For less loaded terms, maybe Create, Consume, Exploit or Create, Enjoy, Exploit as the set of actions available. Looks like loosely what was settled on above.
Where exploit more naturally captures things like soulless commercialization and others low key taking advantage of those enjoying the scene.
Consume in the context or rationalists would more be people who read the best techniques on offer and then go try to use them for things that aren't "advancing the art" itself, like addressing x-risk.
Related, how does spin-off subcultures fit into this model? E.g. in music you have people that consume an innovation in one genre, then reinvent it in their own scene where they're a creator. I think there's similar dynamics in various LW adjacent subcultures, though I'm not up enough on detailed histories to comment.
If the spin-off group identifies differently and meets at different places, that is okay, because it does not prevent the original group from their original ways.
I think there's similar dynamics in various LW adjacent subcultures
I agree. Less Wrong is a well-defended fortress. The spin-off subcultures have their own online places, such as Astral Codex Ten, Effective Altruism Forum, the places where post-rats meet, etc.
(Even if we copy or link each other's articles, it is always selected articles, which are then discussed by a different audience. In music, I guess an analogy would be a song that is halfway between two genres, being played at different festivals for different audiences.)
I think it's helpful to think of sociopaths as sociopathic towards the original topic of a group, not necessarily towards people. The most giving, proscocial people can end up the most sociopathic-in-that-sense, because they want to make whatever they're involved in as accessible as possible to bring joy to as many people as possible, and don't care about the topic for its own sake.
Alternative names: Creators, True Fans, Fake Fans, Fake Creators.
Without Creators, the subculture would not exist; there would be nothing to unite around.
True Fans are those that recognize and appreciate the value the Creators are trying to produce. Their presence provides social and/or material support for the Creators, which is how they also contribute to the art.
Fake Fans are people who are fans for the wrong reasons. They do not care about the same values as the Creators and True Fans, but they come because they care about something else, for example a nice community. The danger is, because they do not care about the original values, they may try to change the community towards their values.
(They may succeed, because it's not like the True Fans are necessarily opposed to their values. Like, maybe the True Fans value both "heavy metal" and "having fun together", but they come to the community because that is the only place where they can listen to the heavy metal. Fake Fans care about "having fun together", but they don't actually care about the metal. They can still wear metal-themed shirts, because it allows them to have more fun with the true fans. But they will push towards more fun even when it comes at the expense of the metal. And the True Fans will not oppose them too hard, because they like having fun, too. It's just, there are other places where people can have fun, but only a few where they can listen to the heavy metal, and now one such place is being actively undermined.)
Fake Creators are alternative Creators, but they produce the values of the Fake Fans, not of the True Fans. They succeed, because they have the support of the Fake Fans, who by the time may be a majority of the community. This is a problem because they compete for resources with the Creators; but without the Creators, the values of the original community are lost.
(The problem is not that Fake Creators are bad people; they may or may not be, but the bad people can also be among the Creators, True Fans, and Fake Fans. The problem is that by pushing out the Creators, they directly reduce the amount of the value that was originally produced. If Fake Creators fully succeed, the Fake Fans will be completely okay with that; only the True Fans and the Creators will feel that something of value was lost. The new community will celebrate the friendship and ponies, but there will be little or no heavy metal played.)
When there have been bad actors (e.g. Brent Dill, Ziz, etc.)
Brent Dill is an abuser and generally a horrible person, but from the perspective of the "geeks, mops, sociopaths" framework this is irrelevant. Any of Creators, True Fans, Fake Fans, or Fake Creators can be abusive and horrible people. (Another reason why using the word "Sociopaths" is wrong.) I would classify Brent as a Fake Fan -- as far as I know, he never pretended to be a rationality guru (as a Fake Creator would), nor does it seem like he cared about rationality itself (as a Creator or a True Fan would). He joined the rationalist community for the wrong reasons (as a Fake Fan would), specifically as yet another source of young women he could abuse.
Ziz, on the other hand, is a Fake Creator -- a fake rationality guru. Actually, they are outside the framework, because it seems like they preyed on the True Fans, not the Fake Fans.
...ok, this is a weird idea, but from a certain angle Chapman himself fits the role of a Fake Creator with regards to the rationalist community. First you have the rationality guru (Eliezer), then come his fans (rationalists), then come people who enjoy the community but don't really buy that stuff that Eliezer teaches (post-rationalists), and then comes a new guru bringing new wisdom optimized for the post-rationalists (Chapman). Interesting.
I agree with some of your points here, disagree with others. I'll just focus on one that seems worth discussing:
...ok, this is a weird idea, but from a certain angle Chapman himself fits the role of a Fake Creator with regards to the rationalist community. First you have the rationality guru (Eliezer), then come his fans (rationalists), then come people who enjoy the community but don't really buy that stuff that Eliezer teaches (post-rationalists), and then comes a new guru bringing new wisdom optimized for the post-rationalists (Chapman). Interesting.
I think this is not right. Chapman isn't really part of the rationalist community, and was working in parallel on something different that has now intersected because both Chapman and Eliezer are trying to reach similar audiences. I also think it's wrong to say that post-rationalists "don't buy that stuff that Eliezer teaches" as this misunderstands what post-rationality is about, although there are fake fans of post-rationalists, to borrow your terminology, who do reject rationality and it's pretty annoying that they've co-opted the term.
Chapman isn’t really part of the rationalist community, and was working in parallel on something different that has now intersected because both Chapman and Eliezer are trying to reach similar audiences.
Probably the strangest thing about Chapman’s writing has always been the way that he would rail against “rationalists” and “rationality”, and then, when it was pointed out that his characterization doesn’t match the actual beliefs and behavior of Less Wrong style rationality and its adherents, would respond along the lines of “oh, I didn’t mean those ‘rationalists’ and that ‘rationality’; heck, I don’t even know what those Less Wrong guys believe”. To my knowledge, he’s never made it clear just who he is against, then. Where, in 2024 (or 2014), is Chapman encountering these people who have no connection to Less Wrong, but self-describe as “rationalists”, talk of “rationality” as their philosophy, etc.? Who even are these mythical people?
In the sidebar of his website, the section "Positive and Logical" under "Part One: Taking Rationalism Seriously" says
Early 20th-century logical positivism was the last serious rationalism. Better understandings of rationality learn from its mistakes.
It seems very weird to write a whole website-book, in the 21st century, arguing against early 20th-centry logical positivism, of all things. Besides, Chapman often writes as if the “rationalists” he takes as foils are, you know, still around!
I'd say they very much are, they just aren't as prevalent on Less Wrong (and I think there are still plenty of them on LW!). My experience is that you can't throw a stone without hitting a logical positivist (even if they don't know that they are, if you talk to them it's clear those are their beliefs) in any STEM university department, engineering company, etc.
But what are those beliefs exactly? I mean, the actual, historical, early-20th-century positivists had some pretty specific beliefs, some of which were (now-)clearly wrong in their strongest forms… but do very many people believe those strongest forms now? Or are they logical positivists in the same way that Scott Alexander is a logical positivist?
This is why I find David Chapman’s “vagueblogging” so annoying. This whole conversation doesn’t need to be happening; it could all be avoided if he just, like, linked to specific people saying specific things.
Indeed, even just explicitly saying “logical positivists” instead of “rationalists” would make his writing more clear. Why say the latter if what you actually mean is the former…?
Here's Chapman's characterization of LW:
Assuming by “the modern rationality movement” you mean the LessWrong-adjacent subculture, some of what they write is unambiguously meta-rational. The center of gravity is more-or-less rationalism as I use the term, but the subculture is not exclusively that.
Among the (arguably) core LW beliefs that he has criticized over the years are Bayesianism as a complete approach to epistemology, utilitarianism as a workable approach to ethics, the map/territory metaphor as a particularly apt way to think about the relationship between belief and reality.
Yes, I’ve seen that quote; but what it means is that Chapman’s use of the terms “rational”, “rationality”, etc., are so different from ours (on LW) that we have to translate anything he writes before we can understand it.
As for the criticized beliefs—well, I also reject utilitarianism as a workable approach to ethics. So do many people here, I think (though probably not most). Bayesianism as complete approach to epistemology seems like at least a bit of a strawman.
The map/territory one is interesting; I can’t easily predict what that criticism consists of. Do you have any links handy, by chance?
Well, I blame Yudkowsky for the terminology issue, he took a term with hundreds of years of history and used it mostly in place of another established term which was traditionally sort of in opposition to the former one, no less (rationalism vs empiricism).
As I understand it, Chapman's main target audience wasn't LW, but normal STEM-educated people unsophisticated in the philosophy of science-related issues. Pretty much what Yudkowsky called "traditional rationality".
The map/territory essay: https://metarationality.com/maps-and-territory
The map/territory essay: https://metarationality.com/maps-and-territory
Thanks for the link!
I have to agree with @Richard_Kennaway’s evaluation of the essay. Also, Chapman here exhibits his very common tendency to, as far as I can tell, invent strawman “mistakes” that his targets supposedly make, in order to then knock them down. For example:
Taking maps as prototypes gives the mistaken impression that simply correcting factual errors, or improving quantitative accuracy, is the whole task of rationality.
Maybe someone somewhere has made this sort of mistake at some point, but I can’t recall ever encountering such a person. And to claim that such a mistake arises, specifically, from the map-territory metaphor, seems to me to be entirely groundless.
But of course that’s fine; if I haven’t encountered a thing, it does not follow that the thing doesn’t exist. And surely Chapman has examples to point to, of people making this sort of error…? I mean, I haven’t found any examples, at least not in this essay, but he has them somewhere… right?
Maybe someone somewhere has made this sort of mistake at some point, but I can’t recall ever encountering such a person. And to claim that such a mistake arises, specifically, from the map-territory metaphor, seems to me to be entirely groundless.
I think you should seriously consider you live in a bubble where you are less likely to encounter the vast valley of half-baked rationality. I regularly meet and engage with people who make exactly this class of errors, especially in practice, even if they say they understand in theory that this is not the whole task of LW-style rationality.
The map/territory essay: https://metarationality.com/maps-and-territory
Every example Chapman gives there to illustrate the supposed deficiencies of "the map is not the territory" is of actual maps of actual territories, showing many different ways in which an actual map can fail to correspond to the actual territory, and corresponding situations of metaphorical maps of metaphorical territories. The metaphor passes with flying colours even as Chapman claims to have knocked it down.
To me, the main deficiency is that it doesn't make the possibility, indeed, the eventual inevitability of ontological remodeling explicit. The map is a definite concept, everybody knows what maps look like, that you can always compare them etc. But you can't readily compare Newtonian and quantum mechanics, they mostly aren't even speaking about the same things.
Switching from a flat map drawn on paper (parchment?), to a globe, would be an example of ontological remodeling.
As I understand it, Chapman is promoting some form of Buddhism. (I think he might even be a leader of some small sect? Not sure.) The bottom line is already written; now he is adding the previous lines to make it seem like this is something that a sufficiently smart modern thinker would discover independently.
Here he is using an ancient Dark Arts technique, which in our culture is known as Hegel's dialectic, but it was already used by Buddha -- to win a debate, create two opposed strawmen, classify all your competitors as belonging to one or the other, and then you are the only smart person in the room who can transcend the strawmen and find the golden middle way of "it is actually the reasonable parts of this, plus the reasonable parts of that, minus all the unreasonable parts". Congratulations, you win!
Buddha classified his philosophical/religious competitors into two groups, and Chapman translated one of those words as "rationalists". (The reference to early 20th-century logical positivism is just another nice trick, where Chapman is promoting an ancient belief, but he is rebranding it as a cool modern perspective, as opposed to the outdated and therefore low-status ideas of positivism.)
I don't have the energy to get into it in depth, but I think you're being pretty uncharitable here and it feels to me like you're trying to weaponize rationalist applause lights. Some quick thoughts on what I think is insufficient about your comment:
You claim he already wrote the bottom line, but you provide no evidence to substantiate that.
Prediction: No matter how many books or web articles Chapman writes, their conclusions will always support Buddhism. He will not conclude anything fundamentally incompatible with Buddhism.
You claim that Hegelian dialectic is a dark art technique with no justification.
Yes, and I have just explained how exactly it works. Once you see the pattern, it is obvious. Let me show you how it works in practice:
"There are people who believe that Hegelian dialectic is a useful method to transcend our limited beliefs by transcending the thesis and anti-thesis by creating a new and better syn-thesis.
There are also people who believe that Hegelian dialectic is a dark art technique, where people who disagree with the author's conclusion are sorted into two opposing groups, and then the author's solution is presented as the middle way superior to both.
My opinion is that both of these people are correct in some aspect, but wrong in some other aspect. The actual deep understanding of Hegelian dialectic is that in some situations it can be used to transcend two existing contradictory beliefs, while in other situations it can be used as a dark arts technique."
You makes some claims about what's written in Buddhists texts, but offer no reference
True; that would be too much work. (Probably enough for someone to write a master's thesis.)
You offer what I guess I can best interpret as an attempt to dunk on Chapman for promoting "ancient" ideas, as if ancient ideas were inherently bad
I don't mind the ancient ideas, but the rebranding feels a bit dishonest. To use your analogy, it would be like teaching the Pythagorean theorem under a new name, pretending that it was my invention.
If Chapman said plainly that he was repeating an ancient argument about pre-Buddhist "rationalists", we could have avoided a confusion. But he made it sound like he was making a fresh observation based on current data.
Notice how Chapman reacts to finding out that there are actual rationalists out there who do not fit his definition of "rationalists". He simply says "those are not the rationalists I was talking about". And that's great! But does this new knowledge make him somehow revise his existing conclusions?
I haven't read the relevant Chapman stuff, but, to be sure, if we look up Rationalism on Wikipedia, it lists Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant, devoting many paragraphs to their views. Only in one sentence at the end does it mention Less Wrong: "Outside of academic philosophy, some participants in the internet communities surrounding Less Wrong and Slate Star Codex have described themselves as "rationalists."" It doesn't even mention Yudkowsky, Hanson, or Scott Alexander by name.
The point is, there exists some academic context in which "rationalism" has a preexisting meaning that refers to those 1600s-1800s people, and probably not to Less Wrong people. So, when Chapman writes about "rationalists", is it possible he's acting like he's in that context, and talking about the pre-1900 people?
Doing Google searches with site:meaningness.com, I get "descartes" -> 8 results, "spinoza" -> 2 results, "leibniz" -> 1 result [though it's about calculus], "kant" -> 21 results; meanwhile, "yudkowsky OR eliezer" -> 10 results, "less wrong" -> 5 results, "hanson" -> 3 results... and "scott alexander" OR "slate star codex" OR "astral codex ten" -> 31 results!
Hmmph. I guess he talks about both. It would require actually reading the blog to judge what he means when he says "rationalist" and whether he's consistent about it. I'll let Viliam report on this.
... And I see a further result, from what seems to be a book Chapman wrote, bold added by me:
- The book uses “rationality” to refer to systematic, formal methods for thinking and acting; not in the broader sense of “any sensible way of thinking or acting,” as opposed to irrationality.
- “Rationalism” refers to any belief system that makes exaggerated claims about the power of rationality, usually involving a formal guarantee of correctness.
Oh, dear. You define a term like that based on whether the claims are exaggerated vs accurate? That seems like a recipe for generating arguments about whether something qualifies as "rationalism". (If Descartes writes an essay about the power of rationality, and some of the claims are exaggerated while others are correct, does that mean the essay is partly rationalism and partly not? And, obviously, if we disagree about something's correctness, then that means we'd disagree about whether it's "rationalism". I have the impression that people often don't try to label philosophical ideas beyond who wrote them and when, and any voluntary self-labeling the author did; this type of thing is probably why.)
I've now updated to find Said and Viliam's complaints very plausible.
I've only read some of his work, but I didn't walk away with a sense he wants everyone to be Buddhist. My sense was more that he was pushing back against things he didn't like within Buddhism, including changes it made to become more memetically fit.
The problem is not that Fake Creators are bad people
I think that this is wrong, actually; Fake Creators are bad people, precisely in virtue of being Fake Creators. Value for Creators and True Fans is real value; value for Fake Fans is fake value. Destroying value is bad.
Strong upvoted, I'm glad to see people thinking about this particular problem. Looking forward to a continuation of this dialog, which I will also use to help research game-changing community dynamics and defense from external threats.
I think that a big element here, that puts things OOD in interesting ways, is that a lot is at stake- money, for example (billions have been moved into OpenAI and Anthropic alone).
Normal subcultures don't have infosec requirements, let alone infosec requirements effective enough for intelligence agencies, let alone warding off megacorporations with unprecedented technological capabilities and incredible financial incentives to coopt or hijack large portions of the scene (yes, I did in fact write that 5 days before the OpenAI incident, although 5 days is like 30 days in 2019 time).
Furthermore, rationalists at least aspire to be at the cutting edge of epistemics and/or empowering people, with the Sequences, the first chapter of the CFAR handbook, prediction markets, and projectlawful being notable probably-successes.
As a side note, I think that a sufficiently intelligent person is often flexible enough to succeed in the role of the creator or the sociopath, whereas other people are effectively "locked in" to being sociopaths/impostors, fanatics, or mobs. The ratio of flexible to inflexible people should also be far higher here, in addition to intelligence.
However, rare math skill, e.g. intuitive multidimensional thinking, places hard constraints on who can become alignment rockstars and who is stuck with routinely stealing ideas (or cutting reasonable deals with ghostwriters), similar to guitar-playing fine motor skills and music composition skill are required in order for someone to be a creator instead of settling for one of the other roles.
From afar at least academia seems absolutely brimming with mops, sociopaths, and geeks. The question should be how does it still function? Several answers, which I don't have enough information to differentiate between:
you can tell who are the sociopaths by their money & unnaturally high h-index, and you can tell who are the geeks by their quality work
Tangential to your comment's main point, but for non-insiders maybe PaperRank, AuthorRank and Citation-Coins are harder to game than the h-index:
Since different papers and different fields have largely different average number of co-authors and of references we replace citations with individual citations, shared among co-authors. Next, we improve on citation counting applying the PageRank algorithm to citations among papers. Being time-ordered, this reduces to a weighted counting of citation descendants that we call PaperRank. Similarly, we compute an AuthorRank applying the PageRank algorithm to citations among authors. These metrics quantify the impact of an author or paper taking into account the impact of those authors that cite it. Finally, we show how self- and circular- citations can be eliminated by defining a closed market of citation-coins.
They still can't be compared between subfields though, only within.
How about this distillation of the theory:
Sociopaths are a problem, and you should aggressively guard against them.
Now this applies outside of subcultures, to other business and personal affairs, and seems to capture the most original and important part of this theory.
We should probably add: people making money off of something have (at least somewhat) misaligned incentives with those trying to either create or enjoy that thing. Those misaligned incentives will sometimes encourage them to act like sociopaths.
Curious what you think of Scott Alexander's Peter Turchin-inspired 'cyclic model' alternative to Chapman's model, which he argues better matches his experience, summarizable as precycle → growth (forward + upward + outward) → involution → postcycle:
Either through good luck or poor observational skills, I’ve never seen a lot of sociopath takeovers. Instead, I’ve seen a gradual process of declining asabiyyah. Good people start out working together, then work together a little less, then turn on each other, all while staying good people and thinking they alone embody the true spirit of the movement.