I haven't looked into this in detail, and I'm not actually sure how unique a situation this is. But, it updated me on "institutional changes to the US that might be quite bad[1]", and it seemed good if LessWrong folk did some sort of Orient Step on it.
(Please generally be cautious on LessWrong talking about politics. I am interested in people commenting here who have read the LessWrong Political Prerequisites sequence. I'll be deleting or at least unhesitatingly strong downvoting comments that seem to be doing unreflective partisan dunking)
((But, that's not meant to mean "don't talk about political actions." If this is as big a deal as it sounds, I want to be able to talk about "what to do do?". But I want that talking-about-it to feel more like practically thinking through an action space, than blindly getting sucked into a political egregore))
A 25-year-old engineer named Marko Elez, who previously worked for two Elon Musk companies, has direct access to Treasury Department systems responsible for nearly all payments made by the US government, three sources tell WIRED.
Two of those sources say that Elez’s privileges include the ability not just to read but to write code on two of the most sensitive systems in the US government: the Payment Automation Manager and Secure Payment System at the Bureau of the Fiscal Service (BFS). Housed on a secure mainframe, these systems control, on a granular level, government payments that in their totality amount to more than a fifth of the US economy.
Despite reporting that suggests that Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) task force has access to these Treasury systems on a “read-only” level, sources say Elez, who has visited a Kansas City office housing BFS systems, has many administrator-level privileges. Typically, those admin privileges could give someone the power to log in to servers through secure shell access, navigate the entire file system, change user permissions, and delete or modify critical files. That could allow someone to bypass the security measures of, and potentially cause irreversible changes to, the very systems they have access to.
“You could do anything with these privileges,” says one source with knowledge of the system, who adds that they cannot conceive of a reason that anyone would need them for purposes of simply hunting down fraudulent payments or analyzing disbursement flow.
"Technically I don't see why this couldn't happen," a federal IT worker tells WIRED in a phone call late on Monday night, referring to the possibility of a DOGE employee being granted elevated access to a government server. "If you would have asked me a week ago, I'd have told you that this kind of thing would never in a million years happen. But now, who the fuck knows."
- ^
I currently am more anticipating things like "institutional decay / general corruption / loss-of-trust" than "dictatorial takeover." But mostly I'm like "seems like weird and alarming things are happening and it's worth paying attention to with some scout mindset."
Huh, I came at this with the background of doing data analysis in large organizations and had a very different take.
You're a data scientist. You want to analyze what this huge organization (US government) is spending its money on in concrete terms. That information is spread across 400 mutually incompatible ancient payment systems. I'm not sure if you've viscerally felt the frustration of being blocked, spending all your time trying to get permission to read from 5 incompatible systems, let alone 400. But it would take months or years.
Fortunately, your boss is exceptionally good at Getting Things Done. You tell him that there's one system (BFS) that has all the data you need in one place. But BFS is protected by an army of bureaucrats, most of whom are named Florence, who are Very Particular, are Very Good at their job, Will Not let this system go down, Will Not let you potentially expose personally identifiably information by violating Section 3 subparagraph 2 of code 5, Will Not let you sweet talk her into bypassing the safety systems she has spent the past 30 years setting up to protect oh-just-$6.13 trillion from fraud, embezzlement, and abuse, and if you manage somehow manage to get around these barriers she will Stop You.
Your boss Gets Things Done and threatens Florence's boss Mervin that if he does not give you absolutely all the permissions you ask for, Mervin will become the particular object of attention of two people named Elon Musk and Donald Trump.
You get absolutely all the permissions you want and go on with your day.
Ah, to have a boss like that!
EDIT TL/DR: I think this looks weirder in Far mode? Near mode (near to data science, not near government), giving outside consultant data scientists admin permissions for important databases does not seem weird or nefarious. It's the sort of thing that happens when the data scientist's boss is intimidatingly high in an organization, like the President/CEO hiring a management consultant.
Your analysis of the default incentives is correct. However, if there is any institution that has noticed the mounds of skulls, it is the DoD. Overclassification, and classification for inappropriate reasons (explicitly enumerated in written guidance: avoiding embarrassment, covering up wrongdoing) is not allowed, and the DoD carries out audits of classified dat... (read more)