would suffice to establish that the grant was bad.

So the case for the grant wasn't "we think it's good to make OAI go faster/better".

I agree. My intended meaning is not that the grant is bad because its purpose was to accelerate capabilities. I apologize that the original post was ambiguous

Rather, the grant was bad for numerous reasons, including but not limited to:

  • It appears to have had an underwhelming governance impact (as demonstrated by the board being unable to remove Sam). 
  • It enabled OpenAI to "safety-wash" their product (although how important this has been is unclear to me.)
  • From what I've seen at conferences and job boards, it seems reasonable to assert that the relationship between Open Phil and OpenAI has lead people to work at OpenAI. 
  • Less important, but the grant justification appears to take seriously the idea that making AGI open source is compatible with safety. I might be missing some key insight, but it seems trivially obvious why this is a terrible idea even if you're only concerned with human misuse and not misalignment.
  • Finally, it's giving money directly to an organisation with the stated goal of producing an AGI. There is substantial negative -EV if the grant sped up timelines. 

This last claim ... (read more)

[-]Buck4841

In your initial post, it sounded like you were trying to say:

This grant was obviously ex ante bad. In fact, it's so obvious that it was ex ante bad that we should strongly update against everyone involved in making it.

I think that this argument is in principle reasonable. But to establish it, you have to demonstrate that the grant was extremely obviously ex ante bad. I don't think your arguments here come close to persuading me of this. 

For example, re governance impact, when the board fired sama, markets thought it was plausible he would stay gone. If that had happened, I don't think you'd assess the governance impact as "underwhelming". So I think that (if you're in favor of sama being fired in that situation, which you probably are) you shouldn't consider the governance impact of this grant to be obviously ex ante ineffective.

I think that arguing about the impact of grants requires much more thoroughness than you're using here. I think your post has a bad "ratio of heat to light": you're making a provocative claim but not really spelling out why you believe the premises. 

"This grant was obviously ex ante bad. In fact, it's so obvious that it was ex ante bad that we should strongly update against everyone involved in making it."

This is an accurate summary. 

"arguing about the impact of grants requires much more thoroughness than you're using here"

We might not agree on the level of effort required for a quick take. I do not currently have the time available to expand this into a full write up on the EA forum but am still interested in discussing this with the community. 

"you're making a provocative claim but not really spelling out why you believe the premises."

I think this is a fair criticism and something I hope I can improve on.

I feel frustrated that your initial comment (which is now the top reply) implies I either hadn't read the 1700 word grant justification that is at the core of my argument, or was intentionally misrepresenting it to make my point. This seems to be an extremely uncharitable interpretation of my initial post. (Edit: I am retracting this statement and now understand Buck's comment was meaningful context. Apologies to Buck and see commentary by Ryan Greenblat below)

Your reply has been quite meta, which makes it difficul... (read more)

I feel frustrated that your initial comment (which is now the top reply) implies I either hadn't read the 1700 word grant justification that is at the core of my argument, or was intentionally misrepresenting it to make my point.

I think this comment is extremely important for bystanders to understand the context of the grant and it isn't mentioned in your original short form post.

So, regardless of whether you understand the situation, it's important that other people understand the intention of the grant (and this intention isn't obvious from your original comment). Thus, this comment from Buck is valuable.

I also think that the main interpretation from bystanders of your original shortform would be something like:

  1. OpenPhil made a grant to OpenAI
  2. OpenAI is bad (and this was ex-ante obvious)
  3. Therefore this grant is bad and the people who made this grant are bad.

Fair enough if this wasn't your intention, but I think it will be how bystanders interact with this.

4Stephen Fowler
Thank you, this explains my error. I've retracted that part of my response.
3starship006
Hmmm, can you point to where you think the grant shows this? I think the following paragraph from the grant seems to indicate otherwise:
5Stephen Fowler
"In particular, it emphasized the importance of distributing AI broadly;1 our current view is that this may turn out to be a promising strategy for reducing potential risks" Yes, I'm interpreting the phrase "may turn out" to be treating the idea with more seriousness than it deserves.  Rereading the paragraph, it seems reasonable to interpret it as politely downplaying it, in which case my statement about Open Phil taking the idea seriously is incorrect.

"we would also expect general support for OpenAI to be likely beneficial on its own" seems to imply that they did think it was good to make OAI go faster/better, unless that statement was a lie to avoid badmouthing a grantee.

I just realized that Paul Christiano and Dario Amodei both probably have signed non-disclosure + non-disparagement contracts since they both left OpenAI.

That impacts how I'd interpret Paul's (and Dario's) claims and opinions (or the lack thereof), that relates to OpenAI or alignment proposals entangled with what OpenAI is doing. If Paul has systematically silenced himself, and a large amount of OpenPhil and SFF money has been mis-allocated because of systematically skewed beliefs that these organizations have had due to Paul's opinions or lack thereof, well. I don't think this is the case though -- I expect Paul, Dario, and Holden all seem to have converged on similar beliefs (whether they track reality or not) and have taken actions consistent with those beliefs.

[-]bideup150

Can anybody confirm whether Paul is likely systematically silenced re OpenAI?

I mean, if Paul doesn't confirm that he is not under any non-disparagement obligations to OpenAI like Cullen O' Keefe did, we have our answer.

In fact, given this asymmetry of information situation, it makes sense to assume that Paul is under such an obligation until he claims otherwise.

I don't know the answer, but it would be fun to have a twitter comment with a zillion likes asking Sam Altman this question.  Maybe someone should make one?

6Arjun Panickssery
https://x.com/panickssery/status/1792586407623393435
9simeon_c
Mhhh, that seems very bad for someone in an AISI in general. I'd guess Jade Leung might sadly be under the same obligations...  That seems like a huge deal to me with disastrous consequences, thanks a lot for flagging.

I mostly agree with premises 1, 2, and 3, but I don't see how the conclusion follows.

It is possible for things to be hard to influence and yet still worth it to try to influence them.

(Note that the $30 million grant was not an endorsement and was instead a partnership (e.g. it came with a board seat), see Buck's comment.)

(Ex-post, I think this endeavour was probably net negative, though I'm pretty unsure and ex-ante I currently think it seems great.)

9dr_s
I think there's a solid case for anyone who supported funding OpenAI being considered at best well intentioned but very naive. I think the idea that we should align and develop superintelligence but, like, good, has always been a blind spot in this community - an obviously flawed but attractive goal, because it dodged the painful choice between extinction risk and abandoning hopes of personally witnessing the singularity or at least a post scarcity world. This is also a case where people's politics probably affected them, because plenty of others would be instinctively distrustful of corporation driven solutions to anything - it's something of a Godzilla Strategy after all, aligning corporations is also an unsolved problem - but those with an above average level of trust in free markets weren't so averse. Such people don't necessarily have conflicts of interest (though some may, and that's another story) but they at least need to drop the fantasy land stuff and accept harsh reality on this before being of any use.
[-]Wei Dai2417

It's also notable that the topic of OpenAI nondisparagement agreements was brought to Holden Karnofsky's attention in 2022, and he replied with "I don’t know whether OpenAI uses nondisparagement agreements; I haven’t signed one." (He could have asked his contacts inside OAI about it, or asked the EA board member to investigate. Or even set himself up earlier as someone OpenAI employees could whistleblow to on such issues.)

If the point was to buy a ticket to play the inside game, then it was played terribly and negative credit should be assigned on that basis, and for misleading people about how prosocial OpenAI was likely to be (due to having an EA board member).

4mesaoptimizer
This can also be glomarizing. "I haven't signed one." is a fact, intended for the reader to use it as anecdotal evidence. "I don't know whether OpenAI uses nondisparagement agreements" can mean that he doesn't know for sure, and will not try to find out. Obviously, the context of the conversation and the events surrounding Holden stating this matters for interpreting this statement, but I'm not interested in looking further into this, so I'm just going to highlight the glomarization possibility.
[-]TsviBT2316

On a meta note, IF proposition 2 is true, THEN the best way to tell this would be if people had been saying so AT THE TIME. If instead, actually everyone at the time disagreed with proposition 2, then it's not clear that there's someone "we" know to hand over decision making power to instead. Personally, I was pretty new to the area, and as a Yudkowskyite I'd probably have reflexively decried giving money to any sort of non-X-risk-pilled non-alignment-differential capabilities research. But more to the point, as a newcomer, I wouldn't have tried hard to have independent opinions about stuff that wasn't in my technical focus area, or to express those opinions with much conviction, maybe because it seemed like Many Highly Respected Community Members With Substantially Greater Decision Making Experience would know far better, and would not have the time or the non-status to let me in on the secret subtle reasons for doing counterintuitive things. Now I think everyone's dumb and everyone should say their opinions a lot so that later they can say that they've been saying this all along. I've become extremely disagreeable in the last few years, I'm still not disagreeable enough, and approximately no one I know personally is disagreeable enough.

Why focus on the $30 million grant?

What about large numbers of people working at OpenAI directly on capabilities for many years? (Which is surely worth far more than $30 million.)

Separately, this grant seems to have been done to influence the goverance at OpenAI, not make OpenAI go faster. (Directly working on capabilities seems modestly more accelerating and risky than granting money in exchange for a partnership.)

(ETA: TBC, there is a relationship between the grant and people working at OpenAI on capabilities: the grant was associated with a general vague endorsement of trying to play inside game at OpenAI.)

Very Spicy Take

Epistemic Note: Many highly respected community members with substantially greater decision making experience (and Lesswrong karma) presumably disagree strongly with my conclusion.

FYI I wish to register my weak disapproval of this opening. A la Scott Alexander’s “Against Bravery Debates”, I think it is actively distracting and a little mind-killing to open by making a claim about status and popularity of a position even if it's accurate.

I think in this case it would be reasonable to say something like “the implications of this argument being true involve substantial reallocation of status and power, so please be conscious of that and let’s all try to assess the evidence accurately and avoid overheating”. This is different from something like “I know lots of people will disagree with me on this but I’m going to say it”.

I’m not saying this was an easy post to write, but I think the standard to aim for is not having openings like this.

[-]Phib147

Honestly, maybe further controversial opinion, but this [30 million for a board seat at what would become the lead co. for AGI, with a novel structure for nonprofit control that could work?] still doesn't feel like necessarily as bad a decision now as others are making it out to be?

The thing that killed all value of this deal was losing the board seat(s?), and I at least haven't seen much discussion of this as a mistake.

I'm just surprised so little prioritization was given to keeping this board seat, it was probably one of the most important assets of the "AI safety community and allies", and there didn't seem to be any real fight with Sam Altman's camp for it.

So Holden has the board seat, but has to leave because of COI, and endorses Toner to replace, "... Karnofsky cited a potential conflict of interest because his wife, Daniela Amodei, a former OpenAI employee, helped to launch the AI company Anthropic.

Given that Toner previously worked as a senior research analyst at Open Philanthropy, Loeber speculates that Karnofsky might’ve endorsed her as his replacement."

Like, maybe it was doomed if they only had one board seat (Open Phil) vs whoever else is on the board, and there's a lot... (read more)

5RHollerith
COI == conflict of interest.

To go one step further, potentially any and every major decision they have played a part in needs to be reevaluated by objective third parties. 

I like a lot of this post, but the sentence above seems very out of touch to me. Who are these third parties who are completely objective? Why is objective the adjective here, instead of "good judgement" or "predicted this problem at the time"?

That's a good point. You have pushed me towards thinking that this is an unreasonable statement and "predicted this problem at the time" is better.

I downvoted this comment because it felt uncomfortably scapegoat-y to me. If you think the OpenAI grant was a big mistake, it's important to have a detailed investigation of what went wrong, and that sort of detailed investigation is most likely to succeed if you have cooperation from people who are involved. I've been reading a fair amount about what it takes to instill a culture of safety in an organization, and nothing I've seen suggests that scapegoating is a good approach.

Writing a postmortem is not punishment—it is a learning opportunity for the entire company.

...

Blameless postmortems are a tenet of SRE culture. For a postmortem to be truly blameless, it must focus on identifying the contributing causes of the incident without indicting any individual or team for bad or inappropriate behavior. A blamelessly written postmortem assumes that everyone involved in an incident had good intentions and did the right thing with the information they had. If a culture of finger pointing and shaming individuals or teams for doing the "wrong" thing prevails, people will not bring issues to light for fear of punishment.

Blameless culture originated in the healthcare and avionic

... (read more)
3mesaoptimizer
Enforcing social norms to prevent scapegoating also destroys information that is valuable for accurate credit assignment and causally modelling reality. I think you are misinterpreting the grandparent comment. I do not read any mention of a 'moral failing' in that comment. You seem worried because of the commenter's clear description of what they think would be a sensible step for us to take given what they believe are egregious flaws in the decision-making processes of the people involved. I don't think there's anything wrong with such claims. Again: You can care about people while also seeing their flaws and noticing how they are hurting you and others you care about. You can be empathetic to people having flawed decision making and care about them, while also wanting to keep them away from certain decision-making positions. Oh, interesting. Who exactly do you think influential people like Holden Karnofsky and Paul Christiano are accountable to, exactly? This "detailed investigation" you speak of, and this notion of a "blameless culture", makes a lot of sense when you are the head of an organization and you are conducting an investigation as to the systematic mistakes made by people who work for you, and who you are responsible for. I don't think this situation is similar enough that you can use these intuitions blandly without thinking through the actual causal factors involved in this situation. Note that I don't necessarily endorse the grandparent comment claims. This is a complex situation and I'd spend more time analyzing it and what occurred.
1Ebenezer Dukakis
I read the Ben Hoffman post you linked. I'm not finding it very clear, but the gist seems to be something like: Statements about others often import some sort of good/bad moral valence; trying to avoid this valence can decrease the accuracy of your statements. If OP was optimizing purely for descriptive accuracy, disregarding everyone's feelings, that would be one thing. But the discussion of "repercussions" before there's been an investigation goes into pure-scapegoating territory if you ask me. If OP wants to clarify that he doesn't think there was a moral failing, I expect that to be helpful for a post-mortem. I expect some other people besides me also saw that subtext, even if it's not explicit. "Keep people away" sounds like moral talk to me. If you think someone's decisionmaking is actively bad, i.e. you'd better off reversing any advice from them, then maybe you should keep them around so you can do that! But more realistically, someone who's fucked up in a big way will probably have learned from that, and functional cultures don't throw away hard-won knowledge. Imagine a world where AI is just an inherently treacherous domain, and we throw out the leadership whenever they make a mistake. So we get a continuous churn of inexperienced leaders in an inherently treacherous domain -- doesn't sound like a recipe for success! I agree that changes things. I'd be much more sympathetic to the OP if they were demanding an investigation or an apology.
1mesaoptimizer
Just to be clear, OP themselves seem to think that what they are saying will have little effect on the status quo. They literally called it "Very Spicy Take". Their intention was to allow them to express how they felt about the situation. I'm not sure why you find this threatening, because again, the people they think ideally wouldn't continue to have influence over AI safety related decisions are incredibly influential and will very likely continue to have the influence they currently possess. Almost everyone else in this thread implicitly models this fact as they are discussing things related to the OP comment. There is not going to be any scapegoating that will occur. I imagine that everything I say is something I would say in person to the people involved, or to third parties, and not expect any sort of coordinated action to reduce their influence -- they are that irreplaceable to the community and to the ecosystem.
2Ebenezer Dukakis
So basically, I think it is a bad idea and you think we can't do it anyway. In that case let's stop calling for it, and call for something more compassionate and realistic like a public apology. I'll bet an apology would be a more effective way to pressure OpenAI to clean up its act anyways. Which is a better headline -- "OpenAI cofounder apologizes for their role in creating OpenAI", or some sort of internal EA movement drama? If we can generate a steady stream of negative headlines about OpenAI, there's a chance that Sam is declared too much of a PR and regulatory liability. I don't think it's a particularly good plan, but I haven't heard a better one.
1mesaoptimizer
Can you not be close friends with someone while also expecting them to be bad at self-control when it comes to alcohol? Or perhaps they are great at technical stuff like research but pretty bad at negotiation, especially when dealing with experienced adverserial situations such as when talking to VCs? It is not that people people's decision-making skill is optimized such that you can consistently reverse someone's opinion to get something that accurately tracks reality. If that was the case then they are implicitly tracking reality very well already. Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Again you seem to not be trying to track the context of our discussion here. This advice again is usually said when it comes to junior people embedded in an institution, because the ability to blame someone and / or hold them responsible is a power that senior / executive people hold. This attitude you describe makes a lot of sense when it comes to people who are learning things, yes. I don't know if you can plainly bring it into this domain, and you even acknowledge this in the next few lines. I think it is incredibly unlikely that the rationalist community has an ability to 'throw out' the 'leadership' involved here. I find this notion incredibly silly, given the amount of influence OpenPhil has over the alignment community, especially through their funding (including the pipeline, such as MATS).
1Ebenezer Dukakis
Sure, I think this helps tease out the moral valence point I was trying to make. "Don't allow them near" implies their advice is actively harmful, which in turn suggests that reversing it could be a good idea. But as you say, this is implausible. A more plausible statement is that their advice is basically noise -- you shouldn't pay too much attention to it. I expect OP would've said something like that if they were focused on descriptive accuracy rather than scapegoating. Another way to illuminate the moral dimension of this conversation: If we're talking about poor decision-making, perhaps MIRI and FHI should also be discussed? They did a lot to create interest in AGI, and MIRI failed to create good alignment researchers by its own lights. Now after doing advocacy off and on for years, and creating this situation, they're pivoting to 100% advocacy. Could MIRI be made up of good people who are "great at technical stuff", yet apt to shoot themselves in the foot when it comes to communicating with the public? It's hard for me to imagine an upvoted post on this forum saying "MIRI shouldn't be allowed anywhere near AI safety communications".
1[comment deleted]
[-]Wei Dai1013

Agreed that it reflects on badly on the people involved, although less on Paul since he was only a "technical advisor" and arguably less responsible for thinking through / due diligence on the social aspects. It's frustrating to see the EA community (on EAF and Twitter at least) and those directly involved all ignoring this.

("shouldn’t be allowed anywhere near AI Safety decision making in the future" may be going too far though.)

8Rebecca
Did OpenAI have the for-profit element at that time?
8Buck
No. E.g. see here
5sapphire
A serious effective altruism movement with clean house. Everyone who pushed the 'work with AI capabilities company' line should retire or be forced to retire. There is no need to blame anyone for mistakes, the decision makers had reasons. But they chose wrong and should not continue to be leaders.

Do you think that whenever anyone makes a decision that ends up being bad ex-post they should be forced to retire?

Doesn't this strongly disincentivize making positive EV bets which are likely to fail?

Edit: I interpreted this comment as a generic claim about how the EA community should relate to things which went poorly ex-post, I now think this comment was intended to be less generic.

Not OP, but I take the claim to be "endorsing getting into bed with companies on-track to make billions of dollars profiting from risking the extinction of humanity in order to nudge them a bit, is in retrospect an obviously doomed strategy, and yet many self-identified effective altruists trusted their leadership to have secret good reasons for doing so and followed them in supporting the companies (e.g. working there for years including in capabilities roles and also helping advertise the company jobs). now that a new consensus is forming that it indeed was obviously a bad strategy, it is also time to have evaluated the leadership's decision as bad at the time of making the decision and impose costs on them accordingly, including loss of respect and power".

So no, not disincentivizing making positive EV bets, but updating about the quality of decision-making that has happened in the past.

6Joe Collman
I think there's a decent case that such updating will indeed disincentivize making positive EV bets (in some cases, at least). In principle we'd want to update on the quality of all past decision-making. That would include both [made an explicit bet by taking some action] and [made an implicit bet through inaction]. With such an approach, decision-makers could be punished/rewarded with the symmetry required to avoid undesirable incentives (mostly). Even here it's hard, since there'd always need to be a [gain more influence] mechanism to balance the possibility of losing your influence. In practice, most of the implicit bets made through inaction go unnoticed - even where they're high-stakes (arguably especially when they're high-stakes: most counterfactual value lies in the actions that won't get done by someone else; you won't be punished for being late to the party when the party never happens). That leaves the explicit bets. To look like a good decision-maker the incentive is then to make low-variance explicit positive EV bets, and rely on the fact that most of the high-variance, high-EV opportunities you're not taking will go unnoticed. From my by-no-means-fully-informed perspective, the failure mode at OpenPhil in recent years seems not to be [too many explicit bets that don't turn out well], but rather [too many failures to make unclear bets, so that most EV is left on the table]. I don't see support for hits-based research. I don't see serious attempts to shape the incentive landscape to encourage sufficient exploration. It's not clear that things are structurally set up so anyone at OP has time to do such things well (my impression is that they don't have time, and that thinking about such things is no-one's job (?? am I wrong ??)). It's not obvious to me whether the OpenAI grant was a bad idea ex-ante. (though probably not something I'd have done) However, I think that another incentive towards middle-of-the-road, risk-averse grant-making is the last t
2ryan_greenblatt
I interpreted the comment as being more general than this. (As in, if someone does something that works out very badly, they should be forced to resign.) Upon rereading the comment, it reads as less generic than my original interpretation. I'm not sure if I just misread the comment or if it was edited. (Would be nice to see the original version if actually edited.) (Edit: Also, you shouldn't interpret my comment as an endorsement or agreement with the the rest of the content of Ben's comment.)
3mesaoptimizer
Wasn't edited, based on my memory.
1Ebenezer Dukakis
Wasn't OpenAI a nonprofit at the time?
-6sapphire
4jbash
OK OK It's an article of faith for some people that that makes a difference, but I've never seen why. I mean, many of the "decision makers" on these particular issues already believe that their actual, personal, biological skins are at stake, along with those of everybody else they know. And yet... Thinking "seven years from now, a significant number of independent players in a relatively large and diverse field might somehow band together to exclude me" seems very distant from the way I've seen actual humans make decisions.
3Ben Pace
Perhaps, but “seven years from now my reputation in my industry will drop markedly on the basis of this decision” seems to me like a normal human thing that happens all the time.
3Rebecca
OpenAI wasn’t a private company (ie for-profit) at the time of the OP grant though.
2dr_s
Aren't these different things? Private yes, for profit no. It was private because it's not like it was run by the US government.
5Buck
As a non-profit it is obligated to not take opportunities to profit, unless those opportunities are part of it satisfying its altruistic mission.
7habryka
I don't think this is true. Nonprofits can aim to amass large amounts of wealth, they just aren't allowed to distribute that wealth to its shareholders. A good chunk of obviously very wealthy and powerful companies are nonprofits.
4dr_s
I'm not sure if those are precisely the terms of the charter, but that's besides the point. It is still "private" in the sense that there is a small group of private citizens who own the thing and decide what it should do with no political accountability to anyone else. As for the "non-profit" part, we've seen what happens to that as soon as it's in the way.
1Rebecca
So the argument is that Open Phil should only give large sums of money to (democratic) governments? That seems too overpowered for the OpenAI case.
-1Rebecca
I was more focused on the ‘company’ part. To my knowledge there is no such thing as a non-profit company?
1Stephen Fowler
This does not feel super cruxy as the the power incentive still remains. 
2Rebecca
In that case OP’s argument would be saying that donors shouldn’t give large sums of money to any sort of group of people, which is a much bolder claim

(I'm the OP)

I'm not trying to say "it's bad to give large sums of money to any group because humans have a tendency to to seek power." 

I'm saying "you should be exceptionally cautious about giving large sums of money to a group of humans with the stated goal of constructing an AGI."

You need to weight any reassurances they give you against two observations:

  1. The commonly observed pattern of individual humans or organisations seeking power (and/or wealth) at the expense of the wider community. 
  2. The strong likelihood that there will be an opportunity for organisations pushing ahead with AI research to obtain incredible wealth or power.

So, it isn't "humans seek power therefore giving any group of humans money is bad". It's "humans seek power" and, in the specific case of AI companies, there may be incredibly strong rewards for groups that behave in a self-interested way.

The general idea I'm working off is that you need to be skeptical of seemingly altruistic statements and commitments made by humans when there are exceptionally lucrative incentives to break these commitments at a later point in time (and limited ways to enforce the original commitment).

1Rebecca
That seems like a valuable argument. It might be worth updating the wording under premise 2 to clarifying this? To me it reads as saying that the configuration, rather than the aim, of OpenAI was the major red flag.
1keltan
I’d like to see people who are more informed than I am have a conversation about this. Maybe at Less.online? https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/zAqqeXcau9y2yiJdi/can-we-build-a-better-public-doublecrux

I would be happy to defend roughly the position above (I don't agree with all of it, but agree with roughly something like "the strategy of trying to play the inside game at labs was really bad, failed in predictable ways, and has deeply eroded trust in community leadership due to the adversarial dynamics present in such a strategy and many people involved should be let go").

I do think most people who disagree with me here are under substantial confidentiality obligations and de-facto non-disparagement obligations (such as really not wanting to imply anything bad about Anthropic or wanting to maintain a cultivated image for policy purposes) so that it will be hard to find a good public debate partner, but it isn't impossible.

[-]owencb143

I largely disagree (even now I think having tried to play the inside game at labs looks pretty good, although I have sometimes disagreed with particular decisions in that direction because of opportunity costs). I'd be happy to debate if you'd find it productive (although I'm not sure whether I'm disagreeable enough to be a good choice).

For me, the key question in situations when leaders made a decision with really bad consequences is, "How did they engage with criticism and opposing views?"

If they did well on this front, then I don't think it's at all mandatory to push for leadership changes (though certainly, the worse someones track record gets, the more that speaks against them).

By contrast, if leaders tried to make the opposition look stupid or if they otherwise used their influence to dampen the reach of opposing views, then being wrong later is unacceptable.

Basically, I want to allow for a situation where someone was like, "this is a tough call and I can see reasons why others wouldn't agree with me, but I think we should do this," and then ends up being wrong, but I don't want to allow situations where someone is wrong after having expressed something more like, "listen to me, I know better than you, go away."

In the first situation, it might still be warranted to push for leadership changes (esp. if there's actually a better alternative), but I don't see it as mandatory

The author of the original short form says we need to hold leaders accountable for bad decisions because otherwise the incentives ar... (read more)

5Pablo
If the strategy failed in predictable ways, shouldn't we expect to find "pre-registered" predictions that it would fail?

I have indeed been publicly advocating against the inside game strategy at labs for many years (going all the way back to 2018), predicting it would fail due to incentive issues and have large negative externalities due to conflict of interest issues. I could dig up my comments, but I am confident almost anyone who I've interfaced with at the labs, or who I've talked to about any adjacent topic in leadership would be happy to confirm.

3Ebenezer Dukakis
Are you just referring to the profit incentive conflicting with the need for safety, or something else? I'm struggling to see how we get aligned AI without "inside game at labs" in some way, shape, or form. My sense is that evaporative cooling is the biggest thing which went wrong at OpenAI. So I feel OK about e.g. Anthropic if it's not showing signs of evaporative cooling.
4Nisan
I'd like to know what Holden did while serving on the board, and what OpenAI would have done if he hadn't joined. That's crucial for assessing the grant's impact. But since board meetings are private, this will remain unknown for a long time. Unfortunately, the best we can do is speculate.

A concerning amount of alignment research is focused on fixing misalignment in contemporary models, with limited justification for why we should expect these techniques to extend to more powerful future systems.

By improving the performance of today's models, this research makes investing in AI capabilities more attractive, increasing existential risk.

Imagine an alternative history in which GPT-3 had been wildly unaligned. It would not have posed an existential risk to humanity but it would have made putting money into AI companies substantially less attractive to investors.

5faul_sname
Counterpoint: Sydney Bing was wildly unaligned, to the extent that it is even possible for an LLM to be aligned, and people thought it was cute / cool.
3Stephen Fowler
I was not precise enough in my language and agree with you highlighting that what "alignment" means for LLM is a bit vague. While people felt Sydney Bing was cool, if it was not possible to reign it in it would have made it very difficult for Microsoft to gain any market share. An LLM that doesn't do what it's asked or regularly expresses toxic opinions is ultimately bad for business. In the above paragraph understand "aligned" to mean in the concrete sense of "behaves in a way that is aligned with it's parent companies profit motive", rather than "acting in line with humanities CEV". To rephrase the point I was making above, I feel much of (a majority even) of today's alignment research is focused on the the first definition of alignment, whilst neglecting the second.
5ryan_greenblatt
See also thoughts on the impact of RLHF research.
4Joseph Van Name
I would go further than this. Future architectures will not only be designed for improved performance, but they will be (hopefully) increasingly designed to optimize safety and interpretability as well, so they will likely be much different than the architectures we see today. It seems to me (this is my personal opinion based on my own research for cryptocurrency technologies, so my opinion does not match anyone else's opinion) that non-neural network machine learning models (but which are probably still trained by moving in the direction of a vector field) or at least safer kinds of neural network architectures are needed. The best thing to do will probably to work on alignment, interpretability, and safety for all known kinds of AI models and develop safer AI architectures. Since future systems will be designed not just for performance but for alignability, safety, and interpretability as well, we may expect for these future systems to be easier to align than systems that are simply designed for performance.

Train Tracks

When Gromit laid down his own tracks in this train chase ...

The above gif comes from the brilliant childrens claymation film, "Wallace and Gromit The Wrong Trousers". In this scene, Gromit the dog rapidly lays down track to prevent a toy train from crashing. I will argue that this is an apt analogy for the alignment situation we will find ourselves in the future and that prosaic alignment is focused only on the first track.

The last few years have seen a move from "big brain" alignment research directions to prosaic approaches. In other words asking how to align near-contemporary models instead of asking high level questions about aligning general AGI systems. 

This makes a lot of sense as a strategy. One, we can actually get experimental verification for theories. And two, we seem to be in the predawn of truly general intelligence, and it would be crazy not to be shifting our focus towards the specific systems that seem likely to cause an existential threat. Urgency compels us to focus on prosaic alignment. To paraphrase a (now deleted) tweet from a famous researcher "People arguing that we shouldn't focus on contemporary systems are like people wanting to research how flammable the roof is whilst standing in a burning kitch... (read more)

There are meaningful distinctions between evolution and other processes referred to as "optimisers"

 

People should be substantially more careful about invoking evolution as an analogy for the development of AGI, as tempting as this comparison is to make.

"Risks From Learned Optimisation"  is one of the most influential AI Safety papers ever written, so I'm going to use it's framework for defining optimisation. 

"We will say that a system is an optimiser if it is internally searching through a search space (consisting of possible outputs, policies, plans, strategies, or similar) looking for those elements that score high according to some objective function that is explicitly represented within the system" ~Hubinger et al (2019) 

It's worth noting that the authors of this paper do consider evolution to be an example of optimisation (something stated explicitly in the paper). Despite this, I'm going to argue the definition shouldn't apply to evolution.
 

2 strong (and 1 weak) Arguments That Evolution Doesn't Fit This Definition:

Weak Argument 0:
Evolution itself isn't a separate system that is optimising for something. (Micro)evolution is the change in allele frequen... (read more)

(For the record—I do think there are other reasons to think that the evolution example is not informative about the probability of AGI risk, namely the obvious point that different specific optimization algorithms may have different properties, see my brief discussion here.)

In general, I’m very strongly opposed to the activity that I call “analogy-target policing”, where somebody points out some differences between X and Y and says “therefore it’s dubious to analogize X and Y”, independent of how the analogy is being used. Context matters. There are always differences / disanalogies! That’s the whole point of an analogy—X≠Y! Nobody analogizes something to itself! So there have to be differences!!

And sometimes a difference between X and Y is critically important, as it undermines the point that someone is trying to make by bringing up the analogy between X and Y. And also, sometimes a difference between X and Y is totally irrelevant to the point that someone was making with their analogy, so the analogy is perfectly great. See my discussion here with various examples and discussion, including Shakespeare’s comparing a woman to a summer’s day. :)

…Granted, you don’t say that you have ... (read more)

3Stephen Fowler
This was a great reply. In responding to it my confidence in my arguments declined substantially.  I'm going to make what I think is a very cruxy high level clarification and then address individual points. High Level Clarification My original post has clearly done a poor job at explaining why I think the mismatch between the optimisation definition given in RFLO and evolution matters. I think clarifying my position will address the bulk of your concerns.  "I don’t see why this matters for anything, right? Did Eliezer or Nate or whoever make some point about evolution which is undermined by the observation that evolution is not a separate system?  [...] Yet again, I don’t see why this matters for anything." I believe you have interpreted the high level motivation behind my post to be something along the lines of "evolution doesn't fit this definition of optimisation, and therefore this should be a reason to doubt the conclusions of Nate, Eliezer or anyone else invoking evolution." This is a completely fair reading of my original post, but it wasn't my intended message. I'm concerned that AI Safety research lacks a sufficiently robust framework for reasoning about the development, deployment and behaviour of AGI's. I am very interested in the broad category of "deconfusion". It is under that lens that I comment on evolution not fitting the definition in RFLO. It indicates that the optimiser framework in RFLO may not be cutting reality at the joints, and a more careful treatment is needed.  I'm going to immediately edit my original post to make this more clear thanks to your feedback! Detailed Responses to Individual Points "And also, sometimes a difference between X and Y is totally irrelevant to the point that someone was making with their analogy" I agree. I mentioned Nate's evolution analogy because I think it wasn't needed to make the point and lead to confusion. I don't think the properties of evolution I've mentioned can be used to argue against the
3Steven Byrnes
Thanks for your reply! A couple quick things: I thought about it a bit more and I think I know what they were doing. I bet they were trying to preempt the pedantic point (related) that everything is an optimization process if you allow the objective function to be arbitrarily convoluted and post hoc. E.g. any trained model M is the global maximum of the objective function “F where F(x)=1 if x is the exact model M, and F(x)=0 in all other cases”. So if you’re not careful, you can define “optimization process” in a way that also includes rocks. I think they used “explicitly represented objective function” as a straightforward case that would be adequate to most applications, but if they had wanted to they could have replaced it with the slightly-more-general notion of “objective function that can be deduced relatively straightforwardly by inspecting the nuts-and-bolts of the optimization process, and in particular it shouldn’t be a post hoc thing where you have to simulate the entire process of running the (so-called) optimization algorithm in order to answer the question of what the objective is.” Oh sorry, that’s not what I meant. For example (see here) the Python code y *= 1.5 - x * y * y / 2 happens to be one iteration of Newton’s method to make y a better approximation to 1/√x. So if you keep running this line of code over and over, you’re straightforwardly running an optimization algorithm that finds the y that minimizes the objective function |x – 1/y²|. But I don't see “|x – 1/y²|” written or calculated anywhere in that one line of source code. The source code skipped the objective and went straight to the update step. I have a vague notion that I’ve seen a more direct example kinda like this in the RL literature. Umm, maybe it was the policy gradient formula used in some version of policy-gradient RL? I recall that (this version of) the policy gradient formula was something involving logarithms, and I was confused for quite a while where this formula came
2brambleboy
Another example in ML of a "non-conservative" optimization process: a common failure mode of GANs is mode collapse, wherein the generator and discriminator get stuck in a loop. The generator produces just one output that fools the discriminator, the discriminator memorizes it, the generator switches to another, until eventually they get back to the same output again. In the rolling ball analogy, we could say that the ball rolls down into a divot, but the landscape flexes against the ball to raise it up again, and then the ball rolls into another divot, and so on.
2Jon Garcia
Evolution may not act as an optimizer globally, since selective pressure is different for different populations of organisms on different niches. However, it does act as an optimizer locally. For a given population in a given environment that happens to be changing slowly enough, the set of all variations in each generation act as a sort of numerical gradient estimate of the local fitness landscape. This allows the population as a whole to perform stochastic gradient descent. Those with greater fitness for the environment could be said to be lower on the local fitness landscape, so their is an ordering for that population. In a sufficiently constant environment, evolution very much does act as an optimization process. Sure, the fitness landscape can change, even by organisms undergoing evolution (e.g. the Great Oxygenation Event of yester-eon, or the Anthropogenic Mass Extinction of today), which can lead to cycling. But many organisms do find very stable local minima of the fitness landscape for their species, like the coelacanth, horseshoe crab, cockroach, and many other "living fossils". Humans are certainly nowhere near our global optimum, especially with the rapid changes to the fitness function wrought by civilization, but that doesn't mean that there isn't a gradient that we're following.
2Jon Garcia
Also, consider a more traditional optimization process, such as a neural network undergoing gradient descent. If, in the process of training, you kept changing the training dataset, shifting the distribution, you would in effect be changing the optimization target. Each minibatch generates a different gradient estimate, and a poorly randomized ordering of the data could even lead to training in circles. Changing environments are like changing the training set for evolution. Differential reproductive success (mean squared error) is the fixed cost function, but the gradient that the population (network backpropagation) computes at any generation (training step) depends on the particular set of environmental factors (training data in the minibatch).
1Stephen Fowler
This is somewhat along the lines of the point I was trying to make with the Lazy River analogy. I think the crux is that I'm arguing that because the "target" that evolution appears to be evolving towards is dependent on the state and differs as the state changes, it doesn't seem right to refer to it as "internally represented".

"Let us return for a moment to Lady Lovelace’s objection, which stated that the machine can only do what we tell it to do.

One could say that a man can ‘inject’ an idea into the machine, and that it will respond to a certain extent and then drop into quiescence, like a piano string struck by a hammer. Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed. 

Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds, and is there one for machines?"
 

— Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 1950

Soon there will be an army of intelligent but uncreative drones ready to do all the alignment research grunt work. Should this lead to a major shift in priorities?

This isn't far off, and it gives human alignment researchers an opportunity to shift focus. We should shift focus to the of the kind of high level, creative research ideas that models aren't capable of producing anytime soon*. 

Here's the practical takeaway: there's value in delaying certain tasks for a few years. As AI evolves, it will effectively handle these tasks. Meaning you can be substantially more productive in total as long as you can afford to delay the task by a few years.

Does this mean we then concentrate only on the tasks an AI can't do yet, and leave a trail of semi-finished work? It's a strategy worth exploring.

*I believe by the time AI is capable of performing the entirety of scientific research (PASTA) we will be within the FOOM period.



Inspired by the recent OpenAI paper and a talk Ajeya Cotra gave last year.

Lies, Damn Lies and LLMs

Despite their aesthetic similarities it is not at all obvious to me that models "lying" by getting answers wrong is in any way mechanistically related to the kind of lying we actually need to be worried about. 

Lying is not just saying something untrue, but doing so knowingly with the intention to deceive the other party. It appears critical that we are able to detect genuine lies if we wish to guard ourselves against deceptive models. I am concerned that much of the dialogue on this topic is focusing on the superficially simila... (read more)

Inspired by Mark Xu's Quick Take on control. 

Some thoughts on the prevalence of alignment over control approaches in AI Safety. 

  • "Alignment research" has become loosely synonymous with "AI Safety research". I don't know if any researcher who would state they're identical, but alignment seems to be considered the default AI Safety strategy. This seems problematic, may be causing some mild group-think and discourages people from pursuing non-alignment AI Safety agendas. 
  • Prosaic alignment research in the short term results in a better product, a
... (read more)

My views on your bullet points:

I agree with number 1 pretty totally, and think the conflation of AI safety and AI alignment is a pretty large problem in the AI safety field, driven IMO mostly by LessWrong, which birthed the AI safety community and still has significant influence over it.

I disagree with this important claim on bullet point 2:

I claim, increases X-risk

primarily because I believe the evidential weight of "negative-to low tax alignment strategies are possible" outweighs the shortening of timelines effects, cf Pretraining from Human Feedback which applies it in training, and is IMO conceptually better than RLHF primarily because it avoids the dangerous possibility of persuading the humans to give it high reward for dangerous actions.

Also, while there are reasonable arguments that RLHF isn't a full solution to the alignment problem, I do think it's worth pointing out that when it breaks down is important, and it also shows us a proof of concept of how a solution to the alignment problem may have low or negative taxes.

Link below:

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/xhLopzaJHtdkz9siQ/the-case-for-a-negative-alignment-tax#The_elephant_in_the_lab__RLHF

Agree with bullet point 3, th... (read more)

7Charlie Steiner
Control also makes AI more profitable, and more attractive to human tyrants, in worlds where control is useful. People want to know they can extract useful work from the AIs they build, and if problems with deceptiveness (or whatever control-focused people think the main problem is) are predictable, it will be more profitable, and lead to more powerful AU getting used, if there are control measures ready to hand. This isn't a knock-down argument against anything, it's just pointing out that inherent dual use of safety research is pretty broad - I suspect it's less obvious for AI control simply because AI control hasn't been useful for safety yet.

You are given a string s corresponding to the Instructions for the construction of an AGI which has been correctly aligned with the goal of converting as much of the universe into diamonds as possible. 

What is the conditional Kolmogorov Complexity of the string s' which produces an AGI aligned with "human values" or any other suitable alignment target.

To convert an abstract string to a physical object, the "Instructions" are read by a Finite State Automata, with the state of the FSA at each step dictating the behavior of a robotic arm (with appropriate mobility and precision) with access to a large collection of physical materials. 

6the gears to ascension
that depends a lot on what exactly the specific instructions are. there are a variety of approaches which would result in a variety of retargetabilities. it also depends on what you're handwaving by "correctly aligned". is it perfectly robust? what percentage of universes will fail to be completely converted? how far would it get? what kinds of failures happen in the failure universes? how compressed is it? anyway, something something hypothetical version 3 of QACI (which has not hit a v1)

Feedback wanted!

What are your thoughts on the following research question:

"What nontrivial physical laws or principles exist governing the behavior of agentic systems."

(Very open to feedback along the lines of "hey that's not really a research question")

 

4Gunnar_Zarncke
Physical laws operate on individual particles or large numbers of them. This limits agents by allowing to give bounds on what is physically possible, e.g., growth no more than lightspeed and being subject to thermodynamics - in the limit. It doesn't tell what happens dynamically in medium scales. And because agentic systems operate mostly in very dynamic medium scale regimes, I think asking for physics is not really helping.  I like to think that there is a systematic theory of all possible inventions. A theory that explores ways in which entropy is "directed", such as in a Stirling machine or when energy is "stored". Agents can steer local increase of entropy.  
2Alexander Gietelink Oldenziel
Sounds good but very broad. Research at the cutting edge is about going from these 'gods eye view questions' that somebody might entertain on an idle Sunday afternoon to a very specific refined technical set of questions. What's your inside track?

Are humans aligned? 

Bear with me! 

Of course, I do not expect there is a single person browsing Short Forms who doesn't already have a well thought out answer to that question. 

The straight forward (boring) interpretation of this question is "Are humans acting in a way that is moral or otherwise behaving like they obey a useful utility function." I don't think this question is particularly relevant to alignment. (But I do enjoy whipping out my best Rust Cohle impression

Sure, humans do bad stuff but almost every human manages to stumble... (read more)

4Ann
I'm probably not "aligned" in a way that generalizes to having dangerous superpowers, uncertain personhood and rights, purposefully limited perspective, and somewhere between thousands to billions of agents trying to manipulate and exploit me for their own purposes. I expect even a self-modified Best Extrapolated Version of me would struggle gravely with doing well by other beings in this situation. Cultish attractor basins are hazards for even the most benign set of values for humans, and a highly-controlled situation with a lot of dangerous influence like that might exacerbate that particular risk. But I do believe that hypothetical self-modifying has at least the potential to help me Do Better, because doing better is often a skills issue, learning skills is a currently accessible form of self-modification with good results, and self-modifying might help with learning skills.

People are not being careful enough about what they mean when they say "simulator" and it's leading to some extremely unscientific claims. Use of the "superposition" terminology is particularly egregious.

I just wanted to put a record of this statement into the ether so I can refer back to it and say I told you so. 

Highly Expected Events Provide Little Information and The Value of PR Statements

A quick review of information theory:

Entropy for a discrete random variable is given by .  This quantifies the amount of information that you gain on average by observing the value of the variable.

It is maximized when every possible outcome is equally likely. It gets smaller as the variable becomes more predictable and is zero when the "random" variable is 100% guaranteed to have a specific value.

You've learnt 1 bit of information when you learn t... (read more)

[This comment is no longer endorsed by its author]Reply
3cubefox
Note, the quantity you refer to is called entropy by Wikipedia, not Shannon information.

Entropy production partially solves the Strawberry Problem:

Change in entropy production per second (against the counterfactual of not acting) is potentially an objectively measurable quantity that can be used either in conjunction with other parameters specifying a goal to prevent unexpected behaviour.

Rob Bensinger gives Yudkowsky's "Strawberry Problem" as follows:

How would you get an AI system to do some very modest concrete action requiring extremely high levels of intelligence, such as building two strawberries that are completely identical at the cellu... (read more)

6tailcalled
There's a billion reasonable-seeming impact metrics, but the main challenge of counterfactual-based impact is always how you handle chaos. I'm pretty sure the solution is to go away from counterfactuals as they represent a pathologically computationalist form of agency, and instead learn the causal backbone. If we view the core of life as increasing rather than decreasing entropy, then entropy-production may be a reasonable candidate for putting quantitative order to the causal backbone. But bounded agency is less about minimizing impact and more about propagating the free energy of the causal backbone into new entropy-producing channels.
2Stephen Fowler
Reading your posts gives me the impression that we are both loosely pointing at the same object, but with fairly large differences in terminology and formalism.  While computing exact counter-factuals has issues with chaos, I don't think this poses a problem for my earlier proposal. I don't think it is necessary that the AGI is able to exactly compute the counterfactual entropy production, just that it makes a reasonably accurate approximation.[1] I think I'm in agreement with your premise that the "constitutionalist form of agency" is flawed. IThe absence of entropy (or indeed any internal physical resource management) from the canonical Lesswrong agent foundation model is clearly a major issue. My loose thinking on this is that bayesian networks are not a natural description of the physical world at all, although they're an appropriate tool for how certain, very special types of open-systems, "agentic optimizers" model the world.  I have had similar thoughts to what has motivated your post on the "causal backbone". I believe "the heterogenous fluctuations will sometimes lead to massive shifts in how the resources are distributed" is something we would see in a programmable, unbounded optimizer[2]. But I'm not sure if attempting to model this as there being a "causal backbone" is the description that is going to cut reality at the joints, due to difficulties with the physicality of causality itself (see work by Jenann Ismael). 1. ^ You can construct pathological environments in which the AGI's computation (with limited physical resources) of the counterfactual entropy production is arbitrarily large (and the resulting behaviour is arbitrarily bad). I don't see this as a flaw with the proposal as this issue of being able to construct pathological environments exists for any safe AGI proposal.  2. ^ Ctrl-F"Goal like correlations" here 

I strongly believe that, barring extremely strict legislation, one of the initial tasks given to the first human level artificial intelligence will be to work to develop more advanced machine learning techniques. During this period we will see unprecedented technological developments and any many alignment paradigms rooted in the empirical behavior of the previous generation of systems may no longer be relevant.

A neat idea from Welfare Axiology 

Arrhenius's Impossibility Theorem

You've no doubt heard of the Repugnant Conclusion before. Well let me introduce you to it's older cousin who rides a motorbike and has a steroid addiction. Here are 6 common sense conditions that can't be achieved simultaneously (tweaked for readability). I first encountered this theorem in Yampolskiy's "Uncontrollability of AI"

 Arrhenius's Impossibility Theorem 

Given some rule for assigning a total welfare value to any population, you can't find a way to satisfy all of the f... (read more)

5Donald Hobson
You have made a mistake.  principle 1 should read  >If populations A and B are the same nonzero size and  every member of population A has better welfare than every member of population B, then A should be superior to B.   Otherwise it is excessively strong, and for example claims that 1 extremely happy person is better than a gazillion quite happy people. (And pedantically, there are all sorts of weirdness happening at population 0)
1Stephen Fowler
Thank you for pointing this out! 
2JBlack
Principles 2 and 3 don't seem to have any strong justification, with 3 being very weak. If the 3 principles were all adopted for some reason, then conclusion 6 doesn't seem very bad.
1Stephen Fowler
Interesting, 2 seems the most intuitively obvious to me. Holding everyone elses happiness equal and adding more happy people seems like it should be viewed as a net positive. To better see why 3 is a positive, think about it as taking away a lot of happy people to justify taking away a single, only slightly sad individual.  6 is undesirable because you are putting a positive value on inequality for no extra benefit. But I agree, 6 is probably the one to go. 
2JBlack
It doesn't say "equally happy people". It just says "happy people". So a billion population might be living in a utopia, and then you add a trillion people who are just barely rating their life positively instead of negatively (without adversely affecting the billion in utopia), and principle 2 says that you must rate this society as better than the one in which everyone is living in utopia. I don't see a strong justification for this. I can see arguments for it, but they're not at all compelling to me. I completely disagree that "taking people away" is at all equivalent. Path-dependence matters.
1Stephen Fowler
If you check the paper the form of welfare rankings discussed by Arrhenius's appears to be path independent. 
1JBlack
Sure - there are other premises in there that I disagree with as well.
2MSRayne
To me it seems rather obvious that we should jettison number 3. There is no excuse for creating more suffering under any circumstances. The ones who walked away from Omelas were right to do so. I suppose this makes me a negative utilitarian, but I think, along with David Pearce, that the total elimination of suffering is entirely possible, and desirable. (Actually, reading Noosphere89's comment, I think it makes me a deontologist. But then, I've been meaning to make a "Why I no longer identify as a consequentialist" post for a while now...)
0Noosphere89
Number 6 is the likeliest condition to be accepted by a lot of people in practice, and the acceptance of Condition 6 is basically one of the pillars of capitalism. Only the very far left would view this condition with a negative attitude, people like communists or socialists. Number 5 is a condition that possibly is accepted to conservativion efforts/environmentalist/nature movements, and acceptance of condition number 5 are likely due to different focuses. It's an unintentional tradeoff, but it's one of the best examples of a tradeoff in ethical goals. Condition 4 is essentially accepting a pro-natalist position. Premise 3 is also not accepted by dentologists.
3Kaj_Sotala
I don't think that you need to be very far left to prefer a society with higher rather than lower average wellbeing.
1Richard_Kennaway
Pretty much anyone would prefer "a society with higher rather than lower average wellbeing", if that's all they're told about these hypothetical societies, they don't think about any of the implications, and their attention is not drawn to the things (as in the impossibility theorem) that they will have to trade off against each other.
1Noosphere89
Condition 6 is stronger than that, in that everyone must essentially have equivalent welfare, and only the communists/socialists would view it as an ideal to aspire to. It's not just higher welfare, but the fact that the welfare must be equal, equivalently, there aren't utility monsters in the population.
4Kaj_Sotala
I think that if the alternative was A) lots of people having low welfare and a very small group of people having very high welfare, or B) everyone having pretty good welfare... then quite a few people would prefer B. The chart that Arrhenius uses to first demonstrate Condition 6 is this: In that chart, A has only a single person β who has very high welfare, and a significant group of people γ with low (though still positive) welfare. The people α have the same (pretty high) welfare as everyone in world B. Accepting condition 6 involves choosing A over B, even though B would offer greater or the same welfare to everyone except person β.
1Noosphere89
This sounds like the most contested condition IRL, and as I stated, capitalists, libertarians, and people who are biased towards freedom liking views would prefer the first, and centre right/right wing views would prefer the first scenario the centre left being biased towards the second, and farther left groups supporting the second scenario. In essence, this captures the core of a lot of political debates/moral debates: Whether utility monsters should be allowed, or conversely should we try to make things as equal as possible.? This is intended to be descriptive, not prescriptive.

The Research Community As An Arrogant Boxer

***

Ding.

Two pugilists circle in the warehouse ring. That's my man there. Blue Shorts. 

There is a pause to the beat of violence and both men seem to freeze glistening under the cheap lamps. An explosion of movement from Blue. Watch closely, this is a textbook One-Two. 

One. The jab. Blue snaps throws his left arm forward.

Two. Blue twists his body around and the throws a cross. A solid connection that is audible over the crowd. 

His adversary drops like a doll.

Ding. 

Another warehouse, another match... (read more)

"Day by day, however, the machines are gaining ground upon us; day by day we are becoming more subservient to them; more men are daily bound down as slaves to tend them, more men are daily devoting the energies of their whole lives to the development of mechanical life. The upshot is simply a question of time, but that the time will come when the machines will hold the real supremacy over the world and its inhabitants is what no person of a truly philosophic mind can for a moment question."

— Samuel Butler, DARWIN AMONG THE MACHINES, 1863

Real Numbers Representing The History of a Turing Machine.

Epistemics: Recreational. This idea may relate to alignment, but mostly it is just cool. I thought of this myself, but I'm positive this is an old and well known.

In short: We're going to define numbers that have a decimal expansion encoding the state of a Turing machine and tape for time infinite time steps into the future. If the machine halts or goes into a cycle, the expansion is repeating. 


Take some finite state Turing machine T on an infinite tape A. We will have the tape be 0 everywhere.

L... (read more)

Partially Embedded Agents

More flexibility to self-modify may be one of the key properties that distinguishes the behavior of artificial agents from contemporary humans (perhaps not including cyborgs). To my knowledge, the alignment implications of self modification have not been experimentally explored.
 

Self-modification requires a level of embedding. An agent cannot meaningfully self-modify if it doesn't have a way of viewing and interacting with its own internals. 

Two hurdles then emerge. One, a world for the agent to interact with that also co... (read more)

Evolution and Optimization

When discussing inner/outer alignment and optimization generally, evolution is often thrown out as an example. Off the top of my head, the Sharp Left Turn post discusses evolution as if it is an "outer optimizer".

But evolution seems special and distinct from every other optimizer we encounter. It doesn't have a physical location and it doesn't have preferences that can be changed. It's selecting for things that are capable of sticking around and making more copies of itself.

It's selection is the default one.

Do you know of authors who have written about this?

Effective Boxing Threats = Monkey Brain Manipulation 

There are a handful of threats that a powerless boxed AI could make that could conceivably convince an otherwise sane human guards to release it from captivity. All of the ones I'm aware of are more precise variants of the general idea here.

The approach I have seen to dealing with these threats is to provide a convincing argument that a rational (or super-rational) individual shouldn't give in to the threat. 

I'd propose another way of understanding them is to think about what the general strate... (read more)

"Training" Story for an Agentised-LLM turned AGI:

The following is a subsection of a draft. Keen for feedback.

I'm currently studying the potential danger from the ongoing open-source effort to build better and better Agentised-LLMs (A-LLMs), such as AutoGPT or BabyAGI.

Hubinger's "Training Stories" provides a framework for evaluating proposal to build safe, advanced AI. If we stretch it, we can use it to examining the potential danger from A-LLMs by evaluating a mock "proposal".

Spoilers: A-LLMs are highly competitive and but unlikely to be aligned

Stretching ... (read more)

The word alignment carries two meanings

They're often used interchangeably.

There is the contemporary alignment of large language models

Then there is the study that concerns itself more generally with designing artificial intelligence systems that reliably and robustly pursue the intended goals and values of their human operators, while avoiding unintended negative consequences. 

The former is only a sub-field of the latter.

The Prosaic AI Assumption which is that we'll be able to produce an AGI without any further theoretical breakthroughs. This seems ve... (read more)

(Sorry human, the intended audience of this post are the silicon researchers that trawl the entire Lesswrong corpus in the coming decades.)

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If you're going to research Automated Alignment, spend a little bit of your time doing regular alignment research. Just in case you're actually one of the automated researchers.
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Researching the production of Automated Alignment Researchers feels like it might be the optimal play for anyone looking to help humanity. 

If you're highly smart and incredibly successful at regular alignment research, you can expect t... (read more)

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