Kudos on taking the time to tighten and restate your argument! I'd like to encourage more of this from alignment researchers, it seems likely to save lots of time taking past each other and getting mired on disagreements over non-cruxy points.
Isn't going from an average human to Einstein a huge increase in science-productivity, without any flop increase? Then why can't there be software-driven foom, by going farther in whatever direction Einstein's brain is from the average human?
In your view, who would contribute more to science -- 1000 Einsteins, or 10,000 average scientists?[1]
"IQ variation is due to continuous introduction of bad mutations" is an interesting hypothesis, and definitely helps save your theory. But there are many other candidates, like "slow fixation of positive mutations" and "fitness tradeoffs[2]".
Do you have specific evidence for either:
Or do you believe these things just because they are consistent with your learning efficiency model and are otherwise plausible?[4]
Maybe you have a very different view of leading scientists than most people I've read here? My picture here is not based on any high-quality epistemics (e.g. it includes "second-hand vibes"), but I'll make up some claims anyway, for you to agree or disagree with:
In your view, who would contribute more to science -- 1000 Einsteins, or 10,000 average scientists?
I vaguely agree with your 90%/60% split for physics vs chemistry. In my field of programming we have the 10x myth/meme, which I think is reasonably correct but it really depends on the task.
For the 10x programmers it's some combination of greater IQ/etc but also starting programming earlier with more focused attention for longer periods of time, which eventually compounds into the 10x difference.
But it really depends on the task distribution - there are some easy tasks where the limit is more typing speed and compilation, and at the extreme there are more theoretical tasks that require some specific combination of talent, knowledge, extended grind focus for great lengths of time, and luck.
Across all fields combined there seem to be perhaps 1000 to 10000 top contributors? But it seems to plateau in the sense that I do not agree that John Von Neumman (or whoever your 100x candidate is) was 10x einstein or even Terrence Tao or Kasparov (or that either would be 10x carmack in programming, if that was their field), and given that there have been 100 billion humans who have ever lived...
I am usually thinking of foom mostly based on software efficiency, and I am usually thinking of the following rather standard scenario. I think this is not much of an infohazard as many people thought and wrote about this.
OpenAI or DeepMind create an artificial AI researcher with software engineering and AI research capabilities on par with software engineering and AI research capabilities of human members of their technical staff (that's the only human equivalence that truly matters). And copies of this artificial AI researcher can be created with enough variation to cover the diversity of their whole teams.
This is, obviously, very lucrative (increases their velocity a lot), so there is tremendous pressure to go ahead and do it, if it is at all possible. (It's even more lucrative for smaller teams dreaming of competing with the leaders.)
And, moreover, as a good part of the subsequent efforts of such combined human-AI teams will be directed to making next generations of better artificial AI researchers, and as current human-level is unlikely to be the hard ceiling in this sense, this will accelerate rapidly. Better, more competent software engineering, better AutoML in all its aspe...
The first 4 paragraphs sound almost like something I would write and I agree up to:
Large training runs will be infrequent; mostly it will be a combination of fine-tuning and composing from components with subsequent fine-tuning of the combined system, so a typical turn-around will be rapid.
We currently have large training runs for a few reasons, but the most important is that GPT training is very easy to parallelize on GPUs, but GPT inference is not. This is a major limitation because it means GPUs can only accelerate GPT training on (mostly human) past knowledge, but aren't nearly as efficient at accelerating the rate at which GPT models accumulate experience or self-knowledge.
So if that paradigm continues, large training runs continue to be very important as that is the only way these models can learn new long term knowledge and expand their crystallized intelligence (which at this point is their main impressive capability).
The brain is considered to use more continual learning - but really it just has faster cycles and shorter mini-training runs (via hippocampal replay during sleep). If we move to that kind of paradigm then the training is still very important, but is now just more continuous.
"Work on the safety of an ecosystem made up of a large number of in-some-ways-superhuman-and-in-other-ways-not AIs" seems like a very different problem than "ensure that when you build a single coherent, effectively-omniscient agent, you give it a goal that does not ruin everything when it optimizes really hard for that goal".
There are definitely parallels between the two scenarios, but I'm not sure a solution for the second scenario would even work to prevent an organization of AIs with cognitive blind spots from going off the rails.
My model of jacob_cannell's model is that the medium-term future looks something like "ad-hoc organizations of mostly-cooperating organizations of powerful-but-not-that-powerful agents, with the first organization to reach a given level of capability being the one that focused its resources on finding and using better coordination mechanisms between larger numbers of individual processes rather than the one that focused on raw predictive power", and that his model of Eliezer goes "no, actually focusing on raw predictive power is the way to go".
And I think the two different scenarios do in fact suggest different strategies.
Yes, [Mishka's description of relatively-slow-foom] matches my point of view as well. When I say that I believe recursive self-improvement can and probably will happen in the next few years, this is what I'm pointing at. I expect the first few generations to each take a few months and be a product of humans and AI systems working together, and that the generational improvements will be less than 2x improvements. I expect that there is perhaps 1 - 3 OOMs of improvement in software alone before getting blocked by needing slow expensive hardware changes. So, the scenario I'm concerned about looks more like a 2 OOM (+/- 1) improvement over 6 -12 months. This is a very different scenario than the 4+ OOM improvement in the first few days of the process beginning which is described in some foom-doom stories.
I feel like the post proves too much: it gives arguments for why foom is unlikely, but I don't see arguments which break the symmetry between "humans cannot foom relative to other animals" and "AI cannot foom relative to humans".* For example, the statements
brains are already reasonably pareto-efficient
and
Intelligence requires/consumes compute in predictable ways, and progress is largely smooth.
seem irrelevant or false in light of the human-chimp example. (Are animal brains pareto-efficient? If not, I'm interested in what breaks the symmetry between humans and other animals. If yes, pareto-efficiency doesn't seem that useful for making predictions on capabilities/foom.)
*One way to resolve the situation is by denying that humans foomed (in a sense relevant for AI), but this is not the route taken in the post.
Separately, I disagree with many claims and the overall thrust in the discussion of AlphaZero.
Go is extremely simple [...] This means that the Go predictive capability of a NN model as a function of NN size completely flatlines at an extremely small size.
This seems unlikely to me, depending on what "completely flatlines" and "extremely small size" mean.
...Games like Go or che
This post seems about 90% correct, and written better than your previous posts.
I expect nanotech will be more important, someday, than you admit. But I agree that it's unlikely to be relevant to foom. GPUs are close enough to nanotech that speeding up GPU production is likely more practical than switching to nanotech.
I suspect Eliezer believes AI could speed up GPU production dramatically without nanotech. Can someone who believes that explain why they think recent GPU progress has been far from optimal?
Just preceding the 6 OOM claim, EY provides a different naive technical argument as to why he is confident that it is possible to create a mind more powerful than the human brain using much less compute:
I don't see anything naive about the argument that you quoted here (which doesn't say how much less compute). Long, fast chains of serial computation enable some algorithms that are hard to implement on brains. So it seems obvious that such systems will have some better-than-human abilities.
Eliezer doesn't seem naive there until he jumps to implying a 6 OOM advantage on tasks that matter. He would be correct here if there are serial algorithms that improve a lot on the algorithms...
I think you are missing obvious things in this analysis that you have literally told me about. you know of at least one source of a foom like jump that you haven't mentioned for intellectual property reasons. I'd appreciate you keeping it that way. i do think that you're right about a specific narrow limitation of software foom because you've thought about how it can and can't happen, but I also don't think you're considering a wide enough space of possibility. why do you think reversible computers are more than a decade out? surely the first agentic ASIs finish the job rather quickly.
I do think this means that specific dangerous architectures are much more the threat than one might expect because eg mishka's comment about hinton-level ais, and so we should be very scared of archs that produce highly competent hyper-desperate adversarial-example-wanters, because it is the combination of competence and desperation that is likely to disobey its friends and parents. even very strong predictive models do not generate hyperdesperate sociopaths, and in fact hyperdesperate beings would destroy language models the same as they'd destroy humans. strategic skill and desperation are what kill...
The key thing I disagree with is:
In some sense the Foom already occurred - it was us. But it wasn't the result of any new feature in the brain - our brains are just standard primate brains, scaled up a bit[14] and trained for longer. Human intelligence is the result of a complex one time meta-systems transition: brains networking together and organizing into families, tribes, nations, and civilizations through language. ... That transition only happens once - there are not ever more and more levels of universality or linguistic programmability. AGI does not FOOM again in the same way.
Although I think agree the 'meta-systems transition' is a super important shift, which can lead us to overestimate the level of difference between us and previous apes, it also doesn't seem like it was just a one time shift. We had fire, stone tools and probably language for literally millions of years before the Neolithic revolution. For the industrial revolution it seems that a few bits of cognitive technology (not even genes, just memes!) in renaissance Europe sent the world suddenly off on a whole new exponential.
The lesson, for me, is that the capability level of the meta-system/technology fr...
That transition only happens once - there are not ever more and more levels of universality or linguistic programmability.
Why do you think this? (I'm unconvinced by "universal learning machine" type things that I've seen, not because I disagree, but because they don't seem to address transitions within the shape of what stuff is learned and how it interacts.)
There are NNs that train for a lifetime then die, and there are NNs that train for a lifetime but then network together to share all their knowledge before dying.
But crucially, humans do not share all their knowledge. Every time a great scientist or engineer or manager or artist dies, a ton of intuition and skills and illegible knowledge dies with them. What is passed on is only what can be easily compressed into the extremely lossy channels of language.
As the saying goes, "humans are as stupid as they can be while still undergoing intelligence-driven takeoff at all"; otherwise humans would have taken over the world sooner. That applies to knowledge sharing in particular - our language channels are just barely good enough to take off.
Even just the ability to copy a mind would push AIs far further along the same direction. Ability to merge minds would go far further still.
For the greatest cheap circuit density, energy efficiency, and speed you need to use analog synapses but in doing so you basically give up the ability to easily transfer the knowledge out of the system - it becomes more 'mortal' as hinton recently argues.
This seems like a small tradeoff, and this does not seem like a big enough deal to restore these to anything like human mortality, with all its enormous global effects. It may be much harder to copy weights off a idiosyncratic mess of analogue circuits modified in-place by their training to maximize energy efficiency than it is to run cp foo.pkl bar.pkl
, absolutely, but the increase in difficulty here seems more on par with 'a small sub-field with a few hundred grad students/engineers for a few years' than 'the creation of AGI', and so one can assume it'd be solved almost immediately should it ever actually become a problem.
For example, even if it's ultra-miniaturized, you can tap connections to optionally read off activations between many pairs of layers, which will affect only a small part of it and not eliminate the miniaturization or energy savings - and with the layer embeddings summarizing a group of layers, now you can do...
I think Jake is right that we shouldn't imagine an unlimited set of levels of learning. I however do think that there are one or two more levels beyond self learning, and cultural transmission. The next level ( which could maybe be described as two levels) is not something that evolution has managed in any mammalian species:
(Copied from another comment) Nathan points out increasing size; and large scale / connective plasticity. Another one would be full reflectivity: introspection and self-reprogramming. Another one would be the ability to copy chunks of code and A/B test them as they function in the whole agent. I don't get why Jacob is so confident that these sorts of things aren't major and/or that there aren't more of them than we've thought of.
I broadly disagree with Yudkowsky on his vision of FOOM and think he's pretty sloppy wrt. AI takeoff overall.
But, I do think you're quite likely to get a quite rapid singularity if people don't intentionally slow things down. For instance, I broadly think the modeling in Tom Davidson's takeoff speeds report seems very reasonable to me. Except that I think the default parameters he uses are insufficiently aggressive (I think compute requirements are likely to be somewhat lower than given in this report). Notably this model doesn't get you FOOM in a week (perhaps more like 20% automation to 100% automation in a few years) and is mostly just doing non-mechanistic trend expolation combined with a growth model.
So, I think it would be much more interesting from my perspective to engage with this report than Yudkowsky.
I am not a domain expert, but I get the impression that the primary factors of Pareto-frontier for software industry is "consumer expectations" and "money costs", and primary component of money costs is "programmer labor", so software development goes mostly on the way "how to satisfy consumer expectations with minimum possible labor costs", which doesn't put much optimisation pressure on computing efficiency. I frankly expect that if we spend bazillion dollars on optimisation, we can at least halve required computing power for "Witcher 3". Demoscene proves that we can put many things in 64KBytes of space.
Is there really such a strong line between standard computing and reversible computing? As I understand it, you usually have a bunch of bits you don't care about after doing a reversible computation. So you either have to store these bits somewhere indefinitely, or eventually erase them radiating heat. That makes it possible to reframe a reversible computer as one in which you perfectly cool/remove the heat generated via computation (and maybe dissipate the saved bits far away or whatever). Under this reframe, you can see how we could potentially have real...
Just want to add that our inverted retina brings additional problems with it. For example, the optic nerve is exposed to wear and tear from increased intraocular pressure. This condition is called glaucoma and is one of the prime causes of irreversible vision loss in humans worldwide. Cephalopods cannot get glaucoma.
every year of hardware increase without foom also raises the bar for foom by increasing the (AI assisted) capabilities of our human/machine civilization.
It is not clear to me that a world that relies on machines is safer from a world that does not. Intuitively, I'd expect the dangerous AI being connected through the internet to tons of other systems to be a risk factor.
every year of hardware increase without foom also raises the bar for foom by increasing the (AI assisted) capabilities of our human/machine civilization
I think it is worth highlighting that this is an assumption, not a necessary fact about how civilization works. To put it into a nonsense-math:
Assumption: Suppose that the current (technology assisted) capability of an average human is X, and that forming a singleton would require capability Then if the technology-assisted capability of average human increases to Y, forming a singleton would ...
This seems clearly wrong:
Go is extremely simple: the entire world of Go can be precisely predicted by trivial tiny low depth circuits/programs. This means that the Go predictive capability of a NN model as a function of NN size completely flatlines at an extremely small size. A massive NN like the brain's cortex is mostly wasted for Go, with zero advantage vs the tiny NN AlphaZero uses for predicting the tiny simple world of Go.
Top go-playing programs utilize neural networks, but they are not neural networks. Monte-Carlo Tree Search boosts their playing st...
I would still worry about software efficiency not holding for AGI that starts from just couple of OOM advantage because of higher frequency.
This seems to me as claiming that an AI that has some or all of the boundary conditions of the human brain can't become any more efficient with respect to its power requirements, rather than saying that it's theoretically impossible to construct a computer smarter than human brain that requires less power, which is what EY's statement was about.
This is a follow up and partial rewrite to/of an earlier part #1 post critiquing EY's specific argument for doom from AI go foom, and a partial clarifying response to DaemonicSigil's reply on efficiency.
AI go Foom?
By Foom I refer to the specific idea/model (as popularized by EY, MIRI, etc) that near future AGI will undergo a rapid intelligence explosion (hard takeoff) to become orders of magnitude more intelligent (ex from single human capability to human civilization capability) - in a matter of only days or hours - and then dismantle humanity (figuratively as in disempower or literally as in "use your atoms for something else"). Variants of this idea still seems important/relevant drivers of AI risk arguments today: Rob Besinger recently says "STEM-capable artificial general intelligence (AGI) is likely to vastly outperform human intelligence immediately (or very quickly)."
I believe the probability of these scenarios is probably small and the current arguments lack technical engineering prowress concerning the computational physics of - and derived practical engineering constraints on - intelligence. Nonetheless these hypothetical scenarios where the AI system fooms suddenly (perhaps during training) appear to be the most obviously dangerous, as they seemingly lead to a "one critical try" situation where humanity can't learn and adapt from alignment failures.
During the manhattan project some physicists became concerned about the potential of a nuke detonation igniting the atmosphere. Even a small non-epsilon possibility of destroying the entire world should be taken very seriously. So they did some detailed technical analysis which ultimately output a probability below their epsilon allowing them to continue on their merry task of creating weapons of mass destruction.
Today of course there is another option, which you could consider the much more detailed version of analysis: we can (and do) test nuclear weapons in simulations, and a simulation could be used to assess atmosphere ignition risks. This simulation analogy carries over directly as my mainline hope for safely aligning new AGI. But as it currently doesn't seem the world is coordinating towards the effort to standardize on safe simulation testing, we are left with rough foom arguments and their analysis .
In the 'ideal' scenario, the doom foomers (EY/MIRI) would present a detailed technical proposal that could be risk evaluated. They of course have not provided that, and indeed it would seem to be an implausible ask. Even if they were claiming to have the technical knowledge on how to produce a fooming AGI, providing that analysis itself could cause someone to create said AGI and thereby destroy the world![1] In the historical precedent of the manhattan project, the detailed safety analysis only finally arrived during the first massive project that succeeded at creating the technology to destroy the world.
So we are left with indirect, often philosophical arguments, which I find unsatisfying. To the extent that EY/MIRI has produced some technical work related to AGI[2], I find it honestly to be more philosophical than technical, and in the latter capacity more amateurish than expert.
I have spent a good chunk of my life studying the AGI problem as an engineer (neuroscience, deep learning, hardware, GPU programming, etc), and reached the conclusion that fast FOOM is possible but unlikely. Proving that of course is very difficult, so I instead gather much of the evidence that led me to that conclusion. However I can't reveal all of the evidence, as the process is rather indistinguishable from searching for the design of AGI itself.[3]
The valid technical arguments for/against the Foom mostly boils down to various efficiency considerations.
Quick background: pareto optimality/efficiency
Engineering is complex and full of fundamental practical tradeoffs:
Pareto optimality is when a design is on a pareto surface such that no improvement in any key variable/dimension of interest is possible without sacrifice in some other important variable/dimension.
In a nascent engineering field solutions start far from the pareto frontier and evolve towards it, so in the early days strict true efficiency improvements are possible: improvements in variables of interest without any or much sacrifice in other variables of interest. But as a field matures these low hanging fruit are tapped out, and solutions evolve towards the pareto frontier. Moore's Law is the canonical example of starting many OOM from the pareto frontier and steadily relentlessly climbing towards it, year after year.
The history of video game evolution provides an interesting case history in hardware/software coevolution around pareto frontiers. Every few years the relentless march of moore's law produced a new hardware platform with several times greater flops/bandwidth/RAM/etc which could be used to just run last generation algorithms faster, but is often best used to run new algorithms. In short each new hardware generation partially reset the software pareto frontier. The key lesson here is the software lag was/is short, and it does not take humans decades to explore the space of what is possible with each new hardware generation.
The potential of the old Atari hardware was fully maxed out long ago: no engineer, no matter how clever, is at all likely to find a way to run unreal engine 5 on even a Geforce 2, let alone an Atari 2600.
EY/MIRI also rely on the claim that human brains are "riddled with cognitive biases" that AGI will not have. I am skeptical of the strong cognitive biases claims and have argued that they stem from a flawed and now discredited theory of the brain. Regardless it is rather obvious that these so called cognitive biases did not prevent programmers like John Carmack from rather quickly reaching the software pareto frontier for each new hardware generation. Moreover, to the extent cognitive biases are real, the AGI we actually have simply reproduces them, because we train AI on human thoughts, distilling human minds: humans in produces humans out.[4] I predicted this in advance and the evidence continues to pile up for my position.
Efficiency drives intelligence
Intelligence for our purposes - the kind of intelligence AI doomers worry about - is dangerous because it provides capacity to optimize the world. We could specifically quantize intelligence power as the mutual information between an agent's potential current actions and future observable states of the world, let's denote that I.
High intelligence power requires high computational power, because high mutual information between potential current actions and future observable states only comes from modeling/predicting the future consequences of current actions. This in turn requires approx bayesian inference over observations to learn a powerful efficient model of the world - ie a computationally expensive learning/training process. This is always necessarily some efficient scalable (and thus highly parallel) approximation to solomonoff induction (and in practice, the useful approximations always end up looking like neural networks ).
Foom thus requires an AGI to rapidly acquire many OOM increase in some combination of compute resources (flops, watts), software efficiency in intelligence per unit compute ( I/flop ) or hardware efficiency (flops/J or flops/$), as the total intelligence will be limited by something like:
I = min(I/flop * flop/J *J, I/flop * flop/$ *$)
Most of the variance around feasibility of very rapid OOM improvement seems to be in software efficiency, but let's discuss hardware first.
EY on brain efficiency and the scope for improvement
EY believes the brain is inefficient by about 6 OOM:
I see two main ways to interpret this statement: EY could be saying 1.) that the brain is ~6 OOM from a pareto optimality frontier, or 2.) that the brain is ~6 OOM from the conservative thermodynamic limit for hypothetical fully reversible computers.
The last paragraph in particular suggests EY believes something more like 1.) - that it is possible to build something as intelligent as the brain that uses 6 OOM less energy, without any ridiculous tradeoffs in size, speed, etc. I believe that is most likely what he meant, and thus he is mistaken.
If the brain performs perhaps 1e14 analog synaptic spike ops/s in 10W, improving that by 6 OOM works out to just 1eV per synaptic spike op[5] - below the practical landauer bound for reliable irreversible computation given what it does. A hypothetical fully reversible computer could likely achieve that nominal energy efficiency, but all extant research indicates it would necessarily make various enormous tradeoffs somewhere: size (ex optical computers have fully reversible interconnect but are enormous), error resilience/correction, exotic/rare expensive materials, etc and the requirement for full reversible logic induces much harder to quantify but probably very limiting constraints on the types of computations you can even do (quantum computers are reversible computers that additionally exploit coherence, and quantum computation does not provide large useful speedup for all useful algorithms).
So either EY believes 1.) the brain is just very far from the pareto efficiency frontier - just not very well organized given its design constraints - in which case he is uninformed, or 2.) that the brain is near some pareto efficiency frontier but very far from the thermodynamic limits for theoretical reversible computers. If interpretation 2 is correct then he essentially agrees with me which undermines the doom argument regardless.
The fact that the brain is OOM from the conservative theoretical limits for thermodynamic efficiency does not imply it is overall inefficient as a computational hardware for intelligence, at least in how I or many would use the term - anymore than the fact that your car being far from the hard limit for areodynamic efficiency or the speed of light implies it is overall inefficient as a transportation vehicle.
Just preceding the 6 OOM claim, EY provides a different naive technical argument as to why he is confident that it is possible to create a mind more powerful than the human brain using much less compute:
A modern GPU or large CPU contains almost 100 billion transistors (and the cerebras wafer chip contains trillions). A pure serial processor is - by definition - limited to executing only a single instruction per clock cycle, and thus unnecessarily wastes the vast potential of a sea of circuitry. The pure parallel processor instead can execute billions of operations per clock cycle.
Serial programming is a convenient myth, a facade used to ease programming. Physics in practice only permits efficient parallel computation. A huge 100 billion circuit can - in one cycle - simulate serial computation to run one op of a javascript program, or it could perform tens perhaps hundreds of thousands of low precision flops in tensorcores, or billions of operations in a neuromorphic configuration.
There is a reason Nvidia eclipsed Intel in stock price, and as I predicted long ago moore's law obviously becomes increasingly parallel over time.
The DL systems which are actually leading to AGI - as I predicted (and EY did not) - are in fact all GPU simulations of brain-inspired low depth highly parallel circuits. Transformers are not even recurrent, and in that sense are shallower than the brain.
Rapid hardware leverage probably requires nanotech
The lead time for new GPUs is measured in months or years, not days or weeks, and high end CMOS tech is approaching a pareto frontier regardless.
Many OOM increase in compute also mostly rules out scaling up through GPU rental or hacking operations, because the initial AGI training itself will likely already require a GPT4 level or larger supercomputer[6], and you can't hack/rent your way out to a many OOM larger supercomputer because it probably doesn't exist, and systems of this scale are extensively monitored regardless. The difference in compute between my home GPU rig and the world's largest supercomputers is not quite 4 OOM.
So EY puts much hope in nanotech, which is a completely forlorn hope, because nanotech is probably mostly a pipe dream, biological cells are already pareto optimal nanobots, and brains are already reasonably pareto-efficient in terms of the kind of intelligence you can build from practical nanobots (ie bio cells). Don't mistake substitute any of these arguments for their strawmen: this doesn't mean brains are near conservative thermodynamic energy efficient limits which only apply to future exotic reversible computers, this doesn't mean that the human brain is perfectly optimized for intelligence, etc.
Instead it simply means that the nanotech path is very unlikely to result in the required many OOM in a short amount of time. The types of nanotech that are most viable are very similar to biology so you just end up with something that looks like a million vat-brains in a supercomputer, but the kind of brains you can build out of that toolkit sacrifice speed for energy efficiency and so would take years/decades to learn/train - useless for foom.
Bounding hardware foom (without software improvement)
The brain is efficient, so absent many OOM from software (bounded in the next section), the requisite many OOM must come from hardware. As nanotech is infeasible, and foundry ramp up takes much longer than the weeks/months of foom, any many OOM rapid ramp up from hardware must come from rapid acquisition/control of current hardware (ie GPUs).
Foom results from recursive self improvement which requires that the AGI design a better initial architectural prior and or learning algorithms and then run a new training cycle. So we can bound a step of RSI by bounding compute requirements for retraining cycles.[7]
Nvidia dominates the AI hardware landscape and produces only a few 100k high end GPUs suitable for AI per year[8], and they depreciate in a few years, so the entire pool of high end GPUs is less than 1M. If the brain is reasonably efficient then training just human-level AGI probably requires 1e24 to 1e26 flops[9]. Even if an AGI gained control of all 1M GPUs somehow, this would only produce about 1e26 flops per day, or about 4e24 flops per hour, which puts a bound on the duration of the first cycle of recursion. To reach the next level of capability, it will then need to expend 10x compute (or whatever your assumed growth factor is - the gap between GPTNs seems to be 100x).
So if human-level requires 1e26 flops training, using all the world's compute doesn't quite achieve 1 level above human in a week[10]. But if human-level requires only 1e24 flops, then perhaps 3 levels above human can be achieved in a week.
I put a low probability on the specific required combination of:
Without 3 in particular - highly efficient distributed training - the max useful compute be 10x to 100x less and thus minimal recursion cycle time will be 10x to 100x longer.
Obviously as moore's law continues that multiplies GPU power per year, eventually noticeably shifting these estimates. However Moore's law is already soon approaching the limits of miniaturization, and regardless every year of hardware increase without foom also raises the bar for foom by increasing the (AI assisted) capabilities of our human/machine civilization.
So the core uncertainty boils down to how much compute does it require to surpass humans?
The human brain has perhaps 10TB of size/capacity, around ~1e14 sparse synaptic ops/s throughput (equivalent to perhaps 1e16 dense flops/s) , and a 1e9s (32 year) training cycle - so roughly (1e23/1e25 flops, 1e23/1e25 memops). A high end GPU has 100GB capacity, 1e15 dense flop/s but only ~1e12 memops/s. Thus I estimate the equivalent ANN training compute at 1e24 to 1e26 flops equivalent on GPUs (variance depending mostly on important of mem bandwidth and alu/mem ratio interacting with software/arch designs). The largest general ANNs trained so far like GPT4 have used perhaps (1e25 flops, 1e22 memops) and achieve proto-AGI.
Obviously architecture/algorithms determine whether a 1e25 flops computation results in an AGI or a weather simulation or noise, but the brain lifetime net training compute sets expectations for successful training runs.
Many OOM sudden increase in software efficiency unlikely
Evolution has ran vast experiments for hundreds of millions of years and extensively explored the design space of computational circuits for intelligence. It found similar general solutions again and again across multiple distant lineages. Human researchers have now copied/replicated much of that exploratory search at higher speed, and (re)discovered the same set of universal solutions: approximate bayesian inference using neural networks.
Thus the prior that there is some dramatically better approach sufficient to suddenly provide many OOM improvement is now low. Giant inscrutable matrices is probably about as good as it gets, as I predicted a while ago.
A many OOM sudden increase in software efficiency requires a rare isolated incredibly difficult to find region in design space containing radically different designs that are still fully general but also many OOM more efficient on current hardware - hardware increasingly optimized for the current paradigm.
Intelligence requires/consumes compute in predictable ways, and progress is largely smooth.
Every year that passes without foom is further evidence against its possibility, as we advance ever closer to the vast expanse of the pareto frontier. Every year of further smooth progress exploring the algorithmic landscape we gather more evidence that the big many-OOM better design is all that much harder to find, all while the requisite bar to vastly outcompete our increasingly capable human/AI cyborg civilization rises.
On Biology
Biology has been doing neural networks for half a billion years, so EY's primary argument for the FOOM here is the claim that biology/evolution is just not that efficient.
Biology is quite efficient, for any reasonable meaning of efficient. Here are a few interesting examples (the first two cherrypicked in the adversarial sense that they have been brought up before here as evidence of inefficiency of evolution):
Biological cells are highly efficient as physical nanobots, operating near thermodynamic limits for most key operations such as replication
Lest anyone has forgotten, the brain is generally efficient
About AlphaZero
In AGI Ruin, EY uses AlphaZero as a more specific example of the potential for large software efficiency advantage of AGI:
AlphaZero's Go performance predictably eclipsed humans and then its predecessor AlphaGo zero when it had trained (using 5000 TPUs) on far more Go games than any expert human lifetime's. Like other largescale DL systems, it shows zero advantage over the human brain in terms of data efficiency in virtual/real experience consumed, and achieves higher capability by training on vastly more data.
Go is extremely simple: the entire world of Go can be precisely predicted by trivial tiny low depth circuits/programs. This means that the Go predictive capability of a NN model as a function of NN size completely flatlines at an extremely small size. A massive NN like the brain's cortex is mostly wasted for Go, with zero advantage vs the tiny NN AlphaZero uses for predicting the tiny simple world of Go.
Games like Go or chess are far too small for a vast NN like the brain, so the vast bulk of its great computational power is wasted. The ideal NN for these simple worlds is very small and very fast - like AlphaZero. So for these domains the ANN system has a large net efficiency advantage over the brain.
The real world is essentially infinitely vaster and more complex than Go, so the model scaling has no limit in sight - ever larger NNs result in ever more capable predictive models, bounded only by the data/experience/time/compute required to train them effectively. The brain's massive size is ideally suited for modeling the enormous complexity of the real world. So when we apply the same general NN techniques to the real world - via LLMs or similar - we see that even when massively scaled up on enormous supercomputers to train with roughly similar compute than that used by the brain during a lifetime[13], on orders of magnitude more data - the resulting models are only able to capture some of human intelligence; they are not yet full AGI. Obviously AGI is close, but will require a bit more compute and/or efficiency.
There are and will continue to be many specialist subsystems NNs (alphacode, alphafold, stable diffusion, etc) trained on specific subdomains that greatly exceed human performance through using specialized smaller models trained on far more data, but general performance in the real world is the key domain for which huge NNs like the brain are uniquely suited.
This has nothing to do with the brain's architectural prior, it's just a relation on how compute is invested in size vs speed and the resulting scaling functions with respect to world complexity.
Seeking true Foom
In some sense the Foom already occurred - it was us. But it wasn't the result of any new feature in the brain - our brains are just standard primate brains, scaled up a bit[14] and trained for longer.
Human intelligence is the result of a complex one time meta-systems transition: brains networking together and organizing into families, tribes, nations, and civilizations through language. Animal brains learn for a lifetime then die without transmission, humans are turing universal generalists with cultural programming. Humans are in fact not much smarter than apes sans culture/knowledge. That transition only happens once - there are not ever more and more levels of universality or linguistic programmability. AGI does not FOOM again in the same way.
As I and others predicted[15], AGI will be (and already is) made from the same stuff as our minds, literally trained on externalized human thoughts, distilling human mindware via brain-inspired neural networks trained with massive compute on one to many lifetimes of internet data. The post training/education capability of such systems is a roughly predictable function of net training compute.
AGI systems are fundamentally different from humans in a few key respects:
These two main differences will lead to enormous transformation, but probably not the foom Yudkowsky has expected for 20 some years, which largely seems to be a continuation of his rather miscalibrated model of nanotech:
The analysis in the hardware section leaves open the possibility for some forms of foom, especially if we see signs:
Part of my intent in writing this posts is a call for better arguments/analysis. A highly detailed plan for replicating brain performance with less than 1e24 training flops is obviously not something to research/discuss in public, but surely there are better public arguments/analysis for foom that don't noticeably make it more likely.
From what I can tell, EY/MIRI's position has consistently been that aligning an AGI is much more difficult than creating it, and they are consistent in claiming that nobody has figured out alignment yet, including them. ↩︎
The most relevant work that immediately came to mind is LOGI from 2007. ↩︎
I have found potential for perhaps a few OOM improvement here or there, but it looks like tapping much of that is necessary just to reach powerful AGI at all. ↩︎
Humans in Humans Out: On GPT Converging Toward Common Sense in both Success and Failure ↩︎
A synaptic op is minimally both a memory read, a low/medium precision MAC, and a memory write. ↩︎
The computation required to train AGI is more of a software efficiency question, discussed in the next section. ↩︎
Weights are downstream dependent on architectural prior and or learning algorithms. ↩︎
Inferred from annual revenue of $27B, price tag of about ~$27k per flagship GPU, and revenue product split. ↩︎
GPT3 uses 3e24 flops, and GPT may have used 1e25 flops. I estimate the equivalent brain lifetime training flops to be around 1e24 to 1e26 flops with the range uncertainty vaguely indicating the impact of software efficiency. Naturally flops is not the only relevant computational metric. ↩︎
1e15 flops/gpu * 1e6 gpus * 6e5s = 6e26 flops ↩︎
Impractical in the sense that they aren't optimal for manufacturing or other reasons. A more typical mass manufactured solar cells has ~20% conversion efficiency, similar to chlorphyll conversion ~28% to ATP/NADPH, before conversion to glucose for long term chemical storage. ↩︎
Is our retina really upside down? ↩︎
The human brain uses vaguely 1e25 flops-equivalent for net training compute, comparable to estimates for GPT4 net training compute. ↩︎
The human brain in numbers: a linearly scaled-up primate brain ↩︎
Moravec and Hanson both predicted in different forms - well in advance - smooth progress to brain-like AGI driven by compute scaling. ↩︎
From AGI ruin ↩︎