I originally asked this on math.stackexchange; after reading Diffractor's Unifying Bargaining sequence (Part 1 here) I'm wondering if there are more insights floating about, so I'm repeating it here.
Shapley values seem to be the standard answer to "how should a coalition split the rewards of their cooperation", but I'm curious about alternatives.
The standard characterization of Shapley values says that Shapley values are the unique coalition payments which satisfy a bunch of properties. Three of them (efficiency, symmetry, and null player) seem pretty necessary for any "reasonable" or "practical" coalition payment rule, but the last one (linearity) does not.
If I didn't care for linearity (or its close synonyms, additivity and aggregation):
- What sorts of payment rules become available?
- What other properties of Shapley values are maintained?
- What other properties would produce a uniquely characterized payment rule?
Alternatively, are any of the other properties also reasonable to drop (for instance, symmetry)? What do you end up with?
Here's a very late follow-up: the rationale behind linearity for Shapley values seems closely related to the rationale behind the independence axiom of VNM rationality, and under some decision theories we apparently can dispense with the latter.
This gives me the vocabulary for expressing why I find linearity constraining: if I'm about to play game A or game B with probabilities p and 1−p respectively, and my payout of A is lower, maybe I would prefer to get a lower payout in B in exchange for a higher payout in A. I'm not sure how much of that is just downstream from "what if my utility isn't linear in the payout" or something like that, though.