During the 2016 election, many prominent media outlets presented odds of ~99% for a Hillary Clinton victory, and then defended such claims after the election by saying things like "well, 1-in-a-100 events do still happen." In my experience, people have mostly stopped doing this and present more reasonable figures, and I attribute this largely to the rise of prediction markets, which many news outlets have started citing directly.
They have clearly "raised the sanity waterline," one of the famous goals of at least the rationalists, if not EA.
In October, PredictIt and PredictWise had Clinton at 83 and 91 cents respectively.
The night before the 2016 election, WCNC published the next-day forecasts by the NY Times, 538 (when Nate Silver was still running it) and the Huffington Post, which gave odds of Clinton winning of 84%, 68%, and 98% respectively.
The Princeton Election Consortium‘s model developed by data scientist Sam Wang forecasted 99% for Clinton. Wang ate a cricket on live TV.
Reuters/Ipsos forecasted 90% Clinton.
Overall, seems like prediction markets were in the same ballbark of wrongness as the media forecasts. Admittedly, the forecast dates here are not identical - a more rigorous breakdown would be welcome.
But in this bunch, the best result was obtained by a professional data scientist, Nate Silver, not by a prediction market.
There’s been a huge amount of discourse around the failed 2016 forecasts, and they all attribute it to failure to take correlated polling errors into account (which Silver did model, explaining his less wrong prediction). There might have been underlying partisan bias or conformity warping modeling decisions, but those biases also exist in prediction markets. Money and reputation is on the...
Markets can be better or worse depending on eg liquidity. My guess would be that today’s markets are better. (The large difference between 83 and 91 cents failing to disappear from arbitrage is an indication that at least one of those markets weren’t so great, though I haven’t checked how current markets look on that metric.)
Shankar's original claim was that the 2016 election was BEFORE functional prediction markets, and that the bit of "raising the sanity waterline" in question happened between then and today.
I really don't think PredictIt should count as a prediction market at all in this context, I recall that they had crazy rules that made it basically impossible for serious people to make serious money by correcting even blindingly obvious market errors. (Don't know anything about PredictWise.)
Yes, at the time the limit at Predictit was $850 per user per market. When the CFTC originally issued its no-action letter to Predictit, it was on the basis that it was for research purposes.
FWIW, I refer to Manifold Markets and prediction-markets every week in my decision-making. My guess is this mundane utility generalizes. I am kind of confused why you think people don't use these for decision-making, they seem really useful in lots of circumstances.
Some random example markets I referred to recently:
What decisions do you think this has affected and what would you estimate the differences in outcomes to be as a result? Or, say, the most important impacts?
Yes, I used them to set a threshold for evacuation protocols at Lighthaven, together with decisions on emergency supplies, how many bugout bags to have, etc.
(I had also built a small website called "hasRussiaLaunchedNukesYet.com" which would send everyone who signed up a text message if the probability of a nuke being launched was above 90% according to the markets, which would then be a natural time to get out and escape)
What scope do you have in mind when you refer to forecasting? Is it specifically Tetlockian forecasting / prediction market style forecasting where most of the value is a forecasted number answering a well-defined question, and the methdology often involves aggregating a bunch of people’s views, each who didn’t spend much time?
If so, then I agree directionally and in particular agree the current track record isn’t great, though I think this sort of forecasting will be plausibly quite useful for AI stuff as we get more close to AGI/ASI, and thus it may be easier to operationalize important questions that don’t require long chains of conceptual thinking, there will be lots of important sub-questions to cover, some of which may be more answerable by superforecaster-like techniques as we have better trends / base rates to extrapolate since we are closer to the events we care about. And also having a bunch of AI labor might help.
But overall I am at least currently much more excited about stuff like AI 2027 or OP worldview investigations than Tetlockian forecasting, i.e. I’m excited about work involving deep thinking and for which the primary value doesn’t come from specific quantitative predictions but instead things like introducing new frameworks (which is why I switched what I was working on). I’m not sure if AI 2027 or OP worldview investigations work is meant to be included in your post.
I am mostly talking about Tetlockian forecasting. I am talking about other versions of it too, though, including AI 2027.
I didn't want to argue against AI 2027 type stuff in this post but on net, I think AI 2027 made some very aggressive predictions, that will turn out to be wrong (even if you give double the time for them to occur) and I think that AI safety people will end up looking silly, like the boy who cried wolf.
For two concrete examples:
"By early 2030, the robot economy has filled up the old SEZs, the new SEZs, and large parts of the ocean. The only place left to go is the human-controlled areas.". This one is easy to operationalize. I would bet that by the end of 2032, less than 20% of the current Earth's oceans will be taken over by the "robot economy".
"June 2027: Most of the humans at OpenBrain can’t usefully contribute anymore."
[Relevant context/COI: I'm CEO at the Forecasting Research Institute (FRI), an organization which I co-founded with Phil Tetlock and others. Much of the below is my personal perspective, though it is informed by my work. I don't speak for others on my team. I’m sharing an initial reply now, and our team at FRI will share a larger post in future that offers a more comprehensive reflection on these topics.]
Thanks for the post — I think it's important to critically question the value of funds going to forecasting, and this post offers a good opportunity for reflection and discussion.
In brief, I share many of your concerns about forecasting and related research, but I'm also more positive on both its impact so far and its future expected impact.
A summary of some key points:
I liked and agreed with @Scott Alexander 's recent tweet on the benefits of prediction markets, though I would have a hard time saying how much of a monetary investment into them that justifies:
...It's hard to say on a society-wide level because I don't know who's using them or how users are changing their minds/actions, but just for me they were very helpful during the beginning of the Iran war. People were saying things like "the regime will fall within days", and I didn't know enough about geopolitics to know whether this was reasonable or not, so it was helpful to be able to check p(regime falls). I also used them as a sanity check for oil price futures which seemed to be having weird herd dynamics in the actual markets. And I've used them to get some sense of the likelihood of various upcoming election-related violence and foul play and to discuss this with friends who are more worried than I am. Also, I've also used other markets (not Polymarket/Kalshi, before then) to know how worried I should be about upcoming potential natural disasters and COVID flareups.
I think a good comparison point would be the social utility of newspapers (let's say excluding investigative journalism, w
The Biden/Kamala example makes me think the value of prediction markets is not the uncovering of little-known info, but making things so blatantly obvious they can't be denied by those who are deceiving themselves.
The most recent Tetlockian forecasting style thing I've spent substantial time on is the 2025 and 2026 AI forecasting surveys, in which hundreds of people each year have made predictions a year out on benchmarks, and other indicators such as revenue.
The theory of change is to (a) establish common knowledge about how fast things are going relative to people's expectations (and we collect data on people's overall views on when AGI will be reached so we can sort of see if we're "on track" for that), and (b) identify which people seem to be making the most accurate predictions. Importantly, it is not to elicit predictions that are directly useful for important decisions.
I've observed some evidence of this working, e.g. re: (a) establishing common knowedge, Anson of Epoch wrote an analysis that I've seen referenced a few times. I'm glad to have a data point against the common refrain of "people underpredict benchmark scores and overpredict real-world impact" from revenue outpacing people's predictions (though it is a narrow and single data point).
Re: (b) identifying who is making the most accurate predictions, I found it informative that in Anson's analysis (footnote 1), forecasters wit...
I've long had some sense like this, though not the expertise to make a claim like this.
My impression is that a lot of the conceit of forecasting and prediction markets boils down to
Have things like this happened? E.g.
3 unrelated points:
I'd love to see this argument expanded further but also appreciate what you've written here.
You sort of mention this, but it strikes me that the argument doesn't need to be "are prediction markets useful for doing good" but just needs to be "does the improvements to prediction markets and infrastructure made by EA money and resources actually meaningfully increase the amount of good prediction markets do?"
Lastly, may I suggest cross-posting this to the EA forum?
I find it hard to tell how much impact widespread forecasting has. You go into the lack of tangible impact in the post but it's hard to prove a negative (forecasting has had no impact). It's also hard to prove real but intangible impact. I trust your opinion as an expert forecaster more than mine but I'm confused here.
One personal forecasting impact I've observed is the ability to point to existing prediction market. For example, someone writes a post about China definitely invading Taiwan in 2026. It's hard for me to tell how good their argument is. With prediction markets I can find that market and get a more objective take. I can ask the post author how much money they put into the market, seeing they stand to make a lot of money correcting it.
This isn't knock down argument against your post. I'm just giving a specific example of less tangible impact. Multiplied over many people making slightly better decisions that might be high impact. It can both be true that this impact is real and EA effort should go elsewhere.
I wrote a whole response to this :-)
Here's an excerpt:
As I understand Marcus's argument, his central thesis is that we haven't seen the benefits of this past forecasting funding, but I think the opposite is true! Here are just a few examples:
I think a primary question I want an answer to here was what went so wrong with OpenPhil's attempt to fund superforecasters on AI questions -- why they were eg so much wronger than either of myself or Paul about the probability of a 2025 IMO gold medal win, as wrong (wronger?) than Holden Karnofsky on AGI timelines, etc. Do we know what went wrong? Is it fixable? Has it been fixed? If people with biases can get "superforecasts" that match their biases, and attempts to read the market entrails divine that markets in 2023 don't think AGI is on the way, and we can't get extinction-related prediction markets for settlement reasons, then there may not be much for AI people to do with prediction markets.
The rest of humanity should keep trying to get good at prediction markets in order to someday get a little closer to dath ilan, and I think non-real-money markets like Manifold are important for experimenting with that. (Manifold's brief ill-fated attempt to become a real-money market was unfortunate.)
This is like if lebron james wrote a post about how basketball is stupid and should receive less attention
Thanks for writing this! Some reasons I would steelman continued funding towards tetlockian or PM-style forecasting:
Do you have any reason to think those people succeeded in other areas as a result of the screen from forecasting success ? Did someone give them opportunities they wouldn't have had without being a top forecaster?
My guess is this is just positive selection.
I liked this post. Strong upvote. I'm neutral on the funding/not funding issue but the points you make about not starting with the tool to solve some problem but with the problem and then selecting the tool(s) is so very important. I frequently see that as a problem in so much public debate and policy making.
(Copied my comment from the EA Forum and related to my post)
I don’t disagree with some of the fundamentals of this post. Before diving into that, I want to correct a factual error:
“the Swift Centre have received millions of dollars for doing research and studies on forecasting and teaching others about forecasting”
The Swift Centre for Applied Forecasting has not received millions in funding. The majority of our earnings have been through direct projects with organisations who want to use forecasting to inform their decisions.
On your wider argument. I think...
I think part of the lack of use is institutional inertia. To use a concrete example, politicians (generally) believe that the things they are doing will be successful, popular, and beneficial to their reelection odds. In the past, the only immediate counter-evidence was polling, and this could be dismissed, often rightly, as push-polling intended to apply pressure rather than accurately predict results. Some of that skepticism has carried over to mechanisms that don't have that problem.
The age of our current political class, rather set in its ways, mean th...
People have a tool they want to use, whether that be cryptocurrency or forecasting, and then try to solve problems with it because they really believe in the solution, but I think this is misguided.
It is true that this (almost) never works, and has resulted in many, many wasted investment dollars.
Unfortunately it is also true that when a problem comes along, it is very convenient if someone else has already partially developed the underlying technology that can be repurposed to solve it. Cuts years off the timeline to a solution. Use of blockchain for crit...
I express no position on the object level, but you may be arguing for something that has already largely happened, see here:
As of March 30, the Forecasting Fund is no longer active, though we continue to make key forecasting grants through other funds, such as Navigating Transformative AI. This page will be maintained until the end of 2026 as a record of the fund’s work.
Related comment I made 2 years ago and ensuing discussion: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ziSEnEg4j8nFvhcni/new-open-philanthropy-grantmaking-program-forecasting?commentId=7cDWRrv57kivL5sCQ
Once, Robin Hanson made a post on his blog about what he'd do with $1M: try to get prediction markets used in companies. The theory of impact is that they are more likely to actually use the markets, and that it is more impactful than political discourse or prop bets. He suggested making a market of the form "If X CEO steps down and is replaced by Y, the stock price will go up by Z", then trying to get a company to take its advice and end up proving it right, and then to try to make it something shareholders demand of any company.
Current markets have lande...
How do you rate the educational benefit to participating in prediction markets for about a year? You mention that trivial/gambling markets on short-term BTC movements don't sharpen skills, what about non-trivial markets? How does it compare to other educational/community activities like commenting on LessWrong or attending meetups?
[COI: I work at the Swift Centre as a forecaster, I have worked for a prediction market, I am very involved in forecasting. It is not my current work however, which is on community notes]
A few things points attempting to say things other commenters haven't, though I largely agree with the critical comments and the things they agree with Marcus on:
I agree that the $100M doesn't seem super well allocated. Not because forecasting is useless, but because the money flowed to big institutions and platforms rather than smaller, weirder, mechanism-design bets. I l...
I think you're measuring the right thing (decisions changed) but blaming the wrong cause. I think the field underperformed because:
There should be a parallel approach to forecasting research. Currently, it's all in silos, when parameters do not act independently
I am intrigued by the 'solution seeking a problem' framing. Unlike blockchain, there are a number of domains and decisions that would analytically benefit from more accurate predictions about the future (e.g. issue prioritisation, campaigning decisions in politics, domestic policy decisions, geopolitical actions) even if they have practically not adopted forecasting widely. Better forecasts can prevent worse counterfactual worlds, e.g. by preventing planning mistakes leading to rapid inflation, encouraging better resilience planning, etc.
The claim that 'F...
Fair critique for many markets, but weather forecasting on Kalshi actually has tangible verification via NWS monitor data. I use Kumo (joinkumo.co/weather-analytics) to check multiple forecasts before betting. It provides real, measurable accuracy metrics not just vague "epistemics.
Summary
EA and rationalists got enamoured with forecasting and prediction markets and made them part of the culture, but this hasn’t proven very useful, yet it continues to receive substantial EA funding. We should cut it off.
My Experience with Forecasting
For a while, I was the number one forecaster on Manifold. This lasted for about a year until I stopped just over 2 years ago. To this day, despite quitting, I’m still #8 on the platform. Additionally, I have done well on real-money prediction markets (Polymarket), earning mid-5 figures and winning a few AI bets. I say this to suggest that I would gain status from forecasting being seen as useful, but I think, to the contrary, that the EA community should stop funding it.
I’ve written a few comments throughout the years that I didn’t think forecasting was worth funding. You can see some of these here and here. Finally, I have gotten around to making this full post.
Solution Seeking a Problem
When talking about forecasting, people often ask questions like “How can we leverage forecasting into better decisions?” This is the wrong way to go about solving problems. You solve problems by starting with the problem, and then you see which tools are useful for solving it.
The way people talk about forecasting is very similar to how people talk about cryptocurrency/blockchain. People have a tool they want to use, whether that be cryptocurrency or forecasting, and then try to solve problems with it because they really believe in the solution, but I think this is misguided. You have to start with the problem you are trying to solve, not the solution you want to apply. A lot of work has been put into building up forecasting, making platforms, hosting tournaments, etc., on the assumption that it was instrumentally useful, but this is pretty dangerous to continue without concrete gains.
We’ve Funded Enough Forecasting that We Should See Tangible Gains
It’s not the case that forecasting/prediction markets are merely in their infancy. A lot of money has gone into forecasting. On the EA side of things, it’s near $100M. If I convince you later on in this post that forecasting hasn’t given any fruitful results, it should be noted that this isn’t for lack of trying/spending.
The Forecasting Research Institute received grants in the 10s of millions of dollars. Metaculus continues to receive millions of dollars per year to maintain a forecasting platform and conduct some forecasting tournaments. The Good Judgment Project and the Swift Centre have received millions of dollars for doing research and studies on forecasting and teaching others about forecasting. Sage has received millions of dollars to develop forecasting tools. Many others, like Manifold, have also been given millions by the EA community in grants/investments at high valuations, diverting money away from other EA causes. We have grants for organizations that develop tooling, even entire programming languages like Squiggle, for forecasting.
On the for-profit side of things, the money gets even bigger. Kalshi and Polymarket have each raised billions of dollars, and other forecasting platforms have also raised 10s of millions of dollars.
Prediction markets have also taken off. Kalshi and Polymarket are both showing ATH/growth in month-over-month volume. Both of them have monthly volumes in the 10s of billions of dollars. Total prediction market volume is something like $500B/year, but it just isn’t very useful. We get to know the odds on every basketball game player prop, and if BTC is going to go up or down in the next 5 minutes. While some people suggest that these trivial markets help sharpen skills or identify good forecasters, I don’t think there is any evidence of this, and it is more wishful thinking.
If forecasting were really working well and was very useful, you would see the bulk of the money spent not on forecasting platforms but directly on forecasting teams or subsidizing markets on important questions. We have seen very little of this, and instead, we have seen the money go to platforms, tooling, and the like. We already had a few forecasting platforms, the market was going to fund them itself, and yet we continue to create them.
There has also been an incredible amount of (wasted) time by the EA/rationality community that has been spent on forecasting. Lots of people have been employed full-time doing forecasting or adjacent work, but perhaps even larger is the amount of part-time hours that have gone into forecasting on Manifold, among other things. I would estimate that thousands of person-years have gone into this activity.
Hits-based Giving Means Stopping the Bets that Don’t Pay Off
You may be tempted to justify forecasting on the grounds of hits-based giving. That is to say, it made sense to try a few grants into forecasting because the payoff could have been massive. But if it was based on hits-based giving, then that implies we should be looking for big payoffs, and that we have to stop funding it if it doesn’t.
I want to propose my leading theory for why forecasting continues to receive 10s of millions per year in funding. That is, it has become a feature of EA/rationalist culture. Similar to how EAs seem to live in group houses or be polyamorous, forecasting on prediction markets has become a part of the culture that doesn’t have much to do with impact. This is separate from parts of EA culture that we do for impact/value alignment reasons, like being vegan, donating 10%+ of income, writing on forums, or going to conferences. I submit that forecasting is in the former category.
At this point, if forecasting were useful, you would expect to see tangible results. I can point to you hundreds of millions of chickens that lay eggs that are out of cages, and I can point to you observable families that are no longer living in poverty. I can show you pieces of legislation that have passed or almost passed on AI. I can show you AMF successes with about 200k lives saved and far lower levels of malaria, not to mention higher incomes and longer life expectancies, and people living longer lives that otherwise wouldn’t be because of our actions. I can go at the individual level, and I can, more importantly, go at the broad statistical level. I don’t think there is very much in the way of “this forecasting happened, and now we have made demonstrably better decisions regarding this terminal goal that we care about”. Despite no tangible results, people continue to have the dream that forecasting will inform better decision-making or lead to better policies. I just don’t see any proof of this happening.
Feels Useful When It Isn’t
Forecasting is a very insidious trap because it makes you think you are being productive when you aren’t. I like to play bughouse and a bunch of different board games. But when I play these games, I don’t claim to do so for impact reasons, on effective altruist grounds. If I spend time learning strategy for these board games, I don’t pretend that this is somehow making the world better off. Forecasting is a dangerous activity, particularly because it is a fun, game-like activity that is nearly perfectly designed to be very attractive to EA/rationalist types because you get to be right when others are wrong, bet on your beliefs, and partake in the cultural practice. It is almost engineered to be a time waster for these groups because it provides the illusion that you are improving the world’s epistemics when, in reality, it’s mainly just a game, and it’s fun. You get to feel that you are improving the world’s epistemics and that therefore there must be some flow-through effects and thus you can justify the time spent by correcting a market from 57% to 53% on some AI forecasting question or some question about if the market you are trading on will have an even/odd number of traders or if someone will get a girlfriend by the end of the year.
Conclusion
A lot of people still like the idea of doing forecasting. If it becomes an optional, benign activity of the EA community, then it can continue to exist, but it should not continue to be a major target for philanthropic dollars. We are always in triage, and forecasting just isn’t making the cut. I’m worried that we will continue to pour community resources into forecasting, and it will continue to be thought of in vague terms as improving or informing decisions, when I’m skeptical that this is the case.