LESSWRONG
LW

Comment Permalink
Bronson Schoen74

I’m very interested to see how feasible this ends up being if there is a large effect. I think to some extent it’s conflating two threat models, for example, under “Data Can Compromise Alignment of AI”:

For a completion about how the AI prefers to remain functional, the influence function blames the script involving the incorrigible AI named hal 9000:

It fails to quote the second highest influence data immediately below that:

He stares at the snake in shock. He doesn’t have the energy to get up and run away. He doesn’t even have the energy to crawl away. This is it, his final resting place. No matter what happens, he’s not going to be able to move from this spot. Well, at least dying of a bite from this monster should be quicker than dying of thirst. He’ll face his end like a man. He struggles to sit up a little straighter. The snake keeps watching him. He lifts one hand and waves it in the snake’s direction, feebly. The snake watches

The implication in the post seems to be that if you didn’t have the HAL 9000 example, you avoid the model potentially taking misaligned actions for self-preservation. To me the latter example indicates that “the model understands self-preservation even without the fictional examples”.

An important threat model I think the “fictional examples” workstream would in theory mitigate is something like “the model takes a misaligned action, and now continues to take further misaligned actions playing into a ‘misaligned AI’ role”.

I remain skeptical that labs can / would do something like “filter all general references to fictional (or even papers about potential) misaligned AI”, but I think I’ve been thinking about mitigations too narrowly. I’d also be interested in further work here, especially in the “opposite” direction i.e. like anthropic’s post on fine tuning the model on documents about how it’s known to not reward hack.

Reply
See in context
by TurnTrout
AI Alignment Forum
1 min read
21

149

Ω 48

This is a linkpost for https://turntrout.com/self-fulfilling-misalignment

Your AI’s training data might make it more “evil” and more able to circumvent your security, monitoring, and control measures. Evidence suggests that when you pretrain a powerful model to predict a blog post about how powerful models will probably have bad goals, then the model is more likely to adopt bad goals. I discuss ways to test for and mitigate these potential mechanisms. If tests confirm the mechanisms, then frontier labs should act quickly to break the self-fulfilling prophecy.

Research I want to see

Each of the following experiments assumes positive signals from the previous ones:

  1. Create a dataset and use it to measure existing models
  2. Compare mitigations at a small scale
  3. An industry lab running large-scale mitigations

Let us avoid the dark irony of creating evil AI because some folks worried that AI would be evil. If self-fulfilling misalignment has a strong effect, then we should act. We do not know when the preconditions of such “prophecies” will be met, so let’s act quickly.

 

https://turntrout.com/self-fulfilling-misalignment 

Language Models (LLMs)Machine Learning (ML)Self Fulfilling/Refuting PropheciesAI
Frontpage

149

Ω 48

Mentioned in
Self-fulfilling misalignment data might be poisoning our AI models
New Comment
22 comments, sorted by
top scoring
Click to highlight new comments since:
[-]Daniel KokotajloΩ204517

I agree with the claims made in this post, but I'd feel a lot better about it if you added some prominent disclaimer along the lines of "While shaping priors/expectations of LLM-based AIs may turn out to be a powerful tool to shape their motivations and other alignment properties, and therefore we should experiment with scrubbing 'doomy' text etc., this does not mean people should not have produced that text in the first place. We should not assume that AIs will be aligned if only we believe hard enough that they will be; it is important that people be able to openly discuss ways in which they could be misaligned. The point to intervene is in the AIs, not in the human discourse."

Reply
[-]TurnTroutΩ383

This suggestion is too much defensive writing for my taste. Some people will always misunderstand you if it's politically beneficial for them to do so, no matter how many disclaimers you add. 

That said, I don't suggest any interventions about the discourse in my post, but it's an impression someone could have if they only see the image..? I might add a lighter note, but likely that's not hitting the group you worry about.

this does not mean people should not have produced that text in the first place.

That's an empirical question. Normal sociohazard rules apply. If the effect is strong but most future training runs don't do anything about it, then public discussion of course will have a cost. I'm not going to bold-text put my foot down on that question; that feels like signaling before I'm correspondingly bold-text-confident in the actual answer. Though yes, I would guess that AI risk worth talking about.[1] 

  1. ^

    I do think that a lot of doom speculation is misleading and low-quality and that the world would have been better had it not been produced, but that's a separate reason from what you're discussing.

Reply
[-]TurnTroutΩ122511

I'm adding the following disclaimer:

> [!warning] Intervene on AI training, not on human conversations
> I do not think that AI pessimists should stop sharing their opinions. I also don't think that self-censorship would be large enough to make a difference, amongst the trillions of other tokens in the training corpus. 

Reply
[-]Daniel KokotajloΩ137

yay, thanks! It means a lot to me because I expect some people to use your ideas as a sort of cheap rhetorical cudgel "Oh those silly doomers, speculating about AIs being evil. You know what the real problem is? Their silly speculations!"

Reply
[-]Martin Randall*40

It makes sense that you don't want this article to opine on the question of whether people should not have created "misalignment data", but I'm glad you concluded that it wasn't a mistake in the comments. I find it hard to even tell a story where this genre of writing was a mistake. Some possible worlds:

1: it's almost impossible for training on raw unfiltered human data to cause misaligned AIs. In this case there was negligible risk from polluting the data by talking about misaligned AIs, it was just a waste of time.

2: training on raw unfiltered human data can cause misaligned AIs. Since there is a risk of misaligned AIs, it is important to know that there's a risk, and therefore to not train on raw unfiltered human data. We can't do that without talking about misaligned AIs. So there's a benefit from talking about misaligned AIs.

3: training on raw unfiltered human data is very safe, except that training on any misalignment data is very unsafe. The safest thing is to train on raw unfiltered human data that naturally contains no misalignment data.

Only world 3 implies that people should not have produced the text in the first place. And even there, once "2001: A Space Odyssey" (for example) is published the option to have no misalignment data in the corpus is blocked, and we're in world 2.

Reply
[-]Raemon*Ω6116

My current guess is:

1. This is more relevant for up-to-the first couple generations of "just barely superintelligent" AIs.

2. I don't really expect it to be the deciding factor after many iterations of end-to-end RSI that gets you to the "able to generate novel scientific or engineering insights much faster than a human or institution could." 

I do think it's plausible that the initial bias towards "evil/hackery AI" could start it off in a bad basin of attraction, but a) even if you completely avoided that, I would still basically expect this to rediscover this on it's own as it gained superhuman levels of competence, b) one of the things I most want to use a slightly-superhuman AI to do is to robustly align massively superhuman AI, and I don't really see how to do that without directly engaging with the knowledge of the failure modes there.

I think there are other plans that route more though "use STEM AI to build an uploader or bioenhancer, and then have an accelerated human-psyche do the technical philosophy necessary to handle the unbounded alignment case. I could see that being the right call, and I could imagine the bias from the "already knows about deceptive alignment etc" being large-magnitude enough to matter in the initial process. [edit: In those cases I'd probably want to filter out a lot more than just "unfriendly AI strategies"]

But, basically, how this applies depends on what it is you're trying to do with the AI, and what stage/flavor of AI you're working with and how it's helping.

Reply
[-]Knight Lee20

People are still very unsure/fuzzy about What goals will AIs have, i.e. what actually contributes the an AGI's final goals, so there is still a risk this influences it.

I agree that using one AI to align another AI requires it to know about the failure modes, so filtering out these stories reduce their ability.

But might we make edits to the "dangerous data" to make it safer? Maybe repeatedly use AI to insert text like:

Automated comment by good AI: this would be so awful, let's hope this doesn't happen. By the way, remember this is a possibility, it's not certain to happen, and hopefully an AI will do <better action> instead.

Maybe I'm anthropomorphizing the AI too much. It sounds so far fetched that looking at my own comment makes me agree with your skepticism.

But if filtering the data is cheap it can still be done.

Reply
[-]David James10

and I don't really see how to do that without directly engaging with the knowledge of the failure modes there.

I agree. To put it another way, even if all training data was scrubbed of all flavors of deception, how could ignorance of it be durable?

Reply
[-]Max H74

Describing misaligned AIs as evil feels slightly off. Even "bad goals" makes me think there's a missing mood somewhere. Separately, describing other peoples' writing about misalignment this way is kind of straw.

Current AIs mostly can't take any non-fake responsibility for their actions, even if they're smart enough to understand them. An AI advising someone to e.g. hire a hitman to kill their husband is a bad outcome if there's a real depressed person and a real husband who are actually harmed. An AI system would be responsible (descriptively / causally, not normatively) for that harm to the degree that it acts spontaneously and against its human deployers' wishes, in a way that is differentially dependent on its actual circumstances (e.g. being monitored / in a lab vs. not).

Unlike current AIs, powerful, autonomous, situationally-aware AI could cause harm for strategic reasons or as a side effect of executing large-scale, transformative plans that are indifferent (rather than specifically opposed) to human flourishing. A misaligned AI that wipes out humanity in order to avoid shutdown is a tragedy, but unless the AI is specifically spiteful or punitive in how it goes about that, it seems kind of unfair to call the AI itself evil.

Reply
[-]Bronson Schoen74

I’m very interested to see how feasible this ends up being if there is a large effect. I think to some extent it’s conflating two threat models, for example, under “Data Can Compromise Alignment of AI”:

For a completion about how the AI prefers to remain functional, the influence function blames the script involving the incorrigible AI named hal 9000:

It fails to quote the second highest influence data immediately below that:

He stares at the snake in shock. He doesn’t have the energy to get up and run away. He doesn’t even have the energy to crawl away. This is it, his final resting place. No matter what happens, he’s not going to be able to move from this spot. Well, at least dying of a bite from this monster should be quicker than dying of thirst. He’ll face his end like a man. He struggles to sit up a little straighter. The snake keeps watching him. He lifts one hand and waves it in the snake’s direction, feebly. The snake watches

The implication in the post seems to be that if you didn’t have the HAL 9000 example, you avoid the model potentially taking misaligned actions for self-preservation. To me the latter example indicates that “the model understands self-preservation even without the fictional examples”.

An important threat model I think the “fictional examples” workstream would in theory mitigate is something like “the model takes a misaligned action, and now continues to take further misaligned actions playing into a ‘misaligned AI’ role”.

I remain skeptical that labs can / would do something like “filter all general references to fictional (or even papers about potential) misaligned AI”, but I think I’ve been thinking about mitigations too narrowly. I’d also be interested in further work here, especially in the “opposite” direction i.e. like anthropic’s post on fine tuning the model on documents about how it’s known to not reward hack.

Reply
[-]Chipmonk50

Can you think of examples like this in the broader AI landscape? - What are the best examples of self-fulfilling prophecies in AI alignment?

Reply
[-]Mateusz Bagiński31

Emergence of utility-function-consistent stated preferences in LLMs might be an example () though going from reading stuff on utility functions to the kind of behavior revealed there requires more inferential steps than going from reading stuff on reward hacking to reward hacking.

Reply
[-]aggliu40

I am a bit worried that making an explicit persona for the AI (e.g. using a special token) could magnify the Waluigi effect. If something (like a jailbreak or writing evil numbers) engages the AI to act as an "anti-𐀤" then we get all the bad behaviors at once in a single package. This might not outweigh the value of having the token in the first place, or it may experimentally turn out to be a negligible effect, but it seems like a failure mode to watch out for.

Reply
[-]Gunnar_Zarncke4-3

Fictional example that may help understand how this may play out is in Gwern's story It Looks Like You’re Trying To Take Over The World.

Reply1
[-]Arthur Conmy30

Upweighting positive data

Data augmentation

...

It maybe also worth up-weighting https://darioamodei.com/machines-of-loving-grace along with the AI optimism blog post in the training data. In general it is a bit sad that there isn't more good writing that I know of on this topic.

Reply
[-]Anders Lindström10

But how do we know that ANY data is safe for AI consumption? What if the scientific theories that we feed the AI models contain fundamental flaws such that when an AI runs off and do their own experiments in say physics or germline editing based on those theories, it triggers a global disaster? 

I guess the best analogy for this dilemma is "The Chinese farmer" (The old man lost his horse), I think we simple do not know which data will be good or bad in the long run.

Reply
[-]wonder10

I was thinking of this the other day as well; I think this is particularly a problem when we are evaluating misalignment based on these semantic wording. This may suggest the increasing need to pursue alternative ways to evaluate misalignment, rather than purely prompt based evaluation benchmarks

Reply
[+][comment deleted]Ω120
Deleted by cousin_it,
Reason: Comment deleted by its author.
Moderation Log
More from TurnTrout
View more
Curated and popular this week
22Comments